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Abstract 
 
 
This doctoral thesis examines filmmaker Stanley Kubrick’s role as a producer and the 
impact of the industrial contexts upon the role and his independent production 
companies. The thesis represents a significant intervention into the understanding of the 
much-misunderstood role of the producer by exploring how business, management, 
working relationships and financial contexts influenced Kubrick’s methods as a 
producer. The thesis also shows how Kubrick contributed to the transformation of 
industrial practices and the role of the producer in Hollywood, particularly in areas of 
legal authority, promotion and publicity, and distribution. The thesis also assesses the 
influence and impact of Kubrick’s methods of producing and the structure of his 
production companies in the shaping of his own reputation and brand of cinema. 
The thesis takes a case study approach across four distinct phases of Kubrick’s 
career. The first is Kubrick’s early years as an independent filmmaker, in which he 
made two privately funded feature films (1951-1955). The second will be an exploration 
of the Harris-Kubrick Pictures Corporation and its affiliation with Kirk Douglas’ Bryna 
Productions (1956-1962). Thirdly, the research will examine Kubrick’s formation of 
Hawk Films and Polaris Productions in the 1960s (1962-1968), with a deep focus on the 
latter and the vital role of vice-president of the company. Finally, the research will 
move to examine the Jan Harlan years (1975-1999), a period in which Kubrick’s 
production rate slowed markedly. 
The thesis utilises the methodological framework of the New Film History and 
draws heavily on archival material. It also develops the historiography of Kubrick, the 
American film industry, and the role of the producer, with significant critical 
engagement with the work of Peter Krämer, Robert Sklar, and Andrew Spicer.  
Asking what Kubrick’s role was as a producer allows for a fuller understanding of the 
way in which he obtained control of his productions, as well as the industrial limitations 
and constraints in which he produced (or failed to produce) his films.
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Introduction 
 
 
Following his time spent as director on the historical epic Spartacus (1960), Stanley 
Kubrick (1928-1999) tried to put as much distance as possible between him and the 
film, seeing it as decidedly un-Kubrickian. Speaking over a decade later, Kubrick said 
that the key lesson he took from the production was the need for what he called legal 
authority: ‘If you don’t have legal authority, you don’t have any authority at all’ 
(Zimmerman 1972: 32). The legal authority on Spartacus resided with its producers, the 
all-powerful Hollywood actor-producer Kirk Douglas (who also played the eponymous 
tragic-hero), and the Bryna Productions producer, Edward Lewis, with Kubrick being a 
director-for-hire after the firing of Anthony Mann just two weeks into the shoot. To 
ensure Kubrick kept in line, the film’s financial backer, Universal, assigned an assistant 
director, Marshall Green, to keep a watchful eye over Kubrick and to make certain he 
kept to schedule (LoBrutto 1997: 181). Universal and the film’s producers were making 
it clear that Kubrick had no legal authority. By 1961, Kubrick was sitting with his 
lawyer, Louis C. Blau, and Kirk Douglas negotiating his way out of his contract with 
Douglas’s Bryna Productions (193), with the intent of continuing his ‘ongoing quest for 
ever greater control’ (229) – to be his own producer. 
And being his own producer Kubrick was, from 1963 onwards with the 
dissolving of the Harris-Kubrick Pictures Corporation (HKPC), a nearly seven-year 
long partnership with producer James B. Harris that had taken Kubrick into the heart of 
Hollywood and eventually across to the United Kingdom. Kubrick took the credit of 
producer for each of his subsequent films from Dr. Strangelove or: How I Learned to 
Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb (1964) through to Eyes Wide Shut (1999). However, 
the producer’s role on a Kubrick production is somewhat more complex than a cursory 
glance at the credits suggests. Though Kubrick always received a producer credit 
between 1964 and 1999, throughout his career he was either supervised or assisted by a 
variety of executive producers (most prominently Jan Harlan for over thirty years from 
the 1970s onwards), co-producers, and associate producers (see figure 1). 
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Film Producers Co Producers Associate 
Producers 
Executive 
Producers 
Day of the Fight (1951) Burton 
Benjamin 
Stanley Kubrick 
   
Flying Padre (1951) Burton 
Benjamin 
   
The Seafarers (1953) Lester Cooper    
Fear and Desire (1953) Stanley Kubrick  Martin Perveler  
Killer’s Kiss (1955) Stanley Kubrick 
Morris Bousel 
   
The Killing (1956) James B. Harris    
Paths of Glory (1957) James B. Harris    
Spartacus (1960) Edward Lewis   Kirk Douglas 
Lolita (1962) James B. Harris   Eliot Hyman 
Dr. Strangelove (1964) Stanley Kubrick  Victor Lyndon  
2001: A Space Odyssey (1968) Stanley Kubrick  Victor Lyndon  
A Clockwork Orange (1971) Stanley Kubrick  Bernard Williams Si Litvinoff 
Max L. Raab 
Barry Lyndon (1975) Stanley Kubrick  Bernard Williams Jan Harlan 
The Shining (1980) Stanley Kubrick  Mary Lea 
Johnson 
Robert Fryer 
Martin Richards 
Jan Harlan 
Full Metal Jacket (1987) Stanley Kubrick Philip Hobbs Michael Herr Jan Harlan 
Eyes Wide Shut (1999) Stanley Kubrick Brian W. 
Cook 
 Jan Harlan 
   Figure 1: List of credited producers on films that Stanley Kubrick directed 1951-1999 
 
Some of these individuals merely received a credit due to their association with the 
literary property that was being adapted, as was the case on both A Clockwork Orange 
and The Shining. Both these films list executive producers and associate producers who 
were the prior owners of the property and in return for their selling the titles they 
received these producing credits.   
 This thesis considers how the role of the producer changed throughout the 
course of Kubrick’s career and asks what Kubrick’s role was as a producer on his films. 
In addition, it will seek to understand in what way he impacted or changed the role more 
generally. These central research questions will situate the producing role, and 
Kubrick’s films, within the wider industrial contexts of the American film industry from 
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the 1950s through to the 1990s. The research will adopt a case study methodology and 
look at four distinct phases in Kubrick’s career: his early years as a guerrilla 
independent producer (approximately 1951-1955); the Harris-Kubrick Pictures 
Corporation years (approximately 1955-1963); the Polaris Production years 
(approximately 1962-1968); and the Jan Harlan years (approximately 1968-1999). 
These case studies will consider the role of the producer during these time periods as 
well as the production companies Kubrick either owned or worked for. 
 
Thesis Context 
This study was born out of a Master’s degree research project that explored the specifics 
of the aesthetic that has come to be labelled Kubrickian. My own Stanley Kubrick 
fandom, along with a continuing appreciation for his films, influenced that project like 
this one. At the same time, I grew frustrated while undertaking the Master’s dissertation 
at the seemingly narrow academic understanding of who Stanley Kubrick was as a 
producer and his role within the film industry. It was apparent that scholarly attention 
had long been fixated on the textual and formal analysis of his thirteen features. 
Readings of his films were becoming ever more microscopic and speculative, 
attempting to derive the finesse of Kubrick’s hand in every frame – nay, every object 
within a frame of his film. Some of the academic theories were becoming just as 
outlandish as those posited by his fans of a more conspiratorial persuasion. See, for 
instance, Geoffrey Cocks’s The Wolf at the Door (2007), a compelling study that at 
times sees recourse to an imaginative interpretation of the Holocaust subtexts in 
Kubrick’s work. This is particularly the case with Cocks’s reading of a scene in Eyes 
Wide Shut: ‘Cruise falls against [a] blue Mercedes-Benz. The choice of car against 
which Cruise stumbles […] is anything but an idle one […] It is images such as these in 
the cinema of Stanley Kubrick […] that confirm a preoccupation with the Holocaust’ 
(1-2). 
The work of scholars like Cocks is not without merit. The way he situates 
Kubrick’s films within the context of twentieth century history speaks to the director’s 
persistent intellectual and aesthetic concerns. But what it fails to recognise are the wider 
industrial conditions in which Kubrick operated. Not only was Kubrick a film director 
(artist), but also a producer (businessman). Kubrick Studies is now moving away from 
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the auteurist constraints of old, toward new perspectives, to coin the title of the recently 
published edited collection Stanley Kubrick New Perspectives (Ljujić, Krämer and 
Daniels 2015), which utilises the Stanley Kubrick Archive donated to the University of 
the Arts London. These new perspectives aim to understand the production contexts of 
Kubrick’s films, the cultural and industrial constraints within which they were created, 
and to understand the collaborative nature of their making. But still many of these 
studies remain limited to understanding Kubrick as a director. If, as Andrew Spicer 
(2004) has claimed, the role of the producer in film studies has been neglected, then 
Stanley Kubrick’s role as a producer has been absolutely forgotten by film historians. 
The old Kubrick Studies, with its traditional textual and formal analysis of the content 
of Kubrick’s films, typically fails to situate Kubrick’s career within an industry that was 
in constant flux throughout his career, stretching as it did across the tumultuous decades 
of the 1950s through to the 1990s and witness to tremendous change and upheaval in 
the American and British film industries. 
 Leading the vanguard in the burgeoning area of Producer Studies is Andrew 
Spicer, who sets out the importance of understanding the role of the producer, which 
allows us ‘not simply a business history of film, but a cultural history of creativity in an 
industrial/commercial context’ with the film industry being situated ‘within a wider 
framework of entrepreneurial activity’ (Spicer 2010: 23). By analysing Kubrick’s role 
as a producer, and the production companies he operated, we can begin to uncover the 
modes of production and the constraints being imposed by the industrial and production 
contexts of an industry in perpetual flux. It also lends consideration to how Kubrick was 
able to amass absolute control of the business and creative functions of his films by the 
1970s. 
Kubrick’s role as a supposed maniacal, all-controlling director is well 
chronicled, to the point of becoming mythologized. The stories of countless re-takes are 
legendary. The way that Kubrick ‘terrorised’ actors is best demonstrated by the way he 
treats Shelley Duvall on the set of The Shining (1980). Kubrick’s behaviour towards 
Duvall is glimpsed in the behind-the-scenes documentary Making the Shining (1980). In 
it we repeatedly see Kubrick shout at Duvall for missing her cues. In fact, this 
documentary plays a central role in the cultification of Kubrick-the-director, with both 
the director’s work and his image becoming ‘cultish forms of consumption and 
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appreciation’ (Egan 2015: 8). The documentary has contributed to Kubrick’s status as a 
cult-auteur, with the film acting as a paratext that Kubrick fans have come to view as an 
‘intimate home movie of Kubrick at work’ (Church 2006: 10).  
The status of Kubrick as a cult-auteur figure hardened into orthodoxy in part 
also due to the lengthening gaps between his films and his ‘withdrawal’ from public 
life, which gained him the label of recluse and hermit (McAvoy 2015: 282). This 
orthodoxy, which has also come to dominate within academia and the wider cultural 
sphere, is detrimental and narrows our full understanding of the contexts of production 
on a Stanley Kubrick film. In fact, the auteur ideology is so strongly linked with 
Kubrick as to have developed into a cult of personality, as David Church argues, saying 
that with Kubrick ‘there are clear parallels between the phenomenon of cult movie 
celebration and the “cult of personality” surrounding his role as auteur. The “cult of 
personality” formed by auteurism builds legends around filmmakers’ (2006). This is not 
to suggest this thesis is somehow anti-auteur. On the contrary, it is very much an auteur 
focused piece of research, but it aims to debunk the cult of personality that the auteur 
theory brings with it and has especially attached itself to Kubrick. By focusing on the 
role of the producer, it aims to take a far more realistic and pragmatic approach to 
understanding Kubrick as a filmmaker working within a profit-orientated industry. Far 
from being a hermit, Kubrick had to interact with a range of businessmen, studio 
executives, producers, screenwriters, technicians, bureaucrats, administrators, and union 
bodies in order to realise his films. Kubrick was also constantly subject to complex 
contracts with studios and financiers throughout his career, even beyond his death when 
a Kubrick production was still contractually obliged to deliver an R-rated film in the 
form of Eyes Wide Shut (Harlan 2005: 513). These contracts are a key primary source to 
this thesis. 
It is only now, nearly two decades after his death in March 1999 and with the 
donation of his personal archive to the University of the Arts London in 2007, that we 
can start to uncover the modes of production and working practices involved on his 
productions. This will potentially lead to the ‘image of Kubrick as a “reclusive” 
“control freak” and a “tyrant” [being] challenged when considering the evidence’ 
(McAvoy 2015: 282). The archival sources that are now available to Kubrick scholars 
need to be used to illuminate new perspectives on his work and working methods. In the 
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case of this thesis, this means his forgotten role as a producer and the roles of the 
producers that worked with him. But before looking to the historical contexts of the 
producer and any attempt at defining the role, it is important to first provide a brief 
biographical contextualisation of Kubrick’s career. 
 
Biographical Context 
The most comprehensive biographical account of Stanley Kubrick is Vincent 
LoBrutto’s Stanley Kubrick (1997). LoBrutto’s biography is useful in beginning to 
understand Kubrick’s working methods as a filmmaker. Still, many gaps exist in the 
narrative that LoBrutto constructs of Kubrick’s life and work, particularly with regards 
to the specifics of his role as a producer. Its primary utilisation for this thesis is as a 
reference guide to Kubrick’s career progress, though there are many areas in which this 
research intervenes and revises LoBrutto’s account, especially around areas of contract 
negotiations and how Kubrick substantially impacted on the development of the 
producer’s role within the industry between the 1950s and 1970s. A number of other 
published resources are also available (John Baxter (1998) for instance) but they are 
limited in their scope and take a much more anecdotal (and salacious, in the case of 
Baxter) approach. 
Kubrick was born on 26 July 1928 in New York City and was raised in the 
borough of the Bronx (Parkinson 2004). His parents, Jack Kubrick and Gertrude 
Kubrick née Perveler, were both the children of Jewish immigrants. They raised Stanley 
and his sister, Barbara, born in 1934, in an unassuming apartment block on the Bronx’s 
Clinton Avenue, part of the fairly affluent 15th congressional district (Kubrick 2002: 
24). Kubrick displayed very little academic ability and spurned his parents’ attempts to 
steer him towards a career in medicine (31). Instead, Kubrick became fascinated with 
photography from a young age after his father gifted him a camera (Mather 2013: 15-
16). His self-taught abilities soon found him being recruited to work for Look magazine. 
Philippe Mather has provided an in-depth account of this period in his Stanley Kubrick 
at Look Magazine (2013), which takes a psychosocial approach to understand the 
formative impact Kubrick’s time working for Look had on his later career, as well as the 
influence of contemporaries such as Arthur ‘Weegee’ Felig and Diane Arbus (15). 
LoBrutto has said that Kubrick was fascinated by the crime photographs of Weegee, 
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describing the photographer’s grotesque style as that of a social caricaturist (1997: 12). 
By the late 1940s, Kubrick was living in New York’s Greenwich Village, earning a 
living by playing chess in Washington Square Park (78). Similar to the impact of Look 
on his career, Nathan Abrams in his own psychosocial history of Kubrick suggests that 
residing in Greenwich Village saw him living ‘contemporaneously with that generation 
of writers, poets, essayists and literary critics who came to be known as the New York 
Intellectual “family”’ (2015a: 64).  
 It was also an important period in his life in which he became deeply acquainted 
with European art house cinema (Cocks 2004: 50-51). Kubrick, as James Naremore 
describes, nourished his cinephilia with ‘regular attendance at New York art theatres 
and the Museum of Modern Art’ (2007: 12). It was here that he learned the ‘technique’ 
of cinema, particularly around editing and montage, backed up with reading Pudovkin’s 
Film Technique (1929) (Walker 1972: 15). He was very much enamoured with the films 
of Fritz Lang, Sergei Eisenstein and, most of all, Max Ophuls (Cocks 2004: 54-57). 
Kubrick was ambitious and longed to make a feature film (Phillips 2016: 22). He 
applied his knowledge of photography and what he learnt from attending the cinema to 
make his first short film, Day of the Fight (1951), a documentary for RKO that followed 
boxer Walter Cartier in the build up to a boxing match. The production saw Kubrick 
perform virtually all of the crew roles, ‘from writing and shooting the film to dubbing in 
the punches and the slams of car doors on the soundtrack’ (Phillips 2016: 22-23). He 
was even talked through the technical aspects of how to shoot a film by an employee at 
the camera rental store (23).  Kubrick’s significance in the development of American 
independent cinema is often overlooked in wider film historiography, despite, as 
Naremore argues, that ‘Kubrick can legitimately claim the distinction of being the first 
American director of an entirely independent art film in the post-World War II era’ 
(2007: 12). Kubrick’s role as an independent filmmaker, producing films in an almost 
guerrilla style, is the first major intervention this thesis makes. 
Fear and Desire (1953), a feature-length war picture produced by Kubrick under 
the auspices of the nepotistic sounding production company ‘Kubrick Family’, was 
made with finances provided by the film’s associate producer, Martin Perveler (Phillips 
and Hill 2002: 287-288). It was a film Kubrick would go to great lengths to distance 
himself from in later years due to its dubious aesthetic quality. Because of its guerrilla 
 15 
filmmaking circumstances, Kubrick was forced to take on many of the major roles, 
including director, cinematographer and editor. In addition, Kubrick directed two other 
short films, The Flying Padre (1951) and The Seafarers (1953), during this period. But 
with Fear and Desire he had become one of the pioneers of modern independent 
filmmaking and would have to work under similar low-budget conditions on his next 
feature, Killer’s Kiss (1955). 
 Around this time, Kubrick formed his first serious business venture, the 
production company Harris-Kubrick Pictures Corporation, in partnership with the 
wealthy television distributor James B. Harris, who invested large amounts of his own 
fortune into the company. HKPC had a number of projects in development at any one 
time, by which means they could try to ensure that one of them received financing 
‘from a major studio or one of the big independent production companies’ (Krämer 
2015a: 54). The exact organisational structure of HKPC has not been explored in 
current literature, with little indication of whether the partnership saw a complete 
separation of business and creative functions. Harris has said in interviews that he 
believed Kubrick needed someone to deal with ‘practical problems, everything from 
financing to distribution so that Kubrick could be left in peace to create’ (Krämer 
2015a: 54). But the company was an equal partnership and this thesis makes another 
intervention into the historiography on Kubrick with a case study of HKPC, its 
managerial organisation, and the working relationship between Harris and Kubrick. 
The duo’s eventual first project made together was the heist crime drama The 
Killing (1956), adapted from Lionel White’s Clean Break (1955) and renamed 
presumably to give it more commercial potential. Harris was the film’s producer and 
Alexander Singer was given an associate producer credit for his part in bringing the pair 
together. HKPC next worked on an adaptation of Humphrey Cobb’s Paths of Glory 
(1937) (between other unrealised projects) with the agent, Ronnie Lubin, sending the 
script to Kirk Douglas (LoBrutto 1997: 133-34). It was at this point that the company 
signed a deal with Douglas’s Bryna Productions in order to get Douglas to star in Paths 
of Glory (1957). The producing credits for Paths of Glory betrayed the political tension 
between Douglas, Harris and Kubrick; Harris received the sole producing credit, while 
Douglas’s Bryna Productions was credited as the production company. This thesis 
illuminates and provides new original perspectives on this period of collaboration 
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between HKPC and Bryna, drawing on under utilised archival material from the Kirk 
Douglas Papers at the Wisconsin Historical Society. 
The collaboration never resulted in any further productions between HKPC and 
Bryna, but it did see the loaning out of Kubrick to direct Spartacus. The film saw 
Kubrick deprived of artistic control, but ‘Harris and Kubrick decided that Kubrick’s 
involvement on Spartacus would be beneficial for their production company’ (LoBrutto 
1997: 174). As the duo aimed to establish themselves within Hollywood, reputation was 
everything and therefore there was more to gain than to lose from Kubrick directing one 
of the most expensive pictures ever produced by Universal. But the experience was 
frustrating for Kubrick and it taught him the valuable lesson that he should retain 
producing power on all of his future films. The contract between Bryna Productions and 
HKPC was soon brought to an end, with the company released from the commitment to 
Douglas on 15 December 1961 (LoBrutto 1997: 193). 
In the intervening years since Paths of Glory, Harris had been striving to obtain 
an option on Vladimir Nabokov’s Lolita (1955) and had negotiated a two-year option 
with Nabokov’s agent, including the agreement that Nabokov would write the 
screenplay (Parkinson 2004). To secure the money for the deal, HKPC sold the rights to 
their first feature, The Killing, to United Artists. HKPC approached numerous studios to 
finance Lolita (1962), very nearly striking a deal with Warner Bros.; that is until they 
saw the contracts drawn up for them (Anon. 1959h: 17). Kubrick was adamant that he 
would not repeat the mistakes of the contract with Bryna. He wanted absolute control 
over his productions, but the contract with Warner Bros. granted the studio final 
approval on most areas of Lolita and such handing over of power was not acceptable to 
Kubrick’s methods as a filmmaker (17). Harris was subsequently able to strike a deal 
with Seven Arts to finance Lolita with the intention of producing it in a country where 
production costs could be reduced (Corliss 1994: 52). The film was made in the UK in 
order to qualify for the so-called Eady Levy, a government subsidy paid out by the 
British Film Fund Agency (Fenwick 2017a: 191-199). This was the beginning of 
Kubrick’s eventual permanent relocation to the country, with the rest of his pictures 
from then on being produced in the United Kingdom. It was also the last film made by 
HKPC. Even though trade press adverts in 1963 initially advertised Harris as being the 
producer of Dr. Strangelove, HKPC was amicably dissolved in 1963. 
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Kubrick became his own producer for the remainder of his career. He also 
incorporated two significant production companies at this time, Polaris Productions and 
Hawk Films. This thesis provides the first comprehensive exploration of Polaris, a 
company that was central to Kubrick’s struggle for producing power in the 1960s. But 
though Kubrick received the producing credit for Dr. Strangelove, he hired an associate 
producer, Victor Lyndon, a partnership that would see out the 1960s. Kubrick would in 
effect have a deputy producer on all of his features, a role that was eventually taken up 
by Jan Harlan, who would receive executive producer credits from Barry Lyndon 
through to Eyes Wide Shut. These deputies took care of what Harlan has described as 
being the administrative aspect of the producer on a Kubrick production: ‘my job was to 
make deals, to negotiate, to get permissions, to hire people, to do what was wanted’ 
(Appendix II). 
 The same producing line-up of Kubrick, Lyndon, Hawk Films and Polaris 
Productions remained in place on 2001: A Space Odyssey (1968), with the film financed 
and distributed by Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer. 2001 was loosely adapted from Arthur C. 
Clarke’s The Sentinel (1951) and Expedition to Earth (1953).1 Loosely because, as I.Q. 
Hunter states, the film ‘is not an adaptation. The end credits on screen simply read, 
‘Based on a screenplay by Stanley Kubrick and Arthur C. Clarke’, and no other source 
text is mentioned’ (2013: 43). Clarke wrote a novel in parallel to the production of the 
film, but was prevented from publishing until the film was released – an unusual move 
given the potential to presell the film through sales of the novel. Still, Kubrick received 
a percentage of all sequel novels and film rights to 2001: A Space Odyssey (LoBrutto 
263-264). This latter point would cause legal consternation in ensuing years, with 
producer Julia Phillips being denied (initially) the rights to produce the film’s sequel, 
2010 (1984), based on Clarke’s 2010: Odyssey Two (Anon. 1982a: 3). 
The making of 2001: A Space Odyssey, from pre-production through to 
distribution, offers numerous research avenues into Kubrick’s workings as a producer. 
LoBrutto reveals some of the aspects of Kubrick’s managerial style, with Kubrick 
working out of ‘mission control’, where he ‘sat behind his desk at command central 
signing letters and making countless phone calls while approving and rejecting choices 
                                                        
1 Later renamed Encounter in the Dawn. 
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of costumes, props, and spacecraft and slavishly examining endless production details’ 
(1997: 283). This isn’t so much the image of a director sitting on a folding chair with a 
megaphone, but more of a high-level bureaucrat. Kubrick’s mission control was a room 
were he could monitor the production at all times and allowed him ‘to rearrange 
scheduling, equipment, staff, the script, data, and shooting days to suit the growing 
artistic demands of the film. Punch cards and every filing system then available was 
used to track the twenty-four-hour-a-day production schedule’ (281). Intriguingly, 
Victor Lyndon revealed in an interview with LoBrutto that Kubrick delegated power, 
‘but only on the non-creative side of the film and even then he checks and double 
checks. The creative side is entirely in his hands’ (240). As Chapter Four of this thesis 
demonstrates, Kubrick was a micromanager, to the point of frustrating his own 
production process. 
From 1970 onwards, Kubrick commenced a partnership with Warner Bros. that 
would last to the end of his career. The exact arrangements of the relationship between 
Kubrick and Warner Bros. are ambiguous, though archival documents reveal the extent 
to which they allowed Kubrick absolute freedom and control of his projects, both in 
terms of producing and directing (see Chapter Five). Kubrick turned to an adaptation of 
Anthony Burgess’s A Clockwork Orange (1962) for his next project. The film was a 
huge box office success, just like 2001. Reflecting his critical and commercial success, 
Kubrick received offers to direct The Exorcist (1973) and an adaptation of Albert 
Speer’s Inside the Third Reich (1969) (LoBrutto 1997: 452), but Kubrick declined, 
revisiting the possibility of making Napoleon, a project on the life of the French 
Emperor that had long obsessed him (Parkinson 2004). But lack of financial support for 
the project saw Kubrick instead turn to an adaptation of an obscure William Makepeace 
Thackeray novel, Barry Lyndon (1844). The production of Barry Lyndon was shrouded 
in secrecy, with even Warner Bros. executives being kept in the dark (LoBrutto 1997: 
385). Kubrick seemed to have the unequivocal trust of Warner Bros. who only saw the 
final film several weeks before it was distributed and, apparently, ‘no publicity was 
released by the studio without his [Kubrick’s] explicit permission’ (405). The film was 
the first to be executive produced by Jan Harlan, with Kubrick as producer, and Bernard 
Williams credited as associate producer. Its release came several months after Jaws 
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(1975) and, as Maria Pramaggiore has noted, seemed out of time with box office trends, 
leading to a somewhat mediocre reception (2015: 15-17). 
The majority of Kubrick’s time between his productions from the 1960s 
onwards was spent ‘researching, reading, screening material, and pulling out all stops to 
find the initial point that would culminate in his next project’ (LoBrutto 1997: 456). To 
that end, Kubrick incorporated Empyrean Films, a reading company that hired a team of 
readers to write reports on novels and was Kubrick’s means of finding new projects. But 
despite the setting up of Empyrean, Kubrick selected a bestselling Stephen King horror 
novel to adapt for his next feature, The Shining. Again, just like Barry Lyndon, the film 
received a mixed reception, but fared much better at the box office. In subsequent years 
the film has garnered cult status and is now ‘celebrated, not only as one of the greatest 
horror movies ever made, but a contemporary classic in its own right’ (Mee 2017: 81). 
Kubrick may not have chosen a Stephen King novel in the hope of wider commercial 
appeal; the book, after all, had not been released when Kubrick decided to adapt it. 
Instead, he had been given a galley to read by Warner Bros.’s John Calley (Ulivieri 
2017). But it was certainly marketed as a horror blockbuster, with a ‘saturation 
advertising campaign’ (Luckhurst 2013: 7). Yet it did not turn out to be quite the 
blockbuster success Warner Bros. was hoping for, taking over a year ‘to break even on 
its $18m production budget plus the costly advertising campaign’ (Mee 2017: 84). 
There was a seven-year hiatus between The Shining and Kubrick’s next feature, 
Full Metal Jacket (1987), once more returning to the war genre. The gestation for Full 
Metal Jacket began in the spring of 1980 when Kubrick first approached Michael Herr 
(who would be given a credit of associate producer alongside screenwriter), but it 
wasn’t until 1985 that Herr was formally invited to write the screenplay, after Kubrick 
had written a treatment of Gustav Hasford’s novel, The Short-Timers (1979) (Phillips 
and Hill 2002: 156-157). Compared to The Shining, Full Metal Jacket was a 
phenomenal success. The film ‘cost $17million and grossed $38million in the first fifty 
days of release’ (LoBrutto 1997: 489). This was despite the fact that the film was 
markedly different in tone and narrative from other Vietnam War films, reflecting 
Kubrick’s ability to balance art and commerce. As Pratap Rughani points out, Kubrick’s 
ambition was ‘to make mainstream audiences question and even contest the very 
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process of story-telling from what generals and film directors like to call the “theatre of 
war”’ (2015: 310). 
The time between Full Metal Jacket and Kubrick’s last film, Eyes Wide Shut, 
was the longest of all in his career at twelve years. During that time a number of 
projects were announced, but never realised, including A.I. (later directed by Steven 
Spielberg as A.I. Artificial Intelligence (2001)) and Aryan Papers. Eyes Wide Shut was 
the longest shoot not only of Kubrick’s career, but also in cinematic history, lasting 
from November 1996 and ending in February 1998 (Webster 2011: 141). Kubrick died 
before the film was released, with Jan Harlan, Leon Vitalli, and Anthony Frewin among 
those handed control of the project by Warner Bros. to see it through to completion and 
to oversee the necessary changes to ensure the film received an R-rating in the USA 
(Harlan 2005: 513). The film featured Tom Cruise and Nicole Kidman in the lead roles 
as a married couple, reflecting their real-life statu. This generated enormous media 
interest in the project, particularly given its marketing campaign that ‘emphasised the 
film’s explicit representation of sex’ (Scholes and Martin 2015: 344). This was in 
contrast to the film’s slow and methodical pacing, leading it to become one of Kubrick’s 
most misunderstood films at the time. Its stature has grown, however, particularly 
among academics, with the film acting as a summation of Kubrick’s entire career. Case 
in point, the film was included as one of the twentieth century’s fifty canonical works of 
cinema, alongside films such as Metropolis (1927), The Seven Samurai (1954), Psycho 
(1960), and Chungking Express (1994), in Graham Roberts and Heather Wallis’s Key 
Film Texts (2002: 246-250). 
This brief career overview provides the biographical context to this thesis and 
outlines Kubrick’s key achievements. Following his death in 1999, and with the 
opening of the Stanley Kubrick Archive in 2007, the standing of Kubrick within 
academic discourse and film history has only grown, to see him valorised alongside 
other key filmmaking figures such as Orson Welles and Alfred Hitchcock. Indeed, his 
reputation and the fandom this generates has led to a number of exhibitions, including 
the official travelling exhibition, becoming significant successes (Fenwick 2017b), 
while DVD re-releases continue apace (Jeffries 2017). The fact that such acclaim and 
status rests on only thirteen feature films is perhaps proof of the continuing strength of 
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the Kubrick ‘brand’ he had established during his nearly half a century as an 
independent producer. 
 
Literature Review 
There has been ample academic study of Stanley Kubrick but, as the following review 
of Kubrick Studies literature will show, this has largely been within the contexts of 
textual interpretation of the formal elements of his films, or from a range of purely 
theoretical fields such as philosophy and psychoanalysis. This culminated with a 
tranche of edited collections immediately after his death that brought together these 
diverse interpretative theories, including Stuart McDougal’s A Clockwork Orange 
(2003), Robert Kolker’s Stanley Kubrick’s 2001: A Space Odyssey (2006), Geoffrey 
Cocks, James Diedrick, and Glenn Perusek’s Depth of Field: Stanley Kubrick, Film, 
and the Uses of History (2006), Jerold J. Abrams’s The Philosophy of Stanley Kubrick 
(2007), and Gary D. Rhodes’ Stanley Kubrick: Essays on His Films and Legacy (2008). 
These collections demonstrate the ways in which such strictly formalist approaches are 
detrimental to a fuller understanding of the cultural and industrial contexts of Kubrick’s 
productions, as well as their collaborative nature. Abrams’ introduction to his collection 
perhaps indicates the limited scope such perspectives take, saying that Kubrick’s 
filmography ‘takes all the differentiated sides of reality and unifies them into one rich, 
complex philosophical vision’ (2007: 1), while Rhodes suggests that his collection 
offers an analysis of the narratives, genres and themes of Kubrick’s films (2008: 2). But 
both these works neglect to situate or understand Kubrick’s work within the wider 
industrial, economic, and societal contexts of the American film industry in which he 
operated. This critical review of Kubrick historiography reveals the gaps that this thesis 
will address in regards to the role of the producer on Kubrick’s films. This will be 
followed by a review of the burgeoning field of Producer Studies in order to understand 
the key research questions that have emerged in recent years and the ways in which 
Kubrick as producer can be studied. 
 
Kubrick Studies 
Academia has come to regard Kubrick as the ultimate auteur given the apparent 
absolute control he had over his films and that this allowed him to remain an 
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independent within the mainstream across five decades. Studies have largely remained 
focused on Kubrick as a director, analysing the artistry of his films and trying to decode 
their meaning. Such orthodoxy in part can be seen to stem from the rise of the auteur 
theory in Film Studies in the 1960s, and from Alexander Walker’s Kubrick Directs 
(1972), the first attempt to comprehensively analyse Kubrick’s oeuvre and identify 
thematic trends. This may have been a reaction to Andrew Sarris’s dismissal of Kubrick 
in his auteurist catalogue of great directors, The American Cinema (1968), in which he 
described Kubrick as being unable ‘to tell a story on the screen with coherence and a 
consistent point of view’ (1968: 196). 
But Walker’s book set the trend for the first wave of auteurist critique of Kubrick, 
followed by the likes of Joseph Gelmis’s The Film Director As Superstar (1970), James 
Monaco’s ‘The Films of Stanley Kubrick’ (1973), Norman Kagan’s The Cinema of 
Stanley Kubrick (1972), and Gene Phillips’s ‘Stanley Kubrick’ (1973) and Stanley 
Kubrick: A Film Odyssey (1975), all of which elevated Kubrick to the pedestal of cult-
auteur that has survived ever since. Kubrick himself was not averse to the use of 
auteurism and of his name as a means of marketing; ever the brand-manager, he ensured 
he took credit even when it was not deserved. This is best emphasised during his time 
on Spartacus. The blacklisted Dalton Trumbo had written the screenplay and Kirk 
Douglas was under pressure not to give Trumbo the writing credit. Step forward 
Kubrick, who said he would take the credit on Trumbo’s behalf, much to Douglas’s 
shocked disapproval (Douglas 1988: 323).2  
Brand-management certainly contributed to this first wave of auteurist criticism of 
Kubrick, a result of the publicity strategy of 2001: A Space Odyssey. While filming was 
taking place, the vice-president of Kubrick’s Polaris Productions, Roger Caras, devised 
a marketing strategy, along with Hawk Films publicist Mort Segal and MGM publicist 
Tom Buck. Buck wrote to Segal in January 1967 to argue that, ‘the editorial focal point 
of this strategy must be Kubrick and his involvement in “2001-A Space Odyssey”. 
Everything else is subservient’ (Buck 1967). Such a strategy inevitably encouraged a 
series of books about 2001 that put Kubrick at the heart of its creation, including Jerome 
Agel’s The Making of “2001” (1970) and Carolyn Geduld’s Filmguide to “2001: A                                                         
2 Douglas eventually gave Dalton Trumbo the writing credit he deserved, contributing to the 
ending of the McCarthyist blacklist (Phillips and Hill 2002: 374-375). 
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Space Odyssey (1973). Critics and academics sought to understand the formal qualities 
of 2001, including Hoch’s ‘Mythic Patterns in 2001: A Space Odyssey’ (1971) and 
Chin’s analysis of plot interest in ‘2001: A Space Odyssey’ (1974). These works all 
claimed to be offering new perspectives (an ever present phrase within Kubrick 
Studies), seeing turns toward psychoanalysis (Feldman’s ‘Kubrick and His Discontents’ 
(1976) for example), or semiotics and questioning the language of film, again with a 
focus on 2001 due to its notable absence of significant dialogue and its breaking of the 
narrative conventions of the classical Hollywood. The latter became a fixture of French 
academic study of Kubrick and continues to hold sway there, influenced in large by the 
works of philosophers such as Giles Deleuze (1985) and Gilbert Simondon (1964), and 
impacting more recent critics such as Cahiers du Cinéma’s Bill Krohn (2010), and 
academics like Antoine Prevôst-Balga (2017) and Vincent Jaunas (2017). The literature 
generated on 2001 continues to multiply, with ‘numerous articles appear[ing] to explain 
the various psychological, sociological, theological, historical and philosophical 
meanings’ of the film (Coyle 1980: 27).  
But Kubrick was, by the mid-1970s, seen as something of a misanthrope, his films 
offering a ‘bleak view of man’ and ‘his simplistic view of life, his boring mannerisms’ 
being a key quality highlighted in critiques and reviews (Feldman 1976: 12). Scholarly 
work had grown stale, though Barry Lyndon did attract several insightful articles, 
particularly Nelson’s ‘Barry Lyndon: Kubrick’s Cinema of Disparity’ (1978). In part, 
this wane of academic attention could be blamed on Kubrick’s lengthening gaps 
between each film, as well as a deepening academic mistrust of the auteur theory (or 
ideology), of which Kubrick was seen very much as the personification. A renewed 
interest occurred in the early 1980s with the release of Kubrick’s blockbuster horror The 
Shining and spurred on by Robert Kolker’s seminal chapter ‘Tectonics of the 
Mechanical Man’ in his A Cinema of Loneliness (2011). The chapter offered an 
existential analysis of the spatial composition of Kubrick’s films and incorporated 
together the various film theories that had to date tackled Kubrick’s oeuvre. Kolker has 
remained a fervent cheerleader of this traditional avenue of research into Kubrick and 
places him within a modernist canon of film aesthetic, along with the likes of Orson 
Welles and Alfred Hitchcock (Kolker 2017a). Invariably describing his style as 
inimitable, Kolker contests that Kubrick’s films ‘constitutes the modernist strain in 
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contemporary American film’ (107), an idea echoed by James Naremore who described 
him as ‘the last and the most successful of the modernist directors who worked for the 
Hollywood studios’ (2007: 3). Naremore and Kolker are concerned with the aesthetic 
construct of Kubrick’s films and the intellectual motivations behind their composition. 
Naremore locates this modernist aesthetic in the idea of the grotesque and the absurdist 
and blackly humorist work of New York intellectuals in the 1940s and 1950s, and 
stresses Kubrick’s association in the 1940s with ‘two specialists in the grotesque’: 
Weegee and Diane Arbus (2006: 7). Both Naremore and Kolker describes this 
modernism as manifesting itself in the spectacle of Kubrick’s films, what he calls the 
‘extraordinary image, because in their images and the stories those images tell is an 
extraordinary array of cinematic ideas and ruminations about how we are in the world’ 
(Kolker 2017a: 213). Kubrick entered into feature filmmaking on the back of these 
artistic trends in a New York intellectual atmosphere ruled by the beatniks, the end of 
ideology, and existentialism (Naremore 2013: 6). 
Still academics and critics were intent on referring to 2001, judging the quality of 
Kubrick’s subsequent films against this, while at the same time becoming focused on 
the ‘sterility’ of his work (Jameson 1981: 125). There was little movement toward any 
greater contextual understanding of Kubrick’s films, despite such discourses emerging 
in Film Studies and the emergence of the New Film History in the 1980s and 1990s.  
This lack of contextual understanding – economic, industrial and social, among other 
things – was picked up by Robert Sklar (1988). In his brief, yet insightful overview of 
Kubrick’s relationship to the American film industry, Sklar notes how ‘the relation 
between Stanley Kubrick and the American motion picture industry has received 
perhaps less attention than any other aspect of the filmmaker’s career’ (114). Sklar 
began the process of aligning Kubrick’s work into production contexts, such as the 
industrial and economic history of United Artists, a company that the Harris-Kubrick 
Pictures Corporation was associated with in the mid-to-late 1950s. Sklar stressed the 
need for further research when saying that, ‘Kubrick’s films have played a much more 
central role than has heretofore been recognised in the transformation of film industry 
practices in the era since the breakup of studio monopolies and the rise of television’ 
(115). He argued that Kubrick’s filmmaking strategies had been unavoidably impacted 
by the conditions of the American film industry and its practices. As a result, Kubrick 
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the producer perhaps developed his own business and production models in order to 
subvert Hollywood and the major distributors (115).  
Other academics in this period were tackling production and industrial contexts, 
such as the changing modes of production within Hollywood, best exemplified in The 
Classical Hollywood Cinema: Film Style and Mode of Production to 1960 (Bordwell, 
Staiger and Thompson 1985: 331-332), a work that explored Hollywood’s industrial 
shift towards independent production in the 1950s. Kubrick was very much a part of 
this industrial change, emerging as he did during the early 1950s. The discourse that 
The Classical Hollywood Cinema set in motion was only picked up in Kubrick Studies 
by Sklar and his assertion of Kubrick’s centrality to the changing industrial practices of 
Hollywood (1988: 115). Peter Krämer would begin moves towards understanding this 
centrality with his ‘The Limits of Autonomy: Stanley Kubrick, Hollywood and 
Independent Filmmaking, 1950-53’ (2013a). Krämer provides an overview of the mode 
of production during the period 1950-53, during which time Kubrick made his short 
films and first feature, Fear and Desire. Krämer builds on Mather’s (2013) work on 
modes of production at Look magazine, and suggests that the mode of production at 
Look may be applied to Kubrick’s short films. He examines how he collaborated with 
producers for his short films, ‘whereby he was either given a topic or pitched an idea’ 
and his pre-production work would then be ‘supervised by a producer’ who would have 
responsibility for the assembly of Kubrick’s submitted footage (2013a: 157). This mode 
of production is likened to the producer-unit-system, characteristic of the Hollywood in 
the 1930s and 1940s (Bordwell, Thompson and Staiger 1985: 157), with Krämer 
situating Kubrick’s early career into the contextual discourse of The Classical 
Hollywood Cinema (1985). Krämer would make further inroads into such discourse 
with his ‘Stanley Kubrick and the Internationalisation of Post-War Hollywood’ (2017a); 
Kubrick’s increasingly internationalised mode of production as well as thematic and 
narrative content were part of a trend in both Hollywood and wider American society 
(262-263). But Sklar’s seminal article is an argument for further research on the films of 
Kubrick within the historical-industrial discourse laid out by The Classical Hollywood 
Cinema and the methodological framework of the New Film History, posing questions 
that can lead to further understanding of not just Kubrick, but of the American and 
British film industries as a whole. However, such challenges were not taken up by 
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academia, with Sklar’s article bypassed in favour of the more traditional interpretive 
models.  
Kubrick Studies in the 1990s saw an upsurge in the literary dissection of his films 
from the field of Adaptation Studies, exemplified by two key texts: Richard Corliss’s 
Lolita (1994) and Greg Jenkins’s Stanley Kubrick and the Art of Adaptation: Three 
Novels, Three Films (1997). The former looks towards the contexts of Nabokov’s novel 
and his involvement in the adaptation, with an emphasis on the Russian author 
throughout, while the latter was a strictly comparative analysis of source novel and its 
adaptation. In fact, in the 2000s Adaptation Studies, which had significantly revived as 
a field of study (see Leitch (2007, 2008) and Stam (2005)), would become a dominant 
method of studying Kubrick, the majority of whose films were adaptations, resulting in 
the publication of a ‘large number of journal articles, ranging from essays focused on 
individual elements of adaptation, such as McQueen’s exploration of the language in A 
Clockwork Orange, to collections such as the special Kubrick Issue of Literature/Film 
Quarterly (2001)’ (Fenwick 2015a: 1). More recently, I.Q. Hunter guest edited a special 
issue of Adaptation, ‘Kubrick and Adaptation’ (2015), and Elisa Pezzotta approached 
Kubrick’s aesthetics via adaptation in her Stanley Kubrick: Adapting the Sublime 
(2013). 
Following Kubrick’s death in 1999, there was an attempt to fully categorise and 
understand his oeuvre through his ‘thematic and stylistic consistencies’ (Pezzotta 2013: 
11). Seeing him as the ultimate auteur, these academics stressed the importance of film 
as a medium to Kubrick and tried to define the idea of the Kubrickian cinema. Thomas 
Nelson’s Kubrick: Inside a Film Artist’s Maze (2000), a work which criticised the stale 
orthodoxy of auteur criticism around Kubrick’s films and instead gave a comprehensive 
reconsideration to Kubrick through film aesthetics and genre, argued that Kubrick 
shouldn’t simply be categorised by default as a European auteur (5), but as an artist 
whose vision stemmed from the ideological techniques of V.E. Pudovkin (1929), with a 
meticulously organised temporal rhetoric designed to guide audiences towards themes 
(Nelson 2000: 5-7). Nelson designated this unity as Kubrick’s ‘aesthetics of 
contingency’. But the works of James Naremore (2007) and others including Luis M. 
Garcia Mainar (2000), Mario Falsetto (2001), Randy Rasmussen (2005), and Robert 
Kolker (2011), often originally published in the 1970s, but revised and expanded for 
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publication after Kubrick’s death, all hark back to the ideological formalism of Film 
Studies in the 1970s, with analyses such as psychoanalysis, semiotics and film 
language, and narrative and textual analysis of Kubrick’s oeuvre. Such literature on 
Kubrick, developed since the release of 2001: A Space Odyssey, can be divided in to 
two trends, the first being a ‘formalist approach based on the analysis of style and 
narrative patterning’, while the second ‘draws on interpretative cues present in the 
films’ leading to postmodernist understandings of Kubrick (Sperb 2006: 33-34). 
A third category should also be proposed, which takes an interdisciplinary 
approach and draws on issues of Film History and film as history, towards an 
historiographical understanding of Kubrick’s oeuvre, weighted firmly in the modernism 
of the twentieth century. This approach was brought to the fore at a symposium on the 
director in 2000 at Albion College’s Centre for Interdisciplinary Study in History and 
Culture. The symposium, titled The Eyes Have It: Stanley Kubrick, Film, and the Uses 
of History, resulted in the edited volume Depth of Field: Stanley Kubrick, Film, and the 
Uses of History (Cocks, Diedrick, and Perusek 2006), a work that according to the 
editors ‘emphasizes the historical contexts, and historiographical implications, of 
Kubrick’s career and oeuvre’ (8). Kubrick’s vision was steeped in the history of the 
twentieth century, with ten of his thirteen films situated within that century and 
confronting ‘the unprecedented organization of power and violence among people and 
states that dominated much of the first half of the century’ (8). Cocks, one of the editors 
of the collection, has been the key proponent of the use of history within Kubrick’s 
films, from his essay ‘Bringing the Holocaust Home: The Freudian Dynamics of 
Kubrick’s The Shining’ (1991), to his book The Wolf at the Door: Stanley Kubrick, 
History and the Holocaust (2007), which argued that the Holocaust was allegorised 
across Kubrick’s films, particularly in The Shining, and was a continuous source of 
influence on his cinematic vision. Such ideas are summarised in the introduction to 
Depth of Field, which states that Kubrick’s films ‘can be seen as bringing the terrible 
news of twentieth century history – and the humbling message of twentieth century 
social and psychological theory – to a mass audience in the form of the 
characteristically twentieth century medium of film’ (Cocks, Diedrick, and Perusek 
2006: 5). The literature adapted by Kubrick was often (but not always) obscure, 
allowing the audience to be free of established interpretations of the source text’s 
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‘meanings’ (7). This allowed Kubrick to ‘engage various philosophical, social, and 
historical concerns free from the constraints not only of expectation but literary and film 
genre. Such license reinforces the importance of a formal Film Studies component to 
the literature on Kubrick’ (7). 
The arguments laid out by Cocks take into consideration psychosocial histories of 
Kubrick and his ancestral origins in Eastern Europe, along with his Jewish background 
and his marriage to Christiane Kubrick, whose uncle, Veit Harlan, worked as a film 
maker for Joseph Goebbels and directed some of the most notorious Nazi propaganda 
films, including Jew Süß (1940) (Cocks 2007: 70-71). Psychosocial histories of Kubrick 
have been pursued by other academics, vehemently so in the case of Nathan Abrams in 
works such as ‘An Alternative New York Jewish Intellectual: Stanley Kubrick’s 
Cultural Critique’ (2015a), in which Abrams states that very few academic studies 
‘consider Kubrick’s origins and ethnicity and how these impacted on his work’ (64). 
Abrams situates Kubrick within a ‘Jewish New York intellectual milieu to show how it 
influenced his outlook’ (64), suggesting that ‘Kubrick’s films engage with Jewish texts 
[…] his films were clearly engaged in the search for meaning, much of which can be 
ascribed to a Jewish upbringing’ (2011). Such psychosocial histories have seen Abrams 
position his analysis of Kubrick within wholly new perspectives, such as a reading of 
2001: A Space Odyssey’s HAL 9000 supercomputer as a subliminal reference to the 
company IBM and to that company’s complicity with the Holocaust (2017). Abrams 
argues that his research demonstrates Kubrick’s ‘exploration of his signature concerns: 
the Holocaust and Jewishness’ (430). Abrams is not alone in this approach, which 
blends developmental psychology with empirical research. Philippe Mather has been 
highly influential in this regard, conducting numerous studies into Kubrick’s early 
career as a photographer at Look magazine and arguing that ‘a young person’s formative 
years usually have a lasting impact on his or her professional development’ (15). This 
leads Mather to consider the influence of Kubrick’s photography on his later cinematic 
aesthetic. These psychosocial histories of Kubrick are arguably an extension of the 
formalist analysis carried out by the likes of Nelson (2000), Garcia Mainar (2000), and 
Falsetto (2001) in an attempt to define the Kubrickian aesthetic. 
 It is at this point in the literature on Kubrick that we begin to arrive at the gaps 
that this research aims to address, gaps first identified by Sklar (1988) almost three 
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decades ago and which have still largely been neglected. The most recent wave of 
Kubrick Studies, which Kolker has described as a ‘spectacular turn’ (2017b) (what 
should more accurately be labelled an empirical turn), utilises the methodological 
framework of the New Film History by scouring the Stanley Kubrick Archive to 
uncover new perspectives. Peter Krämer has been at the vanguard of this new Kubrick 
Studies, with insightful analyses of Dr. Strangelove (2014a), 2001: A Space Odyssey 
(2010), and A Clockwork Orange (2011b), alongside reception studies of the latter two 
films (2009; 2011a). Krämer has begun the process of emphasising collaboration on a 
Stanley Kubrick film, arguing that ‘Kubrick is probably best understood not as a 
dictatorial genius but through his interactions with collaborators’ (Krämer 2015a: 61). 
Other avowed auteurists have often hinted at the fact that Kubrick was first and 
foremost a collaborator, including Michel Chion, a dedicated auteur ideologue himself, 
who said that ‘what ended up as 2001 is not necessarily a film over which Kubrick had 
complete control’ (2001: 41-42) and that Kubrick ‘like others, was operating in the real 
world, and like others he worked with collaborators’ (41). As the Archive celebrates its 
tenth anniversary, it becomes clear that from the body of work that has so far emerged, 
there is much about Kubrick and the way in which he made his films that is unknown. 
The challenge now is to utilise this archival material, as well as the empirical turn 
within Kubrick Studies, to illuminate the interpretive ideas of old and to fully 
understand Kubrick as a truly visionary filmmaker operating within the mainstream of 
Hollywood. Krämer’s work and his statements on the collaborative nature of a Kubrick 
production emphasise the need for a redressing of our understanding of Kubrick the 
director, which in the case of this thesis will be through his role as a producer. To begin 
this process, we need to first establish what the discourse on the role of the producer is 
and what the key research questions are in relation to the role. 
 
Producer Studies 
The rise of Film Studies coincided with the proliferation of the director-as-auteur and 
led to a stranglehold within academia that has endured, meaning little attention has been 
given to the role of the producer (Spicer 2006: 1). But academic studies on the producer 
have burgeoned in recent years. A key instigator of this has been Andrew Spicer, whose 
work focuses on the role of the producer in the British film industry, but his theories 
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and methodologies can be applied more widely. Utilising the methodologies of the New 
Film History, Spicer has begun to reposition the importance of the producer within Film 
History. He has written extensively on the subject, from detailed historical case studies 
of individual producers, such as Sydney Box (2006) and The Man Who Got Carter: 
Michael Klinger, Independent Production and the British Film Industry 1960-1980 
(Spicer and McKenna 2013), to an edited volume that draws together new perspectives 
from across Film Studies, Beyond the Bottom Line: The Producer in Film and 
Television Studies (Spicer, McKenna, and Meir 2013). Spicer’s focus on the producer 
repeatedly emphasises the role’s neglected nature within academia. In fact, it is that 
specific verb, neglect, which leads to the most pertinent research questions within 
Producer Studies. Why is it that the role has been neglected? To what extent has it been 
neglected? How has the role been written about previously? And what is the academic 
response to such neglect? Scholarly neglect can be divided into two core reasons. Firstly 
the negative representation of the producer within film and media, specifically by 
Hollywood, and secondly the ambiguous definition of the role itself (33).  
A limited discourse does exist prior to Spicer’s work, though primarily in 
relation to the studio-era producers such as David O. Selznick, with an inadequate 
amount on producers who transitioned from the Hollywood studio-era into the 
Hollywood Renaissance/New Hollywood. Such works include Matthew Bernstein’s 
insightful study into producer Walter Wanger (Walter Wanger: Hollywood Independent, 
1994), while Thomas Schatz’s The Genius of the System (1988) offers perceptions of 
the semi-independent productions of producers in the 1930s and 1940s, and Tino 
Balio’s United Artists: The Company That Changed the Film Industry (1987) contains 
brief case-studies of key independent producers such as Stanley Kramer, Kirk Douglas, 
and Buster Keaton. Schatz has stressed that the producer is ‘the most misunderstood and 
undervalued figure in American film history’ (1988: 6), with Bernstein arguing that this 
lack of understanding stems from the late 1970s during which ‘victimized writers and 
directors’ castigated the producer as ‘an uncultured philistine’ (1994: xiv). The issue of 
neglect and misinterpretation are prevalent when one looks at the above survey of 
literature within Kubrick Studies, it being obvious that auteurism has valued the role of 
the film director over that of producer and led to a discourse around artistry that omits 
reference to wider industrial contexts. 
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The discourse in Producer Studies has been toward these very concerns, 
coalescing around the need to establish a way forward: how should one 
methodologically approach the study of the producer and what should be the broader 
contexts? A special issue of the Journal of British Cinema and Television (2012) 
brought together current thought and raised questions of creative agency and the form 
this takes with a producer – pertinent when put into the context of Bernstein’s (2008) 
reclamation of the producer as auteur, though with reference to the studio era. 
Throughout the special issue of the Journal of British Cinema and Television, time and 
again we are reminded of the stereotype of ‘producers as the enemies of directorial 
creativity’ (Hoyle 2012: 79). What is called for is not so much an abandonment of the 
auteur theory but a revision toward the collaborative process and collective authorship. 
If we are to begin to understand Film History from the displaced perspective of the 
producer, then the key to this analysis is their role within the entirety of the film 
production process (Spicer 2010).  
Six key research questions have arisen to date in Producer Studies: authorship, 
career assessment, unmade/unfinished films, producers’ role, trans-nationality, and 
methodological approaches. Using a case-study of British producer Sydney Box, 
Andrew Spicer suggests that the study of the producer and their working practices 
should be situated historically due to the constant flux of the film industry (both British 
and American), with the role of the producer changing and morphing in ‘relation to 
these external economic forces’ (2004b: 34). Such ‘chronic instability’ means that the 
producer should be considered a central role within the film industry (35). The 
misinterpretation of the producer within Film Studies is detrimental to our view of Film 
History, since film is necessarily an industry based on profit and thereby needs 
producers to ensure viable, commercial product. But Spicer’s article raised the most 
pertinent research question of all, which has continued to be debated since: what should 
our methodological approach be in the study of the producer? 
The predominant method of analysis in Producer Studies has been to eschew 
filmic texts in favour of unpublished sources. This is mainly as a result of the ephemeral 
nature of the producer’s role and the invisibility of their contribution to the film text. In 
contrast, empirical research finds that archives offer ample evidence of the producer’s 
role. Brian Hoyle (2012), for instance, examines producer Don Boyd’s work on the 
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anthology film Aria (1987) via an historical account of the production of the film. This 
is in order to reveal the working methods of Boyd, avoiding detailed textual analysis of 
the film itself and preferring to illuminate our understanding of it through Boyd’s 
actions as a producer. This method inevitably includes an element of career assessment 
and biography in order to provide context, usually along the lines of the circumstances 
that led to their becoming a producer (Hoyle 2012: 77). Hoyle details the constraints 
faced by Boyd and his financial backers in trying to realize Aria, utilising archival 
material from the Don Boyd Papers, mainly a combination of correspondence and 
budget reports. As Anthony McKenna has pointed out, ‘the producer is best found in the 
archive’ (2012a: 111). 
But there are also limitations to the use of archival sources, primarily the omission 
of material. This may be due to removal of certain documents by the owners of the 
archive for legal reasons, as is the case with the Stanley Kubrick Archive, Warner Bros. 
having had lawyers remove any material they do not wish to be publicly available. It 
may also be a result of the at times seemingly trivial documents contained within the 
archive. In his exploration of the Michael Klinger Papers, McKenna sums up the film 
researcher’s frustrations with the archive: ‘What we get are credit card receipts and lots 
of them, maybe some taxi receipts, and letters saying ‘Where’s my cheque?’ with 
responses saying ‘I sent it yesterday’’ (2012a: 112). Such material can be used to 
construct a picture of how a producer operated, what their working practices were, what 
their future ambitions and strategies were, and ultimately their strengths and weaknesses 
as a business person. It can also reveal what Christopher Meir calls a producer’s 
‘production networks’ (2012: 60), their contacts within studios and other companies and 
how they influenced them (or were influenced by them). For McKenna, such material 
reveals that Michael Klinger, for instance, kept a close-eye at all times on his budgets 
(2012a: 113). Similarly, James Chapman’s study of producer Harry Saltzman uses the 
Film Finances Archives, which reveal Saltzman to be a ‘very poor hands-on producer 
who too often lost control of the film-making process’ (2014: 66). 
In part, the ‘archival turn in film history with its emphasis on documentary 
evidence’ (Chapman 2014: 65) has contributed to the academic interest in the role of the 
producer. Spicer has been at the forefront of calls for such methodological tools in the 
study of the producer and demonstrates such methods in his own accounts of the careers 
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of Michael Klinger (2013) and Sydney Box (2006), using archival material to tell their 
untold stories, often with an eye towards films that were never made. Unmade films 
have proven to be a favourable method of research in Producer Studies. The hidden 
histories unmade films provide are compelling in what they can reveal of the role of the 
producer and the constraints of production, as is the case in the history of Klinger’s 
unmade Green Beach (Spicer 2010). Spicer’s work examines the ‘complexities of 
filmmaking and the continual struggle to balance the competing demands of creativity 
and commerce’ through the role of the producer (2010: 298). His attempts to construct 
the history of Green Beach is an excellent means of addressing issues of industrial, 
political and cultural constraint and in providing fuller accounts of national film 
industries. This is exemplified in Spicer’s recounting of the unmade films of British 
producer Sydney Box, in which through a case study of four unmade films, he 
illuminates ‘the broader constraints and pressures under which producers’ work (2008: 
87). Spicer’s study highlights how financial backing and distribution deals have always 
been at the centre of the constraints faced by producers, and so it was with Box, his 
attempt to make Up at the Villa turned down by investors due to a lack of a guaranteed 
circuit release (98). Analysis of the reasons behind failed and unfinished films can 
‘expose the mechanics of the film industry in a way that similar analysis of canonical or 
overlooked works cannot’ (McKenna 2012b: 230). Analysis of a film’s failure can also 
address the reasons for the success of others (244) and, more importantly, it can begin to 
assess why an apparently all-powerful producer such as Stanley Kubrick had difficulty 
in bringing to fruition a number of feature films. This, though, raises the more complex 
question of the role and function of the producer. 
Attempts to define the role of the producer are often explored through career 
assessments and biographical overviews. There are advantages to such summative 
essays. Take Larry Ceplair’s (2009) study of producer Julian Blaustein, an example of a 
neglected producer whose career assessment reveals insights into the social and political 
contexts of Hollywood, in this case the ideological constraints created by the House 
Committee on Un-American Activities and its witch-hunt for communist infiltrators in 
Hollywood from 1947 through to the mid-1960s. Other such profiles, like Bernard 
Ince’s (2007) biographical assessment of silent-era producer Percy Nash, or Bernstein’s 
(1994) career overview of studio-era producer Walter Wenger, aim to restore forgotten 
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and often prolific industry figures, motivated primarily because they are individuals 
‘warranting attention’ (Ince 2007:1). Michael De Angelis’ (2003) study of 
‘megaproducer’ Robert Stigwood takes such an approach, aiming to understand how 
Stigwood defined his authorial agency through an assessment of his career. De Angelis 
suggests that issues of brand-management and star discourse effected the perception of 
Stigwood as producer and businessman. Stigwood, who produced films including 
Tommy (1975) and Saturday Night Fever (1977), is positioned as displaying finesse in 
his business dealings, and that rather than possessing a distinct signatorial aesthetic that 
would place him as an auteur, De Angelis instead locates a ‘success’ signature (2003: 
252). Whereas other filmmakers in the early 1970s were demonstrating their aesthetic 
prowess, Stigwood instead was able to gauge public opinion and thus produce 
successful films that may not have contained a unifying aesthetic theme (252-253). 
Instead, the films produced by Stigwood in the mid-1970s had their success ‘intricately 
interwoven with the management of the “visibility” of directors and performers’ (253). 
Stigwood as producer would act as an enabler of the creative conditions and 
collaboration on his productions, but distanced himself from aesthetic accountability, 
preferring his image to be associated with commercial viability and profits instead 
(256). 
Spicer, McKenna and Meir (2014: 9-11) highlight the ways in which the 
producers themselves utilise ‘self-promotion and showmanship’, perhaps best 
exemplified by notorious characters such as Robert Evans in the 1960s and 1970s, and 
Harvey Weinstein in the 1980s and 1990s.  The idea of the producer as networker is an 
image sustained through filmic and televisual representations – the producer on the 
phone, schmoozing business partners at expensive restaurants etc – but networking is a 
necessity of the role and the industry. This is perhaps one of the reasons why the role of 
the producer can at times be hard to quantify due to the transient nature of networking, 
with oral contracts and negotiations being made over drinks or on the phone. Kubrick 
especially favoured this method and, as Robert Kolker indicates, ‘These, of course, 
were not recorded and therefore are not archived, meaning that a large part of the 
creative process is still left unknown’ (2017b). 
What the literature on the producer makes clear is that there is no one definite 
answer to what a producer is or does. Each producer is different, operating distinct 
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managerial models across time, with some at a remove from the actual production, 
while others are intimately involved, even directing their own productions. With each 
film, producers may take on new responsibilities or delegate them to associate or line 
producers. The ephemeral nature of the role has led to this ‘privileging of the director’s 
role’ in Film Studies (Spicer, McKenna and Meir 2014:8). This ambiguous nature, as 
McKenna (2012c) and Porter (2012) have argued, also stems also from changes to 
technology, finance and industrial structures. The producer’s ‘creative freedom (or lack 
thereof)’ and his exact function are dependent on numerous industrial factors (McKenna 
2012c: 611).  
Kubrick, by the very nature of Hollywood’s organisation, had to respond to the 
constraints of the film industry and its constant flux. These industrial contexts 
unavoidably impacted his productions and the way he operated as a producer. Therefore 
the role of the producer is the most suited approach to understanding these constraints 
and to provide a fuller account of Kubrick’s position within the industrial 
transformations of Hollywood.  
 
Defining the Producer 
The role of the producer largely remains equivocal by nature, even in spite of the 
growing research in Producer Studies (as explored in the above Literature Review). The 
field seems no closer to ascertaining the exact functions of a producer and it’s quite 
possible that, because of how the role has changed over the decades, each study of a 
producer will lead to differing results as to how they should be defined. Jon Lewis’s 
recent edited collection, Producing (2016), attempts to provide a comprehensive history 
of the role, but even here it is a muddied account as to who or what a producer is, with 
the role transforming from era to era. As Lewis sums up in the introduction to the 
collection,  
 
Of all the job titles listed in the opening and closing screen credits, “producer” is 
certainly the most amorphous. There are businessmen producers (and businesswomen 
producers), writer-director and movie-star producers; producers who work for the studio 
or work as a liaison between a production company and the studio; executive producers 
whose reputation and industry clout alone gets a project financed (though their day-to-
day participation in the project may be negligible); and independent producers whose 
independence is at once a matter of industry structure (as the studios no longer produce 
much of anything anymore). (2016: 1) 
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What Lewis constructs here is an argument of how intrinsically the role of the producer, 
arguably more so than any other film role, is linked to the industrial conditions of 
Hollywood and is shaped by its changing economic structures. Therefore when we think 
of Kubrick’s role as a producer it inevitably leads to a discussion of the industrial 
factors that shaped him and impacted on his work. This thesis will approach the 
defining of Kubrick as a producer through these changing industrial circumstances and 
how he used them to acquire ever more control over his own productions, the legal 
authority he talked of in 1972. 
 It is not the purpose of this thesis to provide an etymology of the role, with 
accounts of its origins provided by Mark Lynn Anderson (2016: 15-35) and Joanna 
Rapf (2016: 36-62) in Lewis’s collection. In addition, Andrew Spicer, A.T. McKenna 
and Christopher Meir provide an overview of the role in the introduction to their edited 
collection Beyond the Bottom Line: The Producer in Film and Television Studies (2014: 
1-13). Instead the thesis will consider how Kubrick transformed the role in order to 
achieve the legal authority he sought. In the process, this will lead to a greater 
understanding of Kubrick as a producer, comparing this to his fellow producers of the 
time. 
It is useful at this point to turn to non-academic sources in order to gain a firmer 
definition of what a producer does, as set out by organisations such as the Producers’ 
Guild of America (PGA) and the registered UK charity Creative Skillset. The PGA has 
developed a Code of Credits for Theatrical Motion Pictures in which they define a 
series of generalised criteria pertaining to the role of producer as well as other 
producing types. The definitions arrived at by the PGA are based on a survey of 
producers within the American film industry in order to ‘offer a comprehensive 
definition of the unique and extensive responsibilities of a producer’ (PGA 2015a: 3). 
But as the PGA makes clear, and as Producer Studies stresses, these responsibilities 
vary greatly from one producer to the next. I first want to briefly consider these 
definitions and arrive at a standard hierarchy of the various producing roles in the 
modern film industry. 
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[Executive Producer] 
Producer     Co-producer   Heads of Department 
    Line producer   Production Coordinator 
        Production Manager 
 Executive Producer 
 Associate Producer 
 Director 
  Assistant to the Producer 
 
The above diagram outlines a generalised producing hierarchy on a modern American 
film production. The executive producer appears twice, firstly in brackets above the 
producer and secondly as an individual who is overseen by the producer. This highlights 
the contradictory and ambiguous nature of this producer type. A major financier or 
studio may have appointed the executive producer in brackets so as to keep a watchful 
eye over the proceedings and report back to them, thus ‘supervising the producer on 
their behalf’ (creativeskillset.org). In contrast, the executive producer who is overseen 
by the producer is someone who has provided a significant contribution in the 
production, or is affiliated in some contractual way to either the film or the literary 
property the film is based on, as was the case with the executive producers of A 
Clockwork Orange. Max L. Raab and Si Litvinoff received the credit and appeared on 
the film poster not because of any involvement in the actual production, but merely 
because they sold the rights to the book to Warner Bros. and received the credit as part 
of the deal (Appendix II). In the case of Jan Harlan, executive producer on all Kubrick 
production from 1975 to 1999, he had a much more active role, often seemingly filling 
the administrative functions normally performed by the producer.  
The producer is at the head of the above hierarchy and is the individual that most 
concerns this thesis. According to the PGA, the producer has ‘final responsibility for all 
business and creative aspects of the production’, in addition to having ‘direct 
participation in making decisions concerning a major portion of the producing 
functions’ (PGA 2015b). This does not mean, however, that they have full legal 
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authority and may be answerable to executive producers, production executives at 
studios, or other financial backers. The extent of their power is determined through their 
employment contract. The PGA outlines the job functions over which the producer has 
decision-making authority. These are across the four key phases of film production: 
development, pre-production, production, and post-production/marketing. Functions 
within the development phase include the need to conceive the underlying concept of 
the production, to select the writer(s), to secure initial financing and to serve as the 
‘primary point of contact for the studio and / or financing entity’ (2015b). The producer 
also should approve the final shooting schedule at this stage. At the production stage, 
the producer continues to supervise on a ‘day-to-day operation the producing team and 
the entire shooting company’ (2015b). They may delegate powers to the co-producer 
and the associate producer, individuals that have ‘primary responsibility for the logistics 
of the production’, with the Heads of Department reporting to them (PGA 2015b).3 The 
producer also has to give approval to weekly cost reports. Finally, during post-
production/marketing the producer is consulted ‘on the media plan and materials, and 
then marketing and distribution plans for the motion picture’ (2015b). But as this 
research will show, such decision-making authority has not always been invested in the 
producer, with Kubrick having to battle with studios and executives to gain these 
powers. 
This brief consideration of the role of the producer outlines the general 
organisational structure of film production. It is by no means definitive and as this 
research will show, Kubrick himself differed greatly at times in his role as a producer 
from any such industry norm. The adopted research methodology of this thesis is what 
is key to understanding how Kubrick worked as a producer. 
 
Approach and Methodology 
The thesis will use the methodological framework of the ‘New Film History’ and take a 
case study approach to Kubrick’s role as a producer and the production companies he 
incorporated between 1953 and 1999. The discourse for a New Film History first                                                         
3 Associate producers may have played a significant role in the development or writing of the 
screenplay (creativeskillset.org), which is why an individual like Michael Herr received the 
credit on Full Metal Jacket.  
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emerged in the mid-1970s. It was a response to the narrow ideological formalism that 
dominated Film Studies as well as the poor scholarly quality of the ‘old’ film history. 
The use of the term New Film History can be traced back as early as 1974 at the 
‘Symposium on the Methodology of Film History’ in Montreal, organised as part of the 
30th Annual Congress of the International Federation of Film Archives and with the 
papers published in a special issue of Cinema Journal (1975, Vol. 14, No. 2). The 
symposium aimed to explore the need for new methodologies in the study of film 
history, particularly with the rise of film archives and studios looking to deposit their 
archives with institutions. Thomas Cripps, present at the symposium, congratulated the 
work of the Wisconsin State Historical Society (holder of the United Artists Archive 
and Kirk Douglas Papers, among many other motion picture archival holdings) that had 
organised corporate and personal papers of studios and stars into a ‘systematic usable 
form’ (Cripps 1975: 45). But Cripps urged other institutions to do the same, because, 
 
without them we can never expect institutional approaches to the history of Hollywood 
production. The theory of the politique des auteurs has its uses, but as more critics are 
becoming aware, the true auteur was the studio. Yet we need paper documents of in 
house correspondence in order to effectively write such future accounts. (45).  
 
This group of film historians, who Charles Musser referred to as ‘Young Turks’ (1985: 
49), saw the need for new empirical methodologies as the discipline of Film History 
developed. Cripps lamented that the history of film had been left in the hands of 
journalists who wrote historical accounts for commercial publication and ‘without 
benefit of citation of corporate records or other manuscript sources’ (Cripps 1975: 44). 
Thomas Elsaesser, in a review article for Sight and Sound in 1986, argued that the 
historical turn in film academia was a result of the increasing availability of archives 
and what he describes as a ‘polemical dissatisfaction with the surveys and overviews’ of 
what constituted film history up to that point’ (Elsaesser 1986: 246). But Jay Leyda had 
explicitly called for a New Film History over a decade earlier at the 1974 Montreal 
symposium in order to ‘deepen and broaden present critical work’ by making use of 
‘unused archive materials’ to create a new and fresh ‘international film history’ (1975: 
40). Leyda called for a radical new film history that would correct the fundamental error 
of the discipline: its tendency to ‘separate film from the rest of our world’ (41). 
 This has been the key methodological concept of the New Film History, placing 
films and their production into a variety of wider contexts, including economic, 
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political, social and cultural, and drawing on primary sources to do so. Eileen Bowser 
summed up the key research questions facing the New Film History: 
 
It can’t be enough to examine a film by itself, or all the films of one director or even 
one country. Films must be seen in relation to each other. Nor can films be seen in 
isolation from their times, from all other cultural, social and political events and ideas. 
The problem is to find the techniques for gathering all this information and then how it 
shall be organized to reveal the history of cinema in a new perspective’ (Bowser 1975: 
2). 
 
The isolation of film, confined within theoretical analysis that stemmed from English 
Literature and Communication Studies, resulted in a reflectionist interpretation, 
neglecting the wider ‘cultural dynamics of film production’ (Chapman, Glancy and 
Harper 2007: 6). But the historical turn also stemmed from the academic legitimisation 
of Film History as it broke from its origins within English Literature and 
Communication Studies by the 1970s, and gained legitimacy by aspiring ‘towards 
scientific or empirical standards of exactitude and knowledge’ (Elsaesser 1986: 247). 
New journals began to emerge that stressed this new historical and methodological 
approach, including The Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Television (HJFRT) and 
Film History. The latter journal explicitly laid out its aims to explore ‘the historical 
development of the motion picture, and the social, technological, and economic context 
in which such development has occurred’ (Koszarski 2012: 3). The journal’s original 
calls for papers stressed how it could ‘not accept papers which are essentially analytical 
or theoretical’ (Anon. 1987: 43). Charles Musser in his 1985 review article of the edited 
collection The American Movie Industry: The Business of Motion Pictures (Kindem 
1982) – which made use of New Film History methodologies – argued how ‘extensive 
use of primary source research often seems more innovative than their perspective’ with 
‘the practitioners of this new film history apparently consider[ing] movie watching to be 
an unnecessary luxury’ (Musser 1985: 49). Primary sources are central to the New Film 
History, using ‘evidence disregarded by traditional film histories: business papers, court 
records, city ordinances, urban transport policy and demographic data of all kinds’ 
(Elsaesser 1986: 247). Rather than view the film as the only object of investigation, the 
New Film History looks to a wider range of sources, with film viewing for some being 
‘an inappropriate research method’ (247). This approach is at the heart of what the New 
Film History is about, what Chapman, Glancy and Harper call ‘methodological 
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sophistication’ over the narrow methods of Film Studies (2007: 6). The growth of the 
New Film History in the past decades has seen a sharpening of the ‘methods of 
empirical analysis’ (Hunter, Porter and Smith 2017: 1). What this has led to has been 
the use of archival and primary sources ‘to explore the socio-economic determinants 
and effects of film culture’ and has ‘shifted emphasis from textual analysis […] to 
evidence-based accounts of the political economy of entertainment’ (1). 
 The New Film History: Sources, Methods and Approaches (Chapman, Glancy 
and Harper 2007) has been a key text in the ‘consolidation’ of this historical turn and 
new methodological framework (Hunter, Porter and Smith 2017: 1). It defines the New 
Film History by three characteristics: first is the contextualisation of film within 
historical processes, ‘including economic constraints, industrial practices, studio 
production strategies and relationships with external bodies such as official agencies, 
funding councils and censors’ (Chapman, Glancy and Harper 2007: 6); second is the 
centrality of primary sources; and third the understanding that films are cultural 
artefacts to which ‘the film historian can add a material dimension to the analysis by 
showing how struggles for creative control can be glimpsed in the visual texture of the 
film itself’ (8). 
While drawing on the historiography of Kubrick Studies, the thesis will utilise the 
methodologies of the New Film History and Producer Studies. The prominence of 
Kubrick Studies and Producer Studies in this chapter is to stress the gap in our 
knowledge of Stanley Kubrick and how the former will be addressed via the use of the 
methodological frameworks and discourses of the latter. Situating this thesis within the 
empirical framework of New Film History and the turn toward a more nuanced textual-
contextual relationship, we can begin to approach Stanley Kubrick from the holistic 
perspective of a producer. But this is not to suggest the survey of these two fields is an 
exhaustive critical analysis of all the research and theoretical discourses that will inform 
this thesis. Indeed, there are many other key texts and ideas that cannot be touched on, 
as to do so would leave little room in this thesis for anything else. Instead, there is a full 
account of all such additional literature in the bibliography. 
The debates in Kubrick Studies have long been concerned with authorship and 
the Kubrickian aesthetic construct over that of the wider contexts favoured by the New 
Film History (Krämer 2007: 105). Still we must consider that, though the use of 
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archival material and empirical approaches is a key component to the New Film 
Historian and to this research, ‘the New Film History should be thought of as more than 
just a question of method’ (Ede 2007: 73), but how those methods are applied to 
understand the ‘material constraints of production’ (86). This has become a key debate 
in Kubrick Studies during the research for this thesis. I.Q. Hunter and I convened a 
major academic conference in 2016. Entitled Stanley Kubrick: A Retrospective, the 
conference brought together Kubrick scholars to consider the state of Kubrick Studies, 
the impact of the opening of the Stanley Kubrick Archive, and the methodologies that 
should be adopted moving forward. But what did result were two special journal issues 
that summarised the current research questions within the field. While the special 
Kubrick issue of Cinergie (November 2017) highlighted the continued output of the 
traditional methodologies in the study of Kubrick, with a heavy emphasis on textual 
analysis and little archival research, the special dossier of the Historical Journal of 
Film, Radio and Television argued that archival research and New Film History 
methodologies had become the leading mode of study in order to fully understand 
Kubrick’s position within film history.  
This reflected a wider divide between Film Studies and Film History in which 
the two ‘tried to ignore each other’ and resulted in a caricature as described by Andrew 
Spicer: 
 
Film Studies was judged by historians to be enmeshed in impenetrable, redundant and 
universalizing theory in which texts seemed to operate in a historical and social 
vacuum. Cinema History was regarded as the province of a naïve, untheorized, 
positivist empiricism that reduced all film texts to a simple set of messages that could 
be read out from their historical context. (2004a: 147) 
 
But as the New Film History has now ‘come of age’ (Hunter, Porter and Smith 2017: 1) 
a fresh wave of film historians look to draw on its methodologies to complement more 
theoretical and interpretive approaches to film, as indicated in ‘The Stanley Kubrick 
Archive: A Dossier of New Research’ (Fenwick, Hunter and Pezzotta 2017: 368-369). 
The dossier outlines how a number of more traditionally reflective fields of study use 
archival sources to ‘complement their textual analysis’ (368). Similarly Andrew Spicer 
acknowledges how there is the beginning of a convergence between Film Studies and 
Film History, with works such as James Chapman’s Saints and Avengers: British 
Adventure Series of the 1960s (2002) and Sue Harper’s Women in British Cinema: Mad, 
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Bad and Dangerous to Know (2000) ‘attentive equally to historical, social and cultural 
contexts and to textual interpretation (including judgments about aesthetic quality), 
recognizing films (or television programmes) as complex and often contradictory texts’ 
(Spicer 2004a: 154). Spicer also notes how new works have a place for agency, ‘but that 
agency is seen as variable and historically conditioned, working within particular 
constraints that operate in different ways at different times’ (154). 
 There is still a need to ensure such a balance is achieved between these two 
research approaches in Kubrick Studies. Archival research should not be used to 
override more traditional research avenues, but instead used to enhance the 
understanding of Kubrick’s films and their content. Robert Kolker, firmly in the old 
tradition of Kubrick research, has recently taken to exploring the Kubrick Archive, but 
warned that an increasing number of Kubrick scholars ‘believe no serious work on 
Kubrick can be done without the appropriate archival research, that criticism and 
analysis must be tethered to the known facts that exist on the archived paper records’ 
(Kolker 2017b). This, he suggests, is a dangerous methodological route to take and 
should be balanced with a more nuanced interpretation of his films.  
This thesis then draws on the empirical methodologies of the New Film History 
to both understand Kubrick’s methods as a producer and the impact this had on the 
aesthetic construct of his films. The thesis makes extensive use of archival material, 
primarily drawn from the Stanley Kubrick Archive, but other archives will also be used, 
including the National Archives, the British Library (which holds the Harold Pinter 
Papers), the University of Liverpool Archives (home of the Brian Aldiss Papers), the 
Wisconsin Historical Society (the location of both the Kirk Douglas Papers and the 
United Artists Archive), and the Margaret Herrick Library. In addition, research has 
been conducted into trade journal entries concerning Kubrick and the industrial 
conditions relating to him. This sees the research making use of journals such as 
Variety, Boxoffice, The Independent Film Journal, Billboard, Broadcasting, The 
Monthly Film Bulletin, as well as a number of newspaper archives, including those of 
the New York Times, Los Angeles Times, and The Guardian.  
 Contact has also been made with a number of Kubrick’s key colleagues, initiated 
through the established collaborative relationship of Jan Harlan. Jan has supported this 
research since 2015 and kindly agreed to be interviewed in January 2016. This has been 
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followed up by conversations via email, by chance encounter at the Stanley Kubrick 
Archive, and at conferences and events. James B. Harris, Kubrick’s producing partner 
from the 1950s and 1960s, also consented to be interviewed in January 2016, which was 
followed up by email correspondence. Other individuals were approached, including the 
graphic illustrator Chris Baker who entered into a lengthy email correspondence for 
several months during 2016 and 2017. Similarly, Anthony Frewin agreed to email 
correspondence throughout 2016, Daniel Richter (Moonwatcher) agreed to 
correspondence in March 2017, and the author Brian Aldiss and his family entered into 
brief correspondence with me in September and October 2016. Initial contact was made 
with two senior figures within Warner Bros., Terry Semel and Julian Senior, but initial 
scoping correspondence eventually came to an abrupt halt, despite follow up emails. A 
number of other individuals were approached for an interview, including Brian W. 
Cook, but these were either declined or received no reply. Transcripts of the two main 
interviews for this project, those with Jan Harlan and James B. Harris, can be found in 
the appendix.  
 
Thesis Structure 
This thesis was born out of a desire to understand the wider industrial conditions in 
which Stanley Kubrick operated as a filmmaker. It was conceived as a way of 
answering the questions laid out by Robert Sklar in his seminal chapter ‘Stanley 
Kubrick and the American Film Industry’ (1988), in which he argues that Kubrick’s 
centrality to the transformation of film industry practices has been ignored by Kubrick 
Studies. The thesis does not necessarily define how all producers within the American 
film industry operate, but instead provides a new understanding as to how Kubrick 
emerged as a producer, developed the role, and ultimately used it to fashion a power 
base by the 1970s.  
The structure of each chapter is laid out in their respective introductions. But I 
want to briefly outline the key research questions each chapter addresses. The thesis is 
structured around four key time periods in Kubrick’s career, and each chapter presents 
case studies of these time periods within wider industrial contexts. The chapters aim to 
understand Kubrick’s role as a producer, to understand his importance to the changing 
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circumstances of the American film industry, and to understand the impact of this upon 
his film production processes. 
 The first key phase, examined in Chapter One, is approximately between 1951 
and 1955, in which time Kubrick produced and directed two privately funded features, 
Fear and Desire and Killer’s Kiss. Kubrick emerged into a film industry that was 
radically different from the one he was operating in by the 1970s, and again by the 
1990s. A variety of economic and industrial conditions within the film industry by the 
1950s led to the ‘growth of unit production’ (Balio 1987: 87). This can be seen as the 
starting point for a new phase in American independent filmmaking as the industry 
moved towards a package-unit system (Tzioumakis 2006: 101-02). Producers would 
package a film, bringing together a temporary production outfit that was financed and 
distributed by the studios. At the same time, this allowed a space for independent 
productions that were privately financed away from Hollywood to take advantage of the 
changing industrial conditions. Chapter One asks what Kubrick’s contribution was to 
the development of this new independent American cinema and, at the same time, what 
the impact of the changing industrial conditions had on his role as a producer. 
The second key phase to be examined is from 1955 to 1963, explored in 
Chapter’s Two and Three, and marked by two significant partnerships: the formation of 
the Harris-Kubrick Pictures Corporation with James B. Harris, and the contractual 
alignment of HKPC with Kirk Douglas’s Bryna Productions. Four films were produced 
and released during this period. The Killing and Lolita are examined in Chapter Two, 
which considers how HKPC was able to navigate the changing industrial conditions of 
Hollywood during this time. With the increasing dominance of the package-unit system, 
the chapter will examine how HKPC was able to utilise these changes to grow and 
diversify from being a small independent company producing a pulp thriller, The 
Killing, to becoming an international production company by the production of Lolita 
some six years later. Rather than take a strictly chronological approach, Chapter Two 
focuses on the managerial processes of HKPC in its earliest days and in its later stages 
to understand how the partnership of Harris and Kubrick impacted on the company’s 
production strategies. The chapter questions how HKPC grew as a company and how it 
was different from its incorporation in 1955 to its dissolvement in 1962. The chapter 
will also question what the impact was of changing industrial conditions on the 
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productions and business strategies of HKPC. Chapter Three focuses on Paths of Glory 
and Spartacus in order to concentrate on the relationship between HKPC and Bryna and 
to question what the contexts were of their contractual arrangements. The chapter also 
questions how the changing methods of producing saw a tension emerge between the 
studios and the independent production companies. This tension was acutely felt over 
issues of publicity and promotion, areas that the studios wished to retain total control. 
By focusing on the collaborations between HKPC and Bryna also allows us to consider 
how Kubrick responded to issues of legal authority through contractual negotiations. 
The chapter will ask how these contracts and the wider industrial contexts impacted on 
the legal authority of the independent producer. 
 The third key phase is the 1960s, explored in Chapter Four. This builds upon the 
idea of a power struggle between the independent producers and the studios. The 
chapter asks what role Kubrick’s production companies, specifically Polaris 
Productions, had in gaining further legal authority over his films. The focus is largely 
on 2001: A Space Odyssey but with an aim to understand the working relationships 
between Kubrick, his vice-president of Polaris, and MGM. The chapter will ask what 
the managerial structure of Polaris Productions was and what its business strategies 
were. Ultimately the chapter will question to what extent Kubrick positioned himself as 
a powerful producer with legal authority over his productions by the end of the 1960s. 
 The fourth key phase is what I term the ‘Jan Harlan’ years, given that Harlan 
came to be Kubrick’s executive producer from the 1970s onward. The period between 
1968 and 1999 is examined to determine why Kubrick’s production rate slowed 
markedly. Chapter’s Four and Five both question whether this was due to Kubrick’s 
own producing methods and the ‘absolute’ control he obtained, or the result of wider 
industrial changes in Hollywood, particularly in the post-Jaws years and the rise of the 
high-concept blockbuster. Chapter Five will ask in what ways Kubrick consolidated his 
power as a producer during the new Hollywood era. It will also seek to determine what 
the industrial contexts of the New Hollywood were on his role as a producer as well as 
how it contributed to the development of a ‘brand Kubrick’. Chapter Six will 
concentrate on Kubrick in the 1980s and 1990s and specifically on his abandoned 
projects. This will be in order to question the producing methods of Kubrick, his level 
of control and authority and why there were seemingly so many failed projects during 
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the latter half of his career. Emphasis will be placed on his company Empyrean Films 
and on the pre-production of Aryan Papers. 
These four key phases are chosen for the way they marked substantial changes 
in Kubrick’s career, his role as a producer, and in the industrial changes in Hollywood. 
Each of the chapters takes a case study approach to the industrial contexts of Kubrick’s 
career as opposed to a film-by-film case study. This means that some of Kubrick’s films 
receive less attention than others, with the aim being to question Kubrick’s producing 
methods and strategies within wider industrial contexts rather than merely focus on the 
production histories of each of his films. The films that receive closer scrutiny do so due 
to their significance in demonstrating Kubrick’s producing methods in relation to the 
particular industrial contexts under discussion. The qualitative case study approach, 
however, demonstrates how similar research projects may carry out studies of other 
important producing figures to understand their position within the industrial contexts 
of Hollywood. A concluding chapter summarises these future potential research avenues 
and the position of this thesis within Kubrick historiography. More importantly, it 
determines Kubrick’s impact on the role of the producer and whether the power he 
accrued impacted on his producing abilities from the 1970s onwards. 
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Chapter One:  
‘Nobody’s going to get anything out of this movie but me’: The 
Emergence of a Film Producer 1953-1955 
 
 
Kubrick plunged head first into the role of feature-film producer out of the necessity of 
his chosen method of production in the early 1950s: low-budget filmmaking. These 
earliest years of Kubrick’s career saw him producing in a ‘guerrilla’ mode of production 
i.e. operating in a mode that required ingenuity, improvisation and often without any 
kind of approval or authorisation. This chapter will examine the pivotal period of 1953 
to 1955 in the development of Kubrick as a producer, with a case history of his second 
feature film, Killer’s Kiss. Kubrick’s early career will be situated within the industrial 
context of a burgeoning young movement of filmmakers in New York that contributed 
to a new modern American independent cinema. The 1950s was a decade of tumultuous 
change in Hollywood, with the studio system in demise following the Paramount 
Decrees of the late 1940s, along with the suburbanisation of the American city and the 
rise of television. The chapter will explore the industrial contexts of independent cinema 
and its relationship with the cinematic mainstream. For Kubrick, this meant an eventual 
alignment with United Artists (UA). UA was a company that had been failing in the late 
1940s and early 1950s, but with new ownership by 1951 it began to chart a new 
industrial mode of production for Hollywood, built on the idea of nurturing new 
independent producers. Kubrick’s time as a low-budget independent producer saw him 
learn the ‘Kafka-esque nature of making, closing, breaking, etc., film deals’ (Kubrick 
1962). 
Kubrick operated in this period in a mode indicative of independent filmmaking. 
Janet Staiger suggests the key traits to independent filmmaking are ‘the relations in its 
work process, its means of production, the financing of its films, its conception of 
quality films, and its system of consumption’ (2013: 17). With Fear and Desire and 
Killer’s Kiss, Kubrick’s economic relationship was not to any major studio or 
production company, but rather private sources of income. Kubrick entered into a range 
of agreements and deferments with private businesses on Killer’s Kiss. Looking at these 
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traits in Kubrick’s early years allows us to begin to understand the emergence of an 
innovative independent producer contributing both to a new independent American 
cinema and to a new mode of production. Kubrick is absent from several major 
accounts of independent filmmaking in New York in the early 1950s, including those by 
Kristin Thompson and David Bordwell (1994) and Blair Davis (2012). But Kubrick was 
a significant contributor to the new independent cinema of the 1950s (as Todd 
McCarthy argued in his obituary of Kubrick (1999: 22)), operating a guerrilla 
filmmaking mode of production that led to the eventual distribution of a privately 
financed film by a powerful Hollywood distribution company. Though guerrilla 
filmmaking is positioned as being an act of resistance by the likes of Mariagiulia 
Grassilli (2008), its production methods involve low-to-no budgets, with money often 
being invested by family and friends, while multiple production roles are performed by 
a single individual often waiving fees for directing or producing (1245-46). This sees a 
work process that is collaborative in nature, with roles and responsibilities blurring, but 
also seeing personal investment and the ownership of the means of production. When 
the term is applied to filmmaking of the type Kubrick was conducting in New York in 
the early 1950s (Geoffrey Cocks said Killer’s Kiss was filmed ‘guerrilla-style’ (2004: 
80)), archive evidence points towards him operating in such a manner. He was 
producing films in an impromptu fashion, involving improvisation, and at times 
operating without authorisation. For example, Kubrick filmed Killer’s Kiss on the 
streets of downtown Manhattan without permission, paying off the police with $20 
notes (Phillips 2005: 287), with production photographs showing Kubrick being 
approached by police officers on location (Minotaur Productions 1954-1955). 
This chapter will offer a case history of Killer’s Kiss and the period 1953-1955 
to demonstrate how Kubrick was contributing to new modes of production and the 
establishment of a new modern American independent cinema. This chapter, and 
subsequent chapters, will explore this new mode of production and Kubrick’s use of the 
package-unit system, a type of organisational business strategy that would eventually 
come to dominate Hollywood by the late 1950s. The case study of Killer’s Kiss will 
also allow us to see how low-budget independent producing in New York operated 
outside of the Hollywood mainstream in the 1950s.  
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Kubrick the Guerrilla Producer: Minotaur Productions and Killer’s Kiss 
Two years after it had been filmed, Kubrick’s first full-length feature, Fear and Desire, 
was released in 1953. The film was distributed by the art-film distributor, Joseph 
Burstyn, and was often double-billed with Luis Buñuel’s The Brute/El Bruto (1953) at 
the Roxy Theatre in Detroit (Anon. 1953g).4 The film was reviewed in Boxoffice on 2 
May 1953 under the category of ‘exploitips’, with the review highlighting Kubrick’s 
guerrilla credentials, writing that it was ‘produced, directed, photographed and edited’ 
by a ‘semiprofessional’ (Anon. 1953f: 11). The film was described as a ‘grim, moody 
and depressing war drama’, which was ‘strictly adult fare, suited only to a few key city 
art houses’ (11). It was reviewed alongside films such as Bad Blonde (1953), a ‘rag-
bone-‘n’-hank-o’-hair murder story’ that is ‘tragically grim’ (11); Guerrilla Girl (1953), 
‘an intensely melodramatic foreign-made picture’ that will ‘get by as a supporting 
dualer’ (12); and Raiders of the Seven Seas (1953), a pirate picture that is a ‘bloody tale 
of a brave buccaneer and a beautiful babe’, a film that isn’t ‘top bracket’, but ‘boasts 
sufficient gore and guts to satisfy seekers of fast-moving adventure stuff’ (12). Such 
films were ever more necessary to American theatres, many of which were still 
presenting double bills and therefore needed ‘inexpensive, attention-getting fare. The 
demand was met by independent companies that produced cheap “exploitation” 
pictures. Having no major stars or creative personnel, these films cashed in on topical or 
sensational subjects which could be “exploited”’ (Thompson and Bordwell 1994: 380). 
These low-budget films often returned a greater profit yield for theatres than larger 
budget studio films (380-81). 
Sometime in early 1953, shortly after the release of Fear and Desire, Kubrick 
founded his first production company, Minotaur Productions. It became a more 
professional and financially stable outfit by 2 September 1953, when Kubrick, the 
company’s president, sent a letter to Morris Bousel, stating that ‘the following 
agreements have been entered into’ (Kubrick 1953): first, a stockholder’s agreement 
between Bousel, Kubrick and Minotaur Productions; second, a loan agreement between 
Bousel and Minotaur Productions; and third, an employment agreement between                                                         
4 The programme described Fear and Desire as follows: ‘Defenceless and tied to a tree, 
Virginia Leith, as the strange half-animal girl, faces the dramatic climax of “Fear and Desire”, a 
film about four desperate men trapped in a forest’ (Anon 1953g). The film’s double-bill partner, 
The Brute, was tagged merely as being ‘the story of a French prostitute’ (Anon 1953g). 
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Kubrick and Minotaur Productions. The agreement with Morris Bousel gave him fifty 
per cent ownership of the company (Deluxe Lab 1953). Bousel was ‘a wealthy 
pharmacist and acquaintance of the Kubrick family’ (Krämer 2013a: 162). Minotaur 
was styled as a ‘New York Corporation having its offices and principle place of 
business’ in Midtown Manhattan (Minotaur Productions 1953a). Kubrick was to base 
himself in New York for the next two years, the centre of a burgeoning low-budget 
independent filmmaking scene. 
The same day as the agreement with Bousel, Minotaur Productions reached a 
further agreement with Howard O. Sackler, a school friend of Kubrick and a budding 
screenwriter (Kubrick 1953). The deal saw the rights of an original story and screenplay 
titled Along Came A Spider, written by Sackler and Kubrick, being given to Minotaur, 
with Sackler receiving a twelfth of any net profits from any motion picture based on the 
story (Minotaur Productions 1953b). Two weeks later, the screenplay had already 
undergone a name change to The Nymph and the Maniac and would undergo a further 
name change to Kiss Me, Kill Me (Deluxe Labs 1953a), before finally being released as 
Killer’s Kiss. All of the film titles played into the sensationalism of other low-budget 
pictures of the time. The transition from screenplay to a film that was ready to be 
released was long and complicated and the producers faced obstacles that many low-
budget film producers in the 1950s experienced; primarily, where to obtain the 
necessary funds in order to complete it? Morris Bousel had invested money into the 
picture, budgeted at $60,000 (Deluxe Labs 1953a), but in order to secure the full 
financing of the project, the producer, Kubrick, had to make a number of loan 
agreements, deferments, mortgage pledges and promissory notes. In other words, he had 
to beg anyone who would listen to give Minotaur Productions cash and resources, what 
one banker described as the producer putting on ‘quite a show’ in order to secure funds 
(Sanders 1955: 387).  
Kubrick made loan agreements with companies such as Deluxe Laboratories, 
with a number of terms and conditions attached. Deluxe Laboratories was a film 
processing and development plant and a wholly owned subsidiary of Twentieth 
Century-Fox (Anon. 1953d: 5). Deluxe was one of the biggest film developing firms in 
the country in the early 1950s, a time when Fox invested heavily in the company to 
allow it to convert to colour processing (Anon. 1951a: 3). The deal drawn up on 17 
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September 1953 – one of several documents drawn up between the secretary of Deluxe 
Laboratories, Ellis Smith, and Kubrick as president of Minotaur – stipulated several 
necessary clauses that the producer had to ensure were met. This included the need for 
the finished film to find distribution with a regular motion picture distributor ninety 
days after completion of the picture, the requirement that the final cut of the film be at 
least seven thousand feet, and the right of Deluxe Laboratories to look at the producer’s 
complete financial books and records at all times (Deluxe Labs 1953a). In return, 
Deluxe advanced $5,000 at six per cent interest, as well as supplying film and prints 
(Deluxe Labs 1953a). 
What the agreement between Minotaur Productions and Deluxe Labs reflects is 
the precarious – even perilous – nature of low-budget guerrilla filmmaking in America 
in the 1950s. Financing independent features involved unique methods and skilful 
negotiating was required on the part of the producer. Generalised terminology can be 
applied to the various funding sources to which producers turned, these being first 
money, second money and completion money (Sanders 1955: 381-82). First money was 
so-called as it was the first money to be repaid, but was usually the last to be raised by 
the producing group. It financed about sixty per cent of the film (381). Second money 
effectively financed the film and was paid off second. This money involved huge risk to 
investors who usually demanded ‘50 per cent of the film’s net profit in return for putting 
up a majority of the second money’ (381-82). The remainder of the second money was 
usually through a deferment of salaries for the director, producer, writer and sometimes 
the main stars. Finally, there was completion money, which was sought should a film 
run over budget (382). In his contracts with Deluxe, Kubrick had to ensure that the 
company was repaid first from any profits the picture made. Minotaur, ‘for the purpose 
of securing the payment of the indebtedness [agreed to] grant, bargain, sell, mortgage, 
pledge, hypothecate and assign unto Laboratory’ (Deluxe Labs 1953b: 1) the following: 
‘all negative and positive prints of the photoplay now or hereafter produced’ (1); ‘all 
rights of every kind and nature in and to the photoplay’, which included, 
 
the motion picture rights and all other rights in the literary material on which the 
photoplay is based, all scripts, continuities and screen version of the photoplay, all 
copyrights and literature, musical and dramatic rights and properties in the photoplay or 
any part thereof. (1) 
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Such a deal may appear to be a heavy price for an advance of $5,000, but it was how 
producers operating completely outside of the Hollywood mainstream were treated 
(Sanders 1955). Minotaur Productions were allowed to receive income from the sale 
and distribution of the film, ‘but upon default of such documents and foreclosure by the 
Laboratory, then the entire income, compensation and profits will become due and 
payable to the Laboratory’ (2). Payment of the chattel to Deluxe became immediate if 
Kubrick and Minotaur defaulted under the Distribution Agreement with their eventual 
distributor, or ‘if such agreement should be terminated or amended without 
Laboratory’s consent’ (3). And should there be no payment to Deluxe, then all prints of 
the picture could be sold off or destroyed by Deluxe with only ten days notice been 
given to Minotaur Productions (4). Essentially, Minotaur had to ensure at all times that 
Deluxe was informed of the production process and could not impede in any way the 
rights mortgaged to Deluxe Labs without their written consent. The two stakeholders in 
Minotaur Productions, Stanley Kubrick and Morris Bousel, ratified the Loan Agreement 
with Deluxe Laboratories on 17 September 1953 (Minotaur Productions 1953c). In a 
document titled ‘Affidavit of Authority and Consent to Execution of Loan Agreement: 
Mortgage, Pledge and Assignment’, the company confirmed that they were a 
corporation ‘party to a certain loan agreement and is the mortgager in a certain 
mortgage, pledge and assignment entered into between Minotaur Productions Inc., and 
Deluxe Laboratories Inc.,’ (1953c). The document confirmed that the Board of 
Directors of Minotaur – Kubrick and Bousel – had ‘duly and legally authorized the 
execution of the Documents’ (1953c). The affidavit was signed ‘in order to induce 
Deluxe to extend credit and / or part with valuable consideration to Minotaur, knowing 
that Deluxe intends to rely thereon’ (1953c). It would seem, then, that Minotaur 
Productions created this document in order to secure the necessary Mortgage of Chattels 
with Deluxe Laboratories. The company were making numerous legal oaths – affidavits, 
promissory notes, Mortgage of Chattels – all in order to claim an advance from Deluxe. 
A further document was drawn up by Deluxe Laboratories Inc., on 17 
September 1953 titled ‘Notice of Irrevocable Authority to Motion Picture Distributor of 
“The Nymph and the Maniac” (Deluxe Labs 1953c). The document was to be sent to 
any distributors of the final film in order to inform them that Minotaur had ‘entered into 
a loan agreement pertaining to the photoplay, to which the Lab had made an advance of 
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$5000’ (1953c). The document ensured that the distributors were aware of the need for 
Minotaur to repay Deluxe first from any income of the picture. The distributor, whoever 
it was to eventually be, was to be a pledge holder, authorised to pay the $5,000 and six 
per cent interest. The distributor would each month forward copies of all financial 
statements to Deluxe, with details of the film’s grosses and the ‘deductions, if any, 
which are to be made for prints, advertising and distribution charges, and the amounts 
paid to the Lab’ (1953c). Once Deluxe Laboratories’ first lien on the income of the 
picture had been completely paid in full, then – and only then – could Minotaur receive 
its share of the proceeds according to any agreement with the distributor (1953c). 
Morris Bousel, who had invested his own fortune into Minotaur Productions and 
Killer’s Kiss, was to be at the back of the queue for any repayments, with large 
corporate entities such as Deluxe forcing the company into lengthy complex legal 
arrangements to ensure the return of their own investment. 
 Independent filmmaking required the finesse of the producer in order to secure 
financing or, even more difficult, the arrangement of deferred fees. Deferment of 
salaries for the director, producer, writer and sometimes the main stars was not unheard 
of, with second money often being raised via this method (Sanders 1955: 382). 
But Kubrick, with Killer’s Kiss, was deferring a lot more than just salaries. For 
example, Titra Sound Corporation, a post-production business in New York City, 
agreed to provide equipment and all necessary services until Minotaur Productions had 
‘fully completed the photoplay in all respects and we shall have notified you of such 
completion’ (Titra Sound Corp 1953). This was on a deferment basis and was to be paid 
out of the net receipts of Killer’s Kiss. Minotaur signed a Mortgage of Chattels and 
Loan Agreement with the Titra Sound Corporation on 19 September 1953. The 
document highlighted the chain of repayments Minotaur had to make on the film, with 
Titra’s repayments ‘subject to the prior rights and liens of Deluxe Labs under and 
pursuant to a chattel mortgage made and executed by Producer in favour of said Deluxe 
Laboratories Inc’ (Titra Sound Corp 1953). Titra were to receive any payments after 
Deluxe. Minotaur agreed, three months after any general release of the film, to furnish 
Titra with ‘statements and reports with respect to the receipts and disbursements’ and 
simultaneous to such statements, ‘deliver to you your share, if any, of such receipts’ 
(1953). As of May 1954, Minotaur had already generated a debt of $5,000 with Titra 
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just for the use of their dubbing studio (Titra Sound Corp 1954). The cost of the 
production was spiralling and Kubrick had taken the costly decision (as he had done 
with Fear and Desire) not to record sound on location, but rather to post-synchronise it. 
This involved arranging cast members, such as Frank Silvera, to render their services in 
connection with post-production dubbing.  
A more important fee-deferment was when Kubrick managed to negotiate a deal 
with the Camera Equipment Company. By February 1955, Frank Zucker, President of 
the Camera Equipment Company, was writing to Minotaur to let them know they were 
‘indebted to in the sum of $20,361.42 for services rendered and materials furnished’ 
(Zucker 1955a), though the exact figure was disputed and could have been as high as 
$24,000 (Zucker 1955b). It seemed that the Camera Equipment Company were not 
concerned by Deluxe Labs claim to first lien on Killer’s Kiss. Instead, they came to an 
agreement with Minotaur that the repayments of the debt come out of the film’s 
eventual sale to United Artists, which was already being arranged in the spring of 1955. 
Kubrick demonstrated his prowess as an independent producer able to negotiate 
deferments when writing to Nat Sobel of Cineffects in June 1954. Explaining to Sobel 
that Killer’s Kiss was still in no state for screening due to the lengthy post-
synchronisation process, Kubrick asks, ‘If without seeing the film, you would like to 
arrange a deferred agreement for the titles and opticals, I would be very pleased to 
oblige you’ (Kubrick 1954). Note the use of language by Kubrick – you would like and I 
would be very pleased to oblige you – as if Kubrick is providing Sobel and his business 
with a favour by arranging deferment of his own fees. This language may sound brazen, 
but it is the language of an emergent producer – a guerrilla producer – showing the level 
of determination and confidence needed to get a picture made on a shoestring, and 
sometimes no string at all budget.  
Killer’s Kiss was finally shot on location in New York in early 1954, over a 
period of three months (Krämer 2014b: 11). And yet, for all the bravura Kubrick 
displayed in his bargaining with company after company, it was not enough to prevent 
him from going vastly over budget. The anticipated budget for Killer’s Kiss had been 
$60,000, but the final budget came in at $90,000 (Appendix III). In the deal signed with 
Deluxe Labs, it was agreed that should the production go over budget that the producer 
(Kubrick) had ‘cash, credits and deferments in its possession which will be sufficient to 
  56 
complete the photoplay as contemplated by the budget’ (Deluxe Labs 1953a). Schedules 
of cost for the film provide an insight into the way the film was budgeted and what the 
highest costs incurred on independent productions were. The costliest elements of the 
budget had been studio and equipment rental, equating to twenty-two per cent of the 
final budget (Appendix III). It’s no surprise that in later years Kubrick would buy his 
own equipment to use across multiple films and thereby save money (D’Alessandro 
2012: 39-42). Studio costs were negligible at just under $1,000, with the majority of the 
film shot on location, as noted in a piece in the New York Times. The film utilised 
locales such as ‘Manhattan’s alleys, streets and rooftops, the Laurel Gardens Boxing 
Arena in New Jersey, a dance hall in Brooklyn, and a mannequin factory on Greene St, 
Downtown’ (Weiler 1954). Laboratory costs came in at fifteen per cent of the budget, 
and recording costs at fourteen per cent, the latter including nearly $2,000 of sound 
effects work. General production costs came to ten per cent of the budget, accounting 
for insurance costs, taxes, union fees and settlements with unions, and the cost of an 
MPAA Seal, itself $700. Personnel costs (technical crew, including the cameraman and 
sound recordists) came in at nine per cent of the budget, with a small crew, the most 
expensive being the electrician and grips at just over $2,500.5 Kubrick himself received 
a paltry wage that equated to little more than expenses. The budget did contribute to 
union fees at a combined cost of around $1,000; this was a legal requirement, with cast 
and crew required to ‘receive a basic minimum salary prescribed by their guilds or 
unions’ (Sanders 1955: 385).6 
The small-scale cast and crew was perhaps the greatest indication of the low-
budget independent mode of production Kubrick was operating. This would become a 
feature of Kubrick’s later career, as he kept personnel costs down in order to allow for a 
greater shooting schedule (Appendix II). Talent costs (including all contracted actors, 
extras and bit players) on the film equated to five per cent of the final production 
budget, while the crew accounted for just nine per cent (Appendix III). The cast totalled 
fifteen credited actors and the crew amounted to thirteen, including Kubrick, Bousel and 
the composer Gerald Fried. Some of the crewmembers also acted as extras or in minor 
                                                        
5 The grip supports the camera operator and cinematographer in the setting up and moving of 
the film camera (creativeskillset.org).  
6 All budgetary figures in this section can be found in Appendix III. 
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roles, such as David Vaughan, the film’s choreographer, who played a conventioneer. In 
addition, Ruth Sobotka, Kubrick’s then wife, was the dancer in the film’s ballet 
sequence. Many of these individuals deferred fees or simply worked for free. This was 
evident from correspondence with crewmembers, such as Max Glenn, one of the film’s 
two credited camera operators. Kubrick wrote to Glenn sometime in early 1955 stating 
that the $1,000 salary that was agreed to Glenn ‘in consideration of services rendered by 
you’ will be ‘paid from the net proceeds of the film […] parri passu with the other 
salary deferments already incurred by us’ (Kubrick n.d.). 
Despite its guerrilla nature, Kubrick did utilise the standard agreement with the 
union International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees and Moving Picture 
Machine Operators of the US and Canada, A.F. of L (International Alliance n.d.). The 
agreement stated that, ‘the International Alliance is the duly authorised and designated 
collective bargaining representative of such employees whose services are utilised by 
the Producer’ (International Alliance n.d.). The agreement required Minotaur to display 
the insignia of the International Alliance on the film credits, while also obliging 
Minotaur to ensure, ‘the wage scales […] shall be those contained in the standard 
collective bargaining contracts now in effect in the N.Y. area’ (International Alliance 
n.d.). It is not clear how closely Kubrick and Minotaur adhered to this agreement 
considering the number of salary deferments in place, though a dispute with the union 
resulted in Minotaur having to make a $5,000 settlement (Bernstein 1964). A total of 
$407.52 was paid to the film’s sound men, Walter Ruckersberg and Clifford van Praag, 
a paltry sum due to Kubrick’s decision to post-synch all sound and which led to the 
inflated post-production recording costs of $13,041.85, with over $11,000 of this being 
on the recording and synching of dialogue (Bernstein 1964). This was an expensive 
decision by Kubrick. 
Minotaur negotiated a deal with United Artists in July 1955 for the company to 
buy Killer’s Kiss at $75,000, finally selling it the week-commencing 25 July 1955, two 
years after it had been shot. Minotaur could not rely on any profits from the film due to 
the various repayment deals in place. When Frank Zucker of the Camera Equipment 
Company learned that Minotaur was negotiating the sale of Killer’s Kiss to UA, he 
wrote to Kubrick. Along with the $75,000 for the purchase of the film, UA was to pay 
Minotaur ‘a further sum of $37,500 payable out of the profits’ (Zucker 1955b). Zucker 
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arranged a deal with Minotaur for the payment of their indebtedness (which came to the 
sum of $24,214.76) to be paid in two instalments; firstly, $18,214 to be paid out of the 
$75,000 UA was paying for the film and, secondly, the balance of $6,000 to be paid 
‘out of 40% of any and all monies payable to you by UA on account of the sum of 
$37,000 payable to you out of the profits, if any, of the picture’ (1955b) – this was to be 
paid directly by UA to the Camera Equipment Company. The agreement was only 
effective should UA consummate a sale within 150 days of 17 February (1955b).  
It is doubtful UA’s motives in purchasing Killer’s Kiss was due to any kind of 
commercial merit they saw in the picture; after all, the film’s grosses would prove 
weak.7 Instead, UA had been grooming up-and-coming young producers ever since its 
revitalisation under the new management of Arthur B. Krim and Robert Benjamin 
(discussed further in Chapter Two). Therefore, the motivation in acquiring Killer’s Kiss 
can be seen as an attempt to align Kubrick and Minotaur Productions with United 
Artists (Anon. 1955b: 3). The deal also ensured Kubrick could pay back his investors 
and freed him up to ‘join the UA indie producer ranks’ (3). But $75,000 was not enough 
to prevent Minotaur Productions from a net loss on their corporate operation of just over 
$20,000 (Bernstein 1964). 
This case history of Killer’s Kiss demonstrates the risky nature of guerrilla 
filmmaking being undertaken by Kubrick, who produced the film with no certainty 
other than he could face financial ruin. The next section of this chapter will begin to 
situate this mode of production within the wider industrial context of low-budget 
filmmaking in New York in the 1950s. 
 
The Transformation of Modes of Production: Kubrick and the New York Group 
Kubrick’s producing of Killer’s Kiss was part of a growing filmmaking scene in New 
York in the late 1940s and early 1950s, which saw producers bring to the screen movies 
that were outside of the traditional confines of Hollywood production (Davis 2012: 28). 
These ‘mavericks’ were enthusiastic individuals who would take their cameras on to the 
streets of New York and film in a realist style, often without the permission of the city 
                                                        
7 Killer’s Kiss grosses were described by Variety as weak, with the film taking under $17,000 
in Detroit (Anon 1955e: 10), and under $4,500 in Kansas City for the week of 27 December 
1955 (Anon 1955f: 8). 
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authorities. Their enthusiasm contributed to the New York low-budget filmmaking 
scene of the early 1950s, a new wave of filmmakers that were one of just several new 
waves around the world; from the Italian Neo-Realists in the 1940s, to the French New 
Wave in the late 1950s and early 1960s, with their low-budget techniques ‘redefining 
the notion of film’ and creating a new modernist aesthetic in the process that ‘would 
enable the medium to create its own reality, its own way of speaking to and about the 
world’ (Kolker 2009: 5). Many of those in New York, Kubrick included, were not using 
corporate capital, but money raised from a range of disparate and risky sources. As 
Blair Davis notes: 
 
Their productions […] were inherently more risky than those made by the major 
studios, entailing radically different production methods. With financial risk far greater 
than it had been in recent years, independent filmmakers often struggled to fund their 
films – a symptom of their maverick status within the industry. (28) 
 
 
This growing scene in New York was fuelled by other media, such as acting, dancing 
and photography, the latter the field Kubrick himself had operated in during the 1940s. 
The New York scene included filmmakers such as John Cassavetes, who would apply 
Method acting in Shadows (1959), and Morris Engel, a photographer who would use 
pioneering methods on his realist film Little Fugitive (1953), such as the use of 
lightweight 35mm cameras that anticipated Direct Cinema documentary and post-
dubbed sound (Thompson and Bordwell 1994: 382). 
Another key individual of this low-budget filmmaking scene was Terry B. 
Sanders, author of ‘The Financing of Independent Feature Films’ (1955). Sanders 
would go on to produce more than seventy dramatic features over the course of his 
career, but it was a short film he produced in the early 1950s that gained him the 
attention of the Academy Awards. A Time Out of War (1954) won the Oscar for Best 
Short Subject (Two Reel) and led to Sanders, along with his brother Denis, being 
employed by Charles Laughton on The Night of the Hunter (1955) as second unit 
directors (American Film Foundation 2009). Sanders proved that low-budget 
filmmaking acted as a calling card to larger budgets and to the big Hollywood 
distributors. 
Independent producers were supposedly finding it financially easier during the 
early 1950s due to increased ‘competition among distributing companies for the product 
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of independent filmmakers’, as long as the producers had ‘proven merit’ (Anon. 1950b: 
3). This increased competition led to an ‘anticipated upturn in 1950’ of independent 
productions (3), on the back of three years of financial hardship and bankruptcy for 
many independent producers (3). The situation for independent producers, however, 
was not as comfortable as this suggests, because there was an increase in distribution 
fees, which came about partly as a result of the financial aid some distributors offered to 
independent producers. Producers were regularly faced with distributions fees of around 
thirty to thirty-five per cent, with even UA raising their percentage fees to 
approximately twenty-seven per cent in January 1950 (16). This was what Variety 
called the ‘cost of artistic freedom’ (Hift 1958: 3). 
This group of New York low-budget producers were not affiliated to one another, 
but operated with similar modes of production: Helen Levitt, who produced the 
documentary In the Street (1948) shot on the streets of New York; producer-director 
Lionel Rogosin with On the Bowery (1956); Shirley Clarke’s early short films set in 
New York; and Janice Loeb, who produced The Quiet One (1948) (Mekas 1970: 88). 
The latter film, produced by Loeb for the production company Film Documente, had 
been distributed by the foreign and art house specialists Mayer & Burstyn (Joseph 
Burstyn would handle the distribution of Kubrick’s first feature, Fear and Desire). 
These films and their producers were laying the ground for a new mode of independent 
film production, producing pictures on extremely low-budgets but made with a new 
aesthetic appeal, born out of their guerrilla methods. The aesthetics of this emerging 
group, referred to by Jonas Mekas in the magazine Film Culture as the New York film 
school (Mekas 1970: 88), were not as important as the consideration of the way they 
made their films on such low budgets. Kubrick was very much a part of this group in 
terms of being a new breed of independent producer operating on a low budget with 
Fear and Desire and Killer’s Kiss. Just like the Italian Neo-Realists had done, these 
filmmakers took their cameras out onto the streets of New York, filming immediate, 
direct narratives that challenged the notion of the need for costly budgets to make a 
commercial film. They were, in a way, precursors of the later Hollywood Renaissance, 
some of them producing student films, such as Terry Sanders. This group of twenty-
somethings were forging not only a new independent cinema in America, but also a new 
way of producing films. And it was what some within the mainstream industry believed 
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was necessary to revitalise Hollywood. David O. Selznick was one of those calling for 
an injection of independent blood into the mainstream: 
 
Young blood and young thinking is a prime pre-requisite if the picture business is to 
survive. It's not by accident, he feels, that the new Stanley Kramer-type of producer, with 
a young and vigorous viewpoint, is able to bat so high an average, whereas some of the 
majors, with veterans at their helm, and perhaps inhibited by too-mature thinking, find 
themselves unable to attract the younger fans in the same large numbers as heretofore. 
(Anon. 1950c: 63) 
 
Selznick had proven the viability of independent methods with The Third Man (1949). 
The film had been co-produced with Alexander Korda on a ‘shoestring approach’ for a 
total of $1,500,000. Only $450,000 of this was the actual production budget, the rest 
being above the line costs for the advisory services of Selznick, and also for his loaning 
out of stars (Anon. 1950c: 63). The industry predicted an ‘upturn’ (Anon. 1950b: 3) of 
independent producers by the early 1950s, with Variety reporting such an upturn as 
having arrived by 1951. At least twenty independent productions were scheduled to 
shoot at the beginning of the year, including The Big Night (1951), The Basketball Fix 
(1951) and Chicago Calling (1951). Rather than obtain financing from the major 
distributors, which proved difficult, many of the producers turned to alternative sources 
outside of Hollywood and ‘concerns which will release their films’ (Williams 1951: 7). 
One reason for this spurt of independent productions, often made on budgets of less 
than $200,000, was down to the ‘revitalization of United Artists’, though only five of 
the twenty films were to be UA releases, with the others having other distribution 
company deals, or no deals at all (7).  
Another of these new young low-budget independent producers operating out of 
New York was Morris Engel, who produced, around the same time as Killer’s Kiss, the 
drama Little Fugitive. The film became a successful art-house hit, distributed by Joseph 
Burstyn, who secured European distribution after it won the Silver Lion prize at the 
1953 Venice Film Festival. Such distribution deals, made on a cash basis, covered the 
film’s budget costs, which were approximately $50,000 (Anon. 1953a: 15). In the USA 
it played extensively at New York City’s Normandie Theatre, one of the city’s first art 
house cinemas that opened in the 1930s (De Luca n.d.). Burstyn, however, did not want 
this independent feature to be categorised (and commercially hampered) as an art house 
picture. He was convinced that the film had popular appeal and was ‘substantial fare for 
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circuit bookings’ (Anon. 1953b: 5). Burstyn’s strategy was to eschew the usual method 
trade-showing the film to exhibitors, instead arranging sneak previews of the film in 
‘large key houses in various cities so that film buyers can view the film with audience 
reaction’ (5). The venues for the previews were the Mastbaum in Philadelphia, the 
Roger Sherman in New Haven, the Stanley in Pittsburgh, the Allen Cleveland and 
Adams in Detroit (5). Burstyn’s strategy also included advertising the film in ‘mass 
audience newspapers which rarely receive arty product space. Aim is to attract a general 
audience as well as the followers of arty house pictures’ (5). 
Though Little Fugitive and Killer’s Kiss were of different genres (the former a 
comedy about a boy who mistakenly thinks he has killed his older brother, the latter a 
romantic noir thriller about a boxer who gets mixed up with a gangster), they attracted 
the attention of Hollywood. Burstyn projected that Little Fugitive could gross $500,000 
on circuit showings (Anon. 1953c: 3), being coupled in 1954 with The Man Between 
(1953). It had already grossed $40,000 in its first four weeks at the Normandie theatre 
by November 1953 (3). This wave of low-budget independent producers proved that, in 
Variety’s words, ‘the amateur can enter the competitive film market on surprising film 
costs’ (Anon. 1953c: 3). The low-budgets of Killer’s Kiss and Little Fugitive dispelled 
the myth of the need for million-dollar production costs (Mekas 1970: 90).   
Arguably, we need to revise our understanding of this growing independent 
filmmaking scene in New York in the 1950s. These were film producers bringing in 
their product on tight-budgets not in an attempt to be flagrantly anti-Hollywood, or as 
any kind of film movement in opposition to Hollywood, but as ‘single individuals who 
were quietly trying to express their own cinematic truth, to make their own kind of 
cinema’ (Mekas 1970: 89). And in order to achieve this, their production methods 
required a guerrilla sensibility and experience, resulting in ‘low budgets, the small 
crews, and the visual and technical roughness imposed by the new and unpredictable 
shooting circumstances’ (Mekas 1970: 89). There is no overriding aesthetic unifier, but 
rather a pattern of low-budget production, where costs were toward equipment rental, 
film stock and post-production, meaning that the actual production had much less 
money and led to a more realistic style. The production stills of Killer’s Kiss reveal its 
low-budget nature, with very little crew and only a few actors, and filming taking place 
in grimy, empty locations (Minotaur Productions 1954-55). In fact, Kubrick purposely 
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shot the picture in the ‘shabbier sections of New York’ to save money (Phillips 2005: 
285). The effect was to lend the film a realism and grit common to the film noir and 
urban crime thriller (285), a genre that was ‘part of a larger movement in the decade in 
which the low-budget gangster film provided a space for experimentation for both 
established and beginning filmmakers’ (Kolker 2011: 111). These low-budget crime 
films contributed to the ‘movement to the streets, to location filming, that permanently 
changed the mise-en-scène of American film. Killer’s Kiss is in part a documentary of 
Manhattan in the early 1950s’ (111). This documentary-like realism may have been an 
influence of Jules Dassin’s The Naked City (1948). Kubrick frequented Dassin’s set as a 
stills photographer, while the rooftop chase that would take place in Killer’s Kiss, ‘with 
an early morning New York City skyline as background reminiscent of The Naked City 
and countless other urban crime films’ (Nelson 2000: 29). One of the most memorable 
scenes in Killer’s Kiss, the boxing match, was directly influenced by the lack of money 
on the production. The sequence is lent a visceral quality via its handheld camera shots, 
extreme close-ups, and rapid cuts. It was precisely because the arena in which they were 
filming was empty that Kubrick was forced to film in such close-ups so as to disguise 
this fact, as well as utilising clever post-dubbing sound to create the illusion and tension 
of a baying crowd. When composing the story, Kubrick and Sackler had purposely 
crafted it around several action sequences ‘that would carry the weight of film and 
[ensure it would] not be costly to shoot’ (285). The result, however, is a brutal and 
intimate boxing sequence that would influence the likes of Rocky (1976) and Raging 
Bull (1980).  
The lack of permission to shoot on the streets or in public buildings is evident 
throughout the film by the presence in the background of curious onlookers. The 
opening title sequence sees Davy (Jamie Smith) waiting in Grand Central Station. As he 
paces back and forth, the camera placed on the ground, we see a cleaner sweeping past 
the actor, enquiringly gazing at both the actor and the camera. Similarly, in a scene on 
the New York subway, there are glances from surrounding passengers toward Jamie 
Smith as he is filmed reading a letter. Kubrick’s financial constraints on the picture 
were leading him to experiment with his aesthetic choices, developing techniques that 
he would use in his later works. As Kolker argues, a number of scenes in the film are 
photographed through window frames, ‘as if Kubrick was consciously experimenting 
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with framing techniques. The film’s nightmare sequence, in which the camera rushes 
through a claustrophobic city street […] is a source for all the major tracking shots in 
the films to come’ (2011: 110). The low-budget influenced aesthetic was similar to the 
other low-budget pictures filmed in New York at the time: 
 
The low-budgets […] served as an impetus in freeing their work from the conventional, 
overused visual and dramatic forms, and also forced them to search for new angles, and 
in a new light. (Mekas 1970: 89) 
 
New York developed as the hub of American independent cinema throughout the 1950s, 
with the low-budget independent scene in the city continuing to grow into the 1960s, at 
which point it consciously developed into an anti-Hollywood movement, subverting the 
West Coast’s mode of production and control through avant-garde and experimental 
filmmaking. Film artists such as Stan Brakhage, Andy Warhol and Kenneth Anger, and 
co-operatives such as Cinema 16, approached filmmaking with a commitment to 
‘alternative points of view, democratic representation, and countercultural 
transformation’ (Levy 1999: 5). A number of these early pioneers of the New York 
independent filmmaking scene were eventually drawn toward the avant-garde group, 
while others, such as Kubrick and Engel, saw their efforts in low-budget production as a 
means to realise larger budgets and distribution with the majors, perhaps with an eye to 
becoming semi-independent producers. Engel would go onto produce his next feature 
with a much larger budget of over $100,000, double that of Little Fugitive (Anon. 
1955a: 3). 
We can situate Kubrick and Minotaur Productions within the industrial and 
cultural contexts of this independent movement in New York in the early 1950s, a 
history from which he is largely absent. Though not the only innovative producer at the 
time, Kubrick’s producing methods on Fear and Desire and Killer’s Kiss were still a 
crucial component in the burgeoning of a modern American independent cinema. 
Primarily, it was Kubrick’s ultra low-budget methods, his guerrilla attitude to 
producing, that deserve greater recognition. Kubrick had persevered for several years 
making what were essentially amateur features, but then succeeded in attracting the 
attention of a major Hollywood company and actually selling it to them on a worldwide 
basis, the first director to make such a deal off the back of such amateurish methods of 
producing (McCarthy 1999: 22). Kubrick was exactly the kind of producer UA had 
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developed a penchant for nurturing, similar to the likes of Edward Small (Kansas City 
Confidential, 1952), Alexander Gottlieb (The Fighter, 1952) and Clarence Green (The 
Thief, 1952), producers who filmed on budgets of around $100,000 to $300,000 and that 
were ripe for selling for television distribution. Killer’s Kiss proved Kubrick’s 
credentials as an independent producer able to work on a tight budget, ideal for the kind 
of operation UA was running concurrent to their major programme. Nicknamed their 
abecedarians,8 UA required that these young producers ‘turn out product “at a price”’ 
(Anon. 1954a: 5). Kubrick was the kind of producer being groomed as part of UA’s 
abecedarian program, allowing him artistic freedom as long as he produced a film 
without an elaborate budget and made a profit. In part, ‘it’s UA’s way of building 
important producer alignments for the future’ (5). The buyout of Killer’s led to Kubrick 
joining the ‘UA indie producer ranks’, in a deal that gave him a cut of any revenue on 
Killer’s Kiss ‘after UA recoups its investment’ (Anon. 1955b: 3).  
Kubrick had no involvement in the exploitation and distribution of Killer’s Kiss. 
However, what he had done in the early 1950s was to set up a production company, 
Minotaur Productions, which was entirely “off-Hollywood” in its operation, and in the 
process contributed to an emerging mode of production: the package-unit system. The 
mode of production is a business strategy for ‘organizing work on a wide scale’ 
(Bordwell, Staiger, Thompson 2010). The package-unit system grew out of the demise 
of the studio system following the 1948 Paramount Decrees. During the classical era of 
Hollywood in the 1930s and 1940s, the producer-unit system had prevailed, whereby a 
central producer would oversee all productions at a studio, with a conveyor-belt like 
output of films in which cast and crew were contracted to a particular studio. The 
package-unit system, however, saw studios ridding themselves in the 1940s and 1950s 
of contracted personnel and instead subcontracting out film productions, or buying and 
distributing pre-packaged film projects. If we view modes of production as being 
business strategies, then production companies like Minotaur operating a package-unit 
system would be termed, in business and management studies, p-form corporations, 
whereby ‘projects are the primary unit of production’ (Söderlund and Tell 2011: 239). 
At this early stage in Kubrick’s career, the p-form corporation was still crude but would 
                                                        
8 An apprentice or one who is learning the basic principles of a subject or craft. 
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advance drastically over the next five years as he went on to form a new business 
partnership. He emerged as a producer into a newly independent film industry. 
But what characterised this shift to a package-unit system? Bordwell, Staiger 
and Thompson (1985) favour a discussion of the labour-force implications and the 
hierarchical structure of the new production mode, whereas Balio (1987) gives a 
detailed focus on the company that forged a trail-blazing new way of operating that left 
the other studios in its wake: United Artists. Taken together, they provide a defining 
context of the changing industrial practices of the 1950s. The package-unit system was 
essentially ‘a short term film-by-film arrangement’ (Bordwell, Staiger and Thompson 
1985: 330) between an independent production company and the distributors, with the 
producer of the company organizing the film project by recruiting the labour and 
sourcing the material to be filmed. At the end of the project, the trade people returned to 
the labour pool, without guarantee of work, and the independent company was often 
dissolved (330). Kubrick operated Minotaur Productions in this way, but what we begin 
to see is how Kubrick functioned as a leader and a manager. The package-unit system is 
a wider industrial model; by analysing more minutely how production companies were 
organised, such as Minotaur Productions and later companies such as Harris-Kubrick 
Pictures Corporation, we can begin to precisely locate the way a producer works. Of 
course, with Minotaur Productions and Killer’s Kiss, Kubrick was operating his 
company and production pretty much single-handedly. Not only was he the executive of 
the whole enterprise, but also its cinematographer, editor, screenwriter, director and 
much more. The package-unit, however, has an emphasis on ‘cross-functional work, 
and the organization of expertise in designated projects [that] can generally be 
conceived as a mechanism for combining and integrating differentiated and complex 
knowledge’ (Söderlund and Tell 2011: 240). Kubrick’s future projects and the way he 
managed them would begin to increasingly conform to such a model. As we progress 
into further case studies, we will begin to uncover how Kubrick’s model and mode of 
production evolved and adapted, contributing to his longevity in the Hollywood 
mainstream for fifty years. 
 
Conclusion 
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This chapter has situated Kubrick’s emergence as a film producer in the contexts of a 
film industry that was turning towards an independent mode of production. Exploring 
Kubrick’s working methods as a producer on an ultra low-budget picture allows for a 
fuller understanding of the industrial constraints and practices of the independent 
filmmaking scene outside of Hollywood in the early 1950s. It also contributes towards 
answering the question first posed by Sklar: what was Kubrick’s role in the 
transformation of film industry practices? (1988: 115) This chapter shows that 
Kubrick’s producing style, utilising guerrilla techniques and finesse in order to secure 
deferments, allowed him to gain the attention of a major Hollywood company, United 
Artists, and to sell what was essentially an amateur picture to them for distribution. 
Kubrick had shown that it was possible to make a feature-length genre picture and use it 
as a calling card to Hollywood. Archive evidence allows us to reconstruct a picture of 
how Kubrick was part of a growing movement in New York, an alternative mode of 
production that saw producers bringing to the screen movies that were outside the 
traditional confines of Hollywood and film financing. These producing methods, 
however, carried great financial risk, with producers often struggling to obtain funding 
at all, arguably a ‘symptom of their maverick status within the industry’ (Davis 2012: 
28).  
Todd McCarthy (1999) sought to reassert Kubrick’s importance as an 
independent filmmaker in the 1950s and argued that Kubrick’s influence during this 
early period was to pioneer a new American independent cinema. McCarthy goes so far 
as to suggest that there was ‘essentially no such thing as independent cinema’ (22) prior 
to Kubrick making Fear and Desire and repeating this with Killer’s Kiss; in the process 
he ‘became what he believed to be the first director make a film on such an “amateur” 
basis and then sell it worldwide, to United Artists’ (22). McCarty’s claim is somewhat 
hyperbolic and, as this chapter has shown, though Kubrick certainly was contributing 
and revising the working methods of the role of the independent producer and of the 
managerial organisation of the independent production company – an ongoing process 
for him in the coming years – he was very much a part of a burgeoning, alternative 
scene in New York. He was one of a number of filmmakers producing ultra low-budget 
films that played both to a growing audience demographic for a different, Europeanised 
cinema, and to an increasing trend of art-house film.  
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 Arguably though, Kubrick’s concern with making these two early features was 
about gaining industry attention to make more ambitious pictures and much bigger 
budgets. This becomes clear in an interview with Terry Southern, in which he remarked 
‘my concern was still in getting experience and simply functioning in the medium, so 
the content of a story seemed secondary to me. I just took the line of least resistance, 
whatever story came to hand’ (Quoted in Phillips 2005: 280). Whilst working on these 
features, Kubrick was still claiming his unemployment benefit from the US 
government, and filming of Killer’s Kiss closed on Fridays to allow him to sign on 
(285). He had to constantly be deferential and respectful to the cast and crew working 
for him often on a paltry wage – if they were being paid at all – as he could not ‘ afford 
to alienate these people who were willing to work for him in such stringent conditions’ 
(285). When Chris Chase (professional name Irene/Helen Kane), who played the lead 
role of Gloria Price in Killer’s Kiss, asked Kubrick why he was being so nice to 
everyone on set, he replied, ‘honey, nobody’s going to get anything out of this movie 
but me’ (287). Certainly, Kubrick’s methods gained the attention of Hollywood, with 
United Artists recognising a promising producing talent. He also gained the attention of 
a young television producer, James B. Harris, and the two forged a relationship that 
would see them further innovate independent producing in the late 1950s, developing an 
innovative approach to the so-called package-unit system, as shall be explored in the 
next chapter. 
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Chapter Two: 
The Harris-Kubrick Pictures Corporation and the Diversification of 
the Package-Unit System 1955-1962 
 
 
The previous chapter positioned Kubrick’s emergence as a producer within burgeoning 
new modes of production, namely independent filmmaking and the early development 
of the package-unit system. By the late 1950s and early 1960s, Kubrick progressed from 
privately financed pictures to fully packaged productions, which were financed and 
distributed by major companies. Both The Killing and Paths of Glory were financed and 
distributed by United Artists (the former with additional investment from Harris and his 
family), while Lolita was packaged and financed by Seven Arts Productions and 
distributed by MGM. 
This chapter will detail how the changing industrial contexts of Hollywood, with 
the transition from the old studio system to the package-unit system, propelled by the 
business strategies of United Artists, saw Kubrick turn to mainstream funding sources 
with his first truly Hollywood picture, The Killing. This project saw Kubrick begin a 
significant business partnership with James B. Harris, who together incorporated 
HKPC. Harris would provide the financial stability Kubrick sought to make his films 
and the skills of an innovative producer. The chapter will present a case history of 
HKPC and the managerial and working relationship of Kubrick and Harris, looking at 
how they managed the company on a day-to-day basis and how the company fitted 
within the developing industrial contexts between 1955 and 1962. Hollywood’s 
transition to the package-unit system was hastened by larger market trends, particularly 
the increase in art house cinemas with more foreign films being imported into the USA, 
and a move towards international production, what Peter Krämer has termed the ‘post-
war internationalism’ of Hollywood (2017a: 261). This chapter will go further in 
situating HKPC in these industrial contexts and describe how the company diversified 
beyond the low-budget packaging of The Killing in 1955, to a company participating in, 
and instigating, international productions by 1962. 
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Tino Balio raises the idea of diversification in his book United Artists: The 
Company That Changed the Film Industry (1987). He briefly argues that independent 
production companies needed to diversify their product (film output) by the late 1950s 
to appeal to a changing demographic in the USA (160-162). The reorganisation of 
economic structures and the mode of production in Hollywood accompanied wider 
industrial trends, mainly the slowdown in film output by the major film studios, a 
downturn in domestic revenue, and increasing competition from television and 
international films (Balio 1985: 401-447). Balio argues that independent companies that 
became associated with a narrow brand of film would find it increasingly difficult to 
grow or to be successful at the US box office (160). This chapter will situate Harris-
Kubrick Pictures within these contexts of diversification and market trends to 
understand how they were able to grow and succeed as an independent production 
company. 
The first section of the chapter will provide a contextual biography of James B. 
Harris, particularly of his life prior to working at HKPC. Harris’s role in the 
development of the company and its ability to diversify beyond its low-budget origins is 
vital. He brought with him the business acumen, financial stability, and international 
contacts of his father, Joseph Harris. The second section will consider the production of 
The Killing within the contexts of the business strategies of United Artists, as well as 
the growing trends of exploitation and art house cinema, spurred by the wider 
international trends of the film industry. The third section analyses the business strategy 
of HKPC, compared to contemporaneous production companies. It will consider why 
they apparently seemed to be in a state of constant project development and how this 
helped contribute to their later growth. It will also consider how the company changed 
from its incorporation in 1955 to its dissolvement in 1962. The final section will place 
emphasis on Lolita and diversification, arguing how Harris-Kubrick Pictures took 
advantage of industrial changes in order to exploit a notorious book, which in itself 
allowed for a truly international production, filming in the United Kingdom and with an 
eye to the European market. A focus upon the ways in which HKPC responded to these 
international trends will suggest how they contributed to a period of rapid industrial 
transformation in Hollywood. 
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James B. Harris: The Boy Wonder 
James B. Harris was born in 1928 in Manhattan, though he was raised on the New 
Jersey shore following a family relocation (Pinkerton 2015). He moved back to 
Manhattan when he was fourteen where he attended the private Columbia Grammar 
School on West 93rd Street (Phillips and Hill 2002: 144). He considered becoming a 
musician, but his musical abilities were limited and so he set about working for his 
father, Joseph Harris, who headed the company Essex Universal (144). The company 
financed films for the theatrical and television market (Anon. 1959a: 7). In 1949, Harris, 
along with David L. Wolper, Sy Weintraub, and his father Joseph Harris, incorporated 
the company Flamingo Films in New York in order to distribute films to the television 
market as well as produce additional content (Anon. 1949a: 18). Harris was to be the 
company’s president, while the company itself was a subsidiary of Essex Universal 
(Anon. 1949b: 22). Flamingo Films came about due to Harris’s awareness that domestic 
grosses for films were falling but that ‘television was becoming more popular […] I 
knew that the television stations would need programming’ (Appendix I). Therefore 
Flamingo acquired the rights to a variety of films, cartoons, and serials to distribute to 
the television networks (Appendix I). The company had been capitalised at $6,000 in 
1949, but by 1955 it had a yearly gross of close to $3,000,000 (Anon. 1955c: 3). 
Flamingo would distribute content to the major networks and exhibited examples of 
their content at the 1955 National Association of Radio and Television Broadcasters 
convention in Washington D.C, screening shows bought by them for distribution, such 
as the cartoon series Telecomics (NBC, 1950-51), and the Henry Donovan produced 
adventure series, Cowboy G-Men (1952-53) (Anon. 1955d: 26). Between 1954 and 
1964 Flamingo  Films also distributed to television one of America’s most watched 
programmes at the time, The Adventures of Superman (ABC, 1952-1958). Along with 
Sy Weintraub, his business partner at Flamingo Films, Harris was pronounced the ‘boy 
wonder’ of the industry for his pioneering of television feature film distribution in its 
earliest days (Anon. 1953e: 7). 
Harris’s experience at Flamingo was invaluable in that he learned the nature of 
the film business and the art of deal making. He travelled the country extensively in 
order to forge deals and create contracts with production companies (Appendix I). His 
strong credentials as a distributor of films to television led to a meeting between him 
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and Kubrick in July 1955 (109-110). Kubrick initially invited Harris to a screening of 
Killer’s Kiss, though his intention was to sell the television rights for Fear and Desire 
to Flamingo Films (Pinkerton 2015). But the film was ‘tied up in litigation’ following 
the death of the film’s distributor, Joseph Burstyn, in a plane crash (Pinkerton 2015).  
 Instead the meeting between Harris and Kubrick in July 1955 led them to decide 
to form HKPC. Kubrick, despite having a deal with United Artists, apparently had no 
ideas about what to film for his next project and saw the potential producing talent in 
Harris, including his ability to conduct financial deals and acquire rights to books 
(Appendix I). Harris invested a large portion of his own fortune into this new 
independent start-up in order to acquire literary property (Appendix I), presumably off 
the back of the success of Flamingo Films and his association with his father’s Harris 
Group companies. Harris brought not only financial investment to HKPC, but also 
substantial industry contacts, including his father, and the lawyer Louis C. Blau, son of 
his father’s sometime business syndicate, Joseph D. Blau, head of the National Telefilm 
Associates Company (Anon. 1957: 1). Joseph Blau and Joseph Harris were powerful 
industry players, who formed the Harris-Blau Group in order to buy a controlling stake 
of Republic Pictures from Herbert J. Yates in 1957 for $5,000,000 (1). Harris was also 
close school friends with Kenneth Hyman, David L. Wolper, and Steve Ross, 
individuals who would all go on to become major figures in Hollywood.9 Kubrick’s 
biographers, such as LoBrutto, have described HKPC in its earliest days as being ‘just 
that, Harris and Kubrick’, with the two sharing a sparse office on West 57th Street in 
New York (1997: 111). Yet HKPC was in fact a close-knit network of family contacts 
and industrial ties, a model Kubrick would pursue later in his career.  
Harris recalls that Kubrick and he agreed to an equal partnership (Appendix I). 
With Kubrick having no clear ideas for his next project, Harris visited a bookstore, 
Scribner’s on Fifth Avenue, to search for material (Appendix I). We can begin to get a 
sense of the extent of what this equal partnership meant; Harris had both a financial and 
creative stake in HKPC and so allowed his personal interests in crime stories to lead                                                         
9 Kenneth Hyman (1928-), son of Seven Arts founder Eliot Hyman (1904-1980), was appointed 
the executive vice-president of Warner Bros-Seven Arts after the takeover of Warner Brothers 
by his father’s company (Anon 1967h: 3); David L. Wolper (1928-2010) was a significant 
documentary and television producer, most notably for the television series Roots (Kaufman 
2007: 36); Steven J. Ross (1927-1992) was the CEO of Time Warner, parent company of 
Warner Bros. (Cohen 1992). 
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him to Lionel White’s hardboiled thriller Clean Break (1955), a story about the robbery 
of a race track in New York. Harris was convinced that this was the book that should be 
the first project for HKPC, saying, ‘[I] gave it to Stanley the next day telling him that 
this would make a good movie’ (Appendix I). On 3 August 1955, Harris had purchased 
the story rights to Clean Break for $10,000 (HKPC 1955). It was intended that this 
would be the first film produced by HKPC as part of a multiple-picture deal with United 
Artists (Anon. 1955c: 3).  
 The meeting between Harris and Kubrick was a hugely significant moment in 
both men’s careers. Flamingo Films had equipped Harris with much needed negotiation 
skills, where he had learnt to secure deals and contracts with various production 
companies (Appendix I). Harris also brought his personal contacts and financial 
stability to the company. All of this was vital if Kubrick and him were to successfully 
steer HKPC into the heart of Hollywood. The next section will explore the ways in 
which HKPC grew and diversified between 1955 and 1962, with a focus on The Killing 
and Lolita. 
 
The Killing, Exploitation, and Art House Cinema 
By 1956, approximately two-thirds of films made in Hollywood were done so through 
so-called participation agreements with independent production companies (Anon. 
1956o: 11). This saw independent companies packaging a picture, providing a script, 
budget, cast and crew to a major company, and in return receiving some form of 
financial backing and distribution. But as Hollywood transitioned towards this mode of 
production the number of films released by the likes of MGM and Paramount declined 
significantly (11). Paramount’s Production chief, Frank Freeman, put this down to the 
changing economic circumstances in Hollywood, with the new mode of production 
making it difficult to ‘plan a specified number of pictures annually’, but that also the 
cost of production had risen (11). The latter was, in part, a result of how the package-
unit system allowed stars and producers to negotiate their own terms and to participate 
in profits of films made by their own production companies. As Freeman complained, 
‘top stars can command as much as one-half of the profits with the studio taking all the 
investment risk’ (11). And to compound this industrial trend, the distributors were 
finding that less of their income was coming from the domestic market. In 1940-41, 
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approximately seventy-five to eighty per cent of Hollywood’s revenue came from the 
domestic market, compared to around twenty to twenty-five per cent from the foreign 
market (11). In contrast, by 1955-56, approximately forty-two to forty-five per cent of 
revenue came from the foreign market (11).  
At the same time, there was an increase in European and non-American films 
imported to fill the gap in exhibition schedules. Between 1956 and 1957, only 287 
features were produced in Hollywood, ‘but more than 600 full length films were 
imported from other sources’ (Myers 1957: 15). In addition, American productions 
increasingly took to filming overseas, taking advantage of, among other things, 
European government subsidies. These ‘runaway productions’ caused consternation 
within the industry, particularly among unions who feared that it was leading to 
specialised roles being given to overseas workers (Fenwick 2017a: 196; Anon. 1960b: 
3, 63). Frank Freeman issued a stark warning to those with such fears: without foreign 
market revenue, most of the Hollywood majors would be out of business and therefore, 
‘companies must produce pictures with an international appeal’ (Anon. 1956o: 11). One 
company to buck the trend in decreased production output was United Artists, the 
company that pioneered the package-unit system in Hollywood in the 1950s. The 
operating control of UA, founded in 1919 by Charlie Chaplin, Mary Pickford, D.W. 
Griffith, and Douglas Fairbanks to give them control over their own productions, was 
acquired by Robert S. Benjamin and Arthur B. Krim in February 1951, with the intent 
of reorganising and revitalising the company (Anon. 1951b: 8). Krim and Benjamin 
were lawyers at the law firm Phillips, Nizer, Benjamin and Krim, and secured the 
financial takeover of UA with the backing of the Walter E. Heller financial company, 
which had assets of over $56,000,000, a net income of $1,148,567 in 1950, and had 
been connected to other film financing deals in the past (Anon. 1951c: 9). Krim and 
Benjamin themselves had no film management experience, but represented artists and 
writers, and this led to them being ‘called upon in 1951 to rescue’ UA (Medavoy 2014: 
33). In part, this lack of film experience contributed to the company’s new business 
direction, which saw Krim and Benjamin implement an ‘innovative and successful 
practice of financing the films of independent producers, directors, actors and writers 
[…] while providing them with unprecedented levels of creative autonomy’ (33). Prior 
to the takeover by Krim and Benjamin, UA had been at the point of bankruptcy, but by 
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1955 had taken a world gross of $45,000,000 (Anon. 1956n: 3), and had a target of 
$70,000,000 by 1957 (Anon. 1957d: 25).  
UA had a new policy direction under Krim and Benjamin and the company took 
an active role in the development of new up-and-coming independent producers, 
placing them in their minor funding stream, nicknamed the ‘abecedarian program’ 
(Anon. 1954a: 5). UA saw HKPC as part of this programme, in which films were 
produced on budgets of around $100,000 by producers like Edward Small and 
Alexander Gottlieb (5). The films were generic fare, cheaply made but seen as being 
commercially viable. The abecedarian programme ran alongside UA’s major 
programme; the latter saw its major producing talent – the likes of Stanley Kramer and 
Hecht-Lancaster – continue to output between twenty and twenty-four A pictures each 
year (5). Producers placed on the abecedarian programme tended not to have previous 
production experience, and would certainly not have handled large budgets, but were 
being given ‘full financial backing plus a distribution deal’ (5).  
In many respects, UA viewed these producers, including HKPC, as apprentices 
who could produce films at ‘unelaborate cost levels. Aimed for are commensurately 
modest profits while the tyros are being groomed for the big-time’ (5). Others that were 
part of the abecedarian programme included Samuel Goldwyn Jr. (Man With the Gun, 
1955), Robert Jacks (A Kiss Before Dying, 1956; The Killer is Loose, 1956), Robert 
Goldstein (Black Tuesday, 1954; The Brass Legend, 1956; Crime of Passion, 1957), 
Arnold Laven (The Vampire, 1957), Frank Seltzer (The Boss, 1956; Terror in a Texas 
Town, 1958), Jules Levey (Vice Squad, 1953), and many others. Their films were 
usually cheap genre pictures: urban crime thrillers, film noirs, westerns, or horror and 
science fiction. The narratives were of the exploitation and pulp-fiction variety. From 
revenge westerns, in which the male protagonists sought to kill gangs that had somehow 
wronged them, such as raping his wife in Robber’s Roost (1955), to the hero being 
targeted by a serial murderer in The Brass Legend. These films were set in gritty, dark, 
and seedy environments, dominated by urbanity and masculinity, and starring actors 
known for their roles in thrillers and crime films, such as Edward G. Robinson, Robert 
Mitchum, Leo Gordon, and Sterling Hayden. They also proved to be highly successful 
at the box office, with the likes of Vice Squad grossing over $1,000,000 domestically 
(Anon. 1954a: 16). Therefore, the choice of Lionel White’s Clean Break as their first 
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feature situates HKPC within the production output of UA’s abecedarian programme. It 
also chimed with Harris’s own penchant for hardboiled crime stories, which he would 
continue to produce and direct once his partnership with Kubrick came to an end.10 
Harris has confirmed his lifelong attraction to crime stories due to the disorderly lives of 
their characters (Appendix I). He has spoken of how he became enamoured with 
White’s Clean Break and ‘never got over’ that, returning again and again to stories of 
anti-heroes and the underbelly of society (Appendix I). 
Harris conducted negotiations for the financing of the film with UA throughout 
August and September 1955. They finally agreed to finance $200,000 toward the 
production. But the deal was hardly groundbreaking, with Joseph Harris explaining to 
his son that it was a basic deal, with the company neither paying for the writing of the 
script nor paying back the money for the literary rights to Clean Break (Appendix I). 
UA were a company without overheads, operating a sub-contracting system of 
production. The company gave a minimal budget to untested producers and expected 
commercially viable, if somewhat low-budget product in return, which they would then 
distribute with no input from the independent producers. UA were essentially, in 
Harris’s words, ‘investing nothing and […] sending us out to try and put a package 
together and bring it to them’ (Appendix I). Harris set out to package the film in a way 
that would entice UA. He continued the pulp theme with the hiring of author Jim 
Thompson (The Killer Inside Me, 1952; After Dark, My Sweet, 1955) to write the 
screenplay for $1,850 (HKPC 1955). Harris followed the same tactic when casting. He 
sent copies of the script to the Jaffe Agency, where he was a client (Appendix I). They 
provided him with a list of names of actors that had appeared in crime films, such as 
Steve Cochran (White Heat, 1949) and Sterling Hayden (The Asphalt Jungle) 
(Appendix I). Hayden agreed to take the lead role and so, with a star and script in place, 
Harris took the package back to UA, but they were unimpressed, particularly the idea of 
having Sterling Hayden in the lead role (Appendix I). This was probably due to his 
lacklustre box office performance in other UA product such as the Edward Small 
produced western Top Gun (1955), and a number of low-budget Republic westerns, 
such as Timberjack (1955), The Last Command (1955), and Shotgun (1955).  
                                                        
10 Harris directed a trilogy of crime films: Fast Walking (1982), Cop, and Boiling Point (1993). 
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   Figure 2: The advert placed by Harris and Kubrick against the wishes of United Artists (Anon 1956a: 17). 
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Instead, UA tried to interfere with the package, putting forward the name of Victor 
Mature, star of epic biblical tales such as The Robe (1953) and Samson and Delilah 
(1949), though this would have delayed the production by a year and a half until he 
became available (Appendix I). 
 Harris hired a production manager, Clarence Eurist, to draw up a detailed budget 
for a twenty-three day shoot, with the cost coming to $330,000 (Appendix I). The hiring 
of Eurist, recommended by UA (Appendix I), continued the alignment of HKPC to the 
abecedarian programme. Eurist had been production manager on other low-budget UA 
films, including The Killer is Loose and Dragon’s Gold (1954). To make-up for the 
shortfall in the budget, Harris needed another $130,000. UA warned Harris that such a 
budget was unacceptable and that should HKPC put up the shortfall in the budget from 
other funding streams, UA would have to be paid back first (Appendix I). As HKPC 
were insistent on using Sterling Hayden in the lead, UA would not commit to a budget 
over $200,000 (Appendix I). Harris had savings of around $80,000 from his time at 
Flamingo Films and was able to negotiate a $50,000 investment from his father 
(Appendix I; LoBrutto 1997: 115-116). Having contributed the required $130,000, 
Harris facilitated the twenty-three-day shoot and lengthy 10 weeks of post-production to 
commence. 
$330,000 was unusual, but not altogether uncommon for a picture considered 
low budget at the time. Other UA films had been budgeted at similar, if not higher cost. 
Kiss Me Deadly (1955) had a budget of $410,000, but this was a Robert Aldrich project, 
a director who, though with few features to his name, had directed Burt Lancaster in the 
$1 million Apache (1954), and the $1.6 million Vera Cruz (1954) with Gary Cooper and 
Burt Lancaster. Harris was a first-time feature film producer working with an unknown, 
if precocious, director. They were part of the unofficial abecedarian programme, which 
saw producers operating on budgets of $200,000, such as W. Lee Wilder’s Planet 
Filmplays produced The Big Bluff (1955) and Mark Stevens’ Timetable (1956).11 
Timetable was produced in parallel to The Killing (Anon. 1955i). In fact, the similarities 
with HKPC are striking. Mark Stevens, the director and producer, formed Mark Stevens 
Productions in 1954 (Fertig 2013), along with Jack Gross and Philip Krasne, with the                                                         
11 Despite numerous references to the film as Time Table, the AFI Catalogue lists it as just one 
word, Timetable (afi.com). 
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intention of making two features a year (Anon. 1954b: 3). Timetable was his first 
feature, based on an original story by Robert Angus (Lyons 2000: 148). Variety 
announced Stevens’s alignment with UA in November 1955, when the company ‘made 
an outright purchase of his initial independent venture, “Time Table”’, with UA to also 
finance and distribute a follow-up low-budget picture (Anon. 1955i: 4). Stevens was 
being aligned with UA and its abecedarian program in the same way HKPC had been. 
Unfortunately, Mark Stevens Productions soon crumbled and the company made no 
subsequent features (Fertig 2013). 
The mid-1950s saw a rapid increase in independent producers incorporating 
their own production companies, hastened by the decline of the classical Hollywood 
studio system. The traditional movie studios – the majors such as Warner Bros., MGM, 
and Paramount – streamlined themselves of their contracted stars, directors, and 
producers, turning their focus to television production and leaving movie production to 
the independent companies and producers, serving mostly as financiers and distributors 
(Schatz 1989: 439). The major movie studios were ‘movie production companies only 
in a marginal sense’ with ‘Hollywood a different industry’ by the mid-1950s (439). One 
significant independent company incorporated at this time, and explored in more depth 
in Chapter Three, was Bryna Productions, established by Kirk Douglas in 1955 in Los 
Angeles (Hilmes 2016). As Gene Arneel reported, ‘rarely has any new movement taken 
on such dimensions in such limited time as the swing toward the formation of 
independent companies’ (1955: 1). UA was at the centre of this rise of the independent 
production company, encouraging an array of big stars and small producers to align 
with them, just as they had HKPC. Douglas’s Bryna aligned with the distributor in 1955 
with The Indian Fighter (1955) as its first picture. Other majors were struggling to cope 
with the industrial transformation being wrought by UA, doing ‘double takes with the 
way performers are incorporating’ (Arneel 1955: 1). 1955 alone saw the likes of Frank 
Sinatra, Robert Mitchum, Joan Crawford, Rita Hayworth, and Henry Fonda, ‘all aligned 
with UA and chances are that numerous others will make the plunge’ (1). Between 1955 
and 1956 the company had invested $35,000,000 into forty-one productions, ‘excluding 
deferments and profit participations’ (Anon. 1956n: 18). The company had set a 
strategy by 1955 of releasing at least four pictures a month, and at least forty-eight 
annually (18) – seventy-six by 1957 (Anon. 1957d: 26) – subverting the industry trend 
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that had seen other major companies limit their product output and cut back on 
production deals (Anon. 1956n: 18). Without overheads, Krim and Benjamin seized on 
the opportunities offered by the rise in independent production companies, allowing 
them to contract a range of directors, writers, producers, and stars to offer a diverse 
product output. Key to the success of their independent model, however, was in the way 
the company retained control over the promotion of the pictures, creating a ‘progressive 
promotion program’ leading to an increase in promotion budgets and an increase in film 
revenue (Anon. 1957d: 28). 
Yet there was a clear division of tiers between the performers-producers, such as 
Kirk Douglas and Burt Lancaster, and the lowly independent producer of the second tier 
abecedarian programme in which HKPC found themselves. Contemporary features 
being made as part of this program were often dismissed in the press as ‘mellers’ 
(melodramas), competently made but exploitative in nature and made to play as support 
on a double-bill. Take a film like The Big Bluff directed by W. Lee Wilder; it was 
reviewed as being a ‘modest melodrama […] tailored to the demands of the program 
market […] will be an asset in twin bill bookings’ (Gilb 1955: 20), while the narrative is 
described as being ‘routine’ (20). Similarly, The Killer is Loose was described as being 
in the suspense-thriller category but having ‘average b.o. prospects’ and being a basic 
Hitchcockian ‘meller’ (Gilb 1956: 6).12 
Harris made the assessment that producing The Killing on the $200,000 offered 
by UA alone would result in a picture of The Big Bluff variety; that it would have to be 
produced on a much shorter shooting schedule; and that Kubrick’s creativity would be 
hampered. So Harris ignored the warnings of UA and invested an additional $130,000 
and left New York for Los Angeles in September 1955 to begin work (Anon. 1955g: 
24). The Killing went into production with a working title of “Bed of Fear” and shooting 
commenced on 2 November 1955, with an estimated finish of 29 November 1955 
(Anon. 1955h: 20). HKPC had no control over the distribution and promotion of The 
Killing once it was handed over to UA. However, Harris did attempt to publicise the 
film (and the HKPC brand) with a full-page advert in Variety to celebrate HKPC as the 
‘new UA team’ (see Figure 2 above) and then with another advert on 13 June 1956,                                                         
12 Cinematography on The Killer is Loose was by Lucien Ballard, who also performed the duty 
on The Killing.  
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describing the film as being ‘like no other picture since “Scarface”’ (Anon. 1956b: 19). 
Harris also began enlisting the services of a publicist, Kay Proctor, to generate 
Academy Award attention for the film. On 29 October 1956, Proctor sent a letter to 
Harris saying she had designed an advertising slogan for The Killing: ‘The Killing is 
tailor made for an Oscar’ (Proctor 1956). She gave Harris permission to use this 
phrasing or the similar ‘Oscar calibre’ (Proctor 1956). The ad was eventually published 
in Variety on 14 November 1956. Harris’s efforts did not prevent The Killing’s poor 
commercial performance, and he lost his $130,000 investment (Balio 1987: 158). But 
the film did become somewhat of a minor hit on the art-house circuit, including in 
Minneapolis. The film had been an absolute box office failure in the major Minneapolis 
downtown theatres in the early summer of 1956, but by August of that year, Variety 
reported that the film was ‘doing sensational business at, of all places, a local 
neighborhood [sic] “fine arts” theatre, the Campus’ (Anon. 1956f: 1). This was despite 
UA’s insistence that the film was a non-art crime thriller.  
 There had been considerable growth in art house cinemas in the 1950s and an 
increase in the screenings of European films, with cultural and critical prestige being 
heaped upon filmmakers such as Ingmar Bergman, Federico Fellini, and Francois 
Truffaut (Anon. 1959i: 7). These avant-garde and European films blurred the 
boundaries between exploitation and art, with their representation of sex on screen 
(what Variety called the ‘busty boom’, in reference to stars such as Brigitte Bardot (7)) 
able to be marketed equally in an art house university theatre and in an exploitation 
cinema on New York’s 42nd Street, as Variety reported: 
 
An example of just how the schizophrenia is manifest: several weeks ago an importer 
opened in New York his latest foreign pic accompanied by much ballyhoo about the 
film’s profound theme and artistic treatment. Following a general drubbing by the 
critics, pic was yanked from the art house and now is being readied for release as a lust-
and-violence exploitation feature. (Anon. 1959i: 7) 
   
By the 1950s, exploitation ‘came simply to denote a low-budget genre film that is 
blatantly gratuitous, prurient and very definitely not art’ (Hunter 2008: 97), which 
perfectly describes the kind of urban revenge thrillers being made as part of UA’s 
abecedarian programme. As I.Q. Hunter has argued, Kubrick drew on both art aesthetics 
(he delighted in watching European art movies and avant-garde films with his friend 
Alexander Walker (Krämer 2017a: 251)), and exploitation (Hunter 2008: 97). Hunter 
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specifically examines A Clockwork Orange as an art-exploitation film, but Kubrick 
emerged as a film director in the 1950s working on low-budget material within an 
exploitation context; Fear and Desire features gratuitous sexual themes, Killer’s Kiss a 
violent showdown in a warehouse filled with nude mannequins. 
 Such blurred boundaries saw no theatres agreeing to book The Killing in 
Minneapolis other than the Campus, an art cinema located next to the University of 
Minnesota. The Campus ran an ad campaign nicknamed the ‘double-your-money back 
guarantee’ (1): if theatregoers did not find the film the most suspenseful picture of the 
year, they got a refund – the theatre received no refund requests (20). The manager of 
the Campus had made the decision to book the film when his ‘attention was called to 
the film’s merits and to the fact that its downtown stint had undoubtedly passed 
practically unnoticed and that few people probably were aware it had already played 
here (it hadn’t even garnered a newspaper review)’ (1). The largely student 
demographic made the film one of the Campus’s biggest grosses, despite the owner of 
the Campus being discouraged from booking the film, ‘with emphasis on the fact it isn’t 
an “art” attraction’ (20). The success of The Killing at Minneapolis’s the Campus 
Theatre was replicated at other art house venues, including Pittsburgh’s Guild Theatre. 
The Guild’s owners saw The Killing as being ‘late-summer filler before the top foreign 
fall product’, but the film became one of the theatre’s highest grossing films of the year 
and its booking was extended long into the autumn (Anon. 1956g: 4). The owners of the 
Guild explained that the film was ‘running way over and above takes for some of the 
outstanding overseas product […] playing lately’; this included Jules Dassin’s heist 
thriller Rififi (1955) (Anon. 1956h: 9). The Guild Theatre was located in Pittsburgh’s 
Squirrel Hill district, which contained two private universities. 
With a non-linear narrative, voice-over, and existentialist themes, The Killing 
resonated with a growing youth demographic that were increasingly attracted to foreign 
and avant-garde films. HKPC had attempted to diversify beyond the aesthetic and 
financial constraints of UA’s low-budget abecedarian programme by producing an 
ambitious art-exploitation film. As Hunter has suggested, ‘art films were understood to 
promote distance and intellectual contemplation whereas exploitation incited low, 
kinetic and wholly non-bourgeois responses – arousal, emotional engagement, corporeal 
thrills’ (2008: 101). Reviews of The Killing acknowledged both its ‘intellectual 
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contemplation’ and its ‘emotional engagement, corporeal thrills’. Sight and Sound’s 
Gavin Lambert described the film as a ‘shrewd, engrossing, complete-in-itself 
melodrama’ (1956: 95). He recognised that Kubrick’s aesthetic simplicity, his reliance 
on ‘simple long takes that extract full meaning from what is said’, gave the film a 
complex, psychological depth (95-96). Variety described it as a ‘suspenseful melo’, and 
as ‘sturdy fare for the action market, where it can be exploited for better than average 
returns’ (Anon. 1956d: 6). At the same time, Variety identify one of the reasons for why 
the film would not perform well at the box office, describing the film as being 
‘occasionally told in a documentary style, which at first tends to be somewhat 
confusing’ (6). The experimental technique of the editing lent itself more to the art 
house demographic. The Manchester Guardian proclaimed Kubrick the ‘new master of 
the thriller’ and found it quite incomprehensible that the film was playing ‘as a humble 
“second feature” at the Dominion’ and other cinemas across London. The paper 
predicted that the film indicated Kubrick was going to ‘leave his mark on the American 
cinema’ and that he was already ‘the peer of John Huston’ (Anon. 1956e: 3). 
Lambert’s comparison of Kubrick to Huston is not without basis. Huston largely 
adapted the films he made, either by himself or with a co-writer; they were often 
dominated by damaged male protagonists; they predominantly, but not exclusively, 
marginalised female roles; and he commenced his career working on pulp and urban 
crime thrillers (The Maltese Falcon (1941); The Asphalt Jungle), before progressing to 
more literary and prestigious adaptations (his 1956 adaptation of Herman Melville’s 
Moby Dick (1851) and 1979 adaptation of Flannery O’Connor’s Wise Blood (1952), for 
example). Kubrick would do the same as he turned his attention to his future projects. 
 
Management and Administration at the Harris-Kubrick Pictures Corporation 
This section will explore how HKPC was managed, drawing on business papers and 
correspondence from the Stanley Kubrick Archive. These documents provide an insight 
into the working relationship between the two company executives and their methods of 
producing between 1956 and 1962 and how the company was able to achieve success. 
I want to look first at the state of HKPC by 1961-62, a transition period that saw 
Kubrick exhibiting more administrative control of the company. By the end of 1962 the 
company would be mutually dissolved as Harris wanted to commence his own directing 
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career, and Kubrick wanted to become his own producer (LoBrutto 1997: 229). By the 
final full year of its operation, HKPC was an established independent Hollywood 
company with international ties to the UK (where they had taken advantage of 
government subsidies on Lolita (Fenwick 2017a: 195-196)), and Germany (Paths of 
Glory had been filmed in Munich and other parts of the country), part of a growing 
trend toward internationalism in post-war Hollywood. This saw the ‘Europeanisation’ 
of the American film industry (Krämer 2017a: 264), with greater use of European 
studios, locations and personnel, part of what has been labelled the ‘runaway 
production’ (see Fenwick 2017a). HKPC also had affiliations to a number of major 
Hollywood companies such as Columbia, MGM, United Artists, and Seven Arts. The 
company had expanded to the point of having ten individuals on its payroll that received 
monthly salaries and expenses by March 1962, including Harris and Kubrick (Anzarut 
1962). This also included employing the services of a publicist, Benn F. Reyes, from the 
Public Relations and Allied Services company, who received over $500 a week 
(Anzarut 1962). Reyes would eventually replace Roger Caras as the vice-president of 
Kubrick’s Polaris Productions in 1967. Kit Bernard was also employed for reading 
services (Anzarut 1962) – presumably to read potential literary material, a role Kubrick 
would consistently attribute to an individual on his staff (it was later allocated to 
Anthony Frewin, and, in the late 1980s, to an entire team of readers at Kubrick’s 
Empyrean Films (see Chapter Six)). 
HKPC had evolved in the era of the package-unit system and, despite its small 
size, was very much holding its own with other independent production companies. The 
payroll of staff was similar to one of the most successful independents in Hollywood at 
the time, the Mirisch Company, which had produced several commercial successes as 
part of a deal with United Artists, including Some Like It Hot (1950), The Apartment 
(1960), and The Great Escape (1963) (Anon. 1964d: 6). Mirisch also employed ten 
permanent staff members, including a lawyer and a publicist (Kerr 2011: 118). This was 
emblematic of the way independent producers and companies were operating. 
Independent companies were able to employ whom they wanted, to pick their own 
physical locations and property, and to contract their own staff, technicians, and 
equipment (Kerr 2011: 119). But this mode of production carried risks, mainly in that a 
proposed package would not be picked up for financing or distribution by a major 
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studio. This contributed to HKPC being in a state of constant development and therefore 
purposely developing a number of projects that would inevitably be abandoned. This is 
touched upon by Peter Krämer in his analysis of the unmade projects of Kubrick, 
suggesting that the company’s many unrealised projects were a result of the 
‘assumption that most of them would be rejected’ by major studios (2017b: 383). I want 
to go further in this analysis of HKPC’s operation, expanding it to the wider industrial 
contexts of the time and the development of the package-unit system. 
HKPC was hiring screenwriters or purchasing and optioning scripts for projects 
that would never go beyond development. By some estimates, anywhere between 
twenty-five and thirty projects were in someway briefly considered by the company 
during its existence (Ulivieri 2017). For instance, on 8 January 1962, $600 was paid to 
an individual named Boardman for the purchase of a screenplay titled ‘Project 2’ 
(Anzarut 1962). Other independent companies, including the likes of Seven Arts, would 
consistently have projects in development. By 1963, Seven Arts had at least twenty 
projects in contractual development, but only seven were actually put into production 
(Anon. 1963a: 3). So too Kirk Douglas’s Bryna Productions, with at least twenty-seven 
projects in some form of development or consideration by September 1957, many with 
contractual deals in place, including with HKPC (Norton 1957a) (see Chapter Three). 
Between 1955 and 1962 Bryna also considered numerous projects that were not even to 
star Douglas himself. This was on the advice of his lawyer and accountant, Sam Norton, 
who suggested it would lead to considerable tax advantages for Douglas personally 
(Douglas 1989: 262). 
Research by Peter Krämer (2016; 2017b) and Filippo Ulivieri (2016; 2017) has 
uncovered a range of stories considered by HKPC, including The Blind Mirror, a crime 
thriller set in Paris, and The 7th Virginia Cavalry Rider, based on a true story from the 
American Civil War. HKPC also commissioned original stories, such as asking pulp 
crime author Jim Thompson to write a treatment for a project titled Lunatic at Large 
circa 1956 (Ulivieri 2017). It was a story designed around the conceit that the ‘audience 
must try to work out which of the characters is an axe murderer escaped from an 
asylum’ (Child 2010). Other projects included Natural Child (1952), a Calder 
Willingham novel that was considered for adaptation around 1956 (Ulivieri 2017). 
HKPC eventually employed the author to work on the screenplay for Paths of Glory; 
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and The German Lieutenant, considered in 1959, and one of the few projects that ‘came 
reasonably close to principal photography’ (Krämer 2017b: 385).  
 It is difficult to validate how seriously any of these titles were considered and 
for what purpose they were attached to HKPC. Research for this thesis has discovered 
other works not mentioned by Krämer and Ulivieri, with HKPC registering titles with 
the Writers Guild of America. Sometime in April 1959, for instance, they registered the 
title The Fool, the Fatman, and the Hunchback, which Variety referred to as ‘a possible 
indie’ (Anon. 1959b: 15). It was standard industry practice to register scripts with the 
Writers Guild of America (WGA) – HKPC paid monthly dues of $7.50 to the WGA 
(Anzarut 1962) – while film titles were registered with the MPAA’s Title Registration 
Bureau, regardless of whether the producer or production company intended to use the 
title. Available evidence in the form of correspondence and business papers does 
suggest, however, that there was significant development expenditure between February 
1959 and January 1960 on at least four unrealised titles. Firstly, Laughter in the Dark 
(1938), a translation of Nabokov’s Kamera Obskura (1932), which HKPC developed 
with actor Carlo Fiore at a cost of $2,000 (Anzarut 1962). Fiore was close friends with 
Marlon Brando, whom HKPC had signed a contract with in 1958 to produce a movie 
(LoBrutto 1997: 155; 158-159). Secondly, Sick Sick Sick (based on Jules Feiffer’s 
collection of satirical cartoons published in 1958) developed at a cost of $993.37. 
Thirdly, a project referred to as ‘16 Million’, authored by Jim Thompson and totalling 
$2,700 (Anzarut 1962); this would have been the Bryna-HKPC adaptation of I Stole 
$16,000,000 (1956), ‘autobiography of the master safe cracker of the 1920s, Herbert 
Emerson Wilson’ (Barbiaux 1958). Finally, a project simply titled ‘Dick Adams’ 
developed at a cost of $2,625 (Anzarut 1962).13 For a brief eleven-month period, HKPC 
spent a total of $8,318.37 on the development of four unrealised projects.  
They also regularly paid freelance researchers to conduct research trips. 
Company receipts show that an airfare was paid for a ‘technical adviser’ to conduct a 
research trip to Germany and Italy in April 1962 (Anzarut 1962). The receipts confirm 
this was for the project The German Lieutenant. The technical adviser conducted a                                                         
13 The only noticeable cultural relevance such a title has is to the baseball player, Richard ‘Dick’ 
Leroy Adams (1920-2016) who briefly played for the Philadelphia Athletics in 1947. Given 
Kubrick and Harris’s passion for baseball, it is possible they wanted to make a film about the 
sport (baseballalmanac.com). 
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further research trip in May 1962 for nearly $900, while Fritz Harlan (Jan Harlan’s 
father) undertook location research for the project in December 1961 (Anzarut 1962). 
Fritz Harlan was a professor of music at the Musikhochschule in Freiburg im Breisgau 
(LoBrutto 1997: 148). Other researchers were paid to explore potential properties. One 
researcher was paid $130 on 25 April 1962 to look into the copyright for Aleksandr 
Kuprin’s The Duel (1905) (Anzarut 1962). The book has obvious thematic connections 
to Barry Lyndon, telling the story of social advancement of a military officer who 
demands a duel to gain satisfaction following an extramarital affair (Billings 2012). As 
HKPC searched for novels to adapt, they submitted copies of the books to the MPAA’s 
Geoffrey Shurlock to gauge the level of acceptability of the content according to the 
Production Code Administration (PCA). Quite often Shurlock would deem the material 
unacceptable. For instance, he could not conceive of how HKPC would manage to adapt 
Felix Jackson’s So Help Me God (1955), a political book about the Un-American 
Activities Committee that was of such a ‘highly controversial nature that it might get 
into the area of questionable industry policy, over and above any specific Code 
violation’ (Shurlock 1956a). Similarly, Willingham’s Natural Child was deemed 
unacceptable due to its ‘extremely light and casual approach to the subject of illicit sex’ 
and the topic of abortion (Shurlock 1956b). 
We can consider the choice of projects by HKPC – what Krämer has suggested 
were topics that appealed to the desire by major studios to extend ‘the boundaries of 
sexual representations on screen […] so as to exploit the resulting controversies’ 
(2017b: 384) – as resulting from the economic structures and organisation of 
independent production companies. Mirisch, and similarly Hecht-Hill-Lancaster and 
Bryna, could be said to have had a relationship with the content of the films they 
produced (Kerr 2011: 120). Paul Kerr’s study of the Mirisch Company-produced Some 
Like It Hot posited that the film was symptomatic of their ‘house style’. The 
management and administration of Mirisch, and its business policies, actively 
influenced their projects and the aesthetic of their directors, even someone as notable as 
Billy Wilder. Kerr’s study is based on textual analysis rather than any archival evidence, 
but does raise interesting questions about the kinds of films being made by package-unit 
independent production companies and the reputation this lent them in Hollywood. 
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A number of package-unit independents in the 1950s and early 1960s were 
producing ‘narratives dramatizing the assembling of an ensemble of experts for a 
specific project, with caper or heist films […] also centering on the putting together of a 
team for a one-off job’ (Kerr 2011: 123); films such as The Asphalt Jungle (1950), The 
Magnificent Seven (1960), Ocean’s Eleven (1960), The Great Escape and, of course, 
The Killing. The drive to produce these particular brands of film was because of the 
industrial imperative of ‘the package-unit indies […] these might best be summarized as 
maximizing profits (and thus maximizing the attractions of each film) while minimizing 
risks and costs’ (Kerr 2011: 123). Star attraction and genre were combined, but the 
narratives also reflected the independent constraints under which the films were made. 
Industrial contexts beyond just censorship often propelled independent producers and 
their companies towards particular genres, particularly when seeking financing and 
distribution with the likes of United Artists. As discussed above, UA influenced 
independent producers to produce low-budget crime thrillers and heist films out of a 
business strategy of their own. 
But not all independent production companies – certainly not HKPC – remained 
constricted to any one particular genre. To do so would have presented significant 
financial risk given the inherent dangers of independent production, most significantly 
that of product differentiation. Throughout the 1950s, marketing and promoting the 
unique selling points of a film became crucial and relying on particular generic fare was 
not a guarantee of box office success. Producers such as Stanley Kramer and companies 
like Hecht-Hill-Lancaster ‘placed their eggs in single baskets – each produced 
essentially one kind of picture. Since these types only had limited appeal, the producers 
placed themselves at a disadvantage from the start by not diversifying’ (Balio 1987: 
160). Diversification in its most basic business history definition is the ‘expansion of 
the scope of business activities […] to avoid overreliance on a narrow range of 
products’ (Kurian 2013: 92). The ‘house style’ of HKPC, if they can be said to have had 
one, was their ability to move from genre-to-genre with each picture. They became 
more ambitious in scope and turned to literary adaptation (adapting Vladimir Nabokov, 
which in itself was a means to raise their artistic ambition and profile), black comedy 
(the use of Peter Sellers), and controversy (they recognised the potential to exploit 
Lolita, as discussed below). They also packaged their pictures around their own 
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growing, maverick status as demonstrated in publicity material they put out about 
themselves (see figure 2). 
HKPC diversified successfully between 1955 and 1962. They began with a film, 
The Killing, which conformed to the low-budget requirements of United Artists. The 
picture was made on a small-scale, similar to the way Kubrick had operated on his 
earliest features, before HKPC expanded their ambition to collaborate and affiliate with 
other independent producers, including Kirk Douglas and Marlon Brando (see Chapter 
Three). By the early 1960s, they were no longer a regionally based production outfit, 
but rather operated an international mode of production, with companies based (for tax 
purposes) in Switzerland and filming in the United Kingdom. The company had loaned 
out its director to work on an historical epic with a multi-million dollar budget that 
garnered extraordinary success. They expanded their affiliations to major independents 
like Seven Arts and even contracted an up-and-coming actress to their payroll, Sue 
Lyon. Most importantly, and perhaps purposely, they courted innovation and 
controversy, pursuing subject matter that gained them attention in the media. HKPC 
used publicity to their advantage, placing an advert (against the wishes of UA) in 
Variety on 21 March 1956 that headlined them as ‘The New UA Team’ (Anon. 1956a) 
(see Figure 2). As LoBrutto has argued, such methods employed by HKPC 
demonstrated that the company was, ‘for their time […] innovative rogues – an 
independent company long before Cannon, Carolco, New Line, or Miramax’ (1997: 
133).  
 
Lolita and the Diversification of the Harris-Kubrick Pictures Corporation 
If HKPC had blurred the boundaries of art cinema and exploitation with The Killing, 
there was a similar approach to the more prestigious Lolita. This next section looks at 
how HKPC’s abilities to diversify their production output, respond to industrial contexts 
– such as the internationalisation of Hollywood – and exploit weaknesses in the 
Production Code allowed them to produce Lolita. 
Following the release of The Killing, and perhaps sensing the need to expand 
beyond low-budget exploitation, HKPC began looking to adapt books of a more literary 
persuasion. These included Stefan Zweig’s The Burning Secret (1911), Calder 
Willingham’s Natural Child, and Vladimir Nabokov’s Laughter in the Dark (1938) 
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(Ulivieri 2017). This material often contained elements of sex and violence, but within 
the acceptable confines of literary work. HKPC had acquired the rights to Nabokov’s 
Lolita (1955) in September 1958 for $150,000 (Anon. 1959a: 17). This greatly excited 
Harris and United Artists were initially interested in financing and distributing the 
picture (Anon. 1958a: 2). The book had gained a notorious reputation given its 
scandalous narrative of hebephilia, summed up sardonically in Variety as being about, 
 
A man who has a passion for “nymphets” – meaning girls from 10 to 14. The male 
marries a woman for the purpose of being with her daughter of the “nymphet” age. The 
woman dies and he carries on with the girl. (Anon. 1958a: 2) 
 
Harris wrote to Kubrick in October 1959 to detail his enthusiasm at the business 
potential of their newly acquired property. Gregory Ratoff, the Russian born film 
producer and actor, told Harris that ‘Lolita is the greatest property in existence’ and 
predicted that it would return a substantial profit for HKPC (Harris 1959a). Harris felt 
that the reputation of HKPC outside of the USA would play to their advantage in 
adapting a novel like Lolita: ‘It’s my guess that Paris, London and Rome are the places 
to be. We have big reputations and films seem to mean more over there’ (Harris 1959a). 
Harris concluded his letter to Kubrick by telling him that Seven Arts’s Kenneth Hyman 
was ‘producing a film with Brigitte Bardot and claims to be able to get her for another. 
I’ll bet there are many other European starlets that we could find if we were there. Try 
and get to these cities while you’re in Europe’ (Harris 1959a). Harris seemed to be 
attempting to persuade Kubrick of a European move with the allure of the likes of 
Bardot. The film was eventually shot in the UK, lured by the so-called Eady Levy, a 
government subsidy paid out by the British Film Fund Agency to productions that 
suitably qualified as British (Fenwick 2017a: 192-193). In order to qualify, producers 
needed to ensure the film was produced in a British territory and ‘at least 75 percent of 
labor costs to have been paid to British persons’ (192). The criteria to qualify as a 
British production impacted not only on Lolita (filming in the UK and casting British 
actors in the lead roles), but also on all of Kubrick’s subsequent pictures that took 
advantage of the Eady Levy (up to The Shining, after which the Eady Levy was 
disbanded by Margaret Thatcher’s government in 1985 (Fenwick 2017: 198)). The 
impact on Lolita was also aesthetic, with the second half of the film (essentially a road 
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movie) losing the ‘authenticity of the American highway locale of Nabokov’s novel and 
instead gave the film a decidedly cozy, British feel’ (196). 
 Harris still faced several hurdles in his attempts to package Lolita and obtain 
financial backing. This included the lack of an actor for the lead role of Humbert 
Humbert (who had to be British for the film to be eligible for the Eady Levy), the 
transgressive reputation of the novel, and Kubrick’s growing insistence on creative 
control. Harris had come close to finalising a deal with Warner Bros., which would have 
seen the company finance the project for $1 million and entitled HKPC to fifty per cent 
of any profits. But the deal was turned down on the basis that ‘Harris-Kubrick refused 
to allow WB any say-so in story treatment, which latter demanded’ (Anon. 1959c: 17). 
Kubrick was causing, in Variety’s words, ‘hassle over “artistic control”’ (17). The trade 
press also reported that another, unnamed film company ‘flatly refused to finance 
“Lolita” when [HKPC] […] allegedly demanded “impossible” terms, including “no 
look” at the screenplay’ (Anon. 1959d: 4). This could have been United Artists, which 
had expressed an interest in funding the development of a screenplay, but eventually 
decided against this. UA’s Robert Blumofe explained the reasoning as being because of 
HKPC making ‘one of the most presumptuous and arrogant demands for a deal that we 
have ever had, particularly when it comes from a couple of youngsters like these’ 
(Blumofe 1959 cited in Balio 1987: 159). 
Harris continued his pursuit of a financial backer who would allow HKPC 
creative freedom on the script, a script that was to be based on controversial literary 
material and thereby was sure to encounter trouble with the MPAA and the Legion of 
Decency. He found this almost impossible, and perhaps sensing the difficulties ahead 
and potential development hell, was simultaneously acquiring other literary property 
and registering other titles for HKPC. Just as the major companies were wary of 
financing Lolita, major Hollywood stars were wary of appearing in any adaptation of 
the scandalous novel. Its taboo subject matter put off a number of star names that did 
not want to be associated with themes of transgressive love. Laurence Olivier had been 
approached while Kubrick worked with him on Spartacus and he provisionally agreed 
to play Humbert in 1959 (Tennant 1959). But less than a month after indicating his 
commitment, Olivier wrote to Harris and Kubrick to backtrack after realising the tarnish 
on his appearance playing Humbert might have: 
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[I do] not feel my mind grasping a film conception of the subject, and I therefore don’t 
feel that I can very well bear the onus of the responsibility of partnership in the script of 
a subject concerning which strong doubts are so uppermost in my mind […] I fear that 
told in terms of dialogue the subject would be reduced to the level of pornography, to 
which I am afraid quite a few people already consign it. (Olivier 1959) 
 
Certainly the book had a pornographic reputation, as Olivier suggests. The Paris based 
Olympia Press had originally published it after it failed to find mainstream publication. 
Olympia had a list of erotic titles to its name, including The 120 Days of Sodom, or the 
School of Libertinage (Marquis de Sade 1904) and The Carnal Days of Helen Seferis 
(Alexander Trocchi 1954).14 Such association in the conservative days of the 1950s 
preceded the book and, therefore, by implication the film HKPC was attempting to 
produce. Harris has said that, ‘I’m sure MCA talked him out of it, that Sir Laurence 
Olivier can’t walk into a project like this with these two kids and, God knows what 
they’re going to do […] you’re Laurence Olivier, you can’t run the risk of telling the 
story of a paedophile’ (Appendix I). Harris would approach David Niven to be cast as 
Humbert, but was told that he was already committed to a television programme with 
Four Star Television and that the sponsors of Niven and the show would withdraw their 
sponsorship should he do the film (Appendix I). Association with the subject material 
was causing jitters in the industry. 
If Hollywood both courted the controversy that surrounded the project, but 
simultaneously fought it, then Harris would have to look beyond the borders of 
Hollywood, beyond those of the American film industry, and seek other modes of 
finance and other ways of producing. By mid-1959 the book had ‘disproportionately 
high’ sales in Europe, particularly Germany and France (Harris 1959a), with Harris 
concluding that this would mean ‘a comparable ready-made audience in those countries’ 
(1959a). In order to raise funds to finance the film, Harris considered preselling it to 
European countries based on the hype (Appendix I). He was once more displaying his 
ability to subvert the Hollywood system. Harris outlined his thinking in a letter to 
Kubrick, saying that the publishing world was ‘buzzing’ due to the anticipated success 
                                                        
14 Olympia Press’s reputation is perhaps more fairly assessed as being bohemian. Alongside the 
erotic titles, Olympia also published titles by Beat Generation poets and writers like Allen 
Ginsberg and Jack Kerouac (Campbell 2016). For further reading on Olympia Press see Carroll 
and Kearney’s The Paris Olympia Press (2007). 
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of the republication of Lolita in Europe (Harris 1959b). This was shaping up not to be 
an American film, but an international project. Packaging the project to have a script 
with Nabokov’s name on it (even if Harris and Kubrick rewrote his script), as well as 
eventually snaring an A-list British star, James Mason, would increase the commercial 
viability of the project and convince distributors in Europe of the audience potential 
before the film had even been produced. Harris concluded that, ‘not only will we have 
multiple millions exposed to the book all over again but can work out a separate movie 
edition when the picture is released’ (Harris 1959b).  
However, the need to pre-sell the picture became less urgent due to a 
serendipitous meeting between Harris and his old schoolmate, Kenneth Hyman. Hyman 
was preparing to relocate to London after being appointed the Head of UK Operations 
for his father’s (Eliot) production company, Seven Arts (Anon. 1960a: 15). By 1959 
Seven Arts had grown vastly and had begun developing subsidiary interests in other 
entertainment media, including the record industry, Broadway plays, and the 
development of leisure resorts in the Bahamas (Anon. 1960a: 1). As Seven Arts enacted 
on its diversification strategy, its main company officers, Eliot Hyman and Lou Chesler, 
pursued a business strategy of creating a ‘family’ of producers to create a constant 
stream of packaged feature productions (1). They offered ‘stock inducements to top 
rated actors and directors to become members’ of this family, with the added enticement 
of not just having their pictures financed but also participating ‘in the overall success of 
the company and not merely in individual pictures’ (1). The mode of production being 
developed by Seven Arts expanded on the successful formula of the package-unit 
system pioneered by United Artists throughout the 1950s. Seven Arts offered producers 
either complete financing, partial financing, or arranging financing through a 
distributor. By September 1960, Seven Arts had approximately fifteen pictures in 
production and had contributed $17,500,000 to their financing (Anon. 1960a: 15). Films 
such as The Misfits (1961), West Side Story (1961), By Love Possessed (1961), and Two 
for the Seesaw (1962) were financed by Seven Arts and distributed by UA (Anon. 
1960a: 15). In the case of The Misfits, Seven Arts were the sole production company, 
while the latter three films were produced in association with the Mirisch Company 
(15). The Mirisch Company affiliated with UA in 1957, agreeing a twelve-picture 
contract with the distributor (Anon. 1964d: 6). Just as Mirisch were diversifying going 
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into the 1960s (they expanded their deal with UA in 1964 to produce forty-eight 
pictures over ten years, ‘dependent on business conditions’ with the policy being 
‘flexible’ (6)), so did Seven Arts. They participated in international productions, 
including eighteen pictures for Hammer Films (Anon. 1960a: 15). They also co-
produced a number of productions such as The Roman Spring of Mrs Stone (1961) and 
The Sergeant (1968), as well as participated in productions that it originally owned the 
films rights to, including Anatomy of a Murder (1959) and Strangers When We Meet 
(1960) (Anon. 1960a: 15). HKPC was included in the Seven Arts ‘family’ as part of 
Hyman’s diversification strategy and Lolita (15), their first picture together, would be a 
fifty-fifty partnership (Appendix I). Seven Arts’s ‘principal function was the assembly 
and development of packages. The actual physical production [is] turned over to 
selected producers’ (Anon. 1960a: 15), in this case, HKPC.  
 With Seven Arts financing and packaging the film, Harris and Kubrick could 
turn their attention to the adaptation itself. The absolute creative freedom on the script 
that Kubrick desired would prove impossible during the days of the Production Code, 
despite his brazen confidence when discussing the issue of censorship with potential 
stars of the picture, such as a letter he wrote to Peter Ustinov on 20 May 1960, claiming, 
‘the censorship thing does not concern me very much […] I don’t think the MPAA will 
give us a seal, but if you’ve been following the grosses of similar films, it doesn’t make 
a difference’ (Kubrick 1960a). His confidence on the censorship issue was twofold: one, 
Harris and Seven Arts intended to road show Lolita for the first year of its release, and 
two, the film itself would be ‘fairly innocent as far as […] the eye will see’, leading 
Kubrick to conclude that ‘the MPAA thing becomes merely academic’ (Kubrick 
1960a). Films that had previously been released without a seal had gone on to be big 
hits at the box office, including two films by Otto Preminger, The Moon is Blue (1953) 
and Man With the Golden Arm (1955), and Elia Kazan’s Baby Doll (1956); the Legion 
of Decency condemned them all. Seven Arts, however, were not to take any risks, 
particularly when it came to the script. Kubrick’s comment that the film was to be 
innocent as far as ‘the eye will see’ betrayed his method of inserting sexual innuendo 
via the spoken word, as would become evident in the final film. The dialogue was filled 
with sexual innuendo, from Humbert being persuaded to rent Charlotte Haze’s home 
because of Lolita’s “cherry pies” and John and Jean being “broadminded” and “doing 
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homework” together, to Charlotte showing Clare Quilty her “garden” and Lolita going 
to have a “cavity filled” by Uncle Ivor. Harris and Kubrick wrote the final screenplay 
based on their own ideas and the drafts prepared by Calder Willingham, Nabokov, and 
Nabokov’s original book, though they departed quite substantially from the source text 
(Pinkerton 2015). 
Seven Arts wanted to ensure protection in passing the project by the censors and 
so brought on board a ‘script technical adviser’, Martin Quigley, who had co-authored 
the Motion Picture Production Code in 1930. As Harris has commented, ‘we figured if 
we could get him on our film as a technical adviser, he could keep us out of trouble’ 
(Appendix I). Quigley would eventually lead negotiations with Geoffrey Sherlock, the 
head of the MPAA, about any necessary cuts to the completed picture (Harris 2016). 
Harris and Kubrick did not participate in these negotiations given Quigley’s intimate 
relationship with the Production Code. Quigley found a number of problems in the 
script prepared by Harris and Kubrick and all of the changes he recommended to the 
first eighty-two pages were incorporated by the start of the shoot on 28 November 1960 
(Hyman 1960a). Further problems were identified in the final eighty-three pages of the 
script, but due to shooting having commenced and it being impractical for either Harris 
or Kubrick to meet with Quigley to discuss them – they were both in the UK – Hyman 
requested that they ‘avoid any shooting of what would be included in these last eighty-
three pages, until such time as this has been settled’ (Hyman 1960a). Hyman asked that 
Harris inform him of any scenes that were scheduled to be imminently shot from the last 
eighty-three pages so Quigley could be informed and see if he had any issues with them. 
Kubrick would no doubt have found Hyman’s interventions frustrating, given his 
documented desire for a deal where financiers could not have access to the script (Anon. 
1959d: 4). Hyman’s requests amounted, in a sense, to legal control over what kind of 
material Harris and Kubrick could film on the instruction of Quigley. In a letter of 28 
November to the pair, Hyman asked them to fully recognise Quigley’s suggestions and 
thinking, because he felt there was increasing societal demand for the ‘elimination of 
subject matter onerous to the public at large’ and that failure to cooperate with Quigley 
would lead to a ‘most unhappy situation’ (Hyman 1960a).  
Hyman’s letter ends with a veiled acknowledgement that, should HKPC not 
have complied with Quigley’s recommendations, then ‘we would have come to the 
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point of no return’ (Hyman 1960a). In fact, the extent of Hyman’s interventions is 
remarkable. For instance, he essentially orders Harris and Kubrick to ‘incorporate 
immediately into the screenplay those changes reflected in the 82 pages in order that 
they can be passed onto Mr Quigley without delay’, and that it would be absolutely 
necessary for further revisions to the screenplay (Hyman 1960a). Hyman was protecting 
not only the film from any protracted battles with the censors, but also the reputation of 
Seven Arts, a company that was rapidly expanding and would certainly not want its 
reputation sullied by an unchecked Harris and Kubrick. If Lolita faced a battle with the 
MPAA and Legion of Decency, it in effect was finding itself being censored by its 
financial backers, Seven Arts. Hence Kubrick’s turn to the use of innuendo, almost as a 
subversive way of rebelling against the lack of creative authority he now found himself 
with on the screenplay. 
 It would seem that Quigley had a direct line to Hyman, bypassing James B. 
Harris. As Harris said, he was absent from issues of censorship, seemingly stripped of 
the power to control this by Seven Arts, who invested Quigley with an element of 
censory authorial agency. In a letter from Quigley to Hyman on 7 December, he tells the 
head of Seven Arts Productions that an article in Variety, in which a pastor attacks 
Lolita, is another ‘current indication of the fury and extent of the attack which well may 
be expected. I hope we will be in a position to meet the attack with the only kind of 
defense [sic] that can be effective’ (Quigley 1960). It is left undetermined in the letter 
precisely what Quigley means by the only effective kind of defence, though presumably 
this includes the need for HKPC to fully comply with Quigley’s recommendations. 
Hyman forwarded both the letter and the Variety article from Quigley to Harris and 
Kubrick five days later, noting that it is important that everyone understands ‘the good 
taste in which the picture is made’ (Hyman 1960b). 
 The underlying tension over the film’s obvious taboo subject was soon exploited 
by HKPC, however, as Harris commenced work on developing promotion of Sue Lyon 
and her ‘Lolita image’ (Harris 1960). Harris’s intent was to introduce Lyon to the world 
through photographs, ‘the shooting of which are completely controlled by Stanley and 
myself’ (Harris 1960). This involved the need to ensure that she was not portrayed as 
being ‘completely opposite in real life to the character’ (Harris 1960). The aim was to 
project an image of what Harris called ‘artistic integrity’ through subtle promotion of 
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Lyon ahead of the film’s screening with the censors (Harris 1960). Promotion of Lyon 
and the Lolita-image in Life magazine emphasised how the title role required her to 
convey ‘both girlish innocence and far too much experience’ (Bunzel 1962: 97). The 
image of Lyon that was presented to the media was of a confident woman, someone 
who was carefree and light-hearted who had ‘clowned’ her way through her audition for 
the role of Lolita (Bunzel 1962: 98). One staged photograph shows her riding a horse 
and confidently pointing off camera; Lyon was presented as a mature and self-assured 
young woman, possessing experience beyond her teenage years. Such images played up 
to the official film poster, showing Lolita provocatively sucking on a lollypop as her 
eyes peek suggestively over the brim of her heart-shaped sunglasses. A bold headline 
across the poster asks, ‘how did they ever make a movie of Lolita?’, and plays up the 
fact that the film was only ‘for persons over 18 years of age’ (Anon. 1962c: 19). Critical 
quotes on one version of the poster provocatively suggested that, ‘Sue Lyon makes you 
believe that she is Lolita!’ The Lolita-image HKPC were crafting was one of the 
tantalising prospect of sex, of seeing Sue Lyon/Lolita act out the book’s most notorious 
passages, all the while playing on its pornographic association to Olympia Press. 
Kubrick himself acknowledged in a 1970 interview with Joseph Gelmis that the 
narrative interest of both the book and film ‘boils down to the question, “Will Humbert 
get Lolita into bed?”’ (Kubrick quoted in Phillips 2001: 88). The Lolita-image drew 
upon the exploitation aesthetics of sex and violence of the low-budget genre pictures 
that HKPC had started out production in as part of UA’s abecedarian programme. But 
just as The Killing blurred the boundaries between exploitation and art film, the 
promotion of Lolita aimed towards such confused categorisation through the 
exploitation of Sue Lyon and the use of Nabokov’s literary credentials in giving him the 
sole screenplay credit. 
 Reviews of the film pointed at how Lolita was both macabre, given its opening 
murder scene and the blackly humorous portrayal of Charlotte’s accidental death, as 
well as both ‘complex and demanding’, being based on a first-rate book (Anon. 1962c: 
19). Other reviews argued that the intellectual themes are juxtaposed against the 
occasional ‘sexy tableau’, such as the opening shots of Humbert sensually painting 
Lolita’s toe nails (Anon. 1962d: 137). Elsewhere, James Mason’s performance is 
described as seedy (137), Sue Lyon’s Lolita is described as having transformed the 
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character into a ‘busty bobbysoxer of independence’ (Anby 1962: 6), and Sellers’s 
impersonation of a German psychiatrist as being in ‘almost Dostoievskian territory of 
sadistic innuendo and crafty, leechlike persistence’ (Anon. 1962d: 137). This tension 
between the literary prestige of the adaptation, with the baser more exploitative 
elements of noir, innuendo, and death no doubt flummoxed some reviewers. Sight and 
Sound’s Arlene Croce effused over Nabokov’s screenplay, saying it was ‘a model of 
adaptation – resourceful, economical, light-bodied’, in contrast to what she saw as 
Kubrick’s poor direction (Croce 1962: 191). She insisted the film suffered due to having 
the genius of Nabokov’s voice and ear melded with Kubrick’s ‘weird’ direction, what 
she called ‘a cross between Josef von Sternberg and Preston Sturges’ (191); in other 
words the intelligent wit and dry humour of Sturges’s comedies, mixed with the ‘trashy 
pornography’ of Sternberg’s work such as The Blue Angel/Der blaue Engel (1930) 
(Gallagher 2002). Both film directors presented dark visions of men, with the humour 
of Sturges’ films stemming from ‘a bitter, pessimistic view of the world and an idea of 
man as grossly imperfect’ (Varsted Kirkegaard 2004), while von Sternberg’s films 
depict the self-destruction of male characters due to their ‘mixtures of sadism and 
masochistic subservience’ to women (Gallagher 2002). 
This is not to suggest that Lolita was any kind of highbrow sexploitation picture, 
despite the attempts to exploit the ‘adult’ nature of the story. The insinuation of an 
‘adults only’ movie became a key part of TV-spots for the film and led one NBC 
affiliate to refuse to show the advert, even though it had been deemed acceptable by 
both NBC executives and censors (Anon. 1962e: 48). Instead, Lolita saw HKPC 
diversifying their product brand, drawing on the various aesthetic associations to 
sexploitation and pornography, while at the same time moving toward a European art 
house complexity, developing a story with psychological depth and auteur credentials. 
This is a process that Elena Gorfinkel calls cultural distinction, of the merging of sexual 
and cinephile taste, bringing art house legitimacy to sexual representations on screen, 
increasingly seen in European movies such as The Fourth Sex (1961), The Twilight 
Girls (1957) and The Libertine (1969) (Gorfinkel 2002: 26-27). These pictures 
expanded the ‘sphere of acceptable consumption in a period of re-stratifying public 
taste’ (39). In the immediate wake of Lolita’s release, low-budget sexploitation films 
were released, such as The Seducers (1962), with narratives of older men seducing the 
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younger daughters of their fiancés or friends. 
By the end of 1963, Lolita had taken $4.5 million in domestic rentals, placing it 
in Variety’s ‘All-Time Top Grossers’ list (Anon. 1964e: 69). The film’s success 
demonstrated the growth of HKPC and how their strategy to internationalise their 
productions and to take advantage of the blurring of transgessive topics and art house 
aesthetics had created a product of cultural distinction that resonated with audiences.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has considered how HKPC fits within the industrial transformations taking 
place in Hollywood in the 1950s and early 1960s, contributing to the literature on these 
contexts. Robert Sklar first raised the question of how Kubrick and his films were 
‘enmeshed in the structures of the American film business’ (1988: 114). He suggested 
that Kubrick ‘hardly ever hesitated from playing the American film business game’ 
(114), and as a result his own filmmaking strategies were ‘inevitably inflected by the 
constraints of American film industry practices’ (115). Peter Krämer (2013a; 2015a; 
2017a) and Tino Balio (1985; 1987) have further uncovered these contexts, particularly 
around the need for diversification in independent filmmaking due to a growing 
internationalisation of Hollywood and its productions. This chapter has argued that, 
through a process of diversification, the company was able to grow and thrive, 
particularly off of this rapid internationalisation of Hollywood, as well as the ability to 
exploit controversy and the weaknesses of the Production Code. As production output 
decreased in the 1950s and budgets increased, and as the package-unit system was 
solidified as the new mode of production, HKPC responded to the business strategies of 
companies such as United Artists and Seven Arts to their advantage. Following its 
takeover by Krim and Benjamin, UA pursued a policy of investing in new and 
innovative producing talent. Kubrick’s precocious methods in the early 1950s and 
HKPC’s ability to align their production package with UA’s abecedarian programme 
ensured they were able to secure a funding deal, as well as gain a semblance of artistic 
independence in how they adapted Lionel White’s Clean Break. Similarly, by 
responding to industrial trends to move productions abroad, as well as blurring the lines 
between art and exploitation, they were able to realise an adaptation of Lolita (if 
somewhat hampered by the constraints of the Production Code). 
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 Notwithstanding its initial failure at the box office, The Killing performed a 
much more important function for HKPC than a return on investment: it had attracted 
the attention of critics and Hollywood insiders. On 30 June 1956, HKPC were included 
in a special producer’s issue of The Independent Film Journal. It outlined Hollywood’s 
hottest producing companies and HKPC, after just one feature, were included, being 
described as the industry’s ‘most versatile young talents’ (Anon. 1956c: 47). Harris was 
vital in the development of HKPC and Kubrick’s own career; his innovations, both at 
Flamingo Films as a pioneer of the distribution of films to television, and at HKPC in 
his ability to secure international deals for the company, demonstrate his significance in 
the development of the role of producer itself. Control was an issue key to HKPC from 
the outset, and throughout its activity, Harris battled – along with Kubrick – to refashion 
the responsibilities of the role and to wrestle these back from financiers, studios, and 
other corporate entities. The neglect of Harris’s contribution, or the way in which 
HKPC operated, has resulted in Kubrick’s early career being positioned within the 
auteurist contexts of his later films. But the production of these films was a constant 
struggle, a power battle that inevitably saw compromise, as well as business decisions 
tailored to meet the strategies of companies such as UA. 
 What this chapter also reveals is the lack of control in one key area of 
producing: the promotion, publicity and distribution of their films. HKPC lacked any 
control over The Killing once the print had been handed over to United Artists, resulting 
in poor grosses for the picture during its initial release. Though they were able to 
control the promotion (and exploitation) of Sue Lyon’s Lolita-image, HKPC had to 
defer to both Seven Arts and MGM over the wider promotion and distribution of that 
picture. HKPC had attempted to appoint their own publicist to Lolita, Kubrick’s friend 
Sig Shore, but Hyman made clear he was not happy with HKPC selecting their own 
publicist and forced them to drop him (Kubrick 1961). But even though HKPC agreed 
to the dropping of Shore they argued strenuously with Seven Arts about how Lolita 
should be promoted. Hyman wanted to forfeit HKPC’s rights of ‘publicity and 
advertising approvals and suggestions’ (Kubrick 1961), but Kubrick saw this policy as 
counterintuitive to the filmmaking process. For him, being an independent producer 
relying on the money of others also meant having absolute control and legal authority. 
His view was based on the belief that the producer of the film had an investment that 
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was not merely financial, but also creative; the film was being made out of a passion for 
the story, and he did trust a corporate entity to take over the responsibilities of the 
picture at the last stage. Kubrick was explicit in this belief, telling Hyman ‘Jim and I 
simply cannot believe that you have so much faith in the wisdom […] of any of the 
major studio sales departments that you would be willing to entrust them entirely to do 
the best possible job […] Seven Arts and ourselves would be asking for the most 
gratuitous chances of things being messed up’ (Kubrick 1961). 
 What this chapter demonstrates is the tension between independent producers 
and the desire by the major Hollywood companies to retain legal authority of the 
productions, particularly over publicity and distribution. As the next chapter discusses, 
the market and industrial trends outlined in this chapter were presenting Hollywood 
with greater financial risk heading into the 1960s and therefore the role of the producer 
and the power they had became an ever more important issue.  
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Chapter Three: 
‘If you don’t have legal authority, you don’t have any authority at all’: 
New Modes of Producing in Hollywood 1957-1960 
 
 
The management and working style of HKPC was established in the previous chapter, 
both their means of independent production and their relation to wider contexts of the 
package-unit system. The company embodied the kind of fresh blood that the industry 
needed to revitalise its flagging fortunes in the face of audience decline and the rise of 
television (Finler 2003: 377-379). They were the ‘injection of independent into the 
mainstream’ that David O. Selznick had been calling for – the ‘young blood and young 
thinking’ that was a ‘pre-requisite if the picture business is to survive’ (Anon. 1950c: 
63). Faced with a declining audience increasingly enamoured with television, producers 
who could package films that were innovative and low-budget stood to benefit. As Peter 
Lev has suggested, the independent producer had become the ‘creative center of the 
film industry […] the victory of the independents was clear’ (2003: 2). This also 
suggests that the location of power and authority within the film industry was shifting, 
with independent producers building their own powerbases. One such former studio 
boss who understood the paradigm shift in the industry was Daryl F. Zanuck, an 
executive at Twentieth Century-Fox. Zanuck quit his role in 1956 to become an 
independent producer and later reflected on this decision: ‘The head of the studio was 
no longer in charge; he was becoming “a negotiator, an executive, a peacemaker”’ (Lev 
2003: 2). 
Yet the balance of power was still in the favour of the major studios. Though 
independent producers could find themselves earning more than studio executives, 
companies like Fox, Paramount, and MGM, were still very much in control of the 
product the producers were making due to being the distributors and promoters of the 
films (2). The power struggle over the next decade would see independent producers 
such as Kubrick battling for control over ‘legal authority’, in other words, to become the 
absolute executive of a film, with studios merely providing a service such as global 
distribution. What was happening in Hollywood throughout the 1950s and 1960s was a 
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realignment of power amongst the industry’s personnel, with a number of individuals 
taking advantage of these circumstances. 
 One of these was Kirk Douglas. Among the most powerful individuals in 
Hollywood in the 1950s, his box office appeal in films like The Bad and the Beautiful 
(1952) and 20,000 Leagues Under the Sea (1954), and Man Without A Star (1955) led 
him to set up his own production company, Bryna Productions, in 1955. Bryna and 
HKPC were two independent production companies that operated in a similar fashion to 
some degree, both headed by producers in control of their own films and then selling 
them to Hollywood majors for distribution. It was not long before these two 
increasingly influential production companies came together to collaborate. Douglas 
had been impressed with The Killing (Douglas 1988: 273), while HKPC were looking 
for backing and star power in order to package an adaptation of Humphrey Cobb’s 
novel Paths of Glory (1935).  
This chapter will trace the interactions of these two companies between 1956 
and 1961, focusing on the issue of control and the new modes of producing in 
mainstream Hollywood. Case studies of Paths of Glory and Spartacus reveal that this 
period would lead to some important realisations for Kubrick about control and, 
particularly, the publicity units on films, all of which would greatly influence him in the 
founding of his own production companies in 1962. The first section of this chapter 
explores the power shift in Hollywood to the independent producer operating in the 
mainstream, before moving on to look at the contractual contexts between Bryna and 
HKPC. The chapter will situate the productions of Paths of Glory and Spartacus within 
the framework of these new modes of producing and the shifting power balance in 
Hollywood, and assess its impact on Kubrick’s later refashioning of the role of 
producer. 
 
New Modes of Producing 
To better understand the new modes of producing and the shifting power dynamics in 
Hollywood, it is necessary to look at the wider contexts of producing and production 
companies by the end of the 1950s. By 1957, in the short space of a decade, the 
industrial conditions of Hollywood had altered radically and the package-unit system 
was now dominant. Whereas the major studios once controlled actors, some now 
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operated as producers with their own production companies. The most successful in 
terms of box office had been Hecht-Hill-Lancaster Productions, the production 
company of actor Burt Lancaster and his two business partners, James Hill and Harold 
Hecht. Lancaster had originally formed his independent production company, Norma 
Productions, along with Hecht in 1948, when it was ‘one of the first independent film 
producing companies in Hollywood […] in an era in which studios still dominated 
Hollywood’ (Fein 1985). Norma Productions produced three films, Kiss the Blood Off 
My Hands (1948) produced by Richard Vernon and distributed by Universal, The Flame 
and the Arrow (1950) distributed by Warner Bros., and Ten Tall Men (1951) distributed 
by Columbia Pictures, with all of them proving successful at the box office and 
demonstrating the financial gain that independent production companies could bring to 
their executives.  
Lancaster and Hecht incorporated a new production company in 1951, Hecht-
Lancaster, and signed a multi-deal contract with United Artists. The deal saw UA agree 
to fully finance the company’s projects, allow them to keep seventy-five per cent of any 
profits, and be given a special distribution fee discount of twenty-five per cent (Balio 
1987: 74). Hecht-Lancaster Productions made five pictures as part of the arrangement: 
The Crimson Pirate (1952), Apache, Vera Cruz, Marty (1955), and The Kentuckian 
(1955). Again each of these films was highly profitable, made on relatively small 
budgets but often returning sizeable profits. Apache had cost approximately $1 million 
but took $3 million domestically, while Vera Cruz took $3.5 million domestically off a 
budget of $1.6 million (Balio 1987: 79). The box office accomplishment of Hecht-
Lancaster Productions was the most prominent example of a new way of producing in 
Hollywood. No longer did major studios hold the power, but rather independent 
companies broke the established industrial order, leading to the rapid demise of the old 
studio system. In turn, ‘they were able to tackle more daring subjects, delving into areas 
that Hollywood had previously shied away from’ (Bergan 2001). 
HKPC was set up in a similar fashion as Hecht-Lancaster. The aim of these 
production companies was not to become so successful as to achieve permanent 
affiliation, or merge with a particular studio (though some did), but rather to build a 
powerbase from which flowed legal authority. In effect, they took over the role of the 
classical Hollywood moguls, the Thalbergs, Warners, and Zanucks who decided what 
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films would be shot, how they would be filmed, and who would star in them. The one 
area where control largely remained with the majors, however, was publicity; if they 
were to be distributing the picture, then they were to control how it was sold. 
 Kirk Douglas at Bryna Productions would exemplify the image of the new 
producer. Douglas recognised the potential of Hecht-Lancaster and their operation of 
the package-unit method and was spurred on to form his own independent production 
company. Douglas was motivated by the resounding critical and commercial success of 
films like Marty, but also by the fifty per cent participation deal he had reached with 
Universal on Man Without A Star (1955) (Douglas 1988: 256). The arrangement saw 
Douglas accrue over $360,000 in payments by May 1957 (Brown 1957). It was 
following the release of Man Without A Star that Douglas formed Bryna Productions. 
Life magazine ran a piece on Douglas describing his new company: 
 
They will find him [Douglas] entering an unpretentious office building at 9 a.m. and 
riding a self-service elevator to an efficiently staffed suite of rooms where he spends all 
day every day running his Bryna Productions. Douglas is still a little self-conscious 
about his new role. In the early days of Bryna the trade paper Variety ran a headline 
which called him an actor-tycoon […] He scorns a conventional desk and prefers to do 
most of his work lying full length on a couch. But there he devotes the most serious 
study to film ideas, treatments, scripts, casts and budgets. (Havemann 1958: 185) 
 
Douglas’s professed motivations behind the formation of Bryna were not to become a 
‘tycoon’, but to gain greater legal authority over the way his films were made (Douglas 
1988: 257). Yet despite his studious management of Bryna, Douglas found his initial 
years in independent production a struggle. Bryna’s first feature, The Indian Fighter, 
was a success at the box office, but the company’s next four features all took a heavy 
loss: Spring Reunion (1957), Lizzie (1957), The Careless Years (1957), and Ride Out 
For Revenge (1957). Something might be said of the fact that Douglas had approved of 
a quick succession of movies in the space of a year, not allowing for quality but rather 
quantity. This contrasted with how Hecht-Lancaster operated and certainly with how 
HKPC would operate. Largely this had been on the advice of Douglas’s lawyer, Sam 
Norton, who advised him that Bryna, for tax purposes, had to produce a number of films 
that did not feature Douglas in a starring role. As a result, Douglas ‘reluctantly set up 
several low-budget pictures’ (Douglas 1988: 262). Independent production was 
predicated not on spectacle or big budget, but rather on smaller budgets, quality 
production, and big name stars. Hecht-Lancaster’s Marty had proven this, as would 
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Paths of Glory to some extent, though the latter’s downbeat ending and anti-war themes 
may well have impacted on its broader appeal. However, Bryna found itself with several 
highly profitable features in the subsequent years, including The Vikings (1958) and 
Spartacus, a film that grossed more than $60 million and became Universal’s highest 
grossing film until Airport (1970). 
 These disparate production companies exemplified in their own way the 
changing state of Hollywood and the uncertainty and unpredictability of the industry. 
Independent production did not automatically equate to being your own independent 
producer in absolute legal control of your films. Nor did being an independent producer 
mean you could produce absolutely any feature without suffering the consequences of 
the whims of the box office. There were still industrial constraints and trends that 
impacted how films were produced and the degree of control producers were allowed, 
as will be explored in the following two sections. 
 
Levels of Autonomy on Paths of Glory 
The critical success of The Killing made it a calling card for HKPC and attracted the 
attention of the major distributors (Appendix I). Time magazine profiled HKPC, where 
once more the phrase ‘boy wonders’ was used to depict Harris and Kubrick, and 
described the way they produced The Killing as showing ‘more audacity with dialogue 
and camera than Hollywood has seen since the obstreperous Orson Welles’ (Anon. 
1956m). The article enthused about HKPC’s ability to produce an innovative and 
quality film on a relatively low-budget. MGM’s Head of Production, Dore Schary, 
offered HKPC a deal to produce their next film, but told them explicitly that it could not 
be an adaptation of Paths of Glory (LoBrutto 1997: 130-131); MGM’s previous anti-
war film, The Red Badge of Courage (1951) directed by John Huston, had failed 
spectacularly at the box office, with a loss of over $1 million (Miller n.d.). HKPC had 
bought the rights to Humphrey Cobb’s Paths of Glory as one of several potential 
projects by the end of July 1956 (Appendix I). But instead, the deal with MGM saw 
them working on an adaptation of Stefan Zweig’s The Burning Secret (1911), a story of 
an extra-marital affair (Anon. 1956h: 5). 
MGM were undergoing ‘management turmoil between 1955 and 1959, with the 
board of directors constantly fighting over who would control the company and what 
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direction it would take’ (Lev 2003: 198). Therefore, it seems unlikely that HKPC would 
produce a film with MGM on the terms they wanted.15 MGM had suffered losses in the 
fourth-quarter of 1955 and the first quarter of 1956. Dore Schary was thereby seeking 
ways to ‘bolster the company’s output’ (Anon. 1956i: 7). But by mid-summer of 1956, 
MGM were looking to make efficiency savings and to ‘reduce manpower in various 
departments’ (7). MGM, along with Twentieth Century-Fox, had been one of the 
slowest of the majors to adapt and change in light of the 1948 Paramount Decrees, the 
rise of television, and the fast changing economic conditions of the film industry. By 
1956 they finally acknowledged a need to revaluate their operational procedures, with 
Schary concluding that ‘in today’s economy all studios “must examine (their) economy 
and stop waste”’ (Anon. 1956j: 5). MGM began ending contracts with various 
personnel and hired an ‘efficiency expert’ (5). By November 1956, stockholders forced 
Schary out of the company, and further cuts were made. With Schary being paid-off, 
MGM used it as an opportunity to ‘trim expenses’ and remove from the payroll HKPC, 
whose development of The Burning Secret had overrun excessively and who had, 
behind MGM’s back as it were, hired Jim Thompson to adapt Paths of Glory (Appendix 
I). 
As Chapter Two showed, HKPC had begun a process of having a number of 
projects in development, arguably in preparation for the rejection of their ideas. Kubrick 
had already started exploring the possibility of adapting an Arthur Schnitzler project, a 
prospect that would gather momentum by the end of the 1950s when he came into 
contact with Schnitzler’s grandson, Peter (Schnitzler 1959; see Chapter Six). HKPC 
also hired Calder Willingham to work on The Burning Secret (Appendix I). Willingham 
was a prolific author, who had written a bestseller by the age of twenty-five, End As A 
Man (1947). It was Kubrick who suggested approaching Willingham, having read 
several of his books and being impressed by his talent (Appendix I). However, the 
hiring of Willingham to adapt The Burning Secret may indicate HKPC’s lack of passion 
for the project, and speak more to their desire to produce Paths of Glory. After all, 
Willingham’s End As A Man was a controversial work that attacked the machismo 
culture of military life. Set in a Military Academy in the southern USA, the cadets are 
subjected to a ‘rigid aristocratic discipline’, overseen by the ‘sadist, Jocko de Paris’, a                                                         
15 See Chapter Two for further discussion about Kubrick’s insistence on artistic control. 
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corporal known for his ‘excessive brutality to his squad’ (Isherwood 1951: 7). The book 
was noted for its realism and satiric humour, and its unflinching and critical view of US 
military life led to its being prosecuted, though the prosecution ultimately failed (7). 
Kubrick therefore probably viewed Willingham as the ideal writer to adapt Paths of 
Glory given its anti-war theme. 
 Without any studio backing, HKPC now had to pre-package Paths of Glory and 
attach a big name star to it. The completed script was sent to HKPC’s agent, Ronnie 
Lubin, who in turn marketed it around various big-name stars in Hollywood, including 
Kirk Douglas (Appendix I). Harris and Kubrick met with Douglas at the Brown Derby 
restaurant in Beverly Hills (Harris 1957c: 1), along with Lubin and Douglas’s agent Ray 
Stark, and made what Harris calls ‘the most outrageous deal’, agreed due to the anxiety 
to ensure Douglas would star in Paths of Glory (Appendix I). On 9 January 1957, a 
five-point memorandum of understanding was drawn up between Bryna Productions 
and HKPC (Bryna 1957). The memorandum set out a four-picture deal between the two 
companies, with an additional three pictures to be completed following Paths of Glory. 
Bryna Productions had no ownership of Paths of Glory as Kirk Douglas was an 
‘employee’ of HKPC (Bryna 1957: 1). Despite Bryna having no ownership interest in 
Paths of Glory, it was still to be branded as a Bryna Productions film, Bryna’s 
‘administrative and other facilities’ were to be used, and publicity was to be out of the 
control of HKPC and given over to Public Relations Consultants Ltd (Bryna 1957: 1). 
The latter was a publicity company formed by Kirk Douglas and operated by Stan 
Margulies (Anon. 1959k). The primary function of Public Relations was to ‘create, 
execute and supervise all publicity, exploitation and advertising on motion pictures 
produced by Bryna’, to ‘hire and supervise personnel needed’, and to work with the 
‘publicity-advertising department of the distributing company’ (Anon. 1959k). Despite 
the deal stressing that ‘Harris and Kubrick are employers and may operate as 
individuals’, with Douglas being an employee of HKPC on Paths of Glory, control of 
the publicity process was being taken out of their hands and given over to Bryna and 
Public Relations Consultants (Norton 1957b: 3).  
 The remaining contractually bound projects after Paths of Glory would see 
HKPC giving up much more control, effectively becoming employees of Bryna (Bryna 
1957: 2). The memorandum of agreement and the affiliation between HKPC and Bryna 
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Productions were at the heart of Kubrick’s battle for legal authority and control 
throughout the late 1950s and early 1960s. The memorandum set out that HKPC had to 
complete a second picture within fifteen months of the completion of Paths of Glory, 
with Bryna able to designate the project, and Harris and Kubrick having to write, 
produce and direct (Bryna 1957: 1). The financial terms of this project entitled HKPC to 
receive ‘an amount equal to 15 percent of budget of picture not exceeding $75,000’ (1). 
This would suggest the production budget was set at a meagre $500,000, half that of 
Paths of Glory. On top of this payment, HKPC were to receive a percentage of any 
profits, shared equally with Bryna (1). While the contractual agreements for the first 
two films were firm (Paths of Glory and a further picture to star Kirk Douglas (Harris 
1957a: 18), Bryna could choose to exercise the option on the final two pictures ‘three 
months after the completion of the second picture and both pictures to be made within 
eighteen months after the exercise of option’ (Bryna 1957: 2). HKPC were to receive 
much smaller percentage fees on these option pictures, particularly on the final option 
where they would receive an amount ‘equal to 10 percent of the budget […] plus 10 
percent of 100 percent of the net profits’ (2). 
 HKPC had entered a contractual arrangement that would leave them without any 
legal producing authority or creative control following the completion of Paths of 
Glory. This was a heavy price to pay in order to secure Douglas in the lead role. Even 
though this was a non-exclusive contract, it effectively bound HKPC to Bryna for the 
foreseeable future, and, worse, allowed Bryna to participate in any creative property 
owned by HKPC (Bryna 1957: 3). They also had to ‘keep Bryna advised of all 
commitments and pending negotiations’ (2). Harris recalls that he felt the deal was 
utterly unfair, but that he and Kubrick were anxious to cast Douglas in Paths of Glory 
because having him as their star was a healthy financial and business investment 
(Appendix I). However, they immediately knew that they had to get out of the 
arrangement somehow: ‘I mean, it’s pretty much like a lifetime, I mean you did a 
picture every 18 months, it would take you about 8 years to be free of it’ (Appendix I).  
Harris’s estimation meant HKPC would not fulfil their obligations to Bryna until 1965 
at the earliest. 
 Still, with Douglas attached to Paths of Glory, HKPC was successfully able to 
package the film to UA who agreed to finance the project for nearly $1 million. UA 
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thereafter removed themselves from interference on the picture, only concerning 
themselves with publicity of the film (Appendix I). This was in line with UA’s mode of 
operation in the 1950s, which saw it become one of the most successful companies in 
Hollywood. Key to the operation was four principles set out by Arthur B. Krim in a 
1959 Variety article, ‘The Company of the Independents’. First and foremost was 
‘autonomy for the independent producers who are made to feel, and who are treated – as 
what UA wants them to be – the owners of their negatives’ (Hift 1959a: 13). Krim 
wanted to create an atmosphere of creativity for UA’s producers ‘to work autonomously 
once a project is agreed upon’ (Anon. 1958b: 4). Underlying this was the company 
attitude that every picture had to be considered a failure from the start, ‘then if it’s a 
success, well, that means the hard work has paid off and we’re agreeably surprised’ 
(Hift 1959a: 13). Each picture and agreement with an independent producer was 
considered a risk, fitting with UA’s claims of not taking undue risks, but rather 
‘measured risks’ (13). Certainly, there was an inherent risk in UA’s policy of granting 
autonomy and control to independent producers, particularly in terms of budget 
overspends. In a nod to the art-commerce dichotomy in a Variety article titled ‘UA: 
Budgets, Art & Sanity’, Krim claimed that independent producers that were financed or 
released through the company ‘very rarely run seriously over budget’ (Hift 1959b: 3). 
He outlined the reasons behind UA’s policy of granting autonomy to producers: 
 
You deal with a certain type of person when you deal with creative talent. If we were to 
start sharpening the pencil and trying for a climate of austerity, we would probably lose 
some of that talent. We would rather accept the extravaganzas that are part of 
showbusiness, but limit ourselves to dealing with people who have a reasonable chance 
of bringing in a big winner. (Hift 1959b: 3) 
 
Krim’s relaxed attitude was at odds with the usual way of conducting business in 
Hollywood. UA essentially absented themselves from a production and left it, and the 
supervision of the budget, in the hands of the producer, with the expectation that all 
budgets would go over by at least ten per cent for unforeseen circumstances (Hift 
1959b: 3). More often than not, the idea of a totally out of control producer wildly 
spending UA’s money was used for publicity, as was the case with Kirk Douglas’ The 
Vikings:  
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The business of ‘The Vikings’ going way over was mostly publicity. The picture was 
originally budgeted at $3,250,000 and it came in at $3,400,000. However, Kirk Douglas 
thought it desirable to give out a higher figure. (Hift 1959b: 3) 
 
UA’s casual attitude to budget overspend was probably because they made their profits 
from film rentals and distribution fees (Balio 1987: 92). Producers stood to lose out if 
the production budget overspent and therefore it was their responsibility to ensure it 
didn’t, with fiscal controls insuring that the producer ‘lived up to his part of the bargain 
once shooting began’ (93). UA’s concern was in maximising film rentals and here we 
can see how the so-called autonomy given to producers was somewhat curtailed by the 
company’s second principle, which subtly highlighted where the control and authority 
truly lay within the UA-independent producer dynamic. UA claimed that they provided 
‘maximum cooperation and collaboration in selling and promotion’ of a film (Hift 
1959a: 13), but made it very clear that they were ‘strictly a motion picture distribution 
company […] UA financed motion pictures simply to guarantee a steady supply of 
product’ (Balio 1987: 89-90). The autonomy and control that Krim and UA liked to 
emphasise they provided for independent producers was not altogether the case, for the 
company retained ‘ultimate discretionary power by exercising approval rights over the 
basic ingredients of a production’ (93), alongside its control of the promotion and 
distribution of a film. Krim insisted that UA collaborated with the independent producer 
in the sales for a film, saying: 
 
We try to be partners in sales with our producers. In the eight years that we have 
operated this company, I can say that we have not once booked a picture into a situation 
where the producer objected to terms. That’s despite the fact that, under our contract, 
we do have a right to overrule the producer unless he comes up with a better booking. 
We believe in cooperation, both in sales and in advertising-publicity and we listen 
eagerly when the independent has ideas for campaigns to sell what, after all, is his 
picture. (Hift 1959a: 13) 
 
The key phrase above is ‘we try’ – there is no absolute promise, despite Krim labelling 
the producer as ‘hero’ and insisting that, ‘when we give a producer 100% autonomy, we 
mean exactly that – 100%’ (13). The issue of autonomy in relation to publicity and 
distribution became the predominant battleground for Kubrick into the 1960s. Peter 
Krämer (2013b) has suggested that promotion and publicity had always been central to 
Kubrick, even since the early 1950s, and was what set him apart from other independent 
producers.  
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UA’s unenthusiastic partnership in sales and promotion was evident on films 
such as The Night of the Hunter, produced by Paul Gregory. The film was Gregory’s 
first production – he was originally a Broadway producer – and he contracted another 
novice, Charles Laughton, to direct it (Night of the Hunter would be Laughton’s first 
and only director credit). Gregory believed that UA mishandled the film’s promotion 
and distribution and gave priority instead to Stanley Kramer’s Not As A Stranger (1955) 
(Anon. 1955j: 5). The film had double the negative cost of The Night of the Hunter’s 
$700,000, and was receiving nearly $1 million in advertising from UA (5). This equated 
to around $50,000 being spent in Los Angeles alone, compared to the $10,000 allocated 
to The Night of the Hunter (5). Gregory argued that such unequal treatment meant The 
Night of the Hunter was lost in the L.A. papers (5). Cursory promotion of a film such as 
The Night of the Hunter was never going to help it given the unusual narrative and 
aesthetic of a film described as ‘one of the most daring, eloquent and personal in style to 
have come from America in a long time’ (Anon. 1956l: 3). Despite the critical praise, 
many were quick to point out that it was a ‘weirdly macabre thriller […] but the tension 
topples sadly, with too much arty, symbolic trickery’ (Anon. 1955k: 16). Kubrick’s 
films would be similarly unusual, from the downbeat, existential endings of The Killing 
and Paths of Glory, to a story of transgressive love between a college professor and a 
pre-pubescent girl in Lolita, and the absurdist comedy film about nuclear Armageddon 
in Dr. Strangelove.  
Paths of Glory, which presented an utterly bleak and damning assessment of 
humanity and war, held obvious similarities to other relatively low-budget anti-war 
films such as Attack (1956), directed and produced by Robert Aldrich. Based on the 
play Fragile Fox (1954) by Norman Brooks, Attack was shot on location in California 
and the RKO backlot in just twenty-five days (Silver 2002). The film, financed and 
distributed by UA, tells the story of less-than-heroic American soldiers who order (or 
cancel) military attacks in World War Two based on the chances of advancing their 
career. Attack was controversial, with the United States military refusing to cooperate 
with the production because of the negative portrayal of the army. The French 
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government had a similar reaction to Paths of Glory, and did not appreciate the negative 
characterisation of the French military.16  
The similarities between Aldrich’s Attack and Kubrick’s Paths of Glory extends 
to their aesthetics that emphasise their thematic concerns, with Aldrich’s ‘characteristic 
low light and side light cast[ing] long shadows on interior walls and floors and form 
rectangular blocks to give the frame a severe, constricting geometry which can 
symbolise the director’s moral determinism’ (Silver 2002). The overlap in thematic 
sensibility between Aldrich’s Attack and Kubrick’s Paths of Glory was in tune both 
with the existential intellectual philosophy that pervaded the 1950s, and with the 
directors’ individual worldviews. Aldrich’s films were imbued with an ideology of 
pessimism, cynicism, and, 
 
idealism combined to create violent, angst-ridden outbursts of existential despair. Little 
wonder that such a thematic outlook should give Aldrich a cutting edge status with 
European observers. (Silver 2002) 
  
This overriding thematic link of individuals attempting to survive in a indifferent and 
even hostile universe can be seen across a number of low-budget UA backed films such 
as Attack, Paths of Glory, The Night of the Hunter, and The Man with the Golden Arm. 
If HKPC’s first feature, The Killing, was part of UA’s abecedarian programme, their 
second feature was part of the company’s ‘Europeanised’ programme, films that were 
inherent commercial risks but appealed to the liberal critical circle and drew heavily on 
the themes of European cinema. Such films, not always resounding successes at the box 
office given their niche appeal and bleak vision, would have appealed to the growing 
art-house audience. What Robert Ray termed the ‘homogeneous mass audience’ was 
disappearing, an audience that had been built on the values and ideology of the classical 
Hollywood and the American myth (Ray 1985: 138-139). Ray argues that classical 
Hollywood was built on the image of a self-sufficient America, an image that was left 
damaged in the post-war years, with the USA effectively ‘Europeanised’ by the 1950s 
due to global events: 
 
                                                        
16 The French Ministry of Interior said that Paths of Glory was ‘subversive propaganda’ that 
was ‘highly offensive’ to the French nation (Anon 1958i: 7). The film was not released in 
France until the mid-1970s. 
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By rejecting these movies, that group was saying, “that’s too infantile a form of what 
we believe.” By turning to the “serious” pictures, it was saying, “show us something 
more complicated.” This minority art-house crowd troubled Hollywood because it 
represented only one manifestation of the new widespread and growing audience 
awareness of alternative possibilities for the movies. (Ray 1985: 139) 
 
Therefore, a section of Americans were responding to films with a more serious and at 
times pessimistic tone, which offered new visions of America, narrative, and cinema. 
The producing model pioneered by UA allowed for such films to reach the mainstream. 
Regardless of the levels of creative autonomy on set, Paths of Glory saw an 
extensive three-way power struggle over its ad-campaign and publicity between HKPC, 
Bryna Productions and its Public Relations company, and United Artists. It was the 
director of Public Relations, Stan Margulies, who oversaw the liaison of publicity with 
UA, with assistance from Myer P. Beck. Both men, though, had a conflict of interest: 
their overriding need to report back to Kirk Douglas and to protect his and Bryna’s 
other ongoing productions. In theory, they sought authorisation from James B. Harris as 
the film’s producer. Public Relations appointed a unit publicity director to the 
production, Syd Stogel, against the wishes of Harris (Harris 1957d). Stogel’s duties 
were to comply with UA’s Publicity Manual and to ensure all necessary publicity 
material was obtained during production, including photographs, synopses, press 
releases, and cast and crew biographies (Harris 1957d). Stogel found himself confused 
by the hierarchical power structure of the production and sought clarity from Margulies 
as to whom he should report; on-set authority came from Harris, but Stogel also had to 
report to Margulies and Beck (Margulies 1957a). They in turn sent regular daily memos 
to give Stogel new tasks, such as telling him to gather and write ‘home town stories and 
art’ for the hired American Army personnel in minor roles (Margulies 1957a). Stogel 
still found that he had to stress that, given his freelance contract to specifically work on 
Paths of Glory, he was hesitant to attend to any of Kirk Douglas’s or Bryna’s other 
publicity needs (Stogel 1957). Increasingly, he found that Kirk Douglas’s time was 
being consumed by pre-publicity and promotion for The Vikings, which was due to 
commence shooting on 1 June, immediately after Paths of Glory (Stogel 1957). Harris 
was fully aware that Public Relations put the interests of Bryna and Kirk Douglas ahead 
of Paths of Glory and neglected to keep either him or Syd Stogel involved in ongoing 
matters (Harris 1957c). He detailed his concerns in a letter to Stan Margulies in March 
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1957, and suggested that Bryna and Public Relations may be in breach of their 
agreement with HKPC: 
 
I get the feeling that you are not working for Harris-Kubrick Pictures and United 
Artists. Although for the purposes of the original agreement we are calling it a Bryna 
Production, you know this is not true and the function of your office is to service 
Harris-Kubrick and United Artists. What I am trying to say is that I am getting the 
feeling many times of being put on notice what is happening instead of being 
counselled with or asked for my opinion. I take exception to correspondence, copies of 
which go to every Department Head at United Artists, advising me what has or is being 
done! This must definitely stop for if it continues you will absolutely destroy our 
working relationship’. (Harris 1957e) 
 
Harris insisted that HKPC should not be treated any differently than Bryna, ‘after all our 
money is as good as anyone else’s. The fact that United Artists may advance it is 
relatively minor as it is deducted from the producer’s share in which we have the 
majority interest’ (Harris 1957e). Harris’s accusations were not wholly unfounded. For 
example, there was much correspondence in the early days of the production between 
Harris, Myers Beck, and Margulies about Harris and Kubrick’s desire to have Saul Bass 
design the film’s adverts. But Saul Bass’s fee of $15,000 caused hesitation, and Harris 
concluded that UA were unlikely to approve the cost (Beck 1957a). Beck insisted that 
Kirk Douglas himself intervene and contact Max Youngstein and Roger Lewis at UA. 
Margulies resisted Beck on the issue, stating that Douglas was ‘saving his ammunition 
for “The Vikings”’ (Margulies 1957b). Margulies’s attitude also revealed who 
continued to retain power over publicity: United Artists. He’d already been reminded of 
this on Paths of Glory, when UA’s Roger Lewis admonished him for not seeking 
approval for adverts he had placed in regional magazines. Lewis reminded him that, 
‘There is one thing that I would like to make clear. It isn’t merely a matter of your 
submitting your ads to me […] I not only want to see proofs but I would like to know 
what your schedule plans are’ (Lewis 1957). The national ad-campaign was taken over 
by UA’s chief of productions, Max Youngstein, who ‘wanted to have a real all-out 
action campaign with no projection whatsoever of unusualness’ (Margulies 1958). 
 What resulted with Paths of Glory was a confused promotion campaign, a 
process that began with Stogel on the set of the film. His press releases concentrated 
‘very much on the war and violence. Much of it emphasises action sequences. The press 
releases never even mention the court martial’ (Daniels 2015: 94). The only action 
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sequence in the film was the attack on the Anthill, with the majority of the story centred 
on the drama and politics of the château and the court martial. We can position the 
promotion of the film within the wider context of UA’s releases at the time, particularly 
Attack. Both films, as discussed above, shared thematic and narrative similarities, with 
tales of anti-heroes and less than positive portrayals of the military. But the similarities 
extend to the way the films were promoted with strikingly similar posters (see figure 3).  
 
 
 
Despite the character driven aspects of the narratives of each of the films, with action 
almost secondary to their stories, the posters both play up the generic contexts of the 
films: these are war pictures first and foremost. UA, following Youngstein’s direction, 
created ad-copy for the film that used ‘clichéd and tired adjectives’ that made Paths of 
Glory ‘sound like “Time Limit”’ (Margulies 1957c). Time Limit (1957), the only film 
directed by actor Karl Malden, was also a UA release and depicted the court martial of a 
soldier accused of treason. The film poster was also similar to Paths of Glory and Attack 
and described the film as showing ‘the face of war you’ve never seen before’. The ad-
   Figure 3: Posters for Paths of Glory (1957) and Attack (1956) displaying clear similarities. 
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copy for Paths of Glory drew on simple, alliterative devices, and crafted an image of a 
generic war picture that dwelled upon the scenes of the attack on the Anthill, with 
phrases such as ‘the boldest bayonets-charge that ever hacked its way through hell’, 
‘there were 8,000 of them…mud splattered, shell-shattered “heroes”’, and ‘the 
bombshell story of a colonel who led his regiment into hell’ (Beck 1957b). These ideas 
are played up further in the original theatrical trailers for the two films, each containing 
similar taglines and descriptions. Over imagery of a war torn cityscape, a title card on 
screen says that Attack tells ‘the story every soldier knew, but none would dare tell […] 
this is the raw, naked face of battle…where not everyone is a hero…and not every gun 
is pointed at the enemy!’ The trailer concludes by claiming that Attack is ‘the war story 
so hot no one dared film it till now’. The Paths of Glory theatrical trailer uses almost 
identical phrasing and marketing suggestions. In a voice over, the trailer announces that 
‘no one dared to make this movie. It was too shocking, too frank’. The trailers play into 
the social and cultural atmosphere of the time and the type of controversial film being 
produced by UA in the 1950s. Just three years prior to the release of Attack, Otto 
Preminger’s UA-backed The Moon is Blue had been released without PCA approval and 
had been a success; similarly, his The Man with the Golden Arm. UA’s policy of 
creative autonomy allowed independent producers to create films that broke social and 
cultural taboos, but in doing so UA had to market them appropriately in order to attract 
a wide-ranging audience. The success of Preminger’s films, in spite of their perceived 
scandalous nature, led to a climate where both Attack and Paths of Glory drew on their 
own controversial themes and narratives. 
What they also did was to mislead the audience into believing the films were 
purely combat films and that the controversial nature of their stories was in their grim 
depiction of war, not in the ethical dilemmas discussed away from the battlefield in 
character driven stories. As Richard Daniels suggests, the Paths of Glory trailer 
emphasises action, fighting, and the courage of the soldiers in the battle sequences, with 
‘no footage at all taken from the crucial court martial scene. A scene which is integral to 
the film is omitted by one of the main marketing tools available’ (2015: 94). Kubrick 
did try to intervene, feeling that the focus on the film as a war picture was in fact 
detrimental to base appeal, particularly in areas such as New York with its young liberal 
demographic. He wrote to Myers Beck (Bryna Productions Sales Representative for the 
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Eastern USA) and asked that the adverts include a headshot of Suzanne Christian (stage 
name for Christiane Kubrick), the only significant female character in the film, to 
‘imply that there is a love interest in the film’ (Kubrick 1958). Kubrick’s reasoning 
came down to the fact that Darby’s Rangers (1958) had taken a similar approach and 
had achieved huge success. He felt this indicated that, ‘the emphasis of “Darby’s 
Rangers” advertising campaign, namely four romances as well as its obvious action 
sales appeal, may have been more appealing than the straight action plus class review 
approach of “Paths of Glory”’ (Kubrick 1958). Kubrick even went so far as to suggest 
new copy to accompany a photograph of Christiane that read, ‘one girl amidst two 
thousand men’ (Kubrick 1958). The suggestions were not heeded, however, and the film 
failed to achieve its anticipated grosses. Even the national trailer, which Kubrick had 
personally overseen, had a waltz scene cut in January 1958 that featured, in Kubrick’s 
words ‘lots of pretty girls dancing’ (Kubrick 1958). Harris and Kubrick, for all their 
autonomy in the production of Paths of Glory, were largely impotent in areas of 
publicity and distribution. Realising this, Kubrick had addressed his above concerns to 
Public Relations rather than to United Artists directly, given that they were ‘clearly 
hostile to every idea that has originated from either Margulies or myself’ (Kubrick 
1958). 
Despite the producing control awarded to HKPC, UA were hesitant to grant full 
legal authority over every aspect of the picture. Given the financial risk involved in such 
a bleak anti-war film in a conservative era dominated by anti-communist McCarthyism 
tendencies and Cold War paranoia, there was never any guarantee that the film would 
be a success with American audiences. UA, in an attempt to mitigate risk, therefore 
stopped short of awarding the film’s producers full control over the sale of the film. But 
by granting producers a degree of creative control, UA had opened a Pandora’s box. By 
giving an element of autonomy, UA (and later other Hollywood companies) would see 
the producers wanting ever more control, particularly over the way their films were 
packaged and sold to the public. The creative innovations and maverick attitudes of the 
likes of HKPC could not be content with seeing their films taken out of their control 
during the crucial stage of promoting it. UA had unleashed a power struggle that 
Kubrick was ready to lead the vanguard of independent producers in winning in the 
1960s. 
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Lew Wasserman’s Monopolisation of the Package-Unit System 
The June 1958 issue of Picturegoer included an article titled ‘Kirk is King’ (Anon. 
1958c: 8-9). The article argued that Douglas had come to dominate Hollywood’s new 
mode of production, the package-unit system. By the end of the 1950s, Douglas and 
other independent producers had ‘wiped out the cinemoguls. The top actors have taken 
over as top dogs in Hollywood’ (8). The piece suggested that Douglas had been 
‘crowned king of Universal-International, hitherto a tycoon-dominated studio’ (8); this 
followed a deal with Universal to finance and distribute Spartacus. Universal had 
undergone seismic changes in the 1950s, first being taken over by Decca Records in 
1952, and then selling its backlot property in Los Angeles to Music Corp of America 
(MCA) in 1958 (8). The deal between Milton R. Rackmil (president of Universal 
Pictures) and Lew Wasserman (president of MCA) saw MCA buy the 370-acre 
Universal backlot, including 150 buildings and 16 soundstages at a cost of $11,250,000 
(Anon. 1958d: 34). Wasserman and MCA had radically altered Hollywood in the 1950s, 
becoming a talent agency that maximised the power of the actors. One of Wasserman’s 
clients was Kirk Douglas. MCA would also come to represent Harris and Kubrick by 
the late 1950s, with MCA agent Ronnie Lubin packaging Paths of Glory and Spartacus 
(Miller 2000: 67-69). 
Some industrial context for Wasserman’s place within Hollywood and the state 
of Universal in the 1950s is useful at this point to understand how Spartacus came to be 
financed by the studio, and ultimately how Kubrick came to direct it. Universal had 
been in the process of implementing budget cuts prior to the purchase of its backlot by 
MCA, as well as reducing its production output from around forty pictures per year to 
twenty (Anon. 1958e: 3). Universal made sure it exploited the historical epic cycle of 
the 1950s, with Spartacus ‘an example of U’s entry into the big budget field’ (Anon. 
1958e: 22). Hollywood in the 1950s and 1960s produced a series of historical epics, 
often within a Biblical (The Ten Commandments, 1956) or classical setting (Ben-Hur, 
1959; Cleopatra, 1963). Indeed, many of the films broke records with the size of their 
budgets and their box office grosses and ‘can be counted as some of the most 
   120 
commercially successful Hollywood films ever released (Russell 2007: 5). Spartacus 
was at the time the biggest budgeted film ever by Universal, at an initial budget of $4 
million, a cost that would be repeatedly revised throughout 1959, particularly following 
the decision to stage a battle sequence between the slaves and Romans to be shot in 
Spain. The production budget had risen from $6,584,750 in June 1959 (Anon. 1960c) to 
$9,681,375 by February 1960 (Anon. 1960d).  
Universal augmented their specialised blockbusters with a series of low-budget 
exploitation pictures, including No Name on the Bullet (1959) and The Wild and the 
Innocent (1959). This new business strategy also saw them finally fully embracing 
independent producers and the package-unit mode of production, ‘emerging as a major 
competitor to United Artists and Columbia’ (Anon. 1959f: 5). Despite not achieving as 
many deals as the latter two studios, Universal was attracting high profile names, 
including the likes of Rock Hudson, Doris Day and of course Kirk Douglas, all clients 
of MCA. This was more than mere coincidence. MCA’s chief executive, Lew 
Wasserman, had been working on the purchase of the Universal backlot for sometime, 
with an eventual eye to a total takeover of the studio (which was finalised in 1962) 
(Bruck 2003: 176-177). Wasserman had instigated the trend for actors to form 
incorporated businesses and negotiated innovative deals for them with the studios 
(McDougal 1998: 152-153). As Douglas Gomery indicates: ‘Wasserman serviced his 
star list well, but needed some sort of new service to become the king of agents. He 
found it in the tax code’ (2005: 205). What followed, as more creative talent signed up 
to MCA, were package deals: 
  
Wasserman learned how to maximise commissions by selling the agency’s talent in 
packages – a writer plus a director plus stars – so a single movie would pay multiple 
fees. Packaging was one of his prime innovations, and thereafter became standard 
operating procedure […] attracting the attention of actors and directors, who now 
demanded a stake in the films they made. Wasserman gave birth to a true auteur system. 
(Gomery 2005: 206)  
 
Wasserman enjoyed great authority and influence over his clients and ensured he was 
involved in ‘all phases of the creative process’ (207). For example, with Hitchcock’s 
Rear Window (1954), Vertigo (1958), and Psycho, Wasserman had ‘made the deal, 
approved the scripts, watched rushes and approved the final release […] [Wasserman] 
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was a skilled leader who loved to work with Hitchcock making movies and making 
money’ (Gomery 2005: 207).  
The changing economic circumstances of Hollywood throughout the 1950s and 
1960s coincided with ‘all of the key creative personnel behind the epic trend […] 
[having] reached positions of great influence. Changes in the industry opened up a 
space for these filmmakers to work with the largest budgets’ (Russell 2007: 30). This 
position of influence, the ‘space’ opened up for the creative personnel and in particular 
the actors, was in large part due to Wasserman, MCA, and his instigation of the package 
deal. Therefore the extent of Lew Wasserman’s influence on Douglas’s career by the 
end of the 1950s should not be underestimated.  
Following MCA’s purchase of the Universal backlot, Wasserman had increasing 
influence over the business operations of Universal and its product. MCA rented the 
backlot to Universal as well as allowing them access to its list of clients (Anon. 1958d: 
34). It was Wasserman, Douglas’s agent, who had suggested that he pitch Spartacus to 
Universal following its rejection by UA and other studios, and that he attach a big name 
director to the project (at one point, Laurence Olivier had been announced as the 
director (Anon. 1958f: 13), while Douglas even approached David Lean (Douglas 
1958a)). Consequently, Universal, encouraged behind-the-scenes by Wasserman, agreed 
to a multiple picture financing deal with Bryna (Douglas 1988: 306-307). What resulted 
was what Variety termed a ‘big cash investment’ by Bryna: 
 
Kirk Douglas’ Bryna Productions, with a forward look, has earmarked 11 features and 
three telepix series during the next three to four years, and allocated a company record 
of $30,000,000 for combined program – $25,000,000 for theatrical releases and balance 
for TV. Company has added four features, which reps a 60% boost, to elevate it into the 
position of one of Hollywood’s top indie outfits. (Anon. 1958g: 20) 
 
To what extent Wasserman or Universal influenced and even pressured Douglas over 
the choice of director for Spartacus is an issue that is unclear. Anthony Mann was 
announced as the director of Spartacus in October 1958 (Anon. 1958h: 3), and had 
departed by February 1959, just two weeks into the shoot (Anon. 1959e: 17). Kubrick 
replaced Mann three days later, after a hurried phone call from Douglas (Appendix I). 
Jeffrey Richards asserts that Universal had insisted that Mann be hired as the director of 
Spartacus, saying that Douglas fought with Universal to replace Mann (Richards 2008: 
85). This contradicts other accounts, such as that of James Howard, who argues that 
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‘within two weeks, Mann was fired from the movie – again at Universal’s insistence’ 
(Howard 1999: 67). Vincent LoBrutto suggests that Universal’s previous success with a 
series of Westerns directed by Mann and starring James Stewart made Mann their 
choice to direct Spartacus (1997: 170-171). LoBrutto overlooks the fact that it had been 
Wasserman who had packaged and sold these Westerns to Universal, and that both 
Mann and Stewart were MCA clients (Gomery 2005: 205-206). What the accounts of 
the production of Spartacus overlook, from LoBrutto (1997) and John Baxter (1998), to 
even more recent accounts such as Radford (2015), is the importance and influence of 
Lew Wasserman and MCA. As Kirk Douglas described the situation: 
 
At the beginning of Spartacus, Lew Wasserman at MCA was my agent; he worked for 
me. In the middle of shooting, MCA bought Universal; I worked for him. For an entire 
movie studio, MCA paid $11,250,000, three-quarters of a million dollars less than the 
budget of Spartacus (Douglas 1988: 326). 
 
Universal had been re-energised by MCA’s buyout of Universal City and with the use 
of MCA’s talent roster (Anon. 1959g: 20). MCA had become the driving force for 
Universal’s makeover, and Wasserman was becoming ever more influential over the 
company. Douglas is revealing in how much he credits the influence of Wasserman in 
the production of Spartacus in his biography I Am Spartacus! Making a Film, Breaking 
the Blacklist (2012). He says that Wasserman insisted he hire Anthony Mann to direct 
and felt that a strong director – a technician – was needed for the film. Douglas 
repeatedly phoned Wasserman to suggest other potential directors, as he recalls: 
 
Joe Mankiewicz. Now there was an idea. He’d done Julius Caesar, and we had worked 
well together on A Letter to Three Wives. He had just finished writing and directing The 
Quiet American with Audie Murphy. Joe had nothing on his plate. I called Lew 
Wasserman. No pleasantries, just a quick, “No, Kirk. With a budget this big, Universal 
wants a technician they can manage. That’s not Joe”. (Douglas 2012: loc 775) 
 
Throughout his career, even once he’d fully taken over Universal in 1962, Wasserman 
remained conservative in his directorial choices. Even when it came to Jaws, with 
which Wasserman created the summer blockbuster, he was hesitant to hire Steven 
Spielberg, asking his producers ‘“Wouldn’t you be better off with one of the sure-
handed guys who's done this kind of picture before?”’ (Wasserman quoted in Shapiro 
2002). 
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Wasserman eventually summoned Douglas to his office and insisted that he hire 
Anthony Mann (Douglas 2012: loc1039-1051). Mann was a high-profile client of MCA 
and one of its most commercially successful directors – a ‘sure-handed guy’. Douglas 
realised he had no choice and so abided by Wasserman’s advice. Clearly, Douglas had 
not been able to assert influence over Universal or, more importantly, his own agent to 
hire the director he initially wanted: Kubrick. Repeatedly in correspondence throughout 
the pre-production of the film, Douglas talks of wanting to make an ‘unusual film’, one 
that was both commercial and artistic (Douglas 1958b). Kubrick was exactly the kind of 
director in this regard. Douglas confirms this in his biography, saying that ‘I like people 
who come up with ideas to make things better; Tony Mann had very little to say’ (1988: 
316). Stan Margulies, who wrote to Philip Scheuer of the Los Angeles Times, further 
documented Douglas’s attraction to Kubrick’s directing style. Scheuer had written that 
Douglas had hired Kubrick because ‘presumably he could be handled’ (Margulies 
1959). Margulies reprimanded Scheuer, saying the reason he was hired was because he 
was a ‘very talented director’ and had achieved critical praise for his directorial 
accomplishments to date (Margulies 1959). 
 Given that Mann was fired mid-shoot, there was a need to hire an immediate 
replacement director. And given that Kubrick was affiliated to Bryna, and that Douglas 
could entice him with new contractual arrangements for HKPC, all parties relented and 
he was appointed on 13 February 1959. Still, the result of hiring Kubrick, along with the 
ever increasing budget, saw pressure being put on Douglas by Universal, and in turn on 
Kubrick by Douglas: ‘Kirk Douglas was obliged to defend his choice of director to 
Universal, so started to put pressure on Stanley, and they got somewhat antagonistic 
toward each other’ (Howard 1999: 68). Conscious of costs, budgets and schedules, 
Douglas and Universal ‘wanted him to shoot quicker…to make cuts and not to cover as 
much as he did’ (68).  
 Lew Wasserman’s MCA had come to monopolise package deals through its 
extensive client list of writers, producers, actors and directors. MCA’s package came to 
dominate late 1950s Hollywood, culminating in the takeover of Universal. At this point, 
Wasserman had to divest himself of MCA due to a series of federal investigations into 
his business practice. But the influence of Wasserman upon the issue of control and the 
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impact on the role of the producer was immeasurable and was especially felt by 
Douglas on Spartacus. 
 
Determining Control of Spartacus 
During the production of Paths of Glory, Harris and Kubrick spoke about the possibility 
of disbanding HKPC, an idea that they relayed to Kirk Douglas. Douglas immediately 
contacted his lawyer, Sam Norton: ‘I talked to Jimmy and Stanley the other day. They 
have told me that after this picture [Paths of Glory] they are splitting up. How would 
this affect my contract with them?’ (Douglas 1957). Bryna and HKPC were, after all, 
engaged in a multi-picture contract. Douglas’s letter to Norton went on to reveal his 
thoughts about the maverick duo: 
 
My primary interest is to make a deal with Stanley Kubrick. He is a very talented 
fellow, but needs a lot of help, much more help than he cares to admit. At this point, I 
will see what I can do with Harris, although I certainly don’t want to insult him. 
(Douglas 1957) 
 
Douglas wanted to see if he could make individual contracts with both Harris and 
Kubrick. He was thinking about his own legal authority and the desire to control a 
creative maverick like Kubrick, with little need for an independent producer such as 
Harris. There had been persistent contractual battles between HKPC and Bryna ever 
since their initial deal on the 9 January 1957. Attempts to quell the concerns over the 
contractual arrangements with Bryna Productions resulted in a revision by 6 February 
1957, when both parties signed a more detailed agreement that outlined precisely their 
roles and responsibilities as employees with Bryna Productions (Harris 1957a). Kubrick 
would not sign this revised agreement for a number of months however.  
Following the completion of Paths of Glory, HKPC repeatedly tried to breach 
their contract by entering into deals with other production companies, including 
Melville Productions to produce Mosby’s Rangers; this would mean that Harris and 
Kubrick would be unavailable to Bryna for at least nine months (Harris 1958). Bryna’s 
lawyers responded by reminding HKPC of their contractual obligations (Norton 1958). 
The increasing frustration on the part of Bryna at HKPC’s obtuse and deliberate 
attempts to avoid their contractual obligations resulted in a threat of legal action as early 
as June 1957 (Harris 1957b). Harris explained that he felt, with the agreement of Kirk 
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Douglas, that further contractual revision was necessary. This was essential if Harris 
and Kubrick were to follow through on their threats to dissolve HKPC: 
 
The original concept of the agreement was for Bryna to acquire the services of Harris 
and Kubrick as a team. This is definitely impossible at this time regardless of whether 
or not a contract exists. So as long as we all know that such a situation is not workable, 
why try to force it. (Harris 1957b) 
 
This complicated history of HKPC is not accounted for in current Kubrick Studies 
literature. Therefore, it is difficult to ascertain how seriously to take the threat of HKPC 
disbanding as early as 1957. Certainly, Bryna and its lawyer, Sam Norton, treated it 
with the upmost seriousness. In a letter to Kirk Douglas in July 1957, Norton laid out 
the situation as it stood, explaining that Harris and Kubrick had apparently 
‘disassociated themselves’ from each other (Norton 1957c). But what should be taken 
into consideration is that as soon as HKPC had secured Douglas to appear in Paths of 
Glory their ‘goal was to get out of this deal, somehow, someway’ (Appendix I). Harris 
and Kubrick may have seen the dissolving of HKPC as a possible route out of their 
contract with Bryna. Their strategy of overdevelopment, with a number of unrealised 
projects to their name, may also have been a way for HKPC to remove themselves as 
quickly as possible from the deal. It is notable that the project I Stole $16,000,000 was 
on the Bryna books as of September 1957, just over three months after production on 
Paths of Glory had finished (Norton 1957a). 
What was unfolding was a battle for control: while Douglas found himself being 
ever more controlled by Lew Wasserman, he saw the opportunity to gain control of 
Kubrick and Harris. The revised contract put to HKPC during the production of Paths 
of Glory had been left unsigned by Kubrick for several months. Kubrick’s refusal to 
sign hinged on one word in the contract: 
 
Stanley wants the word “including”, appearing in the next to the last line of this 
paragraph on page 7, changed to “excluding”. In other words, Stanley wants artistic 
control of each picture in which he works. (Norton 1957c) 
 
The line in question legally obliged Kubrick to relinquish all artistic authority to 
Douglas, ‘in all matters including those involving artistic taste and judgment’ (Harris 
1957a). Changing this was not something Douglas could allow as he saw the power 
residing with him as the producer and executive of the independent company. This was 
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demonstrated clearly on Spartacus, which was in theory produced by Bryna’s vice-
president Edward Lewis, but which saw Lewis deferring to Douglas’s authority as 
executive of Bryna: 
 
As one Universal-International studio executive has said: “Douglas is on every single 
facet of filming this movie. He is consulted about wardrobe, lighting, casting, 
background, historical data…everything.” Adds another: “Kirk’s the driving force of 
every picture he does […] Kirk calls all the shots”. (Austin 1959: 6) 
 
As the contract stated, Harris and Kubrick were to become employees of Bryna and 
therefore would lose any kind of legal authority over the pictures they worked on. That 
resided with Douglas (Harris 1957a). The threat to disband HKPC eventually dissipated 
and Kubrick signed the revised contract, the wording unchanged. But the need to legally 
surrender artistic control was too much and by 1 May 1958, the four-picture contract 
between Bryna and HKPC was terminated (Bryna 1958b). It was at this time that HKPC 
had entered into a six-month arrangement with Marlon Brando’s Pennebaker 
Productions to work on an adaptation of The Authentic Death of Hendry Jones (1956) 
(LoBrutto 1997: 158-165). The arrangement, however, did not work, with Harris soon 
suspecting Brando of being devious in his intentions: ‘I think that Marlon really just 
wanted to direct the picture himself, but he needed someone to do the technical, you 
know, the setting up of the shots and all that stuff, you know, which Stanley could do’ 
(Appendix I). The deal between HKPC and Pennebaker was terminated early, but 
Kubrick still received a $100,000 payment (Appendix I). 
 Meanwhile, a ‘Termination and Release Agreement’ had been drawn up with 
Bryna, which Kubrick this time signed promptly. But due to the early termination of the 
original contract, a number of clauses were enforced that involved fees being paid by 
HKPC to Bryna on future productions they were involved in. This included repayments 
for development on projects such as I Stole $16,000,000, and punitive clauses that saw 
HKPC paying Bryna a sixty-six per cent share of net profits if they produced and 
released Mosby’s Rangers (Bryna 1958b). The termination agreement also called Harris 
and Kubrick’s bluff over their ‘disassociation’, stating that, ‘if Harris-Kubrick Pictures 
Corporation discontinues business, contract covers James B. Harris and Stanley Kubrick 
individually’ (Bryna 1958b). Despite their release from the four-picture deal with 
Bryna, HKPC was still legally bound to them in any future moves they made. The 
termination agreement included an appendix of stars that HKPC was unable to use in 
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the future without incurring further punitive net profit fees of twenty per cent; the list 
read like a roll call of Lew Wasserman’s MCA clients, including John Wayne, Marilyn 
Monroe, James Stewart, Rock Hudson and Gregory Peck. 
 There were also issues around ownership of the script of I Stole $16,000,000, a 
project that Kubrick wanted to ensure was in the possession of HKPC. He had written 
the script based on Herbert Emerson Wilson’s book (Douglas 1988: 324) and there were 
various legal manoeuvrings between the two companies to gain possession of the work 
(Kubrick 1960b). As the likelihood of a picture being produced by Bryna, Douglas, 
Harris, and Kubrick became ever more improbable (Douglas was actively preparing 
Spartacus for production throughout 1958 and HKPC was involved in deals with 
Brando, as well as looking to adapt Lolita), the termination agreement of 1 May 1958 
was legally amended. On 30 March 1959 Bryna put together a ‘loan-out agreement for 
the services of Stanley Kubrick’ in return for Douglas surrendering any interest in an 
adaptation of Lolita and excluding it from any of the conditions of the termination 
agreement (Bryna 1959). HKPC’s volte-face on working with Bryna and Kirk Douglas 
again arose out of self-interest in several areas: the need for HKPC to make back the 
investments made on The Killing and Paths of Glory, with Kubrick’s fee for directing 
Spartacus being paid into the company’s accounts (Appendix I); the need to protect 
Lolita and HKPC’s artistic and legal authority of that property from Bryna; and the need 
to negotiate out of the fee waiver clauses of their termination agreement. Hiring out 
Kubrick ensured that not only did Douglas agree to not being involved in Lolita, but 
that Bryna also ‘waived its rights to elect the 20% interest’ in the film (Lewis 1959). 
 What is interesting in the eventual loan-out agreement drawn up between HKPC 
and Bryna is that there were no explicit references to the issue of artistic control, an area 
that had been the undoing of the original four picture contract between the two 
companies. Kubrick was officially hired from 16 February 1959 at a rate of $5,000 per 
week (HKPC 1959). That Kubrick was drafted in merely as hired help was underscored 
by a clause stating that Bryna could not use his name or image in general advertising, 
but only in connection with Spartacus (HKPC 1959). Far from being under the control 
of Bryna or contracted in affiliation with Bryna, Kubrick remained a HKPC employee 
with few obligations to Bryna on Spartacus beyond ensuring it was competently 
directed. In fact, the deal went as far as to absolve HKPC from any responsibility should 
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Kubrick’s work on Spartacus not satisfy Kirk Douglas and Bryna: ‘we shall be in no 
way responsible to you if, without our fault, the director shall fail, refuse, or neglect to 
perform for you the services above described, or if such services are unsatisfactory to 
you’ (HKPC 1959). 
Absolved of any legal authority or responsibility to Universal – his contract was 
with Bryna, not with Universal – Kubrick seemingly went about directing the picture in 
his usual style, looking for artistic shots and having a high shooting ratio (Radford 
2015: 102). Fiona Radford (2015) has explored Kubrick’s artistic contribution to 
Spartacus and how he was able to make (limited) script suggestions (103-109). This in 
part came about because of the collegiate atmosphere on set, in which Douglas 
welcomed opinions and discussions of the film and script (Douglas 1959b; Radford 
2015: 103). Douglas was certainly open to persuasion and, even though the ultimate 
decision remained his, was willing to facilitate Kubrick’s suggestions and working 
methods. For instance, Kubrick showed a tendency to direct the smallest of details 
during scenes featuring hundreds of extras, to the exasperation of the crew (LoBrutto 
1997: 181-182). Douglas accommodated this behaviour by sending a memo to the 
assistant director, Marshall Green, asking him to ‘instruct one of your assistants to keep 
a careful eye on all the extras […] a careful observation by one of your assistants can 
help Kubrick quite a bit in concentrating on other areas’ (Douglas 1959c). Douglas also 
admitted to producer Ed Lewis that he had been ‘weaned off’ certain scenes in the 
script, including the ‘mass wedding scene, because of the ‘subtle influence of twenty-
nine year old Kubrick’ (Douglas 1959a). 
Radford ends her exploration of the production of Spartacus with a brief but 
highly significant point, saying that ‘we should not underestimate the impact that this 
film had on Kubrick’s career; his colleagues believed that Kubrick was using the epic in 
an attempt to “hit the big time”’ (115). Here was the chance to direct a major 
Hollywood epic, featuring one of the most popular stars of the day, along with a high 
status cast of Shakespearian actors, and an $11 million budget. Harris and Kubrick saw 
no disadvantages, particularly with no contractual responsibilities beyond merely 
providing directorial services for Spartacus (Appendix I). Kubrick took advantage of 
the new modes of production in Hollywood, with the package deal allowing for spaces 
of autonomy (of various degrees). This meant that on Spartacus, as Douglas possessed 
   129 
legal authority, he was the one responsible to Universal, not Kubrick. As Douglas 
himself said: ‘When I make a film if it doesn’t turn out good then it’s my own damn 
fault’ (Austin 1959: 6). Douglas allowed Kubrick a modicum of influence as part of his 
own producing style, in which he facilitated a form of collaboration among his senior 
team. This can be seen in light of his desire to create both a commercially viable film 
and one with artistic vision (Douglas 1959b). 
Kubrick would reflect on Spartacus in later years with Michel Ciment, saying of 
the relationship between the film’s producers and him as director, that: ‘if I ever needed 
any convincing of the limits of persuasion a director can have on a film where…he is 
merely the highest-paid member of the crew, Spartacus provided proof to last a 
lifetime’ (Kubrick quoted in Howard 1999: 69). The limits of persuasion Kubrick 
referred to can be interpreted as legal and contractual obligations or restrictions: the 
power of the producer or the director was in their respective contracts with the 
production companies. For Kubrick when he was working on Spartacus, this meant the 
ever-present threat of his immediate dismissal by Kirk Douglas and Bryna. Though the 
hastily arranged deal did not expressly state issues around artistic control, it did have a 
clause that stated Kubrick could be dismissed at any time if he ‘fails, refuses or neglects 
to perform his required services’ (HKPC 1959). If this occurred, HKPC was obliged to 
financially compensate Bryna Productions for the termination.  
 
Conclusion 
On 15 December 1961, Bryna Productions and HKPC made a final deal with each 
other, one that saw them parting ways permanently. This time, the split was to be 
permanent, unlike the complicated arrangement that had been reached in 1958. The only 
repercussions of the termination were three payments, totalling $40,000, that had to be 
paid by HKPC to Bryna Productions in instalments through to December 1963: failure 
to pay these fees on time would result in further punitive measures, legal action, and 
even potentially the reinstatement of the 1958 deal (Kaplan 1962). However, in 
principal, HKPC was now free of the nearly five-years’ worth of legal authority Bryna 
and Kirk Douglas had had over them. As Leon Kaplan, lawyer for Bryna Productions 
put it, the agreement, ‘gives these individuals a full and complete general release in 
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connection with any transactions of any kind between the Harris-Kubrick company [...] 
and Bryna and Kirk individually’ (Kaplan 1962). 
 Throughout the five years of what at times seemed like never-ending contractual 
negotiations between HKPC and Bryna Productions, Harris and Kubrick found 
themselves acting independently and with the advice only of their lawyer, Louis C. 
Blau. Their agents at MCA recused themselves from the contractual wrangling and 
disputes due to fiduciary responsibility and dual representation. As Richard Harris, an 
MCA agent said, with regards to issues around the ownership of I Stole $16,000,000: 
‘Accordingly, I [Richard Harris, MCA] am withholding from making any comment in 
respect of the proposed agreement’ (Harris 1962). In contrast, Douglas retained the ear 
of his MCA agent, Lew Wasserman, throughout the packaging, production and 
distribution of Spartacus. Though it is not clear to what extent Wasserman influenced 
proceedings or had sway over Douglas with regards to HKPC, the advantage was 
certainly in Bryna’s favour. 
 HKPC’s advantage, and in turn Kubrick’s, was in the spaces of autonomy that 
the industrial transitions in Hollywood offered. With Paths of Glory, HKPC was given 
relative creative autonomy on both the development and shooting of the script, allowing 
them to craft a bold anti-war film that firmly established their position within the 
industry as visionary producers. The film suffered, however, from a lack of control over 
its publicity and exploitation. With Spartacus, Kubrick could take the credit of director 
of a multi-million dollar picture that was a huge box office success, regardless of the 
level of his autonomy on set. The commercial success of Spartacus combined with the 
artistic prestige of Paths of Glory gave HKPC the necessary combination of esteem and 
financial clout to advance their future projects. Harris himself noticed the difference in 
his attempts to package Lolita post-Spartacus: 
 
They knew about Paths of Glory and The Killing and they knew that Stanley was doing 
Spartacus with Olivier and Laughton and Ustinov and Kirk. And, you know, we had 
this tremendous prestige going for us that we were able to get the actors to agree to do 
the screenplay. (Appendix I) 
 
As Peter Krämer has pointed out, ‘Somewhat ironically, the huge commercial and 
critical success of this mega-budget film [Spartacus] – which Kubrick had 
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comparatively little control over – finally established him as an important player in 
Hollywood’ (2013b). 
The limits of persuasion came to dominate Kubrick in the coming decade. He 
would analyse his contracts in fine detail, highlighting single words (just as he had done 
with the original Bryna/HKPC contract) that might affect the limits of his power as a 
producer. Such powers stemmed from the contract struck with a studio and this was 
something that could be negotiated. Lew Wasserman had facilitated these new industrial 
circumstances throughout the 1950s and had flipped the power base within Hollywood: 
power was taken from the studios and given to the actors, who formed their own 
companies and became their own producers. In effect, Wasserman had turned 
Hollywood into a talent driven agency, with the new independent corporations having 
their own PR departments to protect their image. But the one area in which studios and 
distributors were retaining control was over publicity and promotion of a film, the very 
thing used to create a brand. If Kubrick was going to gain full legal authority over his 
pictures he needed to create his own corporations and his own brand. 
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Chapter Four: 
Spheres of Influence: Polaris Productions and 2001: A Space Odyssey 
 
 
The 1960s saw Kubrick’s control as an independent producer grow exponentially. At 
the start of the decade he had found himself in a contract with Kirk Douglas that 
amounted to artistic bondage and deprived him of authority as the director of Spartacus. 
By 1968, he had produced and directed a $10,964,080 science fiction epic, 2001: A 
Space Odyssey, largely without interference from his financial backers, MGM (Sklar 
1988: 188). Yet attention is rarely given to how Kubrick managed to gain such 
influence in such a short time, perhaps in part because of how, as discussed in the 
Literature Review, academics became fixated on the formal composition of 2001. 
Robert Kolker’s recent work, The Extraordinary Image, manages to account for 
Kubrick’s meteoric rise in just two sentences, saying that Spartacus had caused him to 
flee Hollywood where he began ‘making his films as a one-man cottage industry. The 
financial success of Lolita, Dr. Strangelove, and 2001 gave him the security he wanted 
and a unique relationship with Warner Bros. […] and that allowed him the 
independence he needed’ (Kolker 2017a: 39). Kolker’s brisk history is indicative of 
how literature has largely not accounted for Kubrick’s transformation as a producer in 
this decade. There have been moves towards better understanding this period, including 
Mick Broderick’s Reconstructing Strangelove (2017), which explores Kubrick’s 
mounting confidence as a producer in his legal battles with the producers of a rival film 
to Dr. Strangelove, Sidney Lumet’s Fail Safe (1964):17 
 
Kubrick remained pragmatically open to any idea that might maximise his box-office 
returns. In early 1965 he raised the idea of piggy-backing off the domestic Fail-Safe 
release, suggesting to Columbia that it could run Dr. Strangelove with Fail-Safe as a 
double bill. (Broderick 2017: 110) 
 
Peter Krämer positions Kubrick’s rise within the wider contexts of his career, with 
MGM investing in Kubrick because of the success of his previous films (2010: 32).                                                         
17 A plagiarism suit was brought against the authors and producers of Fail Safe, instigated by 
Peter George (author of Red Alert (1958), the source novel for Dr. Strangelove). For further 
reading see Broderick (2017: 97-114). 
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Spartacus, Lolita, and Dr. Strangelove were all commercial hits of varying degrees and 
had led to MGM noting Kubrick’s ‘unusual combination of qualities: artistic ability, 
management ability, and a sense of coherence. And, not least, a splendid sense of 
economy’ (Robert O’Brien cited in Krämer 2010: 108). 
 But this was a complex decade, heavily influenced by the industrial 
transformations in the mode of production that had taken place in the mid-1950s. As the 
1960s progressed, there were changes to the advertising and publicity strategies of the 
major studios and this represented an opportunity for Kubrick to seize further control of 
his films and to further renovate his function as an independent producer. From the 
outset, 2001 made extensive use of Kubrick’s American based company, Polaris 
Productions, in order to create one of the largest merchandising campaigns in 
Hollywood history up to that point. The film itself had been pitched to MGM as an epic 
in space, Kubrick deeming it ‘How the Solar System Was Won’, a nod to the MGM 
epic-Western How the West Was Won (1963), a film with a budget of $14 million that 
grossed over $50 million and, like 2001, was made for Cinerama projection (Bizony 
2014: 21). MGM were looking for further Cinerama movies to be road-showed in the 
mid-1960s, particularly following on from the industry successes of Lawrence of Arabia 
(1962) and The Sound of Music (1965). MGM executive, Robert O’Brien, wanted new 
films that offered the chance for sweeping vistas as exhilarating as those in How the 
West Was Won, but also ‘delivering fresh excitements for audiences […] Kubrick and 
Clarke had every reason to think that space opened up superb possibilities for a 
widescreen extravaganza’ (Bizony 2014: 21). Cinerama had been developed as a way of 
competing with television and to encourage audiences to attend the cinema following a 
decline in audience figures (Maltby 2000: 163). One of the key motivations behind 
MGM’s decision to finance Kubrick and 2001 was the Cinerama format (Bizony 2014: 
415); a justifiable position given that the film would eventually gross $1 million from 
eight Cinerama theatres in the USA on its opening run, while in Tokyo the Cinerama 
theatres had advance bookings in the thousands, and in London the opening weekend 
was a record breaker for the Casino Cinerama (417). 
 This chapter will explore Kubrick’s rise as an independent producer in the 1960s 
via his company Polaris Productions and the way in which Roger Caras, the company’s 
vice-president, envisioned an ambitious publicity and merchandising campaign for 
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2001: A Space Odyssey. The chapter will examine the functions of Polaris Productions, 
the role of vice-president of the company, and of the way Kubrick used Polaris to 
wrestle control of publicity, merchandising and exploitation of 2001 from MGM. The 
film will be positioned within the industrial contexts of the mid-1960s and the changes 
that had taken place in publicity and merchandising as a result of the transformation of 
industrial practices that now saw a favouring of independent producers. Throughout the 
production, Caras and Polaris liaised with MGM and were at the front of the battle for 
power between Kubrick and the company, ensuring promotion and marketing was 
handled correctly and that the Kubrick ‘brand’ was at the forefront of the publicity 
campaign. The development of Kubrick as a producer in the early 1960s saw him 
significantly advance his ideas and authority over publicity, with increasing tension 
with the studios financing him. Kubrick liked to maximise the publicity of his films, 
even when the situations were controversial, as in the plagiarism suit on Dr. Strangelove 
(Broderick 2017: 104-105). By 1962/63, Kubrick was pushing for further control in this 
area, contributing ideas to Columbia that were not always welcome or sought; he even 
initiated marketing of Dr. Strangelove on his own at one point, ‘contacting magazine 
editors with a view of securing publicity’ (Krämer 2013b). This was despite Columbia 
not agreeing with Kubrick’s ideas or his ‘estimation of the film’s commercial potential’ 
(2013b). Such moves by Kubrick were vital in the realignment of authority away from 
the major studios to the emerging ‘super producer’ role that Kubrick was creating for 
himself.  
‘The Day of the Merchandiser Has Come’: Industrial Contexts 
In the 1960s major studios began reconsolidating their power around their publicity, 
exploitation and merchandising departments, with studios such as Paramount, MGM, 
Columbia and UA substantially expanding these departments in the early part of the 
decade. In part this was down to the changing modes of production and how 
independent producers had created what UA’s Roger Lewis termed ‘spheres of 
influence’ for themselves within the industry (Anon. 1959j: 14). Lewis saw changes 
ahead in the way films were to be promoted because of the change of mode of 
production in Hollywood, with the industry ‘beginning to experiment with a more 
progressive concept of film advertising’ (14). Independent producers were allowed at 
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least consultancy rights on the advertising campaigns of their projects with UA, and 
they were ‘vitally interested in the success of their pictures’ and were not ‘burdened 
with excessive traditionalism’ (14). Lewis felt that, ‘The day of the “merchandiser”, and 
I mean the term in the total sense, is yet to come’ (14).  
Many of the studios ad-departments were run by executives that were seen as the 
‘old guard’, men who held conservative attitudes to experimentation and new methods 
(14). But the 1960s brought substantial reorganisation and the sweeping away of this 
old guard. Along with the growing spheres of influence of independent producers, the 
industry itself was transforming and the studios sensed they had to modernise their 
advertising departments to ‘conform with the “new” motion picture industry that is 
presently emerging’ (Hollinger 1961: 7). Several factors contributed to this ‘new’ 
industry: the rise of the independent producer, an emerging and increasingly dominant 
youth audience, the suburbanisation of the cities, a decline in cinema attendance and a 
rise in television, and changes in consumer habits. Company strategies always kept this 
in mind, with Columbia recognising that they had to market more towards a growing 
under-thirty demographic, based on projections of population statistics (Cassyd 1964: 
W-2), while Twentieth Century-Fox realised they had to diversify their advertising, 
focusing drive-ins on the family audience through a process of ‘de-sexing’ their ad-
campaigns (Hollinger 1961: 36). This had to be done ‘subtly so that the younger 
generation won’t catch on’ (36). The changes in advertising were summed up by 
Twentieth Century Fox’s vice-president for publicity and advertising, Charles Eingeld, 
in January 1961: 
 
A major change that has taken place in film advertising concepts is that exhibitors are 
no longer buying pictures but the publicity and advertising campaigns. “They don’t 
even have to see the picture,” he says. “It’s like selling soap. A supermarket will stock a 
brand of soap if it’s convinced the manufacturer is backing his product with a big ad 
campaign. That’s what is happening with pictures. It’s a tremendous development”. 
(Hollinger 1961: 36). 
 
These conditions therefore led to the growth of publicity and merchandising 
departments in the 1960s. For instance, Paramount expanded its operations in 1966 with 
the creation of three new executive posts to work under Joseph Friedman, vice-president 
and director of advertising and public relations (Anon. 1966c: 3). The aim was to create 
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a new ‘top level creative and operational team […] designed to serve Paramount’s long 
and short-term merchandising and marketing needs’ (3).  
Prior to the 1960s, most studios would not begin promotion and publicity until 
the film was complete, or ‘more likely they began after the advertising department had 
taken its first look at the finished production’ (Steen 1961: 8). However, by the late 
1950s this was beginning to change. Columbia, for instance, revitalised their 
merchandising operations based on what they called their ‘Campaign-in-Depth’ strategy 
(8). Columbia increased the intensity of their merchandising campaigns in order ‘to 
reach a massive pre-sold audience’ (8). This may have been an influence of the 
exploitation practices of independent companies such as American International 
Pictures and Allied Artists in the mid-1950s. Teenagers were targeted in marketing 
campaigns that sought to tie-in a movie with its soundtrack, particularly with rock ‘n’ 
roll films such as Blackboard Jungle (1955) (Maltby 2000: 168-169).18 Films such as 
The Cardinal (1963), The Victors (1963), The Quick Gun (1964), Psyche 59 (1964), the 
1964 re-release of The Bridge on the River Kwai (1957), and Dr. Strangelove saw 
Columbia put together its most ambitious and far-reaching merchandising campaigns 
ever. The Victors was the company’s largest ever campaign, with multiple tie-ins, such 
as with a women’s fashion line, heavy promotion of the soundtrack album, and a deal 
with Dell Publishing for a paperback novelisation (Anon. 1964f: 26). Their promotion 
of The Devil at 4 O’clock (1961) began before the film had even entered production, 
with advertising layouts being designed and ‘ideas for the trailer blueprinted’ (Steen 
1961: 8). Columbia’s publicity department ‘lived with the picture throughout its 
production and even its preparation so that every avenue of merchandising would get 
the individual attention of the department’s personnel’ (8). Gidget (1959) had its 
‘promotion angles’ created before the script had even been completed (Steen 1961: 8). 
The strategy of the likes of Columbia saw audiences being pre-sold the picture a long 
time in advance, as much as three years in the case of The Guns of Navarone (1961), 
with Columbia setting the ‘pace’ for future film merchandising (Steen 1961: 8). 
                                                        
18 Blackboard Jungle made extensive use of the song ‘Rock Around the Clock’ by Bill Haley & 
His Comets, the film built ‘around the title music’ (Maltby 2000: 168). The song became a 
number one hit as a result of its use in the film (169). 
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 This strategy, soon being adopted by other studios (Cassyd 1964: W-2), 
invariably required a level of involvement and cooperation of the independent 
production company and producer. The major distributors began to allow producers to 
appoint a representative that could liaise with the respective advertising department. 
This led to a tension over control between the independent producers and the 
distributors. UA’s Roger Lewis, despite his earlier optimism about the coming ‘day of 
the merchandiser’ (Anon. 1959j: 14), had by 1961 changed his opinion. He believed the 
sphere of influence that producers had obtained was leading to an attitude that saw them 
try to intrude upon publicity. He derisively said in an interview to Variety that a ‘large 
group of independent producers and theatremen’ regarded themselves as experts on 
publicity, exploitation and merchandising (Hollinger 1961: 7). The new industrial 
conditions and spheres of influence meant that ‘a “producer” can be anybody – a star, a 
director, a writer, or a businessman – but the moment he receives the title of producer 
he automatically becomes an authority on publicity and advertising’ (7). This was 
compounded by the fact that the publicity representatives hired by the independent 
production companies to liaise with the majors ‘take a “narrow” view i.e. to worry 
primarily about the producer’s personal ego and his status on the Hollywood circuit. 
That means getting column breaks etc. […] their tendency is to keep their clients happy 
and to overlook the big, wide world that exists beyond them” (Anon. 1959j: 14). 
 Still producers like Kubrick found that their contracts largely prohibited their 
involvement in advertising matters. For example, Kubrick’s contract with MGM for 
2001 reveals that he had a good deal of artistic control over the actual production, but 
that when it came to publicity, he merely ‘had the right, but not the obligation, to 
consult with us in the formulation of the final policy to be used […] It is expressly 
agreed that our decision with respect to the formulation and development of such 
advertising and publicity policy shall be final and binding upon you’ (O’Brien 1965). 
This required Kubrick’s cooperation with MGM, because long-range publicity planning 
depended on access to the production. Take Lawrence of Arabia; while it was still in 
production, its producer, Sam Spiegel, sent forty-minutes worth of footage to the 
Columbia headquarters for the sole purpose of, 
 
showing the advertising department a sample of what was to come. The footage gave 
the promotion men a solid foundation on which to work so that the advertising copy, the 
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merchandising plans and general promotion could be analyzed, studied and prepared 
with an eye toward maximum penetration. (Steen 1961: 8) 
  
Without full cooperation such long-range planning would be almost impossible. The 
next section will look at how Kubrick set in place a new production company to exploit 
the spheres of influence opening up in advertising and merchandising and his level of 
cooperation with MGM. 
 
Polaris Productions: A Producing Powerhouse 
Kubrick’s opportunity to define his own legal authority and to further exploit the 
industrial transformations in Hollywood came in 1962 following the dissolving of 
HKPC. On 10 October 1962, Kubrick’s lawyer, Louis C. Blau, incorporated the first of 
two new production companies, Polaris Productions, in Los Angeles (California 
Secretary of State 1962). Blau acted as the agent of Polaris and put together an 
agreement between the company and Kubrick as a director-producer, despite Kubrick 
being the company president. This was quite possibly to enshrine in contract the legal 
authority that he sought when ‘loaning’ himself out from Polaris to his independent 
productions, which were to be produced by Hawk Films. The agreement stated that 
Polaris exclusively employed Kubrick’s services as a producer and director and that he 
was not to render his services to ‘any person, firm or corporation other than ourselves’ 
(Blau 1962: 1). This contract can be seen in the light of HKPC’s past arrangements with 
Bryna Productions; Kubrick was not going to make the same mistake again. For 
instance, perhaps wanting to avoid issues with property rights as had happened with 
Lolita and I Stole $16,000,000 with Bryna, Kubrick assigned the rights of all literary 
work and original material that he owned to Polaris and agreed not to ‘permit any 
person, firm or corporation in any way to infringe upon such exclusive rights’ (2-3). 
The contract also included a clause that prohibited Kubrick from being employed by 
any other motion picture producer or production company, but that Polaris could loan 
out his services to producers or production companies (3). Subsequently, Polaris would 
loan Kubrick’s services as a producer and director to his other production company, 
Hawk Films. 
Hawk was incorporated on 23 October 1962, fifteen days after Polaris, and was 
based in London. This was a move to obtain further control by Kubrick, who set up 
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filmmaking bases in both the UK, where he could exploit the British Film Fund (see 
Chapter Two), and the USA. By the beginning of January 1963, Hawk Films had opted 
for membership of the Federation of British Filmmakers (FBFM) (Anon. 1963f: 22), a 
union of independent producers. The Federation lobbied major distributors, the Board of 
Trade, and international organisations on behalf of its members, with a central priority 
being the retention of independence and control for film producers in an increasingly 
internationalised film industry (Myers 1962: 16).19 Membership of the FBFM 
represented a further move by Kubrick to consolidate his own sphere of influence via 
Polaris Productions and Hawk Films. 
 Polaris and Hawk remained Kubrick’s principal production companies 
throughout the next two decades, though other companies were also incorporated along 
the way, including Peregrine (Barry Lyndon), Harrier (Full Metal Jacket), and 
Empyrean (see Chapter Six). The relationship between Polaris and Hawk can be 
understood in correspondence between accountants working for Kubrick and the UK 
government’s Board of Trade. The chartered accountancy firm Bromhead, Foster & Co. 
wrote to the Board of Trade in April 1968 to outline how 2001: A Space Odyssey had 
been made by Hawk Films in an agreement between it, Polaris, and MGM: 
 
The principal terms of the agreement [are] that M.G.M. and Polaris would provide 
various facilities to the maker including the story rights, the services of Stanley Kubrick 
(producer/director/writer), Keir Dullea (actor), Gary Lockwood (actor) and various 
other non-UK personnel and would provide the finance necessary for the making of the 
film. (Anon. 1968a) 
 
Once 2001 was completed, Hawk Films was required to assign the film to Polaris and 
MGM, the latter handling the film’s distribution (Anon. 1968a). It would seem that 
Hawk was primarily a company concerned with production and creativity, while Polaris 
was Kubrick’s publicity and merchandising division, where ‘brand Kubrick’ was 
formulated (discussed further in Chapter Five and Six). Hawk had the much larger 
payroll, and employed technicians and other crew as well as the vast majority of the cast 
and extras. Polaris, on the other hand, had a much smaller payroll, including the 
producer/director (Kubrick, at a cost of $450,000) and the film’s stars – Keir Dullea and                                                         
19 To date, there has been no study of the Federation of British Filmmakers, or its rival union, 
the British Film Producers Association, and the impact of these unions on the rapid 
internationalisation of the British film industry in the 1950s and 1960s.  
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Gary Lockwood – and the company received numerous expenses and participatory 
profits for Kubrick (Anon. 1968a).  
Polaris became fully operational during pre-production of Dr. Strangelove. It 
was initially based at 120 East 56th Street in Manhattan’s Midtown, before relocating to 
239 Central Park West by 1964, the latter an apartment that had belonged to Kubrick. 
The structure of the company saw Kubrick as its president, with a vice-president who 
ran the day-to-day operations. Nat Weiss was the first to perform this role in December 
1962 after he left Twentieth Century-Fox where he had served as a publicity manager 
(Anon. 1962b). He outlined his duties at Polaris in a draft press release that he sent to 
Kubrick: 
 
The new veeps duties will cover the full range of the production company’s activities 
including advertising, publicity and distribution. Weiss will work in close association 
with Kubrick and serve as liaison between the production company [Polaris] and the 
distributor of its product [MGM]. (Weiss 1962b) 
 
Weiss would not last long in the role, however, and was dismissed by Kubrick in July 
1963 following the publication of The Cleopatra Papers (1963), a book that Weiss co-
authored with a Twentieth Century Fox colleague, Jack Brodsky. It was an exposé of 
the affair between Richard Burton and Elizabeth Taylor during the troubled filming of 
Cleopatra, told through the letters and phone calls between Weiss and Brodsky, with 
the book creating ‘a stir in the entertainment industry with its revelations about the 
Burton-Taylor affair, as well as the administrative power wars at Fox’ (Anon. 2008: 
35). The book was seen as salacious gossip mongering, and annoyed industry insiders 
more for its making public ‘the behind-the-scenes business transactions of one of the 
major film production companies going through financial difficulties’ (VWS 1963: 17). 
Many in Hollywood condemned the book, including Ken Clark, vice-president of the 
MPAA, who described the book as vilifying the film industry: ‘You besmirch an entire 
medium of communications with slander. You have accomplished one thing. You’ve 
exposed to all what it is really like inside the Inner Sanctum’ (Anon. 1963b: 4). Clark 
said that Weiss and Brodsky had ‘slyly concocted juicy scandalous and salable morsels 
for publication’ (4). This adverse publicity as well as Kubrick’s desire to keep his own 
productions confidential probably caused the dismissal of Weiss after just over six 
months in the job (Anon. 1963c: 7).  
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In fact, none of those who took up the role of vice-president of Polaris lasted 
long in the position (see figure 4). As discussed later in this chapter, Roger Caras’s 
working relationship with Kubrick was often fraught with conflict (though, it must be 
stated that by all accounts their friendship was strong and remained so throughout their 
lives (Bozung 2011a)), and he resigned after just eighteen months in the role. More 
tragic was Benn Reyes, a fine administrator and more liable to follow Kubrick’s orders 
than assert his own authority; he died of a heart attack on 8 December 1968 aged fifty-
three, just eighteen months into the role. Reyes was in Stockholm at the time publicising 
2001 (Anon. 1968d: 60).  
 The clearest indicator of Kubrick’s thinking in creating Polaris and the role of 
vice-president is seen in correspondence between him and Weiss, prior to Weiss’s 
appointment to the role. Kubrick and Weiss go into detail about how they envision 
Polaris and its place within Kubrick’s productions, and the role and responsibilities of 
vice-president. Kubrick seemingly invested Weiss with a lot of authority, which 
presented Weiss with the opportunity to ‘line up the people we should have – the best 
publicity writer, the best stills man going’ (Weiss 1962a). It was Weiss’s job – the 
Polaris vice-president’s job – to put the Kubrick brand front and centre of the various 
distributing companies policy. In the case of Dr. Strangelove, Columbia Pictures. Weiss 
stressed that, 
 
as your New York office, I will be a force to move a Lawrence [of Arabia] dominated 
Columbia. [...] I will also personally deliver certain major breaks a major company just 
doesn’t act on (which may be why you never had a picture properly handled before). 
This will not be done by bypassing Columbia, but my working closely here with them. 
(Weiss 1962a) 
 
The Polaris vice-president was to be a liaison between Kubrick and the studios 
financing him. Publicity had become central to Kubrick’s view of filmmaking and was a 
key element that he needed control over throughout his production. As seen in Chapter 
Two, the publicity and distribution handling of his earliest features had been out of his 
control, often with deleterious effects on their box office performance. He’d also 
undergone a power struggle over publicity during post-production of Lolita. The 
establishment of Polaris Productions created a new producing powerbase, spearheaded 
by the company’s vice-president, that would battle to control publicity on his films as 
well as protect his own brand. Kubrick saw the role as a de facto executive producer, 
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promising and coming close to giving such a credit to Roger Caras on 2001 (Caras 
1966n). 
 
 
Polaris Productions Vice-president & 
Publicity Director 1962 - 1973 
Name Years Occupied Role 
Nat Weiss 1962-1963 
Roger Caras 1965-1967 
Benn Reyes 1967-1968 
Mike Kaplan 1971-1973 
 
   Figure 4: Vice-presidents of Polaris Productions Inc., 1962-1973 
 
Kubrick, then, was creating for himself a company from which to exert influence and 
control over his role as a producer. Other independent producers, such as Kirk Douglas, 
had incorporated publicity companies in parallel to their production companies. 
Douglas’s Public Relations Ltd had a similar function to Polaris, in that it was both a 
liaison with the publicity departments of the distributor, but also aimed to assert control 
over publicity and exploitation and to protect the image of Kirk Douglas as a producer 
and actor. Kubrick had gone further with Polaris, however, enshrining his control and 
power as a producer over his own projects in a legal contract. Polaris saw Kubrick 
setting out to grow his sphere of influence as an independent producer and the contract 
with Polaris – with himself – would impact upon his thinking in any future deals with 
major distributors. This is seen in contract negotiations with Columbia in June 1964 for 
a new project following Dr. Strangelove. Kubrick minutely analysed the contract and 
wrote a twenty-three-page critique of it (see Krämer 2015a). One point in the contract 
stated that negative costs needed to be compared to other pictures of a similar cost being 
produced by Columbia at that time. Kubrick stresses that there may be no comparable 
‘independent producer with great influence producing a picture’, placing his own statute 
as an independent producer against the likes of Sam Spiegel and Otto Preminger 
(Kubrick 1964a: 9). Kubrick now envisioned himself as a significant independent 
producer who required, ‘complete total final annihilating artistic control’, and urged the 
distributors to reduce their own power to merely one of approval over the budget, the 
two principal stars, and issues over censorship approval (6).  
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 The next section considers more closely how Polaris Productions proceeded in 
asserting this sphere of influence during a period when it became a fully functioning 
company on 2001 and was headed by Roger Caras. 
When Spheres of Influence Collide: Polaris versus MGM 
In August 1966 Roger Caras wrote to Kubrick with confidence in his claim that, ‘I 
know you are giving me executive producer [credit]’ (Caras 1966n). Such a credit was 
not undeserved given the scope of Caras’s role in the producing of 2001. After all, it 
had been Caras who had introduced Kubrick to Arthur C. Clarke in 1964, as Kubrick 
noted in his original letter to Clarke when approaching him about collaborating on a 
science fiction project (Kubrick 1964b). Following the dismissal of Nathan Weiss in the 
summer of 1963, the role of vice-president of Polaris Productions remained vacant 
during the post-production of Dr. Strangelove. During this period, Caras was the 
Columbia publicity manager and worked closely with Kubrick on the film (Anon. 
1965a: 13), along with Mo Motham and John Lee (LoBrutto 1997: 244). Kubrick 
became acquainted with Caras as he would ‘haunt the Columbia publicity offices’ in an 
attempt to assert influence over the Dr. Strangelove publicity campaign (244-245). 
Caras eventually resigned as Columbia’s National Director of Merchandising in May 
1965 to become the new vice-president and publicity director of Polaris Productions, 
and a vice-president of Kubrick’s Hawk Films Ltd (Anon. 1965a: 13). 
Caras was born in 1928 in Methuen, Massachusetts. He’d graduated from the 
University of Southern California in 1954, majoring in cinema, prior to which he’d 
served in the army where he had studied filmmaking during his tours of East Asia 
(Hammond 2000). By the mid-1950s, Caras was working for Columbia, initially in the 
company’s exploitation department, before moving to its radio and television division 
(Anon. 1956k: 90). His rise through the ranks at Columbia was meteoric. In 1960 he 
became a general executive for the company, in 1961 he worked as an assistant to Paul 
N. Lazarus, Columbia vice-president (Anon. 1961: 64), and in 1962 was an assistant 
director to Joyce Selznick, head of the talent and story department (Anon. 1962a: E4). 
By 1963, he was the company’s exploitation manager, supervising twenty-nine field 
promotion staff (Anon. 1963b: 12). The experiences and skills he built up at Columbia 
would prove invaluable during his time working for Polaris Productions, particularly 
skills developed in exploitation and merchandising, areas that would play a crucial role 
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in the pre-production and shooting of 2001. Caras had overseen the merchandising tie-
ins of a number of Columbia films, including Dr. Strangelove, where he had 
coordinated the promotion plans for the novelisation of the film, a soundtrack record, 
and a tie-in with a candy company (Anon. 1964a: E8). Caras had been central to the 
growth in publicity in merchandising campaigns at Columbia. For Good Neighbor Sam 
(1964), he conducted a two-day brainstorming session with his own staff and over thirty 
New York metropolitan area theatre circuit executives in a bid to ‘cover every possible 
promotional detail’ (Anon. 1964b: E1). Caras made these meetings a part of his 
exploitation strategy, similarly using it on The Bridge on the River Kwai and First Men 
in the Moon (1964) (Anon. 1964c: 11), where he briefed exhibitors and Columbia 
publicity department staff about the relevant national campaign (Anon. 1964b: E1). He 
also developed what became known as the ‘flying squad’, a crack force of exploitation 
specialists. This force was put to use on a number of Columbia releases, including First 
Men in The Moon: 
 
Showcase participants can make use of the flying squad without delay merely by 
making a telephone call to the home office. A [theatre] manager in need of aid will 
receive a personal on-the-scene consultation from as many exploitation specialists as 
necessary to insure success of a local-level campaign. (Anon. 1964c: 11) 
 
The strategy that Caras was pursuing was part of Columbia’s wider policy direction, in 
which ‘the era of the two-week “all out” campaign at release time is over’ and 
‘exploitation at the local level begins not two weeks but two years in advance – the day 
a property is mounted for production’ (Anon. 1965b: 11). A component of this strategy 
saw the establishment of a ‘communications network’ whereby constant communication 
would be kept between the studio, the production and the field staff via a network of 
well-informed assistants (11). 
Caras attempted to construct his own power and sphere of influence at Polaris 
shortly after his appointment as vice-president and conducted interviews to recruit 
assistants in order to build his own communication network. One such assistant was 
Ivor Powell, who became the Publicity and Art Department Liaison on 2001 and a key 
colleague for Caras (Bozung 2011b). The company had, however, limited resources; 
despite being a California registered business, it operated out of a New York address. 
Following the establishment of the New York office, Nat Weiss had joked to Kubrick 
that he had ‘spent a quarter and bought that primer about running a one man, one girl 
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office in New York’ (Weiss 1962a). Kubrick was concerned about setting up a Polaris 
bank account in New York, given its status as a California corporation. Instead, all of 
Kubrick’s major accounts were directed to the UK and a limited cash expense account 
was run for the Polaris office, with weekly expenses to be sent to Ray Lovejoy, who 
worked for Kubrick’s Hawk Films (Lovejoy 1966). Kubrick kept a watchful eye over 
this expense account and would query Caras over the slightest financial irregularity. 
Caras found this situation dissatisfactory, complaining that Kubrick knew full well ‘how 
extremely difficult this will make things […] this represents a hardship and an 
inconvenience’ (Caras 1966a).  
Despite his supposed devolved control of Polaris, and the 4,000 miles between 
him and Kubrick, Caras found himself becoming increasingly and persistently 
micromanaged, demonstrated in the fact that Caras had to seek permission from 
Kubrick on almost all matters (Kubrick 1966a). Kubrick also wanted Caras to 
implement a communication system that would allow them to be in constant contact 
(Kubrick 1966a). On occasions when Caras did not first check with Kubrick about an 
issue, he would find himself reprimanded. For instance, in July 1966, Caras, in 
conversation with Mort Segal of MGM discussing the release date of 2001 and whether 
it would be delayed, had said that he had ‘not heard of any delay nor did [he] see why 
there would be one’ (Caras 1966b). Kubrick, on Caras telling him about his comments 
to Segal, responded by telling him not to ever ‘take any responsibility for discussing 
what, why, when and where on my behalf’ (Kubrick 1966c). With 2001, Caras would 
liaise with MGM’s Dan Terrell, an individual who had been instrumental in fashioning 
the modernisation of publicity and merchandising.  
Terrell, MGM’s executive director for worldwide advertising, publicity and 
promotion, adopted what industry insiders called a ‘punchier’ publicity strategy (Anon. 
1965c: 10); punchier given MGM’s conservative reputation in advertising, publicity and 
exploitation. Terrell was promoted to the role of director of exploitation in February 
1950, following the retirement of William R. Ferguson (Anon. 1950a: 10). Prior to his 
promotion, Terrell oversaw the supervision of advertising and publicity for Loews 
Theatres outside of the New York area. He joined MGM in 1940, working as the 
Washington D.C. advertising publicity director (Anon. 1950a: 10). MGM in the 1950s 
began implementing new exploitation and publicity strategies that they said were 
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‘unmatched in scope in the company’s history’ (Anon. 1952a: 18). MGM’s new 
strategy saw the absolute centralisation of publicity and exploitation at a national level, 
‘handled individually in a manner established through determining the box office 
potential as gauged in pre-release test engagements’ (18). Terrell was central to this new 
strategy, building up a powerbase within MGM. By 1952, he had subsumed publicity 
under his command, merging it with the exploitation department (Anon. 1952b: 22), a 
move Terrell saw necessary to extract the ‘salient features’ of the two respective 
departments (Anon. 1952c: 17). By 1963, a further merger saw Terrell become the 
executive director of advertising, publicity and promotion, a role he would keep for the 
remainder of the decade and from which he would try to retain power from independent 
producers (Anon. 1963c: 7). His new role came about as part of an organisational 
restructure at MGM, with Clark Ramsay promoted to executive assistant to company 
president Robert O’Brien and placed in charge of a new ‘marketing group’, in which 
‘all future creative advertising promotion, selling and research activities’ were 
integrated under him (7). The restructure brought the entire production process under 
the coordination of the triumvirate of O’Brien, Clark and Terrell, ‘from selection of a 
property through to release’ (7).  
The restructure came about as a response to what MGM saw as the ‘complex of 
masses’ that made up the cinema audience by the mid-1960s (Anon. 1963d: 6). Worried 
about the state of the film industry by the 1960s and their own poor box office takings, 
MGM aimed to ‘design pictures for these mass segments and seek every possible 
method of reaching them more effectively and efficiently’ (Anon. 1963d: 6). Terrell 
aggressively took this new strategic approach forward, saying ‘this policy of pre-
planning advertising, publicity and promotion in advance of the completion of a 
particular product […] allows us great freedom in determining which approach is best 
for that particular product’ (Anon. 1963e: 4). He strengthened the approach with the 
appointment of Mort Segal. Segal worked as Terrell’s special assistant, assisting him ‘in 
all areas of advertising, publicity and promotion in this newly created post at MGM’ 
(Anon. 1965d: 9). Terrell commented in Boxoffice that Segal’s appointment was part of 
a ‘further move designed to strengthen the growing MGM publicity, promotion and 
advertising departments in relation to the increased line-up of important films about to 
be released and going into production’ (9). Terrell had overhauled MGM’s publicity 
   147 
department by 1965, creating his own sphere of influence that would come in to conflict 
with independent producers.  
Terrell and his team began an attempt at asserting their power over Polaris and 
2001 once contractual agreements between Polaris and MGM had been reached. Terrell 
contacted Caras to inform him that he had commissioned his team to prepare artwork 
for a ‘special letter head to be used here for all releases on the picture’ (Caras 1965a). 
Terrell had grown accustomed to controlling the strategic approaches to publicity on 
MGM product. For The V.I.P.s (1963), he had mapped a two-month step-by-step 
promotion plan for the film, taking it up to the initial release of the picture (Steen 1963). 
MGM released The V.I.P.s on a mass booking arrangement in over 700 theatres and 
decided to pursue a ‘new concept’ in promotion:  
 
one that would ease the task of the exhibitor and, at the same time, give him a day-by-
day plan of organization and applied action [...] There was no precedent on which to 
pattern a press book that would be designed exclusively for those 700 plus theatres, 
inasmuch as press books usually are created for the mass market. (Steen 1963: p.b1) 
 
The V.I.P.s was considered the most exciting MGM picture in years and Terrell 
intended to further generate excitement through the publicity, promotion and 
exploitation of the picture. His approach was thorough and controlling devising step-by-
step activities for exhibition managers with promotion activities mapped out in 
sequential order: ‘Exhibitors [were] ordered to first read the manual from cover to cover 
and then to contact their local MGM field press representative who would arrange to 
coordinate the local campaign with that on the national level’ (Steen 1963: b1). The 
remarkable press kit for the film (see figure 5) included lobby cards and posters, and 
prepared publicity stories to be planted in the local press on exact dates as instructed by 
Terrell. His promotional and exploitation campaign was extensive, with sketches of the 
clothing worn by Taylor being placed in women’s magazines and in department stores, 
while adverts for the film were placed in in-flight magazines on Trans World Airlines 
and a paperback novelisation was released by Dell Publishing (b1-b2). As trade papers 
noted, Terrell’s press kit and promotional campaign for The V.I.P.s was unprecedented: 
 
Judging by an examination of the pressbook, it appears that something new has been 
added to promotion suggestions. The day-by-day schedule planning is believed to be a 
first, but not likely to be the last. It appears certain that Terrell and his staff have 
pioneered a new concept in promotion. (Steen 1963: b2) 
   148 
 
Given Terrell’s power at MGM and his control of promotion, publicity and exploitation, 
Caras was to face an uphill battle in his liaising between Kubrick and MGM.  
 
   Figure 5: MGM’s press kit for The V.I.P.s, coordinated by Dan Terrell (Steen 1963: b1) 
 
 
Polaris put in place various measures to assert their own authority, such as a complete 
breakdown of the rates for adverts in national newspapers that would be ‘instantly 
available for reference as a way of creating ideas for exploitation and responding 
quickly and with apparent knowledge to any suggestions which come from the 
motherland’ (Kubrick 1965) – the ‘motherland’ was Terrell and MGM.  
In October 1965, Caras wrote to Kubrick to say that he had explained to Dan 
Terrell that ‘it was mandatory you [Kubrick] be given the opportunity either directly or 
at least through me to approve all ads, all designs, all artwork, all copy’ (Caras 1965a). 
Kubrick was instigating a power battle with Terrell. This was an area that Kubrick felt 
he had to have control over as producer, decentralised structurally to his Polaris 
Productions. Terrell was, on the surface, understanding of Kubrick’s desire but he still 
set his team about creating a marketing strategy and exploitation plan (Caras 1965a). 
The aim was to encourage and excite what MGM referred to as the ‘larger mass of 
people, the infrequent ticket buyer’ by selling 2001 as an ‘enormous social epic’ (Buck 
1967). Central to this idea was the film’s grand philosophical and religious themes, 
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what MGM saw as its profound Christianity, and importantly the visual spectacle of 
Cinerama, all of which would ‘lead to the most profound promotion that has ever been 
designed for a picture’ (Buck 1967). Peter Krämer (2015b) has argued how 2001 was 
marketed as a family film, which the above MGM strategy also suggests. And certainly, 
as discussed below, Kubrick and Polaris also felt this was the appropriate marketing 
strategy. But of course it required Kubrick’s full cooperation. 
Caras set out in detail to Kubrick how he saw Polaris and his own role 
functioning as production on 2001 commenced (Caras 1965b). Polaris would act as a 
factory that turned out daily promotional copy – what Caras termed ‘a regular supply of 
column news bits’ (Caras 1965b) – all of which were to be sent to Dick Winters at 
MGM New York to be planted in the press (Caras 1965b). Caras also wanted to devise a 
Polaris Productions newsletter that would be regularly sent to MGM field 
representatives and other key contacts. He described the newsletter as being a ‘news 
chatty type thing to keep people posted on the progress of the production’ (Caras 
1965b). This never went ahead because of Kubrick’s need for absolute control and 
secrecy over what was occurring on the set at Borehamwood (though such a 
promotional device was later used by independent producers such as Michael Klinger 
(Spicer and McKenna 2013: 5-6)).  
Caras was in daily contact with Kubrick, to whom he would send multiple letters 
and faxes, including what Caras headed his ‘Carasgrams’ – bulleted updates on ongoing 
issues. But the powerbase that Kubrick and he was constructing at Polaris soon began to 
cause consternation and resentment within MGM’s publicity and promotion department. 
On 26 October 1965, Caras wrote to Kubrick about the issue of placing adverts in 
foreign national newspapers, such as The Guardian, Der Stern and Le Figaro amongst 
others. Caras, in confidence, outlined to Kubrick how MGM staff, in particular Arthur 
Pincus, were ‘not very happy about all of this, Stan, and feel that they are doing this 
simply to make you happy’ (Caras 1965c). Pincus could not understand the worth of 
placing adverts in publications such as Le Figaro at a cost of nearly $25,000, when the 
film was not scheduled for release until May 1967 at the earliest (Caras 1965c). Caras 
said that MGM had concluded that ‘you’re the greatest, but you are not right in this’ 
(1965c). Regardless, MGM went ahead with the adverts in order to demonstrate their 
commitment to Kubrick and his production (1965c).  
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The working relationship between Arthur Pincus and Caras became increasingly 
fraught, a symptom of the friction between the two rival publicity powerbases. The 
tension came to a head in December 1965 in a letter Caras wrote to Pincus regarding 
MGM’s plan to place an announcement advert for 2001 in The Sunday Observer (Caras 
1965d). Pincus had alerted Caras to the advert only days before the go-ahead, against 
Caras and Kubrick’s request for a coordinated advertising schedule. Caras responded to 
Pincus with the following: 
 
One thing I think, Arthur, that we must settle and settle now, is our personal working 
relationship. Stanley Kubrick is a very reasonable man and I like to think that I am too. 
Stanley is perfectly willing to sit down and discuss any intelligent proposal that is 
properly presented. Witness the fact that your suggestion for the Sunday Observer 
presented to Stanley in a reasonable manner resulted in his agreement with the proposal. 
Compare this with your suggestion that I go to him and tell him that he was not serving 
the picture, that he was not serving MGM, that he was, in fact, doing absolutely nothing 
but serving his own ego. […] Do you honestly feel for a moment that the best way to 
deal with a creative personality, with anyone in fact is to hurl insults at them? (Caras 
1965d) 
 
Caras’s letter is an indication of the building tension between MGM and Polaris 
Productions about who possessed the authority and agency over 2001. Caras became a 
conduit through which MGM believed they could control Kubrick. At one point Pincus 
phoned Caras and demanded that he tell Kubrick that ‘he’s not bright enough to know 
the difference between worthwhile effort for his motion picture and his own ego’ (Caras 
1965d). The above letter sent by Caras had undergone several drafts, some of which 
contained Kubrick’s own annotations. The final draft ended with a paragraph stating 
that 2001 had enormous earning potential and that collaboration was essential between 
MGM and Polaris, with both companies jobs being to ‘officiate at the conversion point 
between investment and earnings’ (Caras 1965d). This was a direct challenge to MGM 
by Kubrick through Polaris Productions. The role of the producer had to include 
authority over every area of the film production, and this despite the financial 
investment by MGM, included publicity, promotion and exploitation. 
 
Polaris versus Kubrick: Exploiting the Future 
Merchandising tie-ins and exploitation was key to 2001’s production and was built into 
the very fabric of the film’s aesthetic. It also became the primary function of Caras’s 
role. He approached a range of companies to supply props and other tie-ins, though not 
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all of these ventures were successful. For instance, computer giant IBM was asked by 
Caras in June 1965 for their ‘mutual participation in the production and merchandising 
of 2001: A Space Odyssey’ (Caras 1965e). Polaris and IBM entered an informal 
agreement that saw IBM assisting Polaris in the supply of design consultation for the 
film, ‘specifically assisting the designers and technical members of the Polaris staff 
prepare designs for the onboard computers to be found on the spacecraft, on the moon, 
on the orbiting Earth station, and on Earth itself’ (Caras 1965e). IBM intended to supply 
hardware for the construction of props and sets, such as ‘data viewing screens, buttons, 
switches etc’ (Caras 1965e). As a result of IBM’s cooperation, the company’s 
trademark was to be displayed ‘as prominently as possible’ throughout the film, though 
Polaris was keen to stress in their agreement that ‘prominently’ meant ‘in keeping with 
the action of the scene in the context of the story […] the director must have, of course, 
complete license and control but there can be no possible doubt that IBM will receive 
extensive exposure within the body of the film’ (Caras 1965e). The draft agreement 
with IBM outlined potential merchandising ideas for the release of the film, including a 
high-level national essay competition with the prize being IBM typewriters and 
hardware, and the possibility of a reservation system to allow audiences to reserve 
tickets for a screening anywhere in the world (Caras 1965e). 
But Kubrick often met Caras’s ideas and promotional innovations with 
indifference. In June 1965 Caras suggested that they approach the ‘very promotion 
minded Hertz’ to use their logo on a storefront during the eventually abandoned Lunar 
Park sequence (Caras 1965f) – nothing came of it. The strategy that Caras was pursuing 
led to him creating ‘the most comprehensive merchandising program ever put together 
in the history of our industry’ (Caras 1965l). In doing so, much was kept hidden from 
MGM, as Caras was instructed by Ray Lovejoy: ‘All cables of a non-confidential 
category […] e.g. non-eyebrow raising’ be sent by direct cable […] confidential cables 
e.g. eyebrow raising, panics or general chaos, be sent individually to either Stanley’s 
home address […] or my home address’ (Lovejoy 1965). Many of the merchandising 
tie-ins had to be arranged swiftly during pre-production in order for them to be ready for 
the film shoot. Revlon, for instance, were to provide make-up and hair design for the 
film and Caras had to coordinate this with Revlon’s designers and the Head of Makeup 
on 2001 (Caras 1965g). Caras had to coordinate numerous other merchandising tie-ins, 
   152 
including the design of a New York Times paper, an attaché case (to be supplied by 
Minneapolis Honeywell), a drinks dispenser (Pepsi-Cola), and watches (supplied by 
Hamilton) to be worn by the cast, among many other ideas (Caras 1965h).  
However, it became increasingly difficult for Caras and Polaris to operate 
efficiently given Kubrick’s desire for centralised control. There was no loop of 
information, only what Kubrick thought on any given day, which led on more than one 
occasion to what Caras referred to as ‘confusion, confusion, confusion’ (Caras 1965i), 
and on another occasion to his declaring that ‘I am beginning to feel like the fifth leg on 
a horse’ (Caras 1965j). Caras’s frustrations become increasingly obvious in his 
correspondence with Kubrick. In one letter he repeatedly questioned Kubrick over the 
choice of a credit card prop to be used in the Moon scenes, saying,  
 
When we discussed this matter you said you wanted a credit card for the Moon. Why 
wouldn’t it be an American Express card? You said you wanted a bank on the Moon. 
Why wouldn’t it be an American Express bank? American Express is very much in the 
banking business. (Caras 1965j) 
  
Caras grasped the marketing and merchandising potential of 2001, even if Kubrick was 
not always immediately aware of it. For instance, he had to make clear to Kubrick that 
the designs for a Parker Brothers board game were merely a merchandising opportunity: 
 
When you look at this Stanley, please think of it as what it is. It is the cover of a game 
box design to sell the game. Please remember also that you are in for a percentage deal 
on this game and should it take off you will be in for substantial revenue over a long 
period of time. (Caras 1966n) 
 
In the case of the tie-in with American Express, Caras argued with reference to hard 
data. The company was willing to promote 2001 via mailing lists that could reach nearly 
two million homes, as well as place posters in their properties across the USA. As Caras 
noted, ‘That would put a 2001 poster in 4,000 offices, 22,000 banks, and 52,000 other 
outlets’ (Caras 1965j). Between 1965 and 1966, the number of opportunities the film 
offered for exploitation and merchandising tie-ins with global businesses was immense 
given the need for a variety of props in designing the future. Caras explained to Arthur 
O’Dell of General Mills that, 
 
It suits the purposes of our story very well to reveal in the picture consumer products as 
they will appear in the first year of the 21st century. It will help the general audience to 
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relate directly to a film where otherwise the technology might be somewhat too 
formidable for our dramatic purposes. (Caras 1965n) 
 
Through his interactions with these companies, Caras was expanding on his previous 
merchandising campaigns at Columbia. 2001 offered the potential for extensive pre-
selling. Certainly, the line up of companies was impressive, including Pan-Am, Hilton 
Hotels (Baron Hilton was to give a lecture titled ‘Hilton Orbitor Hotels’ as part of a 
conference on the ‘Commercial Utilisation of Space’, which Caras felt needed 
exploiting), Macy’s department store, Kodak (design a camera of the future), Revell 
(designing kit models based on the space craft in the film), and MGM Records (Caras 
1967b). 
But Caras’s frustration about the merchandising potential of the film continued 
to grow, with Kubrick seemingly not making any firm decisions. As Caras explained in 
a letter to Kubrick, ‘I am sorry to burden you with this again, but I cannot resolve this 
without your consultation and these bloody letters are about the only way we can handle 
it’ (Caras 1965j). The decisive optimism and energy that Caras espoused in the early 
days of his appointment to Polaris had dissipated after several weeks working at the 
company and the realisation that every decision – every minute detail – had to pass 
through Kubrick, which inevitably resulted in a blockage. Caras emphasised that he 
knew creative control resided exclusively with Kubrick, but he attempted to assure him 
of his own administrative and business expertise: 
 
Please understand Stan that I do not attempt here to impose any of my thinking on the 
aesthetic values you are building into this film. I would not presume to make proposals 
about the aesthetic contents once you have taken a position […] I can do nothing more 
on American Express until I have your further thinking […] They’re going to be 
tremendously important and valuable to you when it comes to box office dollar time. 
(Caras 1965j) 
 
At other times, Kubrick’s centralising of power slowed the production of the film 
drastically and Caras complained of working at ‘cross purposes’ (Caras 1965k). 
Decisions were also mysteriously undone without his knowing, such as when two 
companies, Seabrook Farms and General Mills, who were being used for merchandising 
tie-ins for the food eaten by the astronauts, were dropped and replaced by Bird’s Eye. 
Caras commented on this situation in a letter to associate producer Victor Lyndon, 
asking, ‘is there something I don’t know? Is there some particular reason why this 
   154 
matter is being pursued? […] We’re going to end up here with a very bad reputation’ 
(Caras 1965k). Caras had agreed a merchandising opportunity with General Mills to 
create a food product called ‘2001’. It was to have been launched in 1967 to coincide 
with the film’s original release date. Caras’s obvious disappointment in not pursuing the 
General Mills opportunity is clear from his earlier excitement: 
 
Stan, do you realise what this would mean? We would have them spending several 
million dollars at the time of the picture’s release, pushing their product, all of it tied in 
together with point of sale display in every supermarket and food store in the USA. 
(Caras 1965m) 
 
The merchandising opportunity did not go ahead. Kubrick’s indecisiveness also began 
to have unintended, but serious consequences. Tom Buck, for instance, who worked as 
an advertising agent for Look magazine, had spent months working on an advertising 
supplement for the magazine on 2001 in liaison with Caras. Kubrick, however, would 
not give the final go-ahead and the project fell through. Buck was fired by Look due to 
having gone ‘so far out on a limb for this project and then had it crumble beneath him 
because he could not guarantee dates’ (Caras 1966f). Kubrick sent apologies and asked 
Caras, ‘Can I write to anyone at Look and explain it is my fault?’ (Kubrick 1966b). As a 
compromise, Buck was appointed on a short-term contract to MGM by Dan Terrell, 
tasked with working on various marketing strategies, and was later briefly employed by 
Hawk Films. 
Kubrick’s move to expand his sphere of influence and to control all aspects of 
the film’s production led some to question his producing ability and the impact it was 
having on the commercial potential of the picture. Dan Terrell vocalised these concerns 
with Caras in November 1966, and Caras found himself agreeing with Terrell’s 
criticisms of Kubrick’s management and producing style (Caras 1966c). Terrell had 
been in discussion with executives at Columbia about Kubrick’s transgressions on to 
areas of producing they felt he should not have been involved in on Dr. Strangelove, 
certainly not to the extent he wanted. Columbia were adamant that Kubrick’s over 
bearing producing style had an adverse effect on the box office potential of Dr. 
Strangelove, due to his ‘insistence on a number of ill-advised points in the advertising 
style’ (Caras 1966c). Terrell believed the same thing was occurring on 2001, only on a 
much larger scale and with the likelihood of a much more devastating effect: 
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He [Terrell] said that he did not think you [Kubrick] were always realistic in matters of 
advertising and that decisions he should be making you are now making, although you 
don’t have the time to evaluate the long range needs that MGM must be aware of in 
order to protect their investment. He repeated that he was frustrated more than he has 
ever been in his professional life and that he felt constrained not to disturb you with 
endless arguments and disagreements when you still have a film to make, but that this is 
resulting in definite harm to the film’s potential. (Caras 1966c) 
 
The contract between Polaris and MGM only gave Kubrick and Polaris the right to 
consult with Terrell and his team over the ‘formulation of the final policy to be used in 
the advertising and exploitation’ of 2001 and of the accompanying press book, not 
control (O’Brien 1965). But despite the contractual clauses, Kubrick was still 
attempting to hold on to power over these areas through a process of obfuscation. 
Terrell and MGM argued that until Kubrick ‘surrendered the right to people equipped to 
make’ decisions, then the full potential of the film, and the potential of individuals such 
as Caras, would not be realised (Caras 1966c). Caras concluded with the frank 
admission that Terrell was right:  
 
The unfortunate thing, Stanley, is that their position is not totally unrealistic or 
unreasonable. Many of the things they say are very difficult to argue against. They want 
to see film, they want to read a script, they want the right to judge for themselves what 
is good publicity, what is good exploitation, what is good art and what is good 
advertising. (Caras 1966c) 
 
Kubrick’s obfuscation led to a particular grievance shared by both Terrell and Caras: his 
refusal to cooperate on the showing of a preview reel at an exhibitor’s convention held 
by the National Association of Theater Owners in New York in September 1966. MGM 
had chosen 2001 to be their project picture at the convention ‘to the chagrin of all other 
producers’ (Caras 1966d). Caras had repeatedly mentioned the convention to Kubrick 
and the fact that it was hugely important in the ‘context of the industry and attracts a 
great deal of attention’ (Caras 1966e). The exhibition was taking place seven months 
before the initially intended release date of 2001, but the film still had no representation 
at the exhibition. Kubrick was stalling and had not provided footage – despite the 
existence of completed material – or any production stills. Terrell and MGM were in 
disbelief at the situation and the fact that 2001 footage would be ‘virtually missing from 
the best product reel that has ever been done […] because you [Kubrick] would not give 
them footage’ (Caras 1966c). Caras warned Kubrick that to be absent from the 
convention would be a mistake, both in terms of the sales potential of the film, but more 
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importantly in his relationship with MGM:  
 
Later on when you want things from them [MGM] that entails effort, money, and 
presumably creativity and imagination, they could reply forcibly that when they tried to 
make 2001 the big picture you would not even give them two and one half minutes of 
footage to do it. This is not a simple publicity matter whether or not to give an interview 
or do a tape. This involves a major decision affecting the whole sales department and 
MGM image. (Caras 1966d) 
 
MGM executives felt that Kubrick’s overriding desire for centralised control of his 
production was denying them the opportunity to protect their multi-million dollar 
investment, making Kubrick’s lack of cooperation unjustified (Caras 1966d). Some in 
MGM, including Clark Ramsey, were critical of their own company for allowing 
Kubrick and Polaris ‘complete latitude in everything’ and that it had resulted in a mode 
of production and producing style of that of a ‘six hundred thousand dollar art film’ 
(Caras 1966d).  
 The centralised operation of Kubrick’s producing style meant that when senior 
figures within his companies resigned, the transition to new personnel was complicated. 
Caras’s resignation came in March 1967. The producer Ivan Tors had signed him to 
write and co-produce three features, all for release with Paramount (Anon. 1967c: 21). 
However, Caras did not leave immediately due to the need for a handover to the newly 
appointed vice-president of Polaris, Benn Reyes. Following Kubrick’s appointment of 
Reyes, he informed Caras in mid-March 1967 that Reyes would be travelling to New 
York by the end of the month for a two week handover transition, a time period that 
Kubrick felt was ‘sufficient’ (Kubrick 1967a). Kubrick’s prediction was a gross 
underestimate and by 26 April, Reyes and Caras were still in process of transitioning 
and Reyes sent a request to Kubrick that Caras be kept on for an additional week ‘to 
complete transitions and indoctrination’ (Reyes 1967a). Caras was still working for 
Polaris in May 1967, and the trades did not announce Reyes’s appointment until the 
beginning of July 1967 (Anon. 1967d: 6). But even following Caras’s formal 
resignation from the company, the complex nature and scope of the project meant that 
Reyes and Caras remained in contact over the coming months, with Caras guiding 
Reyes on merchandising, publicity issues, and on locating research for him that Kubrick 
required (Caras 1967a). Caras’s input was perhaps necessary given Kubrick’s increasing 
lack of decisiveness on a variety of issues, leading Reyes to plead with Kubrick in a 
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cable at the beginning of May 1967 that, ‘These matters and many others need your 
specific intervention and direction’ (Reyes 1967b). The list of matters Reyes was 
referring to was extensive, including at least twenty-two outstanding merchandising and 
promotional opportunities at the time of Caras’s resignation (Caras 1967b). These 
included with MGM Records, with the company’s Mort Nasatir in discussions with 
Polaris about the creation of a documentary album filled with interviews on extra-
terrestrial life, alongside a soundtrack album; Parker, which had created the Universe 
game that was ready for marketing by the summer of 1967; Western Publishing, with 
discussions to publish a comic book and children’s book based on the script, though this 
deal fell through due to Kubrick’s unwillingness to make the script available to the 
company (Kubrick 1967b); and a deal with Wedgwood, the fine china and luxury 
porcelain company (Caras 1967b).  
The idea for a tie-up with Wedgwood proved to be one of Caras’s quickest 
accomplishments. He initially briefed Dan Terrell about the potential of the company 
producing an embossed ashtray with the film’s title and an image of the surface of the 
Moon, perhaps suspecting that Kubrick would not be sold on the idea (Caras 1967c). 
Wedgwood wanted to market the ashtray in honour of the Space Age, given the contexts 
of the NASA Apollo space missions to the Moon. However, Wedgwood did not want to 
pay royalties to Polaris for the use of the film’s logo. Instead, there was a discussion of 
whether MGM and Polaris would grant them the use of the film’s logo and imagery 
without royalty fees. If permission was not granted, Wedgwood was to release the 
ashtray anyway, sans film title, something that greatly concerned Caras: ‘We will not 
have the same potential inherent here for store displays. It is not possible to clearly 
project what kind of a merchandising payoff any one item will give but this is 
Wedgwood’ (Caras 1967c). Yet, once more, Kubrick was indecisive about the deal: 
 
I urge you to keep in mind the extremely handsome Parker game and Wedgwood 
ashtray. These are two quality items that have a substantial retail value. The game 
Universe is going to be a smash success […] The Wedgwood ashtray is something that 
everyone who received it would keep and use. It is handsome, carries one of the best 
trade names in the world and is, in fact a collectors’ item. Think on it! (Caras 1967d) 
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Caras’s insistence paid off though, and the Wedgwood ashtray was eventually 
commissioned in time for release at the 2001 premiere in April 1968 (see figure 6). 
Unfortunately a number of the other opportunities that Caras had negotiated all 
hinged on Kubrick giving a release date for the film, which was pushed ever further 
back. This is something that Caras persistently pressed Kubrick on, as deals with the 
likes of Vogue and Macy’s were facing collapse because no date had been fixed (Caras 
1966h). Throughout 1966, Caras requested that Kubrick give him something, even if it 
was only an approximate target given in good faith (Caras 1966i). Kubrick’s response 
was, ‘what if the date I give you is incorrect, either too early or too late? Unless I know 
this I can’t answer your question’ (Caras 1966h). Kubrick’s desire for absolute control 
ultimately led to a frustrated production process due to indecision. 
 What is interesting to note is how, as Peter Krämer has argued (2015b: 40-43), 
there was significant merchandising targeted at children. This included puzzle books 
and three jigsaws by the publisher Springbok, colouring books ‘and other children’s 
activity devices’ with Western Publishing, a desire to produce children’s comic books 
(though this didn’t happen at the time, Marvel would later adapt 2001 into a Treasury 
edition issue, followed by a ten-part comic series in 1976-77 (Fenwick 2015b)), and a 
board game by Parker Brothers (Caras 1966l). Polaris even struck a deal with Howard 
Johnson’s fast food restaurant, a family centred organisation, which made them, Caras 
said, ‘ideal for us’ (Caras 1966m). These ideas were originated within Polaris 
Productions by Roger Caras and allowed Polaris and Kubrick to steer the direction of 
the way the film was ultimately publicised, as a family picture (at least initially). 
But the frustrating managerial position taken by Kubrick, one of withholding 
information and decisions, had also led to one of the most unusual publicity campaigns 
   Figure 6: Wedgwood Ashtray used in the promotion of 2001: A Space Odyssey (Anon 2009). 
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for a film with a multi-million budget. Very few press releases were issued, with a lack 
of ‘course-of-production publicity on the film, and the absence of color-spreads in the 
weekly magazines’ (Anon. 1968n: 7). This is not to suggest the film was absent from 
the trades, with speculation rife as to what the film was about and the reasons behind 
delays in its release (Anon. 1967g: 5). Caras had insisted that Kubrick respond promptly 
to the merchandising ideas being presented to him, and also repeatedly urged him to 
authorise the release of stories to the press. Writing to Kubrick in October 1966, Caras 
said that, ‘I think it is time now for us to start getting exposure. The air of mystery that 
now exists is working for us but I do think we have to start making an impression’ 
(Caras 1966j). Such was the air of mystery that Keir Dullea reported that ‘no one knew 
he was the star of your film’ (Caras 1966k). The methods and strategies developed by 
Caras at Columbia and Terrell at MGM were now being resisted and subverted by 
Kubrick. Arthur C. Clarke said that the virtual embargo on news breaks was a publicity 
stunt (Anon. 1968n: 7), but even the publication of Clarke’s novel, which had been 
ready for some time, had been delayed by Kubrick, with bids for publication only 
commencing in April 1968, concurrent to the film’s release (7). This was a highly 
unusual move, given the merchandising potential of the book (LoBrutto 1997: 298-
299). Kubrick had also turned down other potential exploitation opportunities, including 
selling the sets of 2001 to the International Space Museum in Washington D.C. A deal 
had been approved by both Polaris and MGM in the summer of 1966 (Lyndon 1966). 
But by the release of the film, Kubrick had reneged on the deal, despite estimates that 
profits from any exhibition could reach $200,000 (Anon. 1968o: 7). 
 The publicity campaign for 2001 was unique in the era of pre-selling a film and 
having a long-range publicity and merchandising campaign. MGM launched its ‘major 
mail-order campaign’ for 2001 just five weeks in advance of its world première (Anon. 
1968p: 7). The campaign included a four-page advert in the New York Times, L.A. 
Times, and the Washington Star, followed by ‘one-a-week one-page ads in seven other 
papers’ (Anon. 1968j: 18). Yet, devoid of access to the production and with resistant 
cooperation from Kubrick, MGM were forced into using paintings by the artist Bob 
McCall, which Variety described as an atypical move, because of the late arrival of 
photographic art from the production (Anon. 1968p: 7). Terrell confirmed that the 
paintings would ‘for the moment’ form the basis of the publicity campaign, pending 
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new stills photographs to be approved by Kubrick (7). Terrell was also forced to deny 
rumours that the use of McCall’s artwork was in fact because the publicity campaign 
was delayed by Kubrick’s refusal to cooperate with MGM’s publicity department (7). 
The four-page ads were vague in their promotion of the film, with no credits beyond 
labelling 2001 as a ‘Stanley Kubrick Production’ (7). By doing so, the promotion of 
2001 became a means to sell the Kubrick brand. 
 Kubrick’s avoidance techniques may have in part been an attempt to assuage 
MGM of any doubts about the film, which had taken a decidedly abstract turn since the 
initial pitch. Piers Bizony cites Ivor Powell as saying that Kubrick would phone MGM 
to assure them the film was fine and send them only a few minutes worth of centrifuge 
footage ‘to keep them distracted. It was always just enough so that they would see that 
something really good was happening, but never enough for them to understand how the 
movie as a whole was shaping up’ (2014: 413). In turn, the merchandising deals that 
Caras was making may have steered MGM’s publicity department towards a more 
family-orientated initial marketing campaign, with Dan Terrell in discussions with 
Caras about Polaris’s merchandising activities in the spring of 1967 (Caras 1967b). 
Peter Krämer talks of how MGM had been persuaded to invest in the project because of 
their ‘perception’ of it as a family film (2010: 40). And subsequent to that, the only 
information that Caras often had and could provide MGM was about his deals with 
Howard Johnson’s or Springbok, tie-ins for children’s merchandising, or tie-ups with 
Macy’s department store and Hamilton’s watches (correspondence between Victor 
Lyndon and Roger Caras shows their exasperation at not knowing details of Kubrick’s 
changes to the script (Lyndon 1965)). In effect, then, the merchandising activities of 
Polaris, with which Kubrick was largely happy to proceed, drove the initial publicity 
campaign of MGM, a campaign that would change significantly in tone after the film’s 
release (discussed further in Chapter Five).  
 
Conclusion 
The central promotional element to 2001 eventually became Kubrick himself. Polaris 
acted as a sphere of influence by which Kubrick sought not only to wrestle control of 
publicity from MGM, but also to allow him to have control over his own image. Indeed, 
the lack of press stories about the production led to what Caras described as a 
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‘mystique’ developing around Kubrick in Hollywood (Caras 1967e). Caras, who was 
visiting Los Angeles, told Kubrick that, ‘everywhere I went in Hollywood, they asked 
about you and the picture. They are terribly curious about the picture and hold you in a 
kind of reverential awe. The legend is definitely building’ (Caras 1967e). The projection 
of power within the industry was just as important as actually possessing it, and this was 
at the heart of Polaris’s publicity strategy, as outlined in correspondence between Caras, 
Tom Buck and Mort Segal: ‘The editorial focal point must be Kubrick and his 
involvement in “2001 – A Space Odyssey”. Everything else is subservient’ (Buck 
1967). 
Whereas in the 1950s Kubrick had to at times relinquish control in order to 
obtain financial backing or the support of a Hollywood actor, by the 1960s he was 
becoming ever more resistant and would (unintentionally) frustrate a production by 
withholding information. Even though the growth of publicity departments at the likes 
of MGM and Columbia saw these companies wanting to retain control over a film’s 
publicity, there was an inevitable need to involve the independent producers to whom 
they had relinquished large amounts of artistic control. This meant that cooperation was 
needed so that long-range publicity and merchandising reflected the independent 
producer’s vision. Without this, it made publicity and merchandising difficult for the 
studios. On 2001 it would seem that MGM decided to invest in Kubrick because they 
believed him to be fiscally responsible and with excellent managerial ability (even if he 
did contribute to MGM’s perilous financial state by the beginning of 1968: see Chapter 
Five) (Robert O’Brien cited in Krämer 2010: 108). MGM would have also been aware 
of Roger Caras’s excellent track record as a publicity manager at Columbia, where he 
had devised a number of far-reaching and successful merchandising campaigns. This 
belief in Kubrick’s abilities and the team he had appointed soon dissipated, and MGM 
(and Caras) became ever more frustrated by Kubrick’s obfuscation and refusal to 
cooperate with their publicity department. Arguably, there was very little that MGM 
could do once the budget had risen steeply and that the solution to their financial 
difficulties depended on the success of 2001. Kubrick’s persistent micro-management 
methods as a producer on 2001 often led to blockages and a slow workflow. Such 
management, deliberately obscuring his productions from MGM and delaying decision 
   162 
making, contributed to MGM’s perilous financial state by the end of the 1960s. Variety 
reported on this in December 1967: 
  
The reason Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer failed to pay off any of its outstanding debt during 
the course of the past fiscal year, prexy Robert H. O’Brien said last week, is that the 
company has experienced “a growth in inventory without a corresponding playoff of 
inventory”. Or, putting it more specifically, O’Brien conceded that his debt reduction 
prediction about a year-and-a-half ago had been “based on the premise that “Space 
Odyssey” would be in release”. (Anon. 1967g: 5) 
 
The impact on the commercial success of 2001 was marginal, however, with the film 
becoming a huge box office hit. In part, this was probably down to word of mouth, 
critical attention (which was far more positive than some scholars, such as James 
Naremore (2007: 19-20) suggest), the debate of ‘what the film means’ (what Variety 
called the ‘coffee cup debate’ (Anon. 1968q: 29)), and the way it resonated with the 
fifteen to twenty-five demographic (Palmer 2006: 14). All of this was an ‘unintended 
promotion that quickly outstripped the more conventional advertising campaign plotted 
by MGM’ (14). 
This is not to suggest that Kubrick’s lack of cooperation over publicity was out 
of an attempt to sabotage MGM’s marketing plans, but rather out of a desire to 
centralise absolute control of his productions with himself. Kubrick may not have 
gained full control of the publicity and exploitation of 2001 (initially at least), but 
neither did MGM and they had to deny press rumours of a power struggle over the 
publicity of 2001 (Anon. 1968p: 7). Kubrick had developed for himself a sphere of 
influence through this process of secrecy and withholding information because MGM 
had little room for manoeuvre without Kubrick’s cooperation. Polaris’s activities in 
setting up merchandising tie-ins, often targeted at children, may also have initially 
steered the publicity for 2001, given this was at times the only information MGM had to 
go on. By the end of the decade, Kubrick had fashioned himself considerable power as 
an independent producer with a film that eventually expanded beyond this family 
demographic to become a major hit with the growing youth audience. With the film 
having made over $20 million by 1973 (Sklar 1988: 118), Kubrick had seemingly 
established the Kubrick brand as a commercially viable and prestigious label heading 
into a period of economic uncertainty for Hollywood. 
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Chapter Five: 
Producing A Kubrick Feature in the New Hollywood 1968-1980 
 
 
The previous chapter examined how Kubrick’s growth as an independent producer in 
the 1960s was in large part because of the consolidation of control of publicity and his 
own image into his Polaris Productions. It also established that Kubrick’s producing 
methods on 2001 had led to the project running significantly over budget (by 
approximately $5 million) and over schedule (it was originally to be completed by 
October 1966, but was finally released in April 1968). Kubrick’s producing methods 
even contributed to one of Hollywood’s most important studios missing its yearly 
income targets several years in a row (Anon. 1967g: 5). It is arguable that his inability 
to get projects into production in the immediate wake of 2001 may have been as a result 
of his producing methods and insistence on absolute control, which frustrated the work 
process as he centralised the decision making process with himself. This is not to say 
Kubrick was dictatorial, as he certainly did collaborate, but ultimately he was the person 
in charge who had to make every decision (McAvoy 2015: 290). As Robert Kolker 
argues, ‘control was the way Kubrick survived as a completely independent filmmaker’ 
(2006: 4). Kubrick’s battle to obtain full authority over his productions, from 
development through to publicity and distribution, led to such a frustrated process on 
the publicity campaign for 2001. Its initial marketing campaign was eventually 
relaunched through a close collaboration between Kubrick and publicist Mike Kaplan. 
Kaplan will be a major character in this chapter, recruited by Kubrick from MGM to 
become his new vice-president of Polaris. In that role, Kaplan developed ‘brand 
Kubrick’, an image that did as much to cement Kubrick’s authority over his productions 
as did any contract. 
Jan Harlan, Kubrick’s executive producer from Barry Lyndon through to Eyes 
Wide Shut, is also an important character in both this chapter and Chapter Six. Harlan 
would become Kubrick’s de-facto co-producer (he was credited as executive producer), 
overseeing the logistical operations of each Kubrick production from the 1970s 
onwards. Harlan has remarked about how the role of producer on the films was ‘an 
automatic process. That’s true in every film’ (Appendix II). What he is referring to are 
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the routine administrative processes that take place during production, ranging from the 
writing of daily progress reports to the logistical organisation of the crew on location. 
Harlan reported directly back to Kubrick, with Kubrick retaining overall authority for 
every aspect of the business and creative functions of his productions (Appendix II).  
Kubrick had fashioned himself into the role of a super-producer by the 1970s 
and began exhibiting an image akin to that of Kirk Douglas in the late 1950s (see 
Chapter Three) of a studio executive rather than the traditional, romantic notion of a 
director. Jeremy Bernstein profiled Kubrick in 1966 and described him as sitting at a 
desk in an office, surrounded by letters that needed signing, receiving phone calls from 
around the world, and sending off cables (Bernstein in Phillips 2002: 38-39). In 
addition, profiles of him, such as Bernstein’s New Yorker piece, or an in-depth 
interview with Joseph Gelmis for his The Film Director as Superstar (1970) further 
elevated Kubrick’s status and image within the industry. 
It is the received opinion that following 2001 Kubrick was at the zenith of his 
filmmaking power, particularly once he entered the working relationship with Warner 
Bros. in 1970 that would sustain him for the remainder of his career. His power and 
influence as a producer coincided with the advent of the New Hollywood, with 2001 
released at a time that saw films like Bonnie and Clyde (1967) and The Graduate (1967) 
succeeding at the box office. Arguably, Kubrick would profoundly influence the latter 
half of the New Hollywood, with the rise of the so-called ‘movie-brats’ (Pye and Myles 
1979): the ‘film school generation’ of Steven Spielberg, George Lucas, Francis Ford 
Coppola, Paul Schrader, Martin Scorsese, and John Milius (Pye and Myles 1979: 7-11). 
Thomas Elsaesser describes Kubrick’s position in the 1970s as being unique in that, not 
only was he categorisable as being a Hollywood Renaissance auteur, but more 
importantly that he, 
 
had an inordinate influence not so much on the first New Hollywood as on the second, 
insofar as each of his films from Dr Strangelove (1964) and 2001: A Space Odyssey 
(1968) onwards was a kind of prototype (of the science fiction film, of ultraviolence, of 
the costume film, the horror film) that others could adapt into a blockbuster formula. 
(Elsaesser 2004: 54) 
 
While Elsaesser might view Kubrick as what he terms a ‘survivor’ of the early New 
Hollywood, in that his ‘work remained very consistently “auteurist” […] with a steady 
output of films’ (2004: 54), Kubrick, like other independent producers active in 1970s 
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Hollywood, found filmmaking a struggle. Following 2001, he failed on more than one 
occasion to get his long-planned Napoleon into development, while other projects were 
mooted, including an adaptation of Arthur Schnitzler’s Traumnovelle (1926). These 
projects did not come to fruition and in fact his output was not as steady as Elsaesser 
suggests. Production output became increasingly protracted due to a combination of 
Kubrick’s own working processes (the need to produce high quality and completely 
controlled product; sacrificing large crews in order to allow for a longer shooting 
schedule) and industrial factors (rival projects; a box office becoming dominated by 
high-concept blockbusters). These issues will be picked up in Chapter Six. This chapter 
will examine the way Kubrick looked to further consolidate his power as an 
independent producer with legal authority over his productions by focusing on the idea 
of the Kubrick brand. The chapter will look at how Kubrick’s productions were 
produced within the industrial contexts of the conglomerisation of Hollywood, the 
growing dominance of Warner Bros., and a fast changing demographic in the USA.  
 
Industrial Contexts: Kubrick, Warner Bros. and Absolute Control 
On 22 July 1966, Roger Caras wrote a letter to Stanley Kubrick to tell him of a seismic 
industrial change he had heard was about to take place in Hollywood: United Artists 
were to be taken over by the conglomerate corporation Consolidated Food (the deal 
with Consolidated fell through and UA eventually merged with Transamerica 
Corporation in 1967 (Balio 1987: 304-305)). Caras noted what this meant for the former 
independent company: 
 
[The takeover] puts UA in the enviable position of being free of banks. Production can 
now be financed by the parent company much as it is in the Gulf-Western and 
Paramount set-up. The feeling around town is that this must be the trend within the 
industry. There are mixed emotions as to whether it is all rosy. Some people feel that 
there will be indifference to Show Business norms by any company whose principal 
concerns are ball bearings and not art. (Caras 1966g) 
 
Caras was aware of the industrial significance of the takeover and concluded as much to 
Kubrick: ‘It is interesting, none the less, and could represent a major revolution within 
the industry’ (Caras 1966g). Caras was not wrong and over the next few years the major 
Hollywood studios were taken over by various conglomerate giants and became 
subsidiaries within vast media empires. Perhaps reacting to the industrial changes, 
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Kubrick made a bold move, when in February 1968 he purchased five thousand shares 
of MGM stock, at an investment of $205,000 (Anon. 1968c: 4). Kubrick’s purchase was 
made from a position of confidence at the anticipated success of 2001 and the impact 
this would have on MGM stock prices (Anon. 1968b: 7). However, MGM was a 
struggling company by 1968 and Kubrick’s investment must be seen in this context. 
Certainly, MGM was not without other ‘celebrity’ stockholders, including Carlo Ponti, 
producer of the likes of Doctor Zhivago (1965). But Kubrick’s investment was 
noticeable for the amount he had purchased (it would equate to approximately $1.5 
million at today’s prices). Variety reported one source saying that it equated to a vote of 
confidence ten times over by Kubrick in his own picture (Anon. 1968c: 4).  
 Prior to the purchase of the shares, Kubrick had been an initiator of a series of 
adverts supporting MGM’s management, which had found itself in a battle with Philip 
Levin, an MGM majority stakeholder since February 1965 (Anon. 1967b: 3). Levin 
sought an injunction against MGM to stop members of the board soliciting ‘proxies’ to 
vote on his behalf in the election of directors to the board (3). Levin, along with several 
other shareholders, tried to oust MGM president, Robert O’Brien, from his position, 
along with other management directors. Kubrick persuaded sixty-three other producers 
and directors, including John Frankenheimer and David Lean, to sign the adverts, which 
were taken out in Variety, New York Times, and the Wall Street Journal in January 1967 
and claimed that O’Brien was ‘orientated toward as much quality in film-making as is 
consistent with commercialism’ (3). Appreciating the creative and business authority 
O’Brien had given him during the production of 2001, Kubrick was motivated to take 
out the advert of support for MGM and its management because he believed ‘something 
should be done in the current situation to demonstrate the esteem in which O’Brien is 
held by creative people who have worked with him’ (3). It likely also stemmed from the 
fact that MGM retained a fifty per cent share in 2001, along with perpetual distribution 
rights (Sklar 1988: 118). Levin was infuriated by the adverts and made a complaint to 
the Securities & Exchange Commission (Anon. 1967b: 3). He was determined to 
change the management of MGM and had formed a committee titled the MGM 
Stockholders’ Committee for Better Management, setting out an eight-point plan for the 
company’s future (Anon. 1967a: 4). This included the establishment of a subsidiary, 
MGM Telefilms, to take over control of MGM’s feature films for distribution on 
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television (4). Though Levin was ultimately not granted the injunction he wanted on the 
adverts, nor did he manage to usurp O’Brien (though, O’Brien was later forced to resign 
in January 1969 (Anon. 1969e: 46)), he was victorious in his efforts in the shareholder 
vote and elected his desired director candidates (Markham 2006: 272).  
The damage inflicted on MGM was the beginning of the end for the ailing 
company, with a takeover initiated by Kirk Kerkorian in July 1968 (Barmash 2003: 
150). Kubrick may, however, have had ulterior motivations in supporting O’Brien and 
his management team, as seen by his decision to buy shares. His support of the MGM 
management team may not have been as a result of genuine admiration in their 
leadership, but rather an attempt to further solidify his control and power. Shortly before 
Kubrick acquired the MGM shares, the company’s stock had declined by more than $25 
a share. Such drastic financial downturn was as a result of ‘the company’s current cash 
and earning status, and its prospects for the future in the light of a possible takeover by 
board member Edgar Bronfman and/or Time Inc.’ (Gold 1968: 3). And as mentioned 
above, Kubrick had contributed to MGM’s woes with the over-budgeted and 
overscheduled 2001. By the end of 1968, Kubrick could not even get MGM to green 
light his next project, Napoleon. Despite supposedly being at the heights of his 
producing powers, he still found obtaining financing difficult. Kubrick’s political 
manoeuvres in supporting the MGM management had not paid off. Such politicking 
would occur again during his early years at Warner Bros., as shall be examined below. 
Variety reported in July 1968 that Napoleon would be Kubrick’s next project, 
which he would produce, direct and write, with shooting to commence in early 1969 
(Anon. 1968f: 11). The announcement created a buzz within the global film industry, 
with many European countries hoping to encourage Kubrick to produce the picture in 
their country (Anon. 1968g: 62). Kubrick plunged into the research for the film, 
contracting Professor Felix Markham as the principal historical advisor on the project in 
autumn 1968 (Anon. 1968h: 24). Napoleon was also the first official work conducted by 
Jan Harlan for Kubrick. He’d been brought on to undertake research in Zurich and 
Germany to gather picture material, before Kubrick asked him to join him for a further 
year in Romania. Kubrick had just arranged a principle deal to use the Romanian 
cavalry in the film to depict Napoleon’s first Italian and Russian campaign (Appendix 
II). 
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Just as he believed that there had never been a truly great science fiction film 
prior to his making of 2001, so Kubrick believed, with all ‘apologies and respects’, that 
there had never been a great historical film (Strick and Houston 1972: 66). Kubrick 
included Abel Gance’s Napoleon (1927) in his judgement of bad historical films. 
Napoleon and the Napoleonic wars had attracted numerous directors since the earliest 
days of cinema. Alongside Gance’s silent epic, there were silent films about Horatio 
Nelson (Nelson (Maurice Elvey 1918; Walter Summers 1926); Waterloo (Karl Grune, 
1929), and The Black Hussar (1932)). Many German films of the 1920s and 1930s 
depicted successes over the Napoleonic armies, such as The Higher Command/Der 
höhere Befehl (1935), part of a growing patriotic German national identity. This 
culminated in Kolberg (1945), directed by Veit Harlan (uncle of Jan Harlan and 
Christiane Kubrick) about a German town besieged by French troops. After World War 
Two, however, there were fewer films about Napoleon, with one or two exceptions. It 
was not until the mid-1960s that there was a renewed interest off the back of Sergei 
Bondarchuk’s quartet of Russian made War and Peace (1966-67) films, the totality of 
which won the Academy Award for Best Foreign Language Film in 1969.  
But despite the critical success of Bondarchuk’s War and Peace, MGM backed 
out of their deal with Kubrick by the end of 1968, citing that they were involved in ‘too 
many ultra-high budget previous commitments’ (Anon. 1970a: 21). Kubrick then turned 
the project over to United Artists, who after initial support also turned the project down. 
The interest in Napoleon was growing apace and two other rival films on the life of the 
emperor were announced – one by Warner Bros. to be directed by Bryan Forbes, and 
the other to be produced by Dino De Laurentiis and directed by Sergei Bondarchuk for 
Paramount (Anon. 1969c: 26). As the trades noted, Kubrick’s project was now in direct 
competition with De Laurentiis’s Waterloo (1970) (Anon. 1968f: 11). Waterloo had 
been in development hell since 1966, but finally went into production in the spring of 
1969 with an initial budget of $25 million (Werba 1969: 33). The film became an 
increasingly difficult cause of Kubrick’s inability to get his own Napoleon project off 
the ground. By the late 1960s, there was an increase in so-called ‘rival projects’ – 
‘competitive film projects (same title or themes) separately proclaimed by two or more 
producers’ (Anon. 1969d: 46). This problem was acutely the case for Napoleonic 
pictures. In fact, given the attention by Hollywood film producers following War and 
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Peace, an Italian producer of ‘sex adventures’ decided to exploit the theme with 
Napoleon and Sexy Susan (Anon. 1969c: 26). 
The fate of Kubrick’s project was now subject to the whims of Hollywood’s 
conglomerisation. In October 1969, Kirk Kerkorian took a controlling percentage of 
MGM shares and installed James T. Aubrey as the company’s president following an 
aggressive takeover during the summer (Anon. 1969a: 5). Kerkorian was a businessman 
with a variety of properties, including hotels and casinos in Las Vegas (5). Immediately 
following his acquisition of MGM, Kerkorian commenced a restructure of the company, 
resulting in large cuts and the selling off of real estate. MGM had a deficit of close to 
$15 million by the end of 1969 (Foley 1969: 4). The deficit meant the need for drastic 
financial cutbacks, which production chief James Aubrey implemented ruthlessly 
throughout Christmas 1969, including making redundant over thirty-five per cent of the 
company’s domestic payroll and the dismissal of long-term executives, including Dan 
Terrell (Anon. 1969b: 6). It also meant cancelling numerous high-budget productions, 
with films such as She Loves Me, with Julie Andrews, being dropped, and others, such 
as an adaptation of Saul Bellow’s Adventures of Augie March (1953) halted for ‘budget 
revisions’ (Foley 1969: 4). Over twenty big-budget projects were abandoned (4). 
Under Kerkorian and Aubrey MGM now pursued a new production strategy, 
which focused on low-to-mid budget films geared toward the new youth audience. 
Aubrey in a press statement cited the success of the likes of Easy Rider (1969), made on 
a shoestring budget of $400,000, but grossing over $60 million (Tarbox 1969: 5). 
Aubrey wanted films that were made for audiences of the 18-25 demographic (Foley 
1969: 4). The projected $11 million budget of Napoleon, along with the now 
notoriously slow working methods of Kubrick following the four year production of 
2001, meant that the project was becoming commercially unviable in the industrial 
climate. It was not just MGM that was suffering, though it certainly was hurting the 
most financially. The other big studios were encountering losses in the millions and 
cancelling projects in the tens, including Twentieth Century Fox, Paramount and 
Warner Bros., while United Artists lost $35million throughout 1970 (Foley 1969: 4). 
Kubrick turned to UA for funding for Napoleon in early 1970, but they too refused. 
Perhaps sensing both the project’s unviable potential at the box office, as well as the 
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need to sacrifice significant artistic and business powers in any deal, Kubrick quietly 
put Napoleon on hold. 
Instead, it was announced in February 1970 that Kubrick had struck a deal with 
Warner Bros.’ John Calley to ‘write, produce and direct the film version of Anthony 
Burgess’s A Clockwork Orange. Pic is scheduled to start this summer in Britain and will 
presumably be completed before his much protracted Napoleon project’ (Anon. 1970b: 
22). Despite the deal with Warner Bros., Kubrick continued to pursue research into 
Napoleon simultaneously with the development of A Clockwork Orange. The trades 
reported that Napoleon would be filmed in either 1971 or 1972 after the completion of A 
Clockwork Orange (Anon. 1970c: 22). This never occurred, however, with Kubrick 
instead signing to Warner Bros. to produce a second picture: an adaptation of Arthur 
Schnitzler’s Traumnovelle, scheduled to start shooting in autumn 1971 (Anon. 1971e: 
3). 
The evolution of Warner Bros. in the latter half of the century was rapid, the 
catalyst for change coming in the late 1960s during the period of conglomerisation. 
Warner Bros. also underwent two takeovers by the end of the decade. The company was 
still headed by Jack L. Warner in 1966 and he steered it through turbulent economic 
waters. He implemented a series of executive promotions in the spring of 1966 (Anon. 
1966a: W1), before selling his shares in the company to Seven Arts Productions; a total 
of 1,573,861 at a price of $20 per share (Anon. 1966b: 5). Following the sale of his 
stock, Warner took a back seat, giving up the role of president and chief executive to 
Ben Kalmenson, and instead taking up the newly created position of  Chairman of the 
Board, thereby retaining executive producing powers (Anon. 1966b: 5). Warner’s final 
year with the company was one of intense activity, putting into production a number of 
financially successful and critically praised pictures in 1967, which the industry 
declared ‘the year of Warner Bros.-Seven Arts’ (Anon. 1968e: 7). Films such as Bonnie 
and Clyde, Cool Hand Luke (1967) and Reflections in a Golden Eye (1967) led Variety 
to state that ‘more than any other major studio, it was Warner Bros. – under the 
leadership of 74-year-old Jack Warner – which took the risks’ (Anon. 1968e: 7). By 
mid-1967, Seven Arts had completed their acquisition of Warner Bros. and Eliot 
Hyman was appointed board chairman and his son Kenneth Hyman executive vice-
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president in charge of worldwide production of the newly named Warner Bros.-Seven 
Arts Ltd (Anon. 1967e: 3). 
In 1969, however, Steve Ross’s Kinney National Company, aided by Ted 
Ashley, bought out Warner Bros. from Seven Arts. Warner Bros.-Seven Arts, despite 
initial success at the box office, had soon found itself struggling financially (DiOrio and 
Natale 2002: 51). Following the acquisition by Kinney, Ross installed Ashley as the 
Warner Bros. CEO, a position he held until 1981 (DiOrio and Natale 2002: 51). Ashley 
continued the risk-taking approach that Jack Warner had taken during 1967 and played 
‘a major role in greenlighting controversial and socially relevant projects’ (51). 
Producer-director John Boorman described working at Warner Bros. under Ashley as 
being a ‘tremendously innovative and exciting period, when the prevailing policy at the 
studio was to support the film directors’ visions, and Warner Bros. was clearly leading 
the way’ (51). 
There has been some speculation about the deal between Kubrick and Warner 
Bros., but nothing truly concrete in what the deal specified. The two biographies on 
Kubrick rush over the issue: John Baxter merely states that it was a three-picture deal 
that gave Kubrick complete control (1998: 245-246), while Vincent LoBrutto fails even 
to mention the deal. But there are hints in production correspondence as to the nature of 
Kubrick’s relationship with Warner Bros., and we can also deduce why Kubrick chose 
to produce A Clockwork Orange when he did given the industrial contexts of both 
Warner Bros. and Hollywood. An interoffice memo from Warner Bros.’s Clive Parsons 
to Mike Baumohl (Warner Bros. European Publicity Director) in early 1970 outlines the 
nature of the relationship between Kubrick and the company, at least with regards to A 
Clockwork Orange: 
 
The underlying principle in the case of this picture is that the key creative and business 
decisions are made by Kubrick (after consultation with [Ted] Ashley and [John] 
Calley). Kubrick agrees to give Warner Bros. representatives reasonable access to sets 
and locations with a view to keeping them advised with respect to the progress of 
production and decisions being made in connection therewith. Accordingly, the Kubrick 
contract is very different from our normal production/distribution arrangement and I 
would suggest that you might like to check with me about any specific points which 
come up, before approaching Kubrick. (Parsons 1970) 
 
This memo is remarkably explicit in explaining the nature of the relationship between 
Kubrick and Warner Bros. and there are several key points in the memo beyond the 
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initial announcement that Kubrick made key creative and business decisions. Firstly, 
this is bracketed with the qualification that Kubrick’s decisions had to flow from 
consultations with Warner Bros. executives Ted Ashley and John Calley. Both 
executives kept on top of what was happening throughout the production of A 
Clockwork Orange, as well as remaining in constant dialogue with Kubrick’s team over 
the film’s promotion and distribution. They repeatedly flew out to London to hold 
meetings with Kubrick or to view footage. Dan Stern, the advertising and publicity vice-
president, travelled to London in December 1970 (Anon. 1970e: 5), while Ted Ashley, 
along with John Calley, personally led an echelon of Warner Bros. executives to 
London in January 1971 to hold meetings with Kubrick and other directors, including 
Ken Russell who was working on The Devils (1971) and John Boorman who was 
directing Deliverance (1972) (Anon. 1971a: 6). 
Secondly, the memo states that Kubrick had to provide ‘reasonable access’ to all 
production decisions, a not altogether unfair request given that Warner Bros. were 
providing full financial backing. Again, the repeated visits by Warner Bros. executives 
to London to meet with Kubrick back up this point. And thirdly, the memo confirms 
that the relationship with Kubrick was ‘very different from our normal 
production/distribution arrangement’ (Parsons 1970). John Calley had personally flown 
out to London to meet with Kubrick and negotiate the terms of his next feature. This in 
itself was unusual, given that international production was the responsibility of the 
director of foreign productions, George Ornstein. Ornstein resigned several days after 
the contract had been struck with Kubrick, and was replaced by Danton Rissner (Anon. 
1970d: 4). Kubrick was able to utilise the new management of Ashley-Calley to his 
advantage, obtaining control over every facet of his production, right through to 
promotion and distribution. Of course, there were checks and balances, as suggested by 
the constant meetings and conferences held in London by Warner Bros. executives 
throughout 1970 and 1971. Jan Harlan further outlines this relationship with Warner 
Bros.: 
 
He’d say to them [Warner Bros.], look I’m going to film this, are you interested. And 
they’d say yes, always. Sure, you want to make this film, fine. Ok, I mean, let us see 
what it is, what’s the budget, who is going to be in it. Of course they’re not saying do 
whatever you want, no way, but once they made a deal with him, they would never 
interfere. (Appendix II) 
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Kubrick approached Warner Bros. with the intent of gaining their backing for 
Napoleon. But it was a project that would presumably not have found favour with Ted 
Ashley and John Calley. As Harlan suggests above, Warner Bros. did not allow Kubrick 
outright to do whatever project he wanted; they had to see and approve the project first. 
Ted Ashley and John Calley implemented a series of new policies shortly after 
being appointed by Steve Ross. This included making cuts of $5 million and a move 
toward smaller budgeted films (Verrill 1970: 15). Napoleon did not align with the new 
production motives of Warner Bros., a project that required vast amounts of research 
and development. Ashley, in a meeting with Kinney shareholders, announced that 
Warner Bros. were implementing ‘strict pre-production cost controls, not only to pear 
budgets down but to minimize eventual losses if the project were to be abandoned’ 
(Verrill 1970: 15). The company was now pursuing a policy of low-budget (on average, 
no more than $1.7 million (Verrill 1970: 15)), fast turnaround, and often controversial 
youth films, following on from the recent industry successes of Easy Rider, Bonnie and 
Clyde, and The Graduate. Ashley and Calley had initiated films such as THX 1138 
(1971), Woodstock (1970), Stop (1970), The Devils, Deliverance, Klute (1971) and 
Dirty Harry (1971), as well as eventually releasing Performance (1970), a project 
instigated prior to the Kinney takeover of Warner Bros., and Death in Venice (1971). A 
number of these features received X-ratings in the USA, including Stop and The Devils, 
and contained considerable violence, sex and taboo subjects. The new MPAA ratings 
system was introduced in 1968, replacing the old Production Code. But the new system 
of classification created uncertainty around boundaries and presented what Richard 
Maltby calls ‘the commercial viability of the “X” category’ that became a marketing 
device for studios (2003: 177-78). The new system allowed the ‘majors to produce and 
distribute the kind of overtly sensationalist material they had previously left to 
independents like AIP’ (179). Many of the X-rated features were proving to be box 
office hits, and even Academy Award winners (Midnight Cowboy (1969) was awarded 
Best Picture in 1969).20 
The youth-oriented market was what interested Warner Bros., particularly after 
Woodstock achieved a domestic gross of $14 million by January 1971, leading Steve                                                         
20 For further reading on the introduction of the MPAA rating system, see Maltby (2003: 177-
181) and Cook (2000: 70-71). 
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Ross to announce in an annual Kinney report that Woodstock was an example of the 
‘kind of broad-based product that WB will concentrate upon in future’ (Anon. 1971b: 
5). In line with Ashley’s new policy direction, the films were often filmed on location, 
usually in Europe. Calley had outlined this approach in an interview with Variety in 
September 1970, saying, ‘I think feature films, since they are being made one time only, 
are best made off the lot on the actual locations. It seems to work out better creatively’ 
(Anon. 1970f: 4). It also worked out better for Warner Bros. who were arranging stage 
rental deals for television production (Verrill 1970: 15). 
A Clockwork Orange aligned exactly with the new policy direction and 
industrial contexts of Warner Bros. It was a low-budget, youth-oriented, controversial 
feature that could be X-rated. Whether Kubrick had been encouraged toward the project 
by Warner Bros., who themselves were not enthused by Napoleon, is debatable. After 
all, Jan Harlan has said that, ‘Warner Bros. had great benefits, not financially, but from 
the prestige of having this man on their books. And they didn’t want to lose him, ever 
again’ (Harlan 2016). It may have been that, in return for directing a quick, low-budget 
youth picture, Warner Bros. would allow Kubrick to pursue a more personal project in 
future. The film was produced quickly with an eye to the youth audience and the 
intention of gaining as big a box office draw as possible (this will be explored below 
with regards to Mike Kaplan and brand Kubrick), thereby perhaps allowing Kubrick to 
sway Warner Bros. towards financing Napoleon in the future. 
 
Producing A Clockwork Orange 
The policy direction being pursued by Ashley and Calley ultimately had an impact on 
the way Kubrick produced A Clockwork Orange. He utilised a small crew and began to 
draw upon the same people again and again, as well as his own family members. For 
instance, Jan Harlan was given a permanent position at Kubrick’s Hawk Films, acting as 
the Assistant to the Producer on A Clockwork Orange. Harlan was the brother of 
Kubrick’s wife, Christiane, and had developed a close relationship with Kubrick while 
visiting him on the set of 2001 and conducting research for Napoleon. Previously, 
Harlan had worked for a Zurich based company in organisation and business planning, 
skills Kubrick viewed as being beneficial to Hawk Films and so offered him a 
permanent position in 1969. Harlan relocated to St. Albans shortly afterward (Appendix 
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II). Harlan became a close adviser to Kubrick and was ‘put in charge of business 
matters […] and was the link between Kubrick and the outside world for all financial 
and legal affairs’ (Phillips and Hill 2002: 143). The senior team of Harlan, Mike Kaplan 
and associate producer Bernard Williams (who worked on A Clockwork Orange and 
Barry Lyndon) seemingly contributed to a more streamlined method of producing.21 
They divided the non-artistic producing responsibilities of Kubrick among them, but 
still passed all decisions through Kubrick himself (Appendix II). From A Clockwork 
Orange onward Kubrick would regularly employ close family members in senior 
positions on his productions, as well as working with the same crew members, meaning 
that ‘many of the relationships and organisational hierarchies were already established’ 
(McAvoy 2015: 294). At the centre of this operation was Harlan. Pragmatic in his 
approach, Harlan’s job was to transform ideas that had been expressed to him by 
Kubrick into logistical reality. He also arranged contracts and permissions for location 
shooting, for the rental of props, and other equipment: ‘I had nothing to do with what 
you see on the screen. Only to do with what I was supposed to get, that he wanted. I was 
a member of the crew. Ok, I had signature power, but I was a member of the crew, and 
my job was to […] to do what was wanted’ (Appendix II). Harlan was also appointed 
the director of Hawk Films and took care of the day-to-day running of Kubrick’s 
production companies, along with the likes of accountant John Trehy (Trehy 1973). He 
would sign off requisition orders and other expenses, as well as negotiate deals with 
crew and actors (Harlan 1975). 
 Production on A Clockwork Orange commenced on Monday 14 September 
1970, six days after the officially scheduled start date of 7 September. This was due to 
Kubrick contracting mumps and being too unwell to work. The crew was put on 
standby throughout the week of 7 September, accruing no additional overtime, and the 
six lost days were claimed on the production’s insurance (Williams 1970a). The shoot 
was scheduled to last fifty-four days, but time was lost drastically throughout the early 
weeks of the production in September and October. The daily progress reports compiled 
                                                        
21 Bernard Williams (1942-2015) had extensive experience as a production manager prior to 
working with Kubrick, including on thirteen episodes of the television series The Prisoner 
(1967-68) and on the films Battle of Britain (1969) and Brotherly Love/Country Dance (1970). 
He went on to have a successful career as a producer on Hollywood productions such as 
Manhunter (1986), Star Trek: Generations (1994), and Daredevil (2003) 
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by associate producer Bernard Williams reveal Kubrick’s slow methods of producing 
and directing. For instance, on 24 September 1970, the crew moved to Nettlefold Hall, 
West Norwood to shoot the scene in which Alex is presented to the press following his 
successful Ludovico treatment. The scene required the presence of ten principal actors 
(including Malcolm McDowell, Michael Bates and Godfrey Quigley) as well as forty-
one extras. Only eleven days into the shoot, and the production was already one and a 
half days over schedule due to bad weather and ‘delicate preparation and rehearsal’ for 
the Ludovico treatment sequence (Williams 1970b). The 24 September saw only two 
minutes and ten seconds of footage shot, despite the crew being on location for over ten 
hours and not dismissed until ten o’clock at night (Williams 1970c). The following day, 
25 September, the crew returned to Nettlefold Hall to complete the scene, with a crew 
call of eight o’clock in the morning. Again, ten principal actors were present, but only 
thirty-eight extras were called. Staggeringly, only five minutes and forty-two seconds of 
footage was filmed, despite the crew not being dismissed until three minutes past 
midnight, being present on set for over sixteen hours. In total, Kubrick used twenty-six 
hours on one scene, capturing a total of seven minutes and fifty-one seconds of footage, 
with thirty-five set-ups across the two days (Williams 1970d). This now left the 
production two days over schedule and the crew had to work an additional day on 26 
September (Williams 1970d).  
 This became a common occurrence throughout the production, leading to 
Kubrick dropping whole scenes (such as scenes forty-three and forty-four, to take place 
in the lobby of Alex’s flat block following his successful Ludovico treatment (Kubrick 
1970)) and a persistent rescheduling of the shoot in an attempt to keep to schedule. By 
the end of principal photography in February 1971 the production was sixty-two days 
over schedule. Kubrick’s slow work rate on set, often only completing two or three set-
ups a day (Williams 1970e), meant that he needed to save money in order to give him 
the time he needed. Williams reports that by the end of October Kubrick was looking 
for an alternative location for a scene in a pasta parlour that would allow them to shoot 
on a weekday, ‘thus saving additional expenditure on a premium weekend day’ 
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(Williams 1970f). The scene was eventually dropped in November 1970 (Williams 
1970i).22 
 This work rate would be the pattern for Kubrick throughout his time with 
Warner Bros. and reflected one of the key ways in which Kubrick’s productions 
differed from others on Warner Bros. roster. Given how over schedule Kubrick was 
with A Clockwork Orange, a film that was shot quickly compared with his other 
productions, it is surprising that the shooting schedule for Barry Lyndon was so 
optimistic. Barry Lyndon required much more logistical planning, with regular 
production meetings about what the heads of department termed their ‘key worries of 
filming’ (Anon. 1973a), including the numerous locations and costumes. But the 
shooting schedule put together by Bernard Williams in collaboration with Kubrick and 
Jan Harlan advised that the production would begin on 17 September 1973 (it had been 
envisioned that filming would commence in the summer, but was put back due to 
preproduction logistics) and finish on 18 December 1973. This was wholly inaccurate, 
with production not finishing until the summer of 1974, with post-production pick up 
shots carrying on after this. 
In contrast to the shooting schedule of A Clockwork Orange, other similar 
budgeted Warner Bros. fare, such as Deliverance (a production of just under $2 
million), had much faster turnarounds. John Boorman commenced shooting of 
Deliverance on location on 17 May 1971 and had wrapped by the beginning of 
September, just under four months, compared to Clockwork’s nearly seven months, and 
this in spite of filming on difficult rural locations in Georgia throughout (Anon. 1971c: 
20). And yet, despite their differing shooting schedules, both films came in at roughly 
the same budget. In fact, Kubrick was hailed as a ‘hero’ by executives at a Warner 
Communication’s annual meeting in New York in 1972 for ‘combining aesthetics with 
fiscal responsibility’ (Anon. 1972a: 4). Certainly, he developed producing methods that 
ensured costs were kept to a minimum, allowing him the luxury of time, a method 
stressed by Jan Harlan, saying, ‘if you shoot so long, you have to have a small crew, 
otherwise you go bust’ (Harlan 2016). The total crew employed at various stages on A 
                                                        
22 In Burgess’s book, Alex takes two girls to a pasta parlour to ‘let them fill their innocent 
young listos on spaghetti and sausages’ (Burgess 1962: 37). In Kubrick’s film, these are the two 
girls Alex meets in the record shop. 
   178 
Clockwork Orange totalled approximately fifty, in contrast to Deliverance, which had 
just over seventy, roughly the average for small-budgeted Warner Bros. productions, 
including Dirty Harry and The Exorcist II: The Heretic (1977) (based on the credits of 
the film). 
Throughout the production of A Clockwork Orange and through into post-
production and distribution, the aim was to ensure continued fiscal responsibility while 
maximising the commercial viability of the film and its potential box office gross. This 
was in line with the production policy of Warner Bros. and marked a change compared 
to the excesses of 2001. Harlan has remarked how Warner Bros. insisted there would be 
‘severe penalties’ should Kubrick have gone over budget on any of his productions 
(Appendix II). Harlan does not specify what these penalties were, but does talk about 
how Kubrick kept costs down by utilising small crews. At the same time Kubrick, along 
with Harlan and Williams, maintained a tight rein over production expenses, with 
regular unit memos being issued to the crew’s Heads of Department explaining the 
procurement processes Kubrick had put in place, with ‘no purchases or orders of any 
kind to be made without the approval of Stanley Kubrick’ (Williams 1970g). Heads of 
Department had to complete purchase requisition forms, providing ‘full details of the 
good, supplier’s name and address, purchase or rental price, discount if applicable and 
when required’ (Williams 1970g). Approvals pertained not just to large cost items, but 
also petty cash. Unit memos were issued on a weekly basis, outlining the strict 
procedures and processes Kubrick wanted on the production, and often dealt with issues 
of expense, ranging from the production not covering mileage costs of crew members 
using their own car, to taxi fares being coverable only when ordered by Hawk Films for 
explicit purposes. Some of the production policies were overly didactic, such as not 
viewing 1st January 1971 as a holiday and therefore any crewmember wanting to take 
the day off would see a deduction in their salary of one-fifth (Williams 1970h). The key 
to Kubrick’s producing methods in the 1970s was to always aim to save money. His 
productions had extensive development and preproduction to ensure they were 
logistically well organised, with the team of Jan Harlan, Bernard Williams and Brian 
Cook instrumental in this. The result, as Harlan as suggested, was a small crew with a 
longer shooting schedule compared to other productions (Appendix II). 
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Kubrick kept a watchful eye over every receipt that came into the production 
office (evident in the Stanley Kubrick Archive with the number of receipts and invoices 
that were annotated by Kubrick) and would challenge any costs he saw as unfair or 
dubious. Take how Hawk Films commissioned a company called Abacus to inspect the 
A Clockwork Orange print following issues with Kodak. It is interesting briefly to 
examine the correspondence that Kubrick engaged in with company chairman, John 
Mackey, and the technician Bryan Loftus (who had worked as a special effects 
technician on 2001: A Space Odyssey) and how it demonstrates Kubrick’s micro-
management style, as well as his keen business acumen. Upon receiving the invoice for 
the work done by Abacus, Kubrick immediately responded by suggesting he felt that the 
price of £1450 was inordinately expensive. Loftus had spent 101 hours inspecting the A 
Clockwork Orange print and another 44 hours operating the film printer. The 
company’s work rate was normally priced at £10 per hour, resulting in the charge of 
£1450. Following Kubrick’s dismay, Mackey tried to compromise, by lowering the 
price per hour to £7 for the 101 hours Loftus spent inspecting the print (Mackey 1971). 
Kubrick, however, wanted to know what exactly he was paying for: 
 
I would be extremely grateful if you would indicate how you spent this 101 hours. I 
know that several days were spent at Humphries, but 101 hours represents 2 ½ solid 
weeks of work doing other things than printing […] I hope that you can understand that 
even the reduced bill of £1,015 for two marry-ups and 27 wedges is more in keeping 
with the 2001 budget than the A Clockwork Orange budget. (Kubrick 1971a) 
 
What we can see in this correspondence is, firstly, how Kubrick was attempting to 
receive a discount and succeeded, but secondly, how he was concerned about the budget 
of the film and ensuring it fit in with the low-budget policy of Ashley and Calley. 
Warner Bros., in the early years of the Kinney takeover, was extremely keen on 
ensuring low-budgets, impacting on the creative and business decisions of its producers 
and directors. John Boorman felt this acutely on Deliverance, having to sacrifice any 
use of a score because ‘Warners didn’t have much confidence in the film and said they 
wouldn’t make the film unless I cut the budget’ (McGrath 2015: 33). Similarly, Kubrick 
remarked to Loftus that he would have ‘great trouble in trying to explain this [the 
invoice price] to Warner Bros.’ (Kubrick 1971a). Kubrick perhaps sensed the unusual 
privilege he had been gifted at Warner Bros. in being given such control and freedom 
and therefore wanted to avoid unnecessary expense and an out of control budget that 
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could lead to the loss of authority he had long sought. Fiscal responsibility was 
therefore utmost. And, as A Clockwork Orange moved intro post-production, so was the 
commercial potential of both Clockwork and of the Kubrick brand. 
 
Brand Kubrick 
This section will explore how Polaris Productions, under the vice presidency of Mike 
Kaplan, allowed Kubrick to further cement his authority as an independent producer 
over both the publicity of his films and their distribution. At the same time, Kaplan was 
instrumental in developing ‘brand Kubrick’, a central promotional device in the selling 
of Kubrick’s films from the 1970s onwards. 
Mike Kaplan was exactly the kind of young, enthusiastic and innovative talent 
that Kubrick wanted working for him. He had graduated with a Bachelor of Arts degree 
from the University of Rhode Island in 1964, becoming the associate editor of the 
Independent Film Journal and later joining the publicity department as the trade press 
contact for American International Pictures (Anon. 1965e: 10). MGM executive Dan 
Terrell decided to hire Kaplan as MGM’s trade press contact in July 1965 and soon 
promoted him to the role of newspaper and syndicate contact for MGM (Anon. 1967f: 
3), then following the successful refocus of the 2001 publicity campaign (Kaplan 
combated negative reviews by the New York critics by taking out an ad based on a 
positive review by John Allen), to publicity coordinator in November 1968 (Anon. 
1968i: 11). Kaplan had been of the belief that the generalised publicity campaign for 
2001, devised as being ‘family entertainment’, failed to target a growing youth 
demographic. Kaplan argued that the original campaign, with its Bob McCall artwork, 
presented the film as a ‘modern Flash Gordon. Instead, Kubrick had created a 
metaphysical drama encompassing evolution, reincarnation, the beauty of space, the 
terror of science, and the mystery of mankind. The campaign had to be reconceived’ 
(Kaplan 2007). Even though the film did appeal to a broad audience (Krämer 2015b: 
43-47), by mid-May 1968, 2001 was still behind the likes of other MGM family 
marketed epics such as Doctor Zhivago in terms of advance sales. What this reflected 
was how large segments of the audience attending the film were a ‘quasi-“hippie” 
audience, which plunks down its money at the boxoffice’ rather than buy tickets in 
advance (Anon. 1968l: 20). Kubrick’s films primarily appealed to ‘metropolitan tastes’, 
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with the likes of Dr. Strangelove having a ‘smash success in its New York first-run 
venue’ but outside of major cities such success wasn’t replicated (Sklar 1988: 118). Dr. 
Strangelove became a cult hit in university towns and demonstrated how Kubrick’s 
films appealed to ‘urbane, sophisticated audiences’ (118). Variety reported on the extent 
to which MGM and Polaris had underestimated their marketing of 2001: 
 
This film is for youth and imaginative adults; the curious and the adventurous. There 
was a time during its production when the trade imagined that Kubrick’s sci-fi would be 
a “family” film, but this impression was killed when the pic actually opened […] Metro 
is currently in the throes of changing ad campaign from “general” orientation to a 
specific youth “hip” appeal. (Anon. 1968k: 7) 
 
By 1970, the advertising campaign for 2001 had been re launched under the guidance of 
Kaplan, who devised the now iconic Starchild/Ultimate Trip poster (Kaplan 2012a) for 
a 70mm screening of the film at New York’s Ziegfeld Theatre (Kaplan 2014a). It had 
been MGM’s Mort Segal who had sanctioned the marketing relaunch of the campaign 
alongside the film’s rerelease, seeing the original campaign organised by Terrell as 
‘dehumanising’ the film and limiting its audience potential (Kaplan 2012b). The new 
marketing campaign exploited the previous use of the phrase ‘the ultimate trip’, which 
had featured in MGM Records adverts in summer 1968 for the 2001: A Space Odyssey 
soundtrack. Under a red tinted close-up of Bowman from the Star Gate sequence and 
the bold heading of ‘The Ultimate Trip’, the advert claimed, ‘That’s what they’re 
calling it on “underground” FM. And they’re playing it like Progressive Rock. Above 
ground, they’re calling it the sound track album of the year. And it’s selling like there’s 
no tomorrow’ (Anon. 1968m: 49). 
Kaplan purposely drew on the cult, underground appeal of both 2001 and of 
Kubrick. What Kubrick represented by 1970 was an innovative, controversial director 
whose films resonated with youth audiences. The Star Child poster features only a 
grainy close up of the enigmatic figure from the closing sequence of the film, along 
with a three-word tagline and the film’s title. The only name on the poster is Kubrick’s.  
Kubrick had become synonymous with a brand that signalled controversy, genius and 
mystery. What Kubrick had found in Mike Kaplan was someone who knew how to 
brand and sell a Kubrick film. He told Kaplan that he was the only person he knew of 
who had the knowledge to handle his films and requested he leave MGM to work solely 
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for him (Kaplan 2012b). He subsequently took up the role of vice-president of Polaris 
Productions. Kaplan’s central philosophy to film publicity was as follows: 
 
A film’s campaign could determine its success and every good film could be a box 
office winner if it had the right poster […] Movie posters have complex and competing 
elements — text in the form of title treatment, credits and slogans that merge with 
visuals — they are a pre-Ed Ruscha construct. (Kaplan 2012a) 
 
Perhaps within Kaplan’s philosophy we can find the seed of what the Kubrick brand 
meant in its most basic terms. For if Kaplan, whom Kubrick felt was the man to brand 
and market his films, saw film posters as an extension of Ruscha-esque Pop Art, then 
we can see what the two men saw the Kubrickian brand as representing: the fusion of 
the commercial with art. The Kubrick brand was art-house experimentalism framed 
within mass culture genres. Kubrick did not ultimately create family entertainment 
(even if 2001 had been initially pitched as such to MGM (see Frewin 2010: 93)), but 
Modernist films that at times were indebted to movements such as Pop Art (Melia 2017; 
Naremore 2006: 7). Certainly, the opening forty minutes of A Clockwork Orange are a 
compilation of Pop Art references, from Richard Hamilton to Andy Warhol and Allen 
Jones, right through to the typographic obsessions of Ed Ruscha reflected in the Korova 
Milk Bar. Matt Melia notes that the Pop Art style of A Clockwork Orange was 
‘appropriated by popular culture – Led Zeppelin’s drummer Jon Bonham adopted 
Alex’s bowler hat and Droog suit […] while the film was a stylistic influence on David 
Bowie’s Ziggy Stardust incarnation’ (forthcoming, 2017). This Pop Art sensibility was 
increasingly reflected in the film posters developed for Kubrick’s films in the 1970s and 
1980s living up to Kaplan’s philosophy, as well as utilising the creative efforts of 
influential Pop Art figures like Phillip Castle (Castle designed the posters for A 
Clockwork Orange and Full Metal Jacket). Kubrick had found in Kaplan the man to sell 
his brand of cinema, as well as having secured the chance to control the way his films 
were promoted and distributed. Now he had to prove he could do it better than the 
studios that were financing him. 
Kaplan took up the post of vice-president of Polaris Productions on 3 May 1971 
(Anon. 1971d: 21). Over the next four years, Kubrick and Kaplan were in almost daily 
contact, planning and strategising publicity, promotion and distribution of his films 
(Kaplan 2007). Kubrick had protested at what he believed had been the neglectful 
publicity and promotion of his films in the past by the likes of Columbia. Kubrick 
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suspected that neglect of his and similar challenging films, was ‘predicated on an 
expectation of failure’ (Kubrick 1964c). This was a recurrent complaint from 
independent producers throughout the 1960s and 1970s, with John Boorman displeased 
at Warner Bros.’s handling of Deliverance, which he also attributed to the notion of an 
expectation of failure, saying: 
 
When you see what happens to a film that’s actually making them [the studios] heaps of 
money, you tremble about an interesting failure in their hands. I am coming more and 
more round to the opinion that if you want anything done properly these days, you have 
to go and do it yourself. (Malcolm 1972: 12) 
 
With A Clockwork Orange, Polaris conducted ‘a perfectly choreographed advertising-
publicity-exhibition campaign that broke house records in every major city’ (Kaplan 
2014a). The campaign aimed to maximise profit and to establish a firm Kubrick brand. 
Polaris devised several promotional approaches, including a tie-in “novelization” of the 
film, a distinct poster design, a Newsweek cover story, a newspaper for the film – the 
“Orange Times” – a soundtrack album, and a bold press brochure. A number of these 
promotional items sought to exploit the controversial nature and reception of the film 
and play up its youth appeal. It also involved a unique distribution campaign in which 
Kubrick was intimately involved in the ‘crucial selection of cinemas, which were 
usually decided by a studio’s sales executives’ (Kaplan 2014a). 
David Cook has argued that the promotion and distribution practices of 
Hollywood in the early 1970s took on a ‘new sophistication’, with a turn toward 
‘strategic or “scientific” marketing’ (Cook 2000: 14). Cook specifies that this turn to 
such strategic management of promotion and distribution began with The Godfather 
(1972), a film that performed spectacularly at the box office. It had grossed $568,800 on 
its first week of release in just two cities (Anon. 1972b: 21), and over $3 million by its 
second week, showing in seventeen cities (Anon. 1972c: 11). A Clockwork Orange did 
not gross this amount until its fourteenth week on release (Anon. 1972b: 21). But the 
scientific and strategic approach to promoting and distributing a film that Cook 
attributes to The Godfather is somewhat neglectful of the significance of what Kubrick 
was doing with A Clockwork Orange.  
Kubrick tasked one of his secretaries to collate box office data from back issues 
of Variety into his own personal distribution database (Kaplan 2014a). Variety recorded 
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weekly grosses for key cities and their cinemas across the USA. By 7 May 1969, the 
trade journal introduced a weekly ‘50 Top-Grossing Films’ chart, showing the highest 
grossing pictures nationally based on key theatres in the major cities (Anon. 1969f: 15). 
Kubrick’s database broke down gross data for films similar to A Clockwork Orange, 
including Midnight Cowboy and The Wild Bunch (1969), to see at which cities and 
cinemas they grossed the most. The ledgers were organised by the name of the city, the 
ticket prices, name of the films screened, and the number of tickets sold from 1970 to 
1972 (Anon. 1972f). Mike Kaplan explained the reasoning behind the creation of this 
database that took several months: 
 
To choose the right theater in each city, we needed to know which cinema sold the most 
tickets to the most interesting pictures. But while a studio would know what its own 
films grossed, detailed box office figures of competitive films were closely held secrets. 
There was no comparative information, and that is exactly what Stanley wanted. 
(Kaplan 2014a) 
 
The database allowed Kubrick and Kaplan to direct with military precision where to 
target A Clockwork Orange on any given week, advising a somewhat dumbfounded 
Warner Bros. distribution department as to their preferences. Distribution planning 
began in summer 1971, with Kubrick in correspondence with Leo Greenfield, the head 
of distribution at Warner Bros., about his desired distribution strategy. Kubrick wanted 
A Clockwork Orange to open in only four cities: New York, Los Angeles, Toronto and 
Denver (Kubrick 1971b). Kubrick’s strategy, even in the days of platform releasing, 
saw him have a much narrower distribution strategy than the average Warner Bros. 
release.23 This caused consternation with Leo Greenfield, who told Kubrick that ‘I do 
not believe you are doing justice to picture going as narrowly as you propose’ 
(Greenfield 1971a). 
The initial week of A Clockwork Orange’s release (the week ending 22 
December 1971) saw Kubrick narrow his strategy further, to just two theatres in two 
cities, upping this only incrementally to four theatres in four cities by the third week of 
January 1972. Throughout its release in 1972, the film played on average in nine 
theatres in an average of fifteen cities, leading to an average weekly gross of 
                                                        
23 This is based on data compiled as part of this research from Variety’s weekly ’50-Top 
Grossing Films’.  
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$179,873.24 Such a low weekly average would certainly have caused worry among 
Warner Bros. distribution executives, given that the average weekly gross of other 
similar budgeted Warner’s releases in 1971 and 1972 was $199,698. Greenfield had 
sent a memo to all of his field managers in the summer of 1971 after previewing the 
film, declaring, ‘I sincerely believe this picture will be the greatest grosser in history of 
Warners and possibly one of greatest in the entire motion picture industry’ (Greenfield 
1971b). Instead, Kubrick’s distribution strategy was leading to ten per cent lower 
grosses than the average Warner Bros. picture. 
The box office data for 1971 and 1972 shows, however, that A Clockwork 
Orange achieved an exceptional top fifty box office run of forty-three weeks. This was 
something even The Godfather could not manage, maintaining only thirty-two weeks in 
the top fifty. The average top fifty run in 1971 and 1972 was twenty-three weeks. 
Kubrick’s distribution and promotion strategy had nearly doubled that average on A 
Clockwork Orange, this despite its lower than average weekly grosses. What Kubrick’s 
strategy amounted to was to have A Clockwork Orange showing in a lower average 
number of theatres than other Warner Bros. releases, but in an average higher number of 
cities. The result led to a much longer run in the box office top fifty, with a low weekly 
average gross, but a much higher total top fifty gross. By the end of its initial run in the 
top fifty, it had grossed $8,187,595, in comparison to the Warners average of 
$4,904,901, an increase of nearly sixty-seven per cent. Kubrick’s database on the ticket 
sales and performance of films across a range of cinemas in the USA saw him 
implement a platform release strategy that maximised the commercial viability of a film 
that, in theory, should have seen its market limited by its X-rating (A Clockwork Orange 
was re-released with an R-rating in 1973 after Kubrick made cuts to it) (Anon. 1973b). 
Kubrick’s attempts to replicate this success with Barry Lyndon were less 
successful. The film, which had seen its budget escalate from $3.5 million (Anon. n.d.)  
to $11 million (Whitington 2015), achieved only an initial fourteen-week run in the top 
fifty, at the end of which it had grossed $4,920,903. Warner Communications chief 
executive Steven Ross declared to his shareholders in May 1976 that Barry Lyndon had 
been a ‘flop’ for Warner Bros. (Verrill 1976: 3). By the release of The Shining and Full                                                         
24 Figures in this section are based on data compiled from weekly issues of Variety from 1971-
1972. 
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Metal Jacket, Kubrick turned toward forms of saturation release, particularly with the 
latter, which opened on 125 theatres in ten cities, building to a high of 175 theatres 
cities by its fourth week of release. A number of high-profile, super-grossing films in 
the early-to-mid 1970s, including Jaws, The Exorcist, and The Godfather resulted in 
studios making ‘investment decisions based on a product’s actual potential for sales in 
its main market […] rather than “assume a market that would justify the outlay’” (Cook 
2000: 14). Certainly, the methods of distributing A Clockwork Orange were overtaken 
by the innovative saturation release of Jaws, which arguably impacted on Barry Lyndon 
and The Shining. The Shining maintained only twelve weeks in the top fifty box office 
chart, and Full Metal Jacket only thirteen weeks, grossing $11.5 and $13.5 million 
respectively at the end of their initial chart runs (and on the back of much higher 
budgets than A Clockwork Orange). With A Clockwork Orange though, Kubrick had 
managed to show Warner Bros. how he was able to conform to their early 1970s policy 
of low-budget, fast-turnaround, youth oriented pictures. 
Kubrick had daily strategy meetings with Mike Kaplan from summer 1971 
through 1972 to discuss how to further the distribution potential of A Clockwork 
Orange and promote the Kubrick brand (Kaplan 2014a). Kubrick’s methods of 
distributing and promoting A Clockwork Orange certainly saw him develop ‘new 
sophistication about distribution and marketing’ – the scientific marketing and 
distribution that Cook insists began with The Godfather (Cook 2000: 14). Cook goes 
onto suggest that this new sophistication saw the development of the ‘concept of the 
movie as a discrete product (and, increasingly, as a franchise or product line)’ (14). This 
line of argument can be attributed to what Kubrick was attempting to create about 
himself and his own films: a Kubrick brand and identity, one that possessed distinct cult 
appeal (Mathijs and Sexton 2011: 70). Certainly Kubrick’s cult branding with the likes 
of A Clockwork Orange came at a time ‘in which Hollywood was competing for art film 
audiences as art films, pornography, and countercultural films all crossed over into 
increased mainstream popularity’ (Church 2006). As such, a number of what have come 
to be viewed as cult directors emerged in the 1970s because of how they merged artistry 
with popular genre that raised ‘their cultural status from being mere genre pictures to 
being the artful products of an auteur’ (Church 2006). And Kubrick did just this by 
producing films that occupied what Kate Egan calls a sub-cultural space between art 
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and cult cinema (Egan 2006: 35), mixing ‘low/mass and high/art in ways that made his 
films relatively popular to most viewers (Church 2006). Directors took advantage of the 
demise of the production code to explore more violently and sexually provocative 
topics. What resulted was films that challenged ‘the distinction between art films, 
commercial entertainment and exploitation movies’ (McDonagh 2004: 108), cult films 
that appealed to young audiences and subcultures (Hunter 2008: 99). The films of 
directors such as Monte Hellmann, Bob Rafelson, William Friedkin and others 
‘celebrated sex, drugs, rock music, pop art, high camp, low culture […] [and] they 
systematically reworked the genre films they loved for contemporary audiences’ 
(McDonagh 2004: 110). Audiences responded to these films with cult behaviour (see 
Mathijs and Sexton 2011: 57-66; Hunter 2016: 41-57), particularly with Kubrick and A 
Clockwork Orange: 
 
“Cult” behavior associated with the film was especially marked in Britain (the film’s 
setting), where actual teenage gangs emulated the distinctive dress and talk of the film’s 
dangerous young “droogs,” this being one of several trends in British youth 
counterculture (along with teddy boys, skinheads, mods & rockers, etc.) that would 
eventually culminate in the punk movement of the late-1970’s. (Church 2006) 
 
Kubrick and Kaplan certainly realised that the prime audience for A Clockwork Orange 
was what they termed the ‘youth media – college underground’, these being the 
‘strongest Kubrick followers’ (Kaplan 1971). Kubrick therefore felt that the publicity 
emphasis for A Clockwork Orange had to be on the college underground, which needed 
to be informed of the film before the Christmas school vacations. At the same time, 
‘screenings have to be scheduled before they leave and in enough time for reviews to 
break’ (Kaplan 1971: 1). Kubrick requested that Warner Bros. compile information on 
‘college publications showing last December publication date, first January publication 
date, and dates of the respective Christmas recesses’ (1). Kaplan also wanted Warner 
Bros. to arrange an interview with Kubrick on the community college series The Sound 
on Film, which had previously featured the likes of Robert Altman, David Lean, 
William Vandenheuval, and Robert Mitchum (2). In addition, Kubrick wanted an 
extensive underground advertising campaign, directed initially at publications such as 
Los Angeles Free Press, Village Voice, East Village Other, Good Times, Organ, Rolling 
Stone, and Crawdaddy (2). A ‘second wave’ of ads was to be placed in smaller 
underground publications in January and February 1972, including in Creem, Changes, 
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Interview, University Review, Fusion, Rock, Zygote, Ramparts, Other Scenes, and 
Screw. This was to be complemented with airtime on underground radio stations prior 
to the release of the film, and the two weeks following. It was agreed that audiences 
‘would respond heavily, and additional expenditures here could wait until sixth to 
eighth week or when sustaining push needed’ (2). 
The cult branding also saw Kubrick turn to publisher Ian Ballantine, founder of 
Ballantine Books, for his novelisation of the film. A hugely successful publisher due to 
its innovations in cheap paperback publishing, Ballantine had a focus on science fiction 
and fantasy. Ballantine published authors ranging from Anthony Burgess and Arthur C. 
Clarke, to J.R.R. Tolkien and Ray Bradbury (Tabor 1995). Ballantine was credited as 
developing the mass-market paperback, with publications priced between $1.50 and 
$3.00 (Tabor 1995). Kubrick entered into negotiations with Ballantine to publish his 
vision of a novelisation of A Clockwork Orange in mid-1971. Writing to Ian Ballantine, 
Kubrick explained his intention for the book, saying ‘I think the idea of a total graphic 
record of the film, represented by each cut and the dialogue, will be an important 
innovation in film books’ (Kubrick 1971c). The book was published in paperback in 
July 1972, branded as Stanley Kubrick’s A Clockwork Orange, with the cover page a 
replica of the film poster. At the bottom of the book, in much smaller print, is the 
clarification that the novelisation was ‘based on the novel by Anthony Burgess’. The 
novelisation of a film itself adapted from a literary text was not unheard of; it had 
previously occurred on Kubrick’s Dr. Strangelove. But Stanley Kubrick’s A Clockwork 
Orange was an attempt to render the visual experience of Kubrick’s film into a 
photographic collection. As numerous reviews reported, the book improved ‘on the 
usual format of a published script. Stanley Kubrick’s A Clockwork Orange tightens the 
relationship between dialogue and visuals by placing the spoken word between 
corresponding film frames. Some 700 stills are used in this eye-catching presentation’ 
(George 1972). Variety described the collection as unique, being ‘conceived and put 
together by Kubrick himself’ (Anon. 1972d: 12). Other film companies had been 
rumoured to be looking to take a similar approach with their back catalogue of classic 
films, but Kubrick and Ballantine had published ahead of them (Anon. 1972d: 12). With 
Stanley Kubrick’s A Clockwork Orange, Kubrick puts himself in a central role and 
emphasises himself as the brand. The film’s stars are not named on the cover of the 
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book, while in promotional material Ballantine talked up the fact that it had been 
Kubrick who had both ‘conceived’ and ‘put together’ the book (12). The way it was 
devised and marketed suggested a strategic branding exercise of the director himself. 
But profit motivation was also certainly prominent in the book’s creation. Prior 
to the release of Summer of 42 (1971), Warner Bros. had insisted that the film’s 
screenwriter, Herman Raucher, quickly write a novelisation to aid with the film’s 
promotion (Park 2002). As Raucher recalls, the book ‘gets to be a bestseller before the 
movie is released. So, when the ads for the movie come out, they say, “... based upon 
the national bestseller” […] But we all know that the movie was written first’ (Park 
2002). Similarly Paramount had the writer of Love Story (1970), Erich Segal, adapt the 
screenplay into what Vogue called a ‘modest first novel’ in order to pre-sell the film. 
The book was published on 4 February 1970 – nine months before the film – and 
became a huge commercial success, maintaining thirty-eight weeks in the number one 
spot of the New York Times bestseller list (Cousins 1971: 130). Deborah Allison has 
argued how the 1970s onwards saw Hollywood’s conglomerates recognising the 
‘financial advantages of exploiting their most popular properties across multiple 
subdivisions of their businesses’ (Allison 2016: 5). It must be argued that producers too 
saw the advantage, including Kubrick. The profit motivation in developing Stanley 
Kubrick’s A Clockwork Orange is also hinted at in the way Kubrick suggested a similar 
idea to his close friend, producer Sig Shore, who was in the midst of producing a sequel 
to Super Fly (1972). Shore himself was looking to fully exploit the film’s profit 
potential in every way possible, explaining that, ‘As for the ‘Super Fly’ paperbacks, I 
went to Ballantine’s at Stanley Kubrick’s suggestion […] the first edition of 350,000 
copies sold out after the film opened’ (Werba 1973: 30). 
Quality cannot be seen as central to the publication of Stanley Kubrick’s A 
Clockwork Orange. After all, Ballantine Books could hardly be considered a quality 
publisher, with its tendency to publish mass-market crime, fantasy, science fiction and 
pulp crime novels. What we can assume, then, is that given the retail price of the book 
($3.50) the intention was to reach as large a market as possible. Prior to the book’s 
release, the film was rapidly falling down the ranks of the top fifty box office chart, as 
well as seeing its play dates falling from thirteen cinemas in the week of 21 June 1972 
to five cinemas by the week of 26 July. Similarly, the average weekly gross dropped to 
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just $29,900. Yet in the three weeks following the book’s release, weekly takings 
drastically increased to $421,399 and the film rose to number two in the top fifty box 
office chart and was playing in thirty-nine cinemas. 
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 Figure 7: The 1972 front cover of Newsweek, the photograph of which Kubrick staged himself. The article 
said Kubrick had an ‘inexhaustible drive to orchestrate the smallest details’ (Zimmerman 1972: 28). 
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Given that Kubrick was overseeing the film’s distribution strategy, there is a 
correlation between the upswing in the film’s box office takings (of over 1300 per cent) 
and the book’s release. This promotional strategy was at the heart of all the tie-in 
products devised by Kaplan and Kubrick. Given that A Clockwork Orange had received 
an X-rating in the USA, new outlets to reach an audience had to be found. This was 
particularly true when regional newspapers, such as Detroit News and The Cleveland 
Post, began refusing to publish adverts for X-rated films (Anon. 1972e: 3). What 
followed was Kaplan’s idea for A Clockwork Orange’s own newspaper: Orange Times. 
The publication was devised as a ‘comprehensive editorial handout that would become 
both the production notes and the solution to the advertising ban in markets where X-
rated films had limited media access’ (Kaplan 2012b). But also important to the 
strategy, as it had been on 2001, was the placing of Kubrick at the centre of the film’s 
creation and authorship and devising a mythic persona about Kubrick. Kubrick himself 
was actively involved in this process, particularly when it came to interviews. The 
interviews Kubrick gave were limited, and when he did give them he insisted on seeing 
his copy so that he could edit them (Kaplan 2014b). Kubrick clearly recognised the 
means by which interviews communicated an identity for himself and therefore were 
key to the brand he was fashioning. Newsweek was granted an interview as part of the 
publicity for A Clockwork Orange, which was published on 3 January 1972, just two 
weeks after the film’s release. Kubrick was to be the cover story and Newsweek was set 
to despatch a photographer from its art department in New York to Kubrick’s British 
home to take his picture for the front cover. But Kubrick took the unprecedented step of 
insisting that he would take the photograph, to the annoyance of Newsweek (Kaplan 
2014b). Kubrick took the eventual photograph with the assistance of his wife, 
Christiane, and Jan Harlan, in his wife’s studio (Kaplan 2014b) (see figure 7). The 
brand summarised in the Newsweek cover, with a relaxed Kubrick in a casual sports 
jacket and holding a small film camera while pointing decisively into the near distance, 
was that of an innovative auteur. The image was communicated in words in A 
Clockwork Orange’s press booklet, with the introduction describing Kubrick as 
‘exhilarating and exhausting’, ‘enigmatic’, as having an ‘unpampered self-sufficiency’, 
and as an ‘ironic humanist’ (Alexander Walker, cited in A Clockwork Orange press 
book 1971: 1-2). The Kubrick brand was that of a Hollywood outsider, an artist who 
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was not compromised by Hollywood, its lifestyle or its deals, but rather a man who 
simply had a movie camera and a vision. 
 
Conclusion 
The level of control Kubrick established for himself on A Clockwork Orange saw him 
develop innovative producing methods that contributed to the overwhelming financial 
success of the film. It also saw him finally obtain the full authority he had long battled 
for since the 1950s, subsuming the responsibilities of promotion and distribution into 
his producing role. While his promotion and distribution strategy may have at first 
confused Warner Bros., it soon paid off. In the process, Kubrick set a course for the 
New Hollywood in the 1970s for the super-producers that would come to dominate by 
the end of the decade. Kubrick’s Hawk Films and Polaris Productions were a power 
base of production might bankrolled by Warner Bros. The set backs he had suffered 
following the release of 2001: A Space Odyssey in his attempts to put his Napoleon 
project into distribution meant that Kubrick purposely set about conforming to the 
policy agenda of Warner Bros. by producing a low-budget picture targeted at the 
lucrative youth demographics and maximising its box office returns with a combination 
of strategic distribution and promotional tie-ins. Fundamental to this had been Mike 
Kaplan, who had the promotional acumen to understand Kubrick’s vision and how it 
appealed to the college-underground and metropolitan crowd. It also led to Kubrick 
building a senior team around him made up of close family members or long-time 
colleagues who were familiar with his producing process, a model of production that 
would stay in place for the remainder of his career. 
Yet Kubrick’s unprecedented level of control and input on the promotion and 
distribution of A Clockwork Orange caused tension within Warner Bros. (as well as 
being deliberately used by Ted Ashley as part of a power struggle among the company’s 
executives), and led some to question Kubrick’s strategy and competence. In particular, 
Norman Katz and Myron Karlin were unsure of Kubrick’s distribution plan in the UK 
and resentful of his growing authority within Warner Bros. Karlin was assigned to 
secretly report back to Katz any conversations he had with Kubrick. One such memo 
from Karlin to Katz on 9 February 1972 reported that Kubrick did not want A 
Clockwork Orange to be distributed to every major city in the UK until the media 
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reaction to it had calmed down. Karlin said that Kubrick ‘was, and is, afraid that the 
controversy which is going on over this film is dangerous and could lead to banning of 
the film in the GLC or in other local councils’ (Karlin 1972). He finished by arguing 
that if Warner Bros. had absolute control over A Clockwork Orange it would be 
‘playing today in every important city of the UK [...] Stanley Kubrick, in all sincerity, is 
convinced that this would be reckless, that we can earn the same money later when the 
storm is over’ (Karlin 1972). Kubrick, upon discovering that Katz had been 
surreptitiously reporting on his activities, wrote to him to say that he found this 
‘procedure odious and insulting’ (Kubrick 1972). Katz left Warner Bros. less than a 
month later, forced out by Ted Ashley, John Calley, and possibly Stanley Kubrick. 
The power Kubrick had amassed and the desire to remain a mainstream 
producer who commanded large budgets was not, however, easy to sustain. Throughout 
the remainder of the decade, Kubrick struggled to both develop projects and see returns 
on his pictures in the same way he had with A Clockwork Orange. His strategic 
platform release strategy was severely limited by the time of Barry Lyndon’s release in 
1975, with Jaws having transformed the industrial contexts of Hollywood by bringing 
saturation distribution to the fore. Kubrick had equally transformed the role of the 
producer and director, and become a super-producer commanding big budgets, the 
confidence of studios that were largely agreeable to grant autonomy, and being able to 
devise and control every production process, from development through to distribution 
and beyond.25 Kubrick had also acquired the ability to conduct lengthy shooting 
schedules due to his ability to keep costs down through a combination of astute 
budgeting (a skill learned from his guerrilla producing days) and small crews working 
long hours (he also encouraged staff not to be unionised so that they could work beyond 
their legal limit (D’Alessandro 2012: 92-93)). But Kubrick’s achievement in becoming 
a super producer also made it increasingly difficult for him to operate, as the next 
chapter shall explore. 
 
                                                        
25 Movie brats like Steven Spielberg, discussed in Chapter Six, have been referred to as ‘super 
producers’ in the industry due to the level of artistic and business autonomy they possess while 
still operating within the mainstream system. They command large budgets and develop a 
recognisable producing brand (Jacobs 2011; Anon. 2011) 
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Chapter Six: 
Kubrick versus the Super-Producers 
 
 
By the 1970s, following his battles with the studios in the 1950s and 1960s, and the box 
office successes of 2001: A Space Odyssey and A Clockwork Orange, Kubrick had 
accrued the legal authority on his films that allowed him control over all artistic and 
business aspects of his productions. Warner Bros. gained prestige from having Kubrick 
aligned with them, as well as the benefit of releasing his films into the lucrative home 
video market that they had the largest share of among all the major studios (Prince 
2000: 98). Warner Bros. released both The Shining and Barry Lyndon on VHS in 1982 
when there was no immediate prospect of Kubrick producing a new film (Anon. 1982b: 
24). They also regularly re-released his films into theatres, such as with Barry Lyndon 
in the autumn of 1981. Warner Bros. designed a new marketing campaign for the film in 
order to ‘tap a sizeable market’ that ‘eluded’ the film on its original release (Robbins 
1981: 5). This was done not always with the full cooperation of Kubrick, who feared 
that the rerelease of the film, which was alongside new first run films, would not receive 
the specialized handling it required (35). Still, Kubrick received from Warner Bros. the 
absolute creative freedom he deemed necessary to produce his films (Wyatt 2000: 88). 
This meant that not only was he able to produce the films he wanted (pending budgetary 
approval from Warner Bros.), but he also set the strategic direction for their promotion 
and distribution, controlled merchandising tie-ins, and authorised his own self-publicity. 
He had become the total filmmaker, selecting his own projects, developing them at his 
own pace, and producing them according to his own vision. And this method of 
independent producing would greatly influence a new generation of film producer-
directors: the movie brats. 
Steven Spielberg dominated the global box office from 1975 to 1993. The 
combined totals (based on US domestic grosses) of his biggest releases from that period 
– Jaws, Close Encounters of the Third Kind (1977), Raiders of the Lost Ark (1981), E.T. 
the Extra-Terrestrial (1982), and Jurassic Park (1993) – comes to $1,304,882,469, and 
this figure accounts only for the original release runs and not for subsequent re-releases. 
Meanwhile, Spielberg’s contemporary, producer-director George Lucas, also dominated 
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the box office in the same period. His Lucasfilm Ltd’s biggest releases, Star Wars, The 
Empire Strikes Back, and Return of the Jedi (1983) – films that he either directed, 
produced or executive produced – had a combined original US domestic release gross of 
$769,245,499 (this is discounting the company’s involvement in the Indiana Jones 
trilogy, among other things). Stanley Kubrick, who only released three films in the same 
period – Barry Lyndon, The Shining, and Full Metal Jacket – grossed $110,375,050. To 
put this in context, the average budget for these three film producers across the films 
highlighted was $23.7 million for Steven Spielberg, $20.3 million for George Lucas, 
and $20.3 million for Stanley Kubrick. Kubrick’s average budget from the 1970s and 
into the 1990s matched that of Lucas and was only three million short of Spielberg’s 
average. Yet his combined gross was $1,194,507,419 short of Spielberg’s and 
$658,870,449 of Lucas’s.26 
Kubrick was faced with a changing industrial context from that in which he 
produced 2001 and even A Clockwork Orange. The high-concept saturation release of 
Jaws in 1975 changed the marketing and distribution landscape of Hollywood 
permanently, with the film grossing over $7 million on its opening weekend alone 
(Wyatt 2000: 111). The industry also saw the rise of the super-producer, a new breed of 
total filmmaker with absolute power and authority over their productions and 
possessing a distinct authorial brand. In large part, Kubrick had made significant 
contributions to the creation of this new super-producer, becoming what Adrian Turner 
described as the ‘prototype movie brat’: ‘Stanley Kubrick is the complete filmmaker 
[…] the guru for an entire generation of Hollywood directors. While Coppola, Lucas 
and Scorsese might make very different films, it was Kubrick who taught them the 
meaning of power and independence’ (Turner 1988: 25). But the model of producing 
that Kubrick had established was also the source of his own weakness, particularly in 
the face of the new, younger, and faster super-producers who were dominating the box 
office. Kubrick’s move to become the total filmmaker also meant that he now possessed 
the authority to request every possible outcome of his crew and collaborators before 
making a decision. Indeed, as Kubrick’s output from the 1970s onwards reduced 
dramatically, he acquired an ever-growing obsession about the films of the new super-
producers such as Lucas and Spielberg (as discussed later in this chapter).                                                          
26 Figures in this section are based on data from boxofficemojo.com. 
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This chapter will examine the problems Kubrick faced in the 1980s and 1990s. 
Competing against the high-concept blockbuster at the box office, but wanting to 
continue producing on the kind of budgets he had grown accustomed to, Kubrick was in 
a persistent state of project evelopment. From 1975 until 1999, a twenty-four year 
period, Kubrick produced only three films, compared to the ten films he either directed 
or produced between the twenty-two year period of 1953 and 1975. Kubrick had always 
been slow in his output of films, but after 1975 it almost stalled completely. Between 
1953 and 1975 Kubrick averaged a film just over every two years. From 1975 to 1999 
that average tripled to one film every eight years. To try to understand why his output 
decreased so drastically despite the authority and independence awarded to him by 
Warner Bros., the chapter will examine the industrial contexts surrounding these later 
years of Kubrick’s career. This was a period that not only saw a slowing down of his 
productions, but also saw him finding it difficult to move a project out of development 
and into production. 
The chapter will begin by looking at the process of development at Kubrick’s 
companies, with a focus on his long-time assistant Anthony Frewin who was tasked 
with being Kubrick’s in-house reader. This role was later expanded into a company, 
Empyrean Films, which was supervised by Frewin. The chapter will look at how Frewin 
recommended projects to Kubrick and how Empyrean explored the industrial trends of 
Hollywood. The chapter will then look at the rise of the super-producer during this 
period and compare and contrast their producing model against that of Kubrick. There 
will be a close comparison with arguably the ultimate super-producer of the 1970s to 
the 1990s, Steven Spielberg. Kubrick and Spielberg became close friends and there are 
many similarities in their business strategies. Kubrick even considered producing 
Spielberg on the project A.I. The chapter will conclude with a final case study of an 
unmade Kubrick project, Aryan Papers, which will be situated in the production context 
of Spielberg’s Schindler’s List (1993). The chapter focuses on an unmade Kubrick 
project at the expense of films he did successfully produce in order to understand the 
constraints of Kubrick’s own producing methods, as well as the wider industrial 
constraints he was facing. The aim will be to understand, firstly, why Kubrick took so 
long in producing movies from the 1970s onwards and, secondly, what the impact of 
obtaining absolute authority of his productions had on his role as a producer.  
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Empyrean Films 
Anthony Frewin (1947-) first worked for Stanley Kubrick as a runner during pre-
production of 2001: A Space Odyssey (Phillips and Hill 2002: 124). Frewin’s father, 
Edward Frewin, also worked for Kubrick and had convinced the producer to employ 
Anthony in September 1965, when Frewin had just turned seventeen (Frewin 2016). 
Kubrick, impressed with Frewin’s commitment, soon promoted him to become his 
general assistant, a role he maintained until Kubrick’s death in 1999. Frewin progressed 
to become one of Kubrick’s most trusted advisers, becoming the ‘in-house reader of 
novels, screenplays, and such’ (Frewin 2016). Rather than simply acquire the rights to 
vast swathes of literary property, Kubrick had Frewin read through and write reports of 
as many novels and screenplays as he could. The number became overwhelming though 
and so, in the late 1980s (approximately 1987), Kubrick sanctioned Frewin to place an 
advert in the Times Literary Supplement calling for readers (Frewin 2016). They would 
be employed under a newly incorporated company, Empyrean Films, of which Frewin 
would be the director, placing distance between the company and Kubrick so as to 
maintain anonymity. It was paramount to Kubrick that the press and wider industry not 
learn ‘what novels etc he was “considering’” (Frewin 2016). 
The team of readers, recruited and line-managed by Frewin, were never informed 
that Empyrean Films was a Stanley Kubrick company (Frewin 2016). The 
administration of the company, including its finances, was taken care of by Frewin, who 
dispatched weekly cheques to his team of readers. But Kubrick personally selected the 
books to give to them (Frewin 2016). Readers would typically receive around £20 to 
£50 to read novels and other literary works (Frewin 1988a; 1988b). Some would be 
asked to conduct research on potential projects at the British Library or other similar 
institutes, and were paid at a rate of £5.50 per hour (Anon. 1990b). This research 
included ‘golem research’, in connection with The Golem (Gustav Megrink 1914), 
‘literary robot research’ (Frewin 1990a), and other similar sci-fi research between 1988-
1990, including research into ‘the year’s best science fiction’ (Frewin 1990b). Another 
reader in 1991 conducted ‘Polish research’, presumably in connection with Aryan 
Papers (Frewin 1991). The readers provided reports on an eclectic range of works, with 
the reports being fed back to Kubrick, who read every one of them before returning 
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them to Frewin to file away (Frewin 2016). The influence of the reports on Kubrick was 
to signify to him whether a story was in fact worth pursuing. 
The direction to the readers and feedback on the reports could be quite pointed, as 
was the case with one reader on 24 November 1988 who had provided two reports on 
two collections of Bob Shaw science fiction short stories: A Better Mantrap (1982) and 
Tomorrow Lies in Ambush (1973). A handwritten note by Frewin compliments the 
reader for providing ‘good synopses – thanks’, but goes onto reprimand them for their 
formatting, saying, ‘double space and allow good margins at the foot of the typewritten 
page!!’ (Frewin 1988a). Such formatting was presumably at the request of Kubrick so 
as to allow him to annotate the reports with his thoughts and ideas.  
Empyrean also had a number of its readers repeatedly write reports on 
Traumnovelle (1926), the Arthur Schnitzler novella that would eventually be adapted 
into Eyes Wide Shut. Kubrick had a long history of attempting to adapt this work, going 
as far back as the late 1950s, when he was in correspondence with Schnitzler’s 
grandson, Peter Schnitzler. During production of Spartacus, Kubrick had invited Peter 
to visit the set for a day. Schnitzler subsequently wrote a letter to Kubrick to thank him 
for this opportunity. Dated 27 May 1959, the letter goes on: ‘I am excited at your 
interest in, and ideas about, my grandfather’s work and I hope that something comes of 
it’ (Schnitzler 1959). The letter details how Schnitzler had obtained a copy of his 
grandfather’s notebooks and was forwarding them immediately to Kubrick, ‘so that 
perhaps you could look at some of his ideas’ (Schnitzler 1959). The financial accounts 
of Empyrean show that in 1988 readers were again and again being asked to write a 
report of Traumnovelle. The first was on 18 October, followed by further reports on 29 
October, 22 November, 25 November, two on 26 November, and two on 7 December, 
with comments on the latter by Anthony Frewin to the reader thanking them for their 
‘thoughtful work’, which was ‘much appreciated’ (Frewin 1988b). Commenting on 
these reports, Frewin has said that Kubrick was ‘interested in other people’s “take” on 
the book. The readers’ report had little or no impact, I believe, on SK’s approach’ 
(Frewin 2016). Empyrean was almost like Kubrick’s personal focus group of literary 
minded individuals providing opinion on works that interested him and their potential 
for adaptation. It would take until 1994 for Kubrick to begin adapting Traumnovelle 
with screenwriter Frederic Raphael.  
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 There are clear patterns of interest in the books that Kubrick gave his readers, 
particularly science fiction, the literary novel, and post-modern authors. These included 
Isaac Asimov, Philip K. Dick, and Thomas Pynchon. Kubrick had shown an interest in 
Pynchon’s The Crying of Lot 49 (1965), a book that Frewin had outlined as the basis for 
a potential Kubrick film. He broke the story down into a development report, outlining 
how it could be adapted, locations for filming, casting suggestions, and an approximate 
budget (Frewin n.d.). Kubrick’s fascination with Pynchon derived from both the 
author’s ‘blackly funny humour’ as well as his popularity (Frewin n.d.: 6). Frewin’s 
development report pointed out that ‘Pynchon has a great following in both the States 
and over here [UK]’ with The Crying of Lot 49 ‘easily being the most popular […] it 
has been continually in print in both countries since it was published’ (6). The 
similarities between Kubrick and Pynchon are striking: Pynchon is a famed recluse, 
with scant information known about him, refusing to be ‘interviewed or photographed’ 
(Hunter-Tilney 2006: 26). A profile of Pynchon in the Financial Times in 2006 
described his slow pace of output, how his work explored themes of humankind’s 
enslavement to technology and the darkest recesses of the human mind, and how his 
fans are mostly a ‘male army of obsessives who indulge in endless Pynchon-related 
speculation’ (Hunter-Tilney 2006: 26). 
The Crying of Lot 49 was labelled by some as ‘pop fiction’ (McConnell: 1973: 
15), part of a new American fiction that came to prominence in the 1960s, in which 
writers like Pynchon, Irvin Faust, and John Barth explored themes of ‘the absurdity of 
society and the madness of the self’ (Kostelanetz 1967: 8). Pynchon was a brand of 
post-War writer that initiated a trend of black comedy in literature, a herald of the genre 
that defined a new mood of scepticism in Cold War American society (Pogel and 
Chamberlain 1985: 187-188). Similarly, Kubrick had mainstreamed the use of black 
humour in American cinema with Dr. Strangelove and, as a consequence, ‘opened the 
doors for the adaptations of books by such frank black comedians as Terry Southern, 
whose The Magic Christian (1969) and Candy (1968) developed black comedy for film 
with greater boldness and far more self-consciousness than had hitherto been the case’ 
(Pogel and Chamberlain 1985: 186-187). The box office for black comedy in the late 
1960s and throughout the 1970s was big; Candy grossed over $16 million off the back 
of a $3 million budget (imdb.com); Mother, Jugs & Speed (1976) returned nearly $8 
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million in rentals (imdb.com); and Dog Day Afternoon (1975), Sidney Lumet’s anti-
establishment heist movie, grossed $50 million off the back of a $1.2 million budget 
(boxofficemojo.com). 
But narrative trends had shifted dramatically since the early days of the New 
Hollywood, and Frewin argued that films like Jaws and Star Wars now utilised 
‘conventional subject matter and conventional narrative treatment’ (Frewin n.d.: 1). 
Interestingly, a number of the books Kubrick sent to the readers at Empyrean were post-
technological science fiction, dystopian cyber-punk, or fantasy, playing into a growing 
trend for science fiction in the wake of successful films such as Star Wars, but also 
films like Mad Max (1979), the Aliens franchise, Blade Runner (1982), The Terminator 
(1984), and RoboCop (1987). With the box office increasingly dominated in the 1980s 
by science fiction and fantasy, Empyrean’s readers were sent titles that included John 
Crowley’s Engine Summer (1979), a post-apocalyptic novel; Evelyn Waugh’s Love 
Among the Ruins (1953), a satirical dystopian novel set in the near future in the UK; 
Ursula K. Le Guin’s The Dispossessed (1974), a science fiction laced with political 
overtones about the state of capitalism; and William Gibson’s cyberpunk science fiction 
Mona Lisa Overdrive (1988). Kubrick’s interests and his direction of Empyrean were 
seemingly tied to greater narrative and industrial trends within Hollywood, though not 
exclusively science fiction. He still had a fascination with stories concerning 
relationships and extramarital affairs, requesting reader reports on the likes of 
Dostoevsky’s The Eternal Husband (1870) and Ian McEwan’s collection of short 
stories, First Love, Last Rites (1975). Both of these works can be described as 
possessing comic elements, playing into yet another narrative trend in Hollywood, the 
mature romantic comedy, particularly following on from the success of When Harry 
Met Sally (1989). They also speak to Kubrick’s desire to adapt a story about marriage 
and infidelity, namely Traumnovelle. 
But Frewin saw potential in black comedy as a particular genre of filmmaking 
that had barely been touched in American cinema. Taking a swipe at the popular appeal 
of Star Wars, the report for The Crying of Lot 49 claimed that, ‘Humour can be just as 
enthralling and exhilarating and captivating as any socko space opera’ (Frewin n.d.: 1). 
The recognition of the potential box office success of black humour also reflects on 
some of Kubrick’s most successful work, such as Dr. Strangelove and A Clockwork 
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Orange, which are laced with a darkly comic, at times perverse and grotesque humour. 
But given the changing industrial conditions of Hollywood, Kubrick and his staff were 
aware of the need for speed in order to be able to compete at a competitive box office if 
they were to adapt The Crying of Lot 49. To this end, a target was set of three years 
from pre-production through to distribution, keeping in mind that the marketplace will 
have inevitably altered in that short period of time. The report says that ‘markets are 
changing all the time […] it is the measure of a successful filmmaker that he can 
gauge/gamble on/anticipate what will be of popular appeal come the opening of this 
picture’ (Frewin n.d.: 1). Kubrick not only had to respond to his own artistic and 
intellectual motives, but was also looking to the wider Hollywood industry and to the 
speed with which his contemporaries were producing. 
What we also begin to see in the immediate aftermath of the release (and 
mediocre performance) of Barry Lyndon is Kubrick exploring multiple options to 
produce projects motivated in part by their financial implications. This was uppermost 
in his mind particularly when he committed to producing The Shining in the summer of 
1977. He wrote to Jan Harlan, his production accountant Jo Gregory, and his production 
manager Doug Twiddy to ask them to provide him with ‘a general idea of the weekly 
cash requirements you think we will have for pre-production, for a 20-week shooting 
schedule, and for 10 months post-production’ (Kubrick 1977b). Harlan explored the 
logistical and budgetary requirements for adapting a number of projects, including an 
adaptation of Henry Rider Hagaard’s The Saga of Eric Brighteyes (1890). Harlan 
prepared a treatment of the novel for Kubrick, adapting elements of the story to 
streamline it. The story concerned Viking explorers in Iceland in the tenth-century, but 
this inevitably meant the need to film on location: ‘It would have meant going on 
location to very cold areas if north Scotland wasn’t good enough. So probably would 
have been Iceland or Northern Finland and he [Kubrick] didn’t really fancy the idea’ 
(Appendix II). Kubrick had largely filmed both A Clockwork Orange and Barry Lyndon 
on location and had faced significant problems, ranging from time lost due to bad 
weather, damage to properties, accidents with actors, and death threats from the IRA. 
Studio filming allowed for the retention of control over such variables as weather and 
time. Just as The Saga of Eric Brighteyes would have proven logistically problematic 
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and costly, so too would shooting The Crying of Lot 49 on location given the book’s 
California setting. 
 Ultimately, The Crying of Lot 49 never went beyond development, nor did the 
books sent to the Empyrean readers (with the exception of Traumnovelle). But what we 
can see is that Kubrick used Empyrean Films to locate new and exciting stories as well 
as search for unique narratives. In many respects, Empyrean was a counterintuitive 
reading company, locating books that Kubrick should not adapt. After all, despite his 
continuing interest in the industrial and box office trends of Hollywood, Kubrick’s level 
of producing power from the 1970s saw him take absolute control of the Kubrick brand. 
This centred on a unique filmmaking aesthetic that saw him either set the trend or create 
films ‘out of time’ (Elsaesser 2012: 217), which deconstructed genre and created 
something that audiences had never seen on screen before. As Elsaesser has argued, 
Kubrick often set trends with his brand of prototype cinema, moving from genre-to-
genre in the 1960s and 1970s as part of a wider industrial search for the ‘winning 
combination, which could revitalize and re-energize what in spite of these 
transformations, remained an essentially stars-and-genre based way of making 
mainstream cinema’ (2012: 215). Films that he did eventually put into production in the 
1980s and 1990s were often at a remove from other films being made, either coming off 
the back of recent genre cycles (The Shining was released just after a spate of horror 
films, while Full Metal Jacket was a belated contribution to the mid-1980s Vietnam 
combat film cycle) or differing substantially to other films at the box office. Some of 
the marketing for Eyes Wide Shut drew upon the film’s ‘sexier’ scenes (Nicole Kidman 
getting undressed, for instance), presumably to attempt to affiliate it with the earlier 
1990s cycle of sexual thrillers. I.Q. Hunter suggests Eyes Wide Shut ‘nostalgically 
updates erotic art cinema of the 1970s […] within the contemporary format of the erotic 
thriller’ (2008: 102). If anything, though, the film could be ascribed to the Kubrickian 
genre of filmmaking, to the Kubrick brand, what Linda Ruth Williams defined as 
‘emulating and exemplifying the pinnacles of trash genres through meticulously 
rendered works of cinema art’ (2005: 397). Kubrick was as central to the film’s 
marketing as its two stars, Tom Cruise and Nicole Kidman, and the film poster placed 
the surnames of the three together, with Kubrick given equal star billing. The Kubrick 
brand revolved around his search for a new and innovative way to tell a story. As the 
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following sections in the chapter will explore, quite often this meant exploring a project 
to its very limits (see Krämer 2015c) and ultimately abandoning it and repeating the 
process with another project. 
 
Kubrick and Spielberg  
Steven Spielberg and Stanley Kubrick became friends in the late 1970s, apparently 
introduced to each other by George Lucas. The trio had encountered one another during 
the period that Kubrick had taken over Elstree Studios to film The Shining 
(D’Alessandro 2012: 121). Spielberg has talked of how he would regularly receive 
phone calls from Kubrick and visited him at his home on a number of occasions (Harlan 
2001). Kubrick was clearly an admirer of Spielberg, both of his work and his ability to 
dominate the box office (see Krämer 2017b: 197). 
But the difference in how Spielberg and Kubrick approached producing could 
not have been starker. Kubrick’s mode of operation had largely unchanged since the 
1960s and whereas Spielberg and his Amblin Productions regularly featured in the trade 
journals, with yet new property acquisitions and production deals, Kubrick was seldom 
heard from, particularly following the release of Full Metal Jacket. There was brief 
speculation in 1993 that Kubrick might be about to work on a new science fiction 
project, A.I. Warner Bros. announced that Kubrick was to begin production on the 
project in late 1994, with Screen International describing the project as being ‘set in the 
future when the greenhouse effect has melted the icecaps, flooding major cities such as 
New York and intelligent robots serve the community’ (Dempsey 1993: 1). The project 
had been mooted for production at the turn of the decade, but had been abandoned due 
to what Kubrick perceived as being the poor quality of special effects (1). It was 
Spielberg’s Jurassic Park that convinced him special effects had advanced enough for 
A.I. to go into production. But just as other rumours about potential Kubrick projects 
had disappeared without a trace, so too did A.I. It was another Kubrick project on the 
scrapheap. 
 It is intriguing to consider Spielberg as a producer and how he differed from and 
compared to Kubrick. After all, Kubrick did approach Spielberg to direct A.I. in the 
early 1990s, with himself as producer. Spielberg did not begin producing his own films 
until the 1980s with the incorporation of his own independent production company, 
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Amblin, in April 1980.27 Spielberg’s first feature as producer was E.T. the Extra-
Terrestrial, a film that came to be the very symbol of Amblin; in 1984 the company 
logo was redesigned to feature the moon-silhouetted Elliott on his bike riding across the 
night sky. Prior to E.T., Spielberg’s films had been produced by close friends, including 
Michael Phillips, or by George Lucas’s Lucas Films. Jaws had been produced by 
Richard D. Zanuck and David Brown, producers based at Universal, the studio that 
financed and heavily promoted the film. It had been at Universal where Spielberg had 
worked as a contract director on projects such as Duel (1971) and his first debut 
theatrical feature, The Sugerland Express (1974). In time, Amblin would not only 
produce Spielberg’s own features, but the work of other directors as well. Spielberg 
would himself serve as an executive producer on films such as Robert Zemeckis’ Back 
to the Future trilogy (1985-1990), or other 1980s staples like Gremlins (1984) and 
Batteries Not Included (1987), and he became more prolific as a producer of other’s 
movies than a director of his own projects (Andrews 1992: 4). In fact, by 2016, 
Spielberg had produced or executive produced 148 movies (Russell 2017: 46). His 
business acumen was summed up in a press report from 1992, describing him as a 
pragmatic, ambitious workaholic (Andrews 1992: 4). 
In contrast, Kubrick never produced a film beyond his own, and was credited as 
a producer on only nine of his thirteen feature films. Yet, whereas the accruement of 
power and independence by Kubrick as a producer led to a decrease in his output of 
films, Spielberg’s increased exponentially throughout the 1980s. He was building a 
power base, but despite this he infrequently took the credit of producer on his own 
work, a role that Kubrick had come to see as crucial to his own power and control. 
Between the formation of Amblin and the release of Schindler’s List, Spielberg was 
only credited as producer on six out of the ten features he directed. 
But both Spielberg and Kubrick were astute producers and businessmen. Variety 
reported on Spielberg’s industry reputation in 1991, saying that many top studio 
executives saw a resemblance in Spielberg to Louis B. Mayer and David O. Selznick 
(Natale and Kissinger 1991: 1). Despite his family friendly films and childlike public 
                                                        
27 Amblin Entertainment is named after Spielberg’s 1968 short film Amblin’. Amblin 
Entertainment produced a number of features shortly after its incorporation in 1980, including 
Spielberg’s own E.T. and the Michael Apted directed Continental Divide (1981). 
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persona, executives reported Spielberg as an ‘intensely aggressive and acquisitive 
businessman who goes after projects with a tenacity that is striking even by the hardball 
standards of Hollywood’ (53). Spielberg’s was a method of producing that did not 
wholly differ in this regard to Kubrick’s. Kubrick had been concerned throughout his 
career with reshaping the role of the producer and of obtaining ever further control, as 
well as acquiring literary property that sparked his intellectual imagination. But 
Spielberg was interested in property acquisition for its own sake, using ‘his clout to gain 
possession of more projects than he can conceivably give his full attention to’ (53). This 
was arguably the case in the early 1990s, when Spielberg was parallel directing and 
producing Jurassic Park and Schindler’s List.  
Spielberg had formed Amblin Entertainment with Frank Marshall and Kathleen 
Kennedy, the couple producing most of his projects throughout the 1980s. But the 
company was not as streamlined as its box office grosses might suggest. Just as Kubrick 
was often finding himself struggling to get projects out of development, so too did 
Amblin. Industry insiders in the 1980s and 1990s were often wary of entering deals 
with the company for fear of becoming stuck in development hell. This was put down to 
Spielberg’s business strategy of acquiring a vast array of projects that he himself did not 
have the time to direct. Spielberg, Kennedy and Marshall have dismissed any attempts 
to claim there was a specific business model at Amblin Entertainment, saying that they 
approached the business by ‘just making what we felt we wanted to see’ (Masters 
2016). Kennedy had been the president of the company, which was described as being 
set up ‘like a mini-corporation – divided into divisions and departments’ (Andrews 
1992: 4). But the company was far more strategized than its three founders care to let 
on. Spielberg always had final say on matters, but his focus was given to the thirty plus 
projects that would be in development at any one time (4). The setup of Amblin was 
described as being ‘staffed by 65 people, including producers, marketing specialists and 
merchandising experts. It is one of Hollywood's largest independent production 
companies and considered the most productive by far’ (4). This was a highly organised 
business operation, with Spielberg at its head. Even if Spielberg was not a 
micromanager and delegated much of the responsibility, he was still the executive, 
through whom all decisions were passed, wielding ‘total control over his movies’ (4).  
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The company’s overheads were largely covered by Universal, with only a few 
staff being paid by Amblin (Salamon 1987: 1). Kennedy operated the minutiae of 
Amblin and supervised day-to-day office administration and staff, but the Wall Street 
Journal was allowed rare access to the company’s base in 1987 and revealed an image 
of a powerful producer: 
 
Mr. Spielberg is a compulsive worker and his crew of 33 is a bunch of earnest, clean-
cut young workaholics who could easily pass for Silicon Valley whiz kids. These 
Amblinites describe their boss as an energetic taskmaster […] It is Mr. Spielberg 
himself who decides which of his films will generate merchandising tie-ins; he consults 
on scripts, ad campaigns and trailers. (Salamon 1987: 1) 
 
Undoubtedly Kubrick had paved the way for this new breed of super producer, 
particularly in the way he had wrestled control over the publicity campaigns and 
merchandising tie-ins of his films. Branding and reputation are just as important as 
financial success, and this is something Kubrick actively promoted, the ‘Kubrick 
brand’. He even referred to his independent production companies as the ‘Stanley 
Kubrick Studios’ (D’Alessandro 2012: 124), reflecting both his power and 
independence as a producer, but also the strength of the Kubrickian brand. 
And yet, despite the similarities between Kubrick and Spielberg, by the 1980s 
Kubrick’s method of producing stood in marked contrast to the prolific nature of 
Spielberg’s producing. Kubrick seemed unable to move a project out of development, 
having more than enough time but struggling in the face of the swift pace of these new 
super producers like Spielberg. Consider the speed with which Schindler’s List was 
produced once it entered production, compared to the sloth-like pace of Aryan Papers, 
slowed by Kubrick’s indecision. The contrast also comes in the fact that Spielberg was 
not a micro-manager, like Kubrick; Spielberg delegated power often out of the necessity 
of the sheer amount of work he made for himself. As Variety reported, ‘one producer 
who is working with him [Spielberg] says “he’s not interested in the deeper details of 
things. The more projects he can spread his attention over the happier he is. He’s more 
comfortable functioning as the doting uncle and delegating the specifics to others”’ 
(Natale and Kissinger, 1991: 53). The producing control that Kubrick had so long 
battled for had resulted in a tendency to seek persistent control over every facet of his 
production and production companies.  
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Kubrick also developed a growing fascination with the blockbuster movies of 
Spielberg and Lucas and was regularly requesting figures on box office grosses (Anon. 
1975; Anon. 1976; Anon. 1992). But this interest in the new super producers arguably 
had a detrimental effect on the development of his own projects. Take for instance the 
collaboration with Brian Aldiss on A.I.. Aldiss and Kubrick had first discussed the 
possibility of collaborating in 1975, following the release of Barry Lyndon (Aldiss n.d. 
a). Kubrick greatly admired Aldiss’s work, and in particular his short story Supertoys 
Last All Summer Long (1969), which ‘attracted the attention of Stanley Kubrick, 
unsurprisingly considering Kubrick’s interest in technology and sentient computers and 
the story’s bleak portrait of human selfishness and irresponsibility’ (Beard 2005: 5). 
The initial collaboration came to nothing, though the pair remained in correspondence 
over the ensuing years. It wasn’t until the release and subsequent box office success of 
Spielberg’s E.T. the Extra-Terrestrial that Kubrick seriously considered adapting 
Supertoys. Aldiss has said that Kubrick wanted to create a ‘rival’ movie to E.T. (Aldiss 
n.d. b). In a later legal dispute over his work for Kubrick (he had not been paid), Aldiss 
noted how he felt the story was disappointing because of his continuing fascination with 
E.T., what he called Kubrick’s ‘E.T. syndrome’ (Aldiss n.d. b). Despite some further 
discussion of potential ideas, by February 1983, Kubrick had soured on the 
collaboration (Aldiss n.d. b). There were further attempts to develop the project in the 
late 1980s and 1990s, working with writers such as Iain Watson and Sara Maitland, as 
well as with graphic illustrator Chris Baker (Krämer 2015c). Perhaps sensing his 
affinity with Spielberg, Kubrick eventually approached him to direct A.I., with himself 
as producer (Appendix II). Such a move would have been unprecedented in Kubrick’s 
career though, but was apparently a serious consideration by both filmmakers (Krämer 
2015c: 380). For Kubrick to abdicate directorial control went against everything he had 
battled for and therefore may indicate a realisation that his slow output saw him 
(unintentionally) reacting to box office trends by the 1980s. Indeed, Aldiss suggested 
that Kubrick was ‘reaching the end of his creative career’ by the 1980s (Aldiss 2015). It 
is within this context the chapter will now move on to consider Aryan Papers, 
developed parallel to Spielberg’s own Schindler’s List. 
 
Perpetual Pre-Production: The Case of Aryan Papers 
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One of the most famed ‘lost’ Kubrick films, aside from A.I. and Napoleon, was 
Kubrick’s Holocaust project, Aryan Papers. Based on the novel Wartime Lies by Louise 
Begley (1991), the project underwent significant development and pre-production and 
very nearly entered the production stage, but was abandoned at the last minute. The 
story goes that following the release of Steven Spielberg’s Schindler’s List Kubrick no 
longer felt the project could go ahead (Appendix II). But this reason alone does not 
account for the loss of money and the amount of time and actual contracts and financing 
that was being arranged. What follows is a reconstruction of the development and pre-
production of the project in an attempt to understand the efforts involved in getting a 
Kubrick film into production, as well as seeking contextual understandings as to why, 
beyond the official line, Aryan Papers was abandoned. 
 Along with science fiction, one of Kubrick’s primary narrative interests 
throughout his career was the Holocaust and what Geoffrey Cocks calls ‘German 
subjects’ (2004: 150). Cocks provides a brief overview of the abandoned Kubrick 
projects related to Germany and the Holocaust, drawing on biographical sources such as 
John Baxter (1999) and Alexander Walker (1972), and using them towards his own 
overarching argument of Kubrick’s films being weighted in twentieth century history.28 
Similarly Filippo Ulivieri offers a brief survey of the Nazi-themed works Kubrick 
contemplated adapting to the screen, including Swing Under the Nazis: Jazz as a 
Metaphor for Freedom (1985), Mike Zwerin’s (a trombonist who played with Miles 
Davis (Anon. 2014)) account of jazz musicians in Nazi-occupied Europe. There are 
other archival sources that explicitly reveal Kubrick’s continuing interest in the 
Holocaust, including the Harold Pinter Papers at the British Library. Pinter and Kubrick 
had become friends engaged in regular correspondence in the late 1970s (Kubrick 
1982a). Pinter even on occasion asked Kubrick to look at his screenplays, including an 
adaptation of the first volume of Marcel Proust’s In Search of Lost Time, though it is 
not entirely clear whether Pinter hoped for Kubrick to direct the project (Kubrick 
1982b).29 The two also corresponded about fiction and non-fiction work that they had                                                         
28 Geoffrey Cocks provides an insightful account of Kubrick’s interest in ‘The German 
Lieutenant’ in the late 1950s, examining the screenplay by Richard Adams (2004: 151-154). 
29 Kubrick recommended that Pinter take the project, published in 1977 as The Proust 
Screenplay, to the BBC (Kubrick 1982b). It was never realised as a film, but was later staged as 
a theatrical play at the Royal National Theatre, directed by Di Trevis. For further details see 
Zerofsky (2014). 
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read, suggesting titles they thought the other might be interested in. This included The 
Destruction of the European Jews (Hilberg 1961), one of the earliest authoritative 
histories of the Holocaust (Esh 1963: 114). Kubrick told Pinter that he was interested in 
making a film about the Holocaust and that The Destruction of the European Jews was 
‘constantly illuminated by the kind of vivid detail which can be the spark of narrative 
ideas. Indeed, there are so many ideas, situations and characters set forth, the problem is 
more one of selection than anything else’ (Kubrick 1982a). As Nathan Abrams has 
noted, Kubrick implored anyone he could to read the book, including Jan Harlan and, in 
the 1980s, Michael Herr, describing it as ‘monumental’ (2015c: 545). Abrams and 
Cocks have continued to explore the way Kubrick’s Jewish heritage and the Holocaust 
pervade his work and remained an overriding obsession for him. As Cocks notes, 
paraphrasing Kubrick, ‘what he most wanted to make was a film about the Holocaust, 
but good luck in putting all that into a two-hour movie’ (2013: 20). Instead, Cocks 
argues that Kubrick indirectly alluded to the Holocaust – or ‘sublimated his feelings’ – 
through a number of his works, most prominently in The Shining (20). 
 It remained an ongoing active concern for Kubrick to produce a film about the 
Holocaust in the 1990s. Jan Harlan has said that Kubrick wished to make a fiction film, 
rather than a documentary, in order to be able to tell a story that had drama (his 
comments to Pinter, above, hint at this). He also briefly considered, circa 1976, a project 
based on the UFA studios in Berlin during the 1930s and 1940s (Appendix II). Harlan 
was also asked by Kubrick to explore a project with the Nobel Laureate Isaac Bashevis 
Singer. Singer’s fiction explored Jewish themes, with some of his books set during the 
Holocaust, including Enemies, A Love Story (1972) and Shosha (1978). Unfortunately, 
Singer turned down the offer of collaborating with Kubrick (Appendix II). By 1991 
Kubrick had returned to thoughts of producing a Holocaust movie, following the 
publication of Begley’s Wartime Lies. What is clear from the above is that Kubrick had 
a persistent desire to produce a Holocaust film, a motivation that went beyond some of 
his more speculative projects as outlined by the likes of Filippo Ulivieri (2017) and 
Peter Krämer (2017b). 
Parallel to Kubrick’s interest in producing a Holocaust film, Steven Spielberg 
was also exploring a potential picture on the subject. Variety reported in May 1989 that 
Martin Scorsese was to direct Schindler’s List for release by Universal in 1990 and to be 
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produced by Spielberg’s Amblin (Dawes 1989: 34). Spielberg had been developing 
Schindler’s List since the early 1980s, adapted from Thomas Keneally’s novel 
Schindler’s Arc (1982) by Steven Zaillian (Anon. 1990a: 12). Kubrick would 
presumably have been aware of Spielberg’s interest in developing Schindler’s Arc given 
the two had initiated a friendship in the late 1970s. Telephone calls were frequent 
between the pair and one must suppose that a discussion of the book came up. Kubrick 
also kept up-to-date with industry news, including competitor studios, and would have 
more than likely seen the announcement in 1989 that Spielberg had convinced Scorsese 
to direct Schindler’s List. The two also shared a preoccupation with twentieth century 
history and the Holocaust that informed their work (Russell 2007: 78). 
 A new Kubrick production company, Hobby Films, was incorporated on 1 
September 1989, registered to Pinewood Studios (Anon. 1989). The incorporation of the 
company indicated that Kubrick was potentially gearing up to move into production on 
a new project. This was more than likely A.I., which is discussed further below. But 
following the release of Begley’s Wartime Lies, it was reported in 1991 that Kubrick 
was working on a screenplay for Warner Bros. (Groves 1991: 91). Little was known 
about the project, beyond that he was working on a script, nor did any of Kubrick’s 
colleagues or any Warner Bros. executives seem to know much about the project (91). 
What is clear is that Kubrick needed to get a project into production soon; he had signed 
a contract with Warner Bros. in 1985 to produce three films for them, starting with Full 
Metal Jacket (Anon. 1985: 52). Work on the script of Aryan Papers coincided with the 
uncertainty of whether Schindler’s List would go into production, which once more had 
halted by 1991 (Natale and Kissinger 1991: 53). In contrast, Kubrick had completed an 
extended treatment of Aryan Papers by June 1992 (Kubrick 1992a), with a further draft 
treatment completed by October 1992, this time including camera annotations as he 
began to think about moving into production. The treatment ran to 126 pages and 
included 208 scenes, along with a prologue and epilogue. The prologue was headed as, 
‘The Final Solution…’ and scrawled next to it in Kubrick’s hand the word ‘stock’ – he 
was to use documentary stock footage for this sequence, and would feature such footage 
throughout the picture (Kubrick 1992c). 
 With a completed treatment (though, it would continue to be adapted and 
reworked over the next year) and with Schindler’s List in development hell, pre-
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production for Aryan Papers was initiated, with Jan Harlan leading the logistics. Harlan 
worked for over a year in preparing the production, scouting for locations in central and 
Eastern Europe, and commencing casting and auditions. Harlan has said that he had 
gone so far as to arrange a deal with the Brno city council to ‘put Nazi flags up on a 
weekend, close the city centre for a weekend to copy Warsaw […] To have trams from 
the tram museum there. We were that far-gone, we had spent a lot of money’ (Appendix 
I). But as preproduction on Aryan Papers progressed, it became apparent that Kubrick 
had doubts, with his need to have every outcome available to his decision making 
frustrating the production process. Major Hollywood actors were being cast for the film, 
only for Kubrick to abruptly change his mind, writing to International Creative 
Management’s Jeffrey Berg in December 1992 to tell him: 
 
You know I think “x” is not only a major star but also one of the best actresses in the 
world. I love her work! But as I get close to finishing the script, I am truly embarrassed 
to have to say that I am no longer confident she is absolutely right for the part. This is 
of course one of those intangible assessments that drive people crazy, but until I can 
eliminate some of my doubts, I don’t think it would be good to meet. I do sincerely 
apologise for this. (Kubrick 1992b) 
 
Such indecision by Kubrick was slowing preproduction and by January 1993 Variety 
was reporting Schindler’s List as being in production, to be directed by Spielberg and 
slated for release that same year (Fleming and Brennan 1993: 83). This did not prevent 
Kubrick and Warner Bros. announcing, three months after Schindler’s List had entered 
production, that filming of Aryan Papers was to go ahead in the summer of 1993, with a 
scheduled release of Christmas 1994 (Klady 1993: 24b). But there was clearly 
hesitation, with no obvious shooting schedule or a script in place. Joseph Mazzello had 
tentatively been cast in the lead role (following completion of Jurassic Park). But even 
the deal with Mazzello was somewhat vague, with his agent Scott Henderson saying 
only that there was a ‘commitment to his client and that they had been told to keep his 
summer schedule clear. However, neither he nor his client had seen a script’ (24b). 
 Harlan has said that, with regards to Kubrick abandoning Aryan Papers, that, 
‘the time frame for Steven [Spielberg] was so fast, and we are so slow. He would have 
been out before us, that was the key. Never mind details, the key thing is we would have 
followed Schindler’s List’ (2016). And yet, despite this assertion, development of the 
project continued throughout 1993, with Spielberg in Eastern Europe filming 
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Schindler’s List at the same time that Harlan was in the region arranging the logistics of 
Aryan Papers. Kubrick seemed to be following in the footsteps of Spielberg; casting 
actors he had used in Jurassic Park, announcing his own Holocaust film in the trades 
after Spielberg, requesting to see Spielberg’s Holocaust research (Lucky and Fritz 
1993), looking to film Aryan Papers in Eastern Europe like Spielberg, and even 
eventually considering producing Spielberg as director of A.I. 
Far from the project slowing down, in the months after Schindler’s List went 
into production, preproduction on Aryan Papers gathered pace. The scale of Aryan 
Papers was becoming a visual spectacle to rival Kubrick’s abandoned Napoleon. He 
had tasked Phil Hobbs to find 1000 Mauser rifles, as well as Schmeisser sub machine 
guns, MG 34s and M/G 42s, and numerous Russian, German and Polish artillery (Bapty 
and Co. 1993). The film was even to feature scenes of the Jewish ghettos in Warsaw 
being cleared. The grandeur of what Kubrick was envisioning required aerial filming, 
with specialist film pilots being approached (Paris 1993). Harlan scouted various 
Eastern European cities in which to base the production, with a focus on Bratislava in 
the newly formed Slovakia. Harlan outlined the intentions of the production to the 
Czech and Slovak American Enterprise Fund (CSAEF) based in the city. The CSAEF 
was established by the American Congress in 1989, one of several funds that were part 
of the US government’s Assistance to Eastern Europe under the Support for East 
European Democracy (SEED) Act (1989). The aim of the SEED fund was to ‘promote 
political democracy and economic pluralism’ in Eastern Europe by aiding the 
development of their private business sectors (Senate Finance Committee 1989). The 
Kubrick production team was keen to make use of the services of CSAEF and the 
contacts they had within the Slovak Ministry of Culture. Pressure was applied to the 
Slovak government to allow the production to take place, describing the production as 
being an ‘important’ film (Senat 1993). Rick Senat, Warner Bros.’s vice-president of 
European Affairs, contacted the Slovak government to suggest that, should they allow 
Kubrick to set up the ‘necessary company structure with satisfactory arrangements for 
VAT and exchange control’ quickly, then Bratislava would become their production 
base (alternatives included Prague) (Senat 1993). 
 The fledgling capitalist economies of former Eastern Bloc countries, such as the 
Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Poland, were now looking to entice private business, 
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including film productions. Variety reported in August 1993 that there had been an 
increase in Hollywood productions in Eastern European countries and that, ‘since the 
Iron Curtain came tumbling down, local production and service outfits have been 
aggressively marketing their countries’ wares, both as a source of hard currency to 
plough back into local productions and of work to keep the newly privatised studios 
turning over (Richardson 1993: 28). Basing an American production in central or 
Eastern Europe had the potential to cost forty per cent less than in the West and the likes 
of Poland (the best actors), the Czech Republic and Slovakia (the best locations), and 
Hungary (the best technical services) were vying for foreign film shoots (Richardson 
1993: 28). Spielberg filmed Schindler’s List in Poland in the first part of 1993, with ‘all 
on-location services provided by […] Heritage Films’ and $9 million of the film’s $25 
million budget spent in the country (28). Following the completion of Schindler’s List, 
Film Polski placed a full-page advert in Variety with the headline, ‘Poland, Your Next 
Great Filming Adventure’, quoting Spielberg as saying that filming in Krakow had been 
the ‘greatest directing experience’ of his career (Anon. 1993: 24). The governments of 
some of these countries were willing to ‘contribute up to 50% of a film’s costs, 
depending on the size of the budget’, with money accrued from big budget Hollywood 
productions being reinvested into their respective film studios (Richardson 1993: 28). 
There were also distinct tax advantages to filming in a country such as Slovakia, hence 
the Kubrick production team’s and Warner Bros.’s pressure on the Slovak government. 
Price Waterhouse advised Jan Harlan that Kubrick’s production company, Hobby 
Films, ‘would not be required to register for commercial or tax purposes in the country 
and will accordingly not be subject to direct tax on any profits’ (Nissler 1993). 
 What followed throughout the late spring and the summer of 1993 was an 
increasingly frustrated preproduction process, purposely being held up by Kubrick due 
to indecision over the matter of where to base the production. Despite the fact that 
Harlan and Warner Bros. had started to negotiate deals for Aryan Papers to be filmed in 
Slovakia, it became increasingly obvious to Harlan that Kubrick was not prepared to 
commit himself. A production document entitled ‘Essential steps to be taken now on the 
assumption that we will stick to a September 6 start date’ – most likely compiled by 
Harlan and Philip Hobbs in early May 1993 – highlights the key problems standing in 
the way of an anticipated September shoot, in order for the film to meet Warner Bros.’s 
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release date of Christmas 1994. A timetable was in place that included Harlan meeting 
with ministers in the Slovakian government, John Trehy, the production accountant, 
breaking down the script and preparing a budget, and the preparation of precise prop 
lists. The most important hurdle to overcome was left to the end of the document 
however: 
 
May 20/21 - SK to decide whether he wishes to view Slovakia locations before 
commitment is made; if SK wants to see the locations he should travel no later than 
May 24. In order to start filming on September 6 a firm commitment has to be made by 
28 May for engagement of essential personnel, studio contract, application for permits. 
(Harlan n.d.) 
 
The timetable set out was important given that there was, in theory, only fourteen weeks 
until production commenced. This involved the incorporation of yet another new 
production company, Albatross. This was put on hold, however, on 20 May 1993 when 
Jan Harlan contacted lawyers at S.J. Berwin and Co. to say: 
 
It seems contradictory I know, but do wait please with the filing of the papers until you 
receive a further confirmation. Today's hold-up is not the rental price for an office at 
Koliba! We have encountered a more fundamental problem and I must clear this up 
first. (Harlan 1993b) 
 
The fundamental problem was that Kubrick had raised his doubts about basing the 
production in Bratislava, and was now, in Harlan’s words, ‘more interested in Brno than 
Bratislava’ (Harlan 1993c). It is not entirely clear why Kubrick was motivated toward 
basing the production in the Czech Republic; after all, it was reported that productions 
costs in the country were much higher in comparison to other Eastern European 
countries, with prices for location work in the country ‘rapidly rising’ (Richardson 
1993: 28). Harlan was also making enquiries with other European studios, including the 
Rosenhugel Studios in Vienna. But the frustrations suffered by Harlan in Kubrick’s 
persistent u-turns (who once more, by the end of May, had shown interest in Bratislava) 
was beginning to show in a memo he wrote to him on 30 May 1993:  
 
You said that there are no good locations in Slovakia and that everything is better in 
Brno, and Roy said the same. You don't want to build sets at Koliba and if you do want 
to build anything we seem to get what we need in Brno. Why Bratislava? I like to 
understand. You can have a house in Austria in either case – would a house be the 
factor which decides whether we start in Bratislava and move to Brno later or not? 
(Harlan 1993a) 
 
   216 
By the end of 1993, preproduction and the project as a whole was put on indefinite hold. 
Even the author Louis Begley was kept in the dark as to the status of the project. 
Begley’s agent contacted Harlan in March 1994 to enquire as to the ‘details of any 
production plans for Louis Begley’s Wartime Lies. The author is anxious to know what 
is happening with the project’ (Cox 1994). Harlan has insisted that the project was 
aborted due to Schindler’s List entering production (Appendix II). Yet preproduction 
continued into September and October of 1993, several weeks before the US premiere 
of Schindler’s List on 30 November. Therefore, this idea that it was Schindler’s List that 
led to the cancellation of Aryan Papers is not wholly convincing. 
What is clear from the above brief overview of the problematic attempts to 
produce Aryan Papers is that Kubrick was delaying the process, unsure of where to film 
(by September, Philip Hobbs was scouting locations in Denmark), as well having no 
firm script, only a treatment. Kubrick had a commitment to complete two more films for 
Warner Bros. and the company executives were keen to see a new Kubrick project 
released. Harlan goes onto suggest that Terry Semel phoned Kubrick and asked him to 
put Aryan Papers on hold, telling Kubrick, ‘Let’s postpone it. What Warner Bros. was 
much more interested in anyway was that Stanley should do A.I. Artificial Intelligence’ 
(Harlan 2016). What the development of Aryan Papers and A.I. shows is that Kubrick’s 
‘exploratory’ process (as Krämer 2015c refers to it) was one that led to indecision and 
made it increasingly unlikely any of these ambitious pictures would ever be produced. 
His methods saw him investigate the budgetary, logistical and technical possibilities of 
making a film, as well as testing the originality of his vision. If any of these criteria, 
particularly the latter, should fail to pass his own standards, the project would be 
abandoned. Absolute producing power led Kubrick to exacting strict quality controls 
over what projects he ultimately gave the seal of being ‘A Stanley Kubrick Production’. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has explored how Kubrick’s slowing down in his film output from the 
1970s onwards was a direct result of his total filmmaking power, as well as the impact 
of his producing model on the super producers that now dominated the box office. 
Kubrick had become the total filmmaker by the 1970s, a producer who yielded absolute 
creative and business control over his films, with the financial support of Warner Bros. 
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The power he had accrued and the style of independent producing was soon being 
emulated by other filmmakers from the mid-1970s onwards. But Kubrick slowed in his 
output both as a result of this total control that he had accrued and also because the new 
super producers, like Steven Spielberg and George Lucas, were producing blockbusters 
that he was in awe of and wanted to replicate their financial success. However, he also 
wanted to avoid any kind of imitation of box office trends and of his own work. 
Consequently, Kubrick found himself taking ever longer to find a story worth taking out 
of development and putting into active production. 
Kubrick was a modernist film producer who wanted to explore the medium of 
cinema and his own aesthetic and intellectual concerns. Total filmmaking power and 
continued moderate success at the box office afforded him the time (and indulgence) to 
explore projects to understand their potential as Kubrick films. He has himself 
commented how a ‘good story suitable for making into a film is so rare, subject matter 
is secondary’ (Quoted in Phillips 2002: 180). His reading company, Empyrean, 
exemplified this approach, a company that not so much scouted property to acquire it 
(the Spielberg approach), but rather sifted out material that wasn’t worthy of Kubrick’s 
attention. Kubrick also felt that market research conducted by studios was redundant, if 
not counterintuitive, packaging films on what they believe audiences want and in the 
process trying to avoid ‘the problems associated with making a good film’ (181). 
Kubrick had to find a way of moving beyond trends. His was a brand of cinema that 
deconstructed genre and refashioned it afresh, an expectation he became increasingly 
aware of, stating in a number of interviews for the release of Full Metal Jacket that his 
films were often misjudged by critics because ‘they’re expecting something else’ (174) . 
Jan Harlan summed up Kubrick’s producing methods by the 1980s as being guided by 
his own standards of quality: ‘It was never, ‘ah it’s not too bad, let’s do it’, forget that, it 
wasn’t Kubrick […] The main thing was that he had to like what he did’ (Appendix II). 
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Conclusion 
 
 
July 2017 saw the release of Christopher Nolan’s Dunkirk, and with it came the latest 
inevitable comparisons between the director and Stanley Kubrick. The Guardian’s 
Andrew Pulver (2017) suggested that Nolan had ‘put himself in the Kubrick league’ 
with Dunkirk, while other critics similarly raised the comparison, with Sean Hutchinson 
suggesting that Nolan was an auteur like Kubrick and that Dunkirk ‘is the type of movie 
every major auteur of a certain mold needs to make’ (2017). Nolan is not the only 
director in recent years to have been compared to Kubrick (think Paul Thomas 
Anderson, Darren Aronofyksy, or David Fincher). Yet the comparison between Nolan 
and Kubrick is perhaps the most frequent, particularly in the wake of his science fiction 
blockbuster Interstellar (2014), without doubt an ode to 2001: A Space Odyssey, a fact 
Nolan made clear in interviews (Collins 2014). Perhaps where this comparison finds 
any kind of validation is in Nolan’s powerful producing style and his relationship with 
Warner Bros. He is a rarity in Hollywood in his unique ability to maintain blockbuster 
budgets and combine them with his own personal aesthetic vision. As the Wall Street 
Journal noted, Nolan’s Interstellar was ‘highly unusual’ given its budget of $165 
million and yet not being adapted from any kind of literary property, suggesting that the 
previous time Hollywood had invested such a high budget in a non-franchise film was 
four years previous with Nolan’s Inception (2010) (Fritz 2014). Nolan has been 
awarded such privilege by Warner Bros. due to his ability to ‘combine box office 
success with artistic ambition’ with the studio providing him ‘with all the benefits of a 
studio deal with no strings attached’ (Fritz 2014). 
 Such an arrangement immediately brings to mind that between Kubrick and 
Warner Bros. and it is here that the comparison between Nolan and Kubrick is actually 
pertinent. It is perhaps also evidence of Kubrick’s lasting legacy as a producer and the 
way he impacted upon the producing model. When asked in an interview with Tim 
Cahill why he thought he had managed to obtain the level of autonomy that he had by 
the 1970s, Kubrick replied that, ‘I’d like to think it’s because my films have a quality 
that holds up on second, third, and fourth viewing. Realistically, it’s because my 
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budgets are within reasonable limits and the films do well’ (Kubrick quoted in Phillips 
2002: 189).  
 Kubrick certainly became ever more mindful of the need to position his films 
within a commercial context if he was to maintain the kinds of budgets he had grown 
accustomed to. Indeed, as Robert Sklar has suggested, Kubrick ‘had hopes of competing 
in the same arena with the likes of Spielberg and Lucas’ (1988: 123). Sklar ended his 
article by asking whether Kubrick’s desire to marry ‘aesthetic achievement’ with ‘fiscal 
responsibility’ ‘has produced the longest period without a film in Stanley Kubrick’s 
career?’ (123). My response to Sklar would be that it wasn’t so much that Kubrick 
struggled due to the changing circumstances of distribution and the move to saturation 
releasing. After all, films such as The Shining and Full Metal Jacket were both notable 
successes, particularly so Full Metal Jacket, which had grossed over $40 million after 
just two months on release (boxofficemojo.com). Rather, and as discussed in Chapters 
Five and Six, Kubrick’s accruement of authority and power as a producer afforded the 
time (whether for good or bad) to develop unique pictures that fed into the wider 
Kubrick brand of cinema. This meant a lengthy search for new literary material from 
which to adapt his next picture and collaborations with writers, cinematographers, 
actors, and art directors to find distinctive new ways of telling a story. 
As indicated at the beginning of this thesis, Sklar’s article was a key motivator 
in the instigation of the project. Sklar pointed out that Kubrick’s role within and 
relationship to the American film industry had been neglected by scholarly inquiry 
despite being ‘enmeshed’ within the structures of the film business (1988: 114). He also 
laid two key avenues for potential research. First, the idea that Kubrick was central to 
the transformation of business practices in the film industry since the 1950s (115). And 
second, that Kubrick’s filmmaking strategies were invariably impacted to varying 
degrees by industrial constraints (115). To this end, this thesis responded to Sklar’s 
article by raising the following questions: what was Stanley Kubrick’s role as a 
producer? How did the role of the producer change throughout the course of his career? 
And in what ways did Kubrick impact or change the role? 
 Kubrick’s rise to become one of the most powerful independent producers by 
the 1970s and his subsequent affiliation with Warner Bros., which saw him gain the 
legal authority over his productions that he long sought, was not an easy one. He 
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commenced his career producing his own low-budget features in a style that saw him 
operating outside of the mainstream of Hollywood and, given the limited budget and 
time, this impacted on the aesthetic of films such as Fear and Desire and Killer’s Kiss. 
The necessity of the films led to Kubrick the producer having to negotiate deferments, 
discounts and other means to ensure the films were completed. His abilities and 
business acumen in being able to sense the shifting industrial ground underway in the 
American film industry saw him able to exploit art house distribution and potential 
television distribution for Fear and Desire, as well as sell Killer’s Kiss to a major film 
company, United Artists, who supported a range of low-budget independent producers.  
Hollywood was transitioning into a new independent mode of production during 
the 1950s, which saw producers now packaging and selling their product to studios that 
in return financed and distributed them. As Chapters Two and Three argue, this opened 
up a space for both artistic and business control for independent producers, which 
Kubrick was able to exploit during his partnership with James B. Harris. Though Harris 
was credited as the producer of HKPC, in effect this was a producing partnership that 
saw the pair develop a working relationship that influenced one another. Together this 
saw the company able to diversify and develop a brand, one associated with 
controversial and innovative films that broke boundaries; think of the heated reaction to 
Paths of Glory in Europe, or the scandalous nature of Lolita. United Artists and other 
companies such as Bryna Productions may have been minded to attempt to control 
Kubrick, but he was determined to gain authority over his pictures, demanding 
outrageous deals that led to Harris and Kubrick producing Lolita without any 
distribution arrangement. They also demonstrated how independent producers had to 
move beyond being labelled within one genre category, to become a brand, and to 
internationalise their productions (filming Paths of Glory and Lolita in Europe). 
Kubrick also established a producing pattern that would last for the remainder of his 
career during this period, persistently adapting literary property into films as well as 
optioning new books as part of an independent producing strategy to ensure a steady 
flow of output. 
Kubrick’s key impact on the role of the producer came in the 1960s with the 
formation of his independent production companies, Polaris Productions and Hawk 
Films. Kubrick used these to leverage further power for himself, particularly in areas of 
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publicity, merchandising and distribution. As Chapter Four demonstrates, with the 
changes in modes of production in Hollywood seeing the package-unit system dominate 
by the beginning of the decade, the major studios attempted to consolidate their power 
(and minimise financial risk) by growing their publicity and exploitation departments. 
Contracts with independent producers saw them willing, to an extent, to give up artistic 
control of the production, but retaining authority over the promotion and distribution of 
the film. Producers were only granted consultancy rights. This was not an area Kubrick 
was willing to compromise on and he used his production company, Polaris, to gain 
influence over the promotion and exploitation process of 2001: A Space Odyssey. This 
led to an unprecedented campaign for the film compared to the industrial norm of the 
time (particular for a picture of its budget), with the campaign only being fully launched 
a month prior to the film’s release. The tension between the studios and the independent 
producers was now pronounced and revealed how the producer was vital in every aspect 
of a picture’s production to ensure its commercial success, particularly a producer as 
artistically ambitious as Kubrick. 
Despite the exalted position 2001 holds within both Kubrick’s career and 
cinematic history, it did not immediately equate to Kubrick becoming the absolute 
dominant producer one might expect. Turbulent industrial conditions within Hollywood 
meant that Kubrick had become a financial risk, with his Napoleon project being 
dropped or rejected by the likes of MGM and United Artists, two companies that had 
given him favourable conditions in the past. As Kubrick himself has commented, ‘up 
until A Clockwork Orange, there wasn’t a single producer who was prepared to produce 
my films. For example, MGM only took on 2001 at the last minute; no one wanted it’ 
(Kubrick quoted in Heymann 2016: 737). This perhaps reflects Kubrick’s decision to 
choose A Clockwork Orange as his next feature, financed by Warner Bros. As Chapter 
Five argues, the film fed into the new policy direction of Warners to release low-budget, 
youth orientated pictures. In return, Kubrick was allowed not only input over publicity, 
exploitation and distribution, but was also given overall strategic authority. This was his 
first true opportunity to establish fully his own producing brand and to demonstrate his 
ability to sell his own films. The subsequent success of A Clockwork Orange led 
Warner Bros. to proclaim that Kubrick was a visionary independent producer that had 
confirmed the viability of his producing model in blending art house sensibilities with 
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wider commercial appeal and industrial trends. As a result, Kubrick was afforded the 
machinery of blockbuster marketing and financing to support his own intellectual and 
aesthetic concerns. He had become the total filmmaker, acquiring the full 
responsibilities and authority of the producer that once resided with the studios and 
allowing him to explore the artistic potential of each of his films. Other new emerging 
super-producers replicated the model, as the New Hollywood experimented with films 
that would appeal to a changing demographic. Director-producers like Steven Spielberg, 
George Lucas, and Francis Ford Coppola all developed personal visions alongside 
unique producing brands.  
 Market conditions changed still further in the 1980s and 1990s, with producer 
branding becoming ever more central (Grantham and Miller 2016: 131-132), and movie 
franchises increasingly dominating, to the point that by the turn of the century, 
producing power largely returned once more to the studios, with directors as ‘hired 
hands’ of these event movies (Fritz 2014). This led to Kubrick’s position as independent 
producer looking rather precarious and uncertain by the 1990s and with a gap of twelve 
years between Full Metal Jacket and Eyes Wide Shut. However, Kubrick still retained 
the power and authority he had established thirty-years previously, mainly as a result of 
the Kubrick brand, one that developed ever more mystique given his absence from 
cinema screens. Variety published a piece on Kubrick labelled ‘Missing Persons 
Corner’ (Groves 1991: 91) that queried Kubrick’s absence and highlighted the Kubrick 
brand by stating that he ‘cranks out a masterpiece every five to seven years’ (91). It was 
this brand that saw him gain equal star billing as his two leading stars in Eyes Wide 
Shut. It demonstrated how a Kubrick film in itself was an event picture, just like the 
major dominating franchise films such as Star Wars. Unfortunately, a combination of 
misplaced marketing, mixed reviews, and censorship issues in the USA saw the film 
take domestic grosses of $55 million off the back of a budget of $65 million 
(boxofficemojo.com). Despite having seriously considered a science fiction blockbuster 
with A.I. Artificial Intelligence, even proposing that he produce it with Spielberg as a 
director (merging their brands as well as his own artistic appeal with Spielberg’s 
commercial potential), Kubrick had instead chosen an ultimately personal film that went 
against the industrial conditions of the time (the new epics, science fiction, fantasy, and 
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superhero films). Perhaps sensing his own slow output and relying on his brand to sell 
the film, Eyes Wide Shut was at a remove from a now franchise-dominated Hollywood. 
 This was indicative of how obtaining absolute producing control could be 
dangerous. Arguably, the more legal authority Kubrick was granted over his pictures, 
the more he was able to indulge his worse excesses as a producer. Kubrick would 
request all available outcomes from his colleagues before he made a decision (McAvoy 
2015: 294). While this may have led to a unique aesthetic style, it also led to a situation 
in the latter half of his career where he struggled to produce and release pictures, at 
times putting him behind cinematic trends (Barry Lyndon through to Eyes Wide Shut 
seemingly all ‘out of time’ on their original release (Pramaggiore 2015: 15)). This was 
compensated on set, however, by reducing budget costs and the size of his film crew in 
order to ‘shoot for a long time’ (Brian Cook quoted in McAvoy 2015: 294). 
 Kubrick’s impact on the role of the producer was to create a model that proved it 
was possible to straddle art and commerce. He demonstrated how it made commercial 
sense for a producer-director to be in absolute control of every facet of their production, 
right through to distribution, in order to sell their own brand of cinema. And though 
Hollywood now largely relies on ‘already-popular, ensemble, multi-generic formats 
with built-in, tested appeal’ (Grantham and Miller 2016: 137), there remains an outlet 
for independent producers to develop their own brand within a commercial context 
along the lines of the Kubrick model. This returns us to the start of this chapter and to 
Christopher Nolan, who has adopted this model. Key to this has been Nolan’s ability to 
bring his pictures in on or often under budget, and on time (Fritz 2014), similar to how 
Kubrick from A Clockwork Orange onwards would ensure fiscal responsibility as part 
of his strategy to ensure the longevity of his influence over Warner Bros. 
 This doctoral thesis set out to situate Kubrick and his role as a producer, and 
impact he had on that role, within the wider context of the American film industry. The 
research methodology, taking a case study approach, is equally applicable to other film 
producers and within Producer Studies as a whole. As the field of Producer Studies 
progresses, drawing on the methodological tools of the New Film History, it allows us 
to further understand the economic constraints on film production and the ever-present 
tension between film as art and film as commerce. The implications for Kubrick Studies 
I would suggest are of huge importance. Kubrick was not a filmmaker operating in 
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some kind of hermetically sealed bubble in St. Albans, as the image of him is 
sometimes presented. Instead he was a film director, producer and, yes, artist, working 
against, reacting to, and influencing the industry he worked within. There are further 
avenues for research within such contexts then, with the historiography on Kubrick 
needing to fully realign and take account of his place as a film producer in a 
commercially orientated industry and to consider the wide-ranging archival material 
that is now available. Kubrick’s influence as a producer able to blend artistic ambition 
with commercial appeal will remain his lasting legacy. 
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Appendix I: 
Transcript of Interview with James B. Harris 
 
 
Date: 23 March 2016 
Participants: James B Harris (JBH) (Los Angeles, USA), James Fenwick (JF) 
(Leicester, UK) 
 
JF: Would you mind if I record this? 
 
JBH: Of course, I think it be better. At least you would have it as exactly as I’m saying 
it and it would be easier for you and it makes no difference to me. 
 
JF: Excellent. 
 
JBH: Recording it, that’s fine.  
 
JF: Thank you very much. What I’ll do with the interview is I’ll type it up as a 
transcript. Kicking off with the questions then, the first two questions I’ve got are about 
Flamingo Films, which is going right back to the start of your career and I just 
wondered if you could briefly tell me about Flamingo Films. What exactly was this 
company and what were you doing there? 
 
JBH: That company was formed to distribute films to television. In those days, 
television was just getting started and I had previously been working with a distribution 
company for theatrical films and I saw that the grosses were starting to fall off and that 
television was becoming more popular and I knew that the television stations would 
need programming. In those days, there wasn’t any cable that connected all of the 
stations that they have now. I mean you have networks where something is broadcast in 
New York and is picked up all over the country. In those days the stations were not 
connected by cable and then for a company called Kinescopes, they would make a 
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Kinescope of the show and send it to the affiliate stations and they would run it three 
days later or four days later, which meant that all of those stations needed programming 
to fill in between the programmes they might be getting from the major networks.  
 
JF: Yeah. 
 
JBH: I assume you’re familiar with ABC, NBC, CBS? 
 
JF: Yeah, yeah. 
 
JBH: So I guess perceiving that the industry was starting to look more to TV for its 
income from film I had this idea about acquiring the rights to television, TV rights, to 
short subjects, cartoons, serials, feature films, and that’s when, together with a friend of 
mine, David L. Wolper, a schoolmate of mine in high school, we formed Flamingo 
Films. My father was one of the partners, and a friend of my brothers was another 
partner. So there was the four of us that formed Flamingo Films, which was named 
Flamingo because Wolper and I as young guys had stayed at the Flamingo Hotel in Las 
Vegas. We were very impressed by the glamour. And so we decided to call our 
company Flamingo Films. And that’s the genesis of how that happened. And it became 
very successful because there wasn’t any competition. There were very few companies 
that were distributing films to television at that time.  
 
JF: Yes, and I noticed in Variety, the trade journal Variety, that they referred to you and 
one of your partners you were working with as boy wonders in the industry at that time. 
 
JBH: Yeah. It was a problem for me as I was travelling around the country and I wasn’t 
really old enough to sign the contracts. You had to be twenty-one to sign the contract 
for it to be binding. But I didn’t tell anybody that I was under twenty-one, although I 
looked about fifteen. So I never went to college. I briefly attended Julliard School of 
Music for a short period of time, realising I was never going to be a professional 
musician. I just didn’t have that much talent. So I started working, you know, when I 
was seventeen. And so I was able not to waste my time in college, which would have 
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been a complete waste of time for me, and learnt the film business, distributing films at 
that time.  
 
JF: Yeah. So at what point did you decide to leave Flamingo Films? And obviously, you 
came into contact with Kubrick, so how did this come about, the meeting with Kubrick 
and so forth? 
 
JBH: Well, what happened was that being just at the right age to be drafted into the 
army, which happened during the conflict with Korea, and so having a successful run 
with Flamingo Films, which was interrupted by two years in the army, which because of 
being in the film business I was able to get into the film unit in the signal corps and 
when I was in the signal corps I guess I made friends through one of the other soldiers, 
in the same outfit, and his name was Alex Singer. 
 
JF: Oh right, yes. 
 
JBH: And Alexander Singer was a boyhood friend of Stanley Kubrick, which he started 
to tell me about and since Alex and I were now getting involved in film in the army, we 
were experimenting with little short subjects and things like that, he brought his friend 
around one day to watch us and that was Stanley Kubrick, who at that time had done 
three short subjects and a feature film called Fear and Desire. And so I briefly met 
Stanley whilst I was still in the army. But when I finished my tour of duty, after two 
years, I went back to distributing films to television. And, you know, I went back to 
pick up from where I left off. And I ran into Kubrick in the street in New York City and 
he told me since he’d seen me a year before he had done another film, which was called 
Killer’s Kiss and he was going to have a screening and he invited me to the screening. 
And I attended the screening and I was very impressed with the fact that this young 
fella, who is only eight days older than myself, so he was pretty young at that time, had 
accomplished all of this. It didn’t really matter how good or bad the films were, it was 
the fact that he was able to get them made, you know. 
 
JF: Yeah. 
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JBH: And I had seen Fear and Desire and now Killer’s Kiss to me seemed a step 
upwards in terms of, you know, appreciating the film. And Stanley said to me, I 
understand you’re in the television-distribution industry and I’d like to talk to you about 
distributing Fear and Desire for television. So I said, why don’t you come to the office 
the next day and we’ll work out a deal. When he came to the office he was embarrassed, 
and the man who had distributed the film theatrically, a man named Joe Burstyn, had 
died in a plane crash. 
 
JF: Wow. 
 
JBH: And Fear and Desire was tied up in the courts because lawyers had to adjudicate 
his will and all of that and, I mean, he couldn’t give me a clear release on Fear and 
Desire, which meant we had nothing to talk about at that point. And so I asked him 
what he had been doing, and he said the film you saw last night, I’ve sold it to United 
Artists for $75,000 and they said to me that the door is open for anything else I want to 
do along those lines. So at that point I was disenchanted with travelling and selling on 
the road films for television and I thought this might be an opportunity for doing 
something I’ve always wanted to do and that’s produce movies.  
 
JF: Yeah. 
 
JBH: So I asked Stanley, at this point do you have anything going on and he said 
absolutely nothing in hopes of making another film. So I said, why don’t we team up, I 
just want to leave this business that I’m in and become a producer and he thought, I 
guess he perceived me as someone who could be helpful in terms of financing and 
acquiring rights to books and to things that didn’t require him to do everything that he 
did on his first two films.  
 
JF: Yeah. 
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JBH: And so we just decided that we’d become partners. I’d be the producer and he’d 
be the director. We’d be equal partners and we shook hands. The only thing was what 
do we do now? So after, after work that day, I went to a bookstore on Fifth Avenue in 
New York called Scribner’s and I started looking at the books in the mystery and 
western section. I saw a book called Clean Break, which was about a robbery of a 
racetrack. I bought the book and read it overnight and gave it to Stanley the next day 
telling him that this would make a good movie. And you know I think if I gave him the 
phone book he would have said let’s do it. He was so anxious to get into action again. 
 
JF: Yeah. 
 
JBH: But, you know, Stanley had a terrific sense of story, of what could make a good 
film.  
 
JF: Yeah. 
 
JBH: And so he read it, he was a fast reader, he read it in a couple of hours, and he said 
lets do it and so I found out I could acquire the rights, which I did. Cost me $10,000 and 
I acquired the film rights to this book, Clean Break, and we went running to United 
Artists, which supposedly had the door open and they said, well, why don’t you guys do 
a screenplay and show it to us. I figured, wow, this is great. When I tell my father we 
have a deal with United Artists, he says, you know, that deal is available anywhere. 
They’re not paying you to write the script, they’re not giving you the money back for 
the rights, you know, this is like if I ask you to go out in the street and look for money 
in the gutter, and I’ll give you fifty per cent of everything you find. My dad being a 
businessman, you know, this made me aware of the fact that I had this deal that was 
available at every studio in existence and so, anyway, we did develop the script. Stanley 
brought to my attention a man named Jim Thompson, who Stanley thought was a 
terrific crime writer at the time and so I became familiar with him. And we hired Jim 
Thompson to work with us on the screenplay. When we finished the screenplay we took 
it to United Artists and they liked the screenplay and they said, you know, see if you can 
get us a star. You know, it’s the same deal all over: they’re investing nothing and 
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they’re sending us out to try and put a package together and bring it to them. I didn’t 
know any better, but I figured at least somebody was interested.  
 
JF: Yeah. 
 
JBH: So we boxed up the scripts and we sent them out to California, to the same agent 
that I had acquired the film rights to the book. It was called the Jaffe Agency at that 
time. And with a list of people we thought would be good to play the lead. In those 
days, they had these terrific B pictures that usually played on the second bill of the 
double bill, and they had stars like Sterling Hayden and, you know, they were a terrific 
bunch of actors. So we had this whole list of…Steve Cochran, do you remember that 
name? 
 
JF: I’ve come across that name, yes. 
 
JBH: Yeah, anyway, you know, there may be a dozen of them on the list.  And we got a 
call-back a couple of weeks later from Sterling Hayden’s agent saying he liked it very 
much but he didn’t know who this Stanley Kubrick was that says he’s going to direct it. 
He says Stanley Kramer? No, no, this is Stanley Kubrick. So I did the best pitch job I 
could do explaining that Stanley was this budding filmmaker that someday is going to 
be the best. I tell them anything to get them to do the job. 
 
[Laughter] 
 
JBH: When I took it to United Artists, they said Sterling Hayden, we have him in 
Westerns that we’re selling for $25 flat rentals, why don’t you get a star? And, you 
know, we were very excited about Sterling, because he had done The Asphalt Jungle, 
the John Huston film. I mean we thought what better credentials could an actor have? 
So anyway, they said they could get us Victor Mature in a year and a half if we were 
willing to wait, maybe he would do it. I mean, tell two kids who are out to make a film 
that they have to wait a year and a half on the possibility that you might get somebody 
you didn’t even think was right for the film. 
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JF: Yeah. 
 
JBH: So we said, we want to do it with Sterling. So they said, we’ll give you $200,000 
that’s all. This’ll be your budget. And this really gets into answering some of your other 
questions, doesn’t it? 
 
JF: Well yes it really does. In terms of, you just said that UA gave $200,000 to the 
budget then, because I’ve been doing a lot of research at the Kubrick Archives down in 
London and I was just wondering at this stage, would you have been the person who 
was compiling the budget? And putting together a budget report? 
 
JBH: Well, well, we took that information back, the fact that they would be willing to 
put up $200,000, but that’s all, right. They warned us, don’t spend more than $200,000 
on this movie. And so we had a budget, we got hold of a production manager and we 
had a budget drawn up. It came to be something like $330,000. And that was based, you 
know budgets are based on the schedule, you have to make a schedule, know how many 
days you’re going to shoot, and then you know how much it is going to cost. So we had 
a twenty-four day schedule and that was going to cost $330,000 and we told UA and 
they said, don’t you dare spend it, or you’re going to lose it, because we’re only going 
to put up $200,000. If you’re going to put up the other $130,000 you’re going to be in 
second position to us, because we have to get our money back first, and you may lose it. 
Well, I had to, I had to make that decision. Do I want to take this chance and raise the 
money? I had saved up about $80,000 from my, from my distribution days and I figured 
I could borrow another $50,000 from my dad and put up the $130,000 myself. UA 
warned me not to do it, but I figured, for $200,000 we wouldn’t make a picture that 
looked very good, you know, we’d have to rush through it, and Stanley, you know, we 
figured Stanley couldn’t do his thing. 
 
JF: Yeah. 
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JBH: And so I bit the bullet and came up with the $130,000 and we moved to 
Hollywood because we couldn’t find a racetrack back east that would co-operate with 
us. So we took the script and moved it to California and UA then recommended a 
production manager that we could use out there. His name was Clarence Eurist, E-U-R-
I-S-T. You know, and he, we find the budget, you know, and it stayed at $330,000 and 
twenty-four days and we had Sterling Hayden at that point for $40,000. Stanley was 
totally knowledgeable about all of the actors, you know, he had seen every picture made 
probably, and he knew all about this terrific cast that we put together, you know, with 
Elisa Cook Jr., and, oh God, Ted de Corsia, Jay C. Flippen, you know the whole cast. 
 
JF: Yeah, yeah, fantastic cast. 
 
JBH: Yeah, it wasn’t called The Killing at that time, that was when we finished the film 
and that’s what UA decided to call it. We decided to call it…oh… 
 
JF: I’ve seen something, Bed of Fear? 
 
JBH: Bed of Fear, yeah. 
 
JF: I’ve come across that, yeah. 
 
JBH: You know, and our screenplay, you know what a legal size pad looks like?  
 
JF: Yes. 
 
JBH: When you open the pages up, whereas with a clip you open them sideways. 
 
JF: Yes. 
 
JBH: Our script opened up like a like a legal pad, totally different  
 
[Laughter] 
   233 
JBH: Totally different to what they were use to seeing. 
 
JF: Yeah. So would you say that you and Kubrick saw The Killing as like a calling card 
to Hollywood?  
 
JBH: Well, we just wanted, first of all, we just wanted to make a movie. And secondly, 
we wanted to make a good movie. And we loved the book because the book’s structure 
was this flashback arrangement, where you follow each participant up to this race and 
then you go back and pick up another participant and see what he does. And there were 
about four different participants that caused the structure to work in flashback form, 
which I thought was unique and, you know, haven’t seen anything like that, and so we 
thought we were going to make a very interesting crime movie. You know it’s funny, 
fools or where angels fear to tread, we never thought about failure, you know, we just 
didn’t believe there was such a thing, so we went ahead and did the film and Stanley 
completed it in twenty-four days. He edited, you know we had an editor but Stanley 
really edited. He’d tell the other guy what to do and Stanley and I would go outside and 
throw a football around, you know waiting for the editor to show us what it looked like. 
But Stanley really edited the film and we then had a, United Artists arranged a preview, 
you know, they called them sneak previews because the people didn’t know what they 
were going to be seeing. 
 
JF: Oh right, yeah. 
 
JBH: And we ran it in California. It was actually because people never knew what they 
were going to see, there was always a lot of walkouts, you know, once they saw it 
wasn’t going to be a romantic film, or a musical, or you know, a light comedy, you 
know, a lot of people walked out. That’s always a disappointment, you think they 
haven’t even seen it yet and they’re walking out. But everybody that saw the film at that 
point, that we knew, because we invited people that we knew, including Sterling 
Hayden and Sterling Hayden’s agent, and they all thought that the film was a 
disappointment. They thought we’d made a huge mistake in not telling it as a straight 
line story, and, you know, if enough people tell you you’re sick you should lie down, 
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and Stanley and I, you know, heard this from everybody, people that we were close to, 
and we figured, my god, could we have been wrong about this. So we went back to New 
York and we rented an editing room and we tore the film apart and tried to do it as a 
straight line and, after a while, we looked at each other and we thought we must be nuts 
to lose faith in what we believe in. I mean, this is why we acquired the rights to the 
book and this is the way to tell the story, so we put it back the way we liked it, which is 
the way you see it now. And turned it into United Artists, turned it into UA. And, you 
know, UA are so busy, they had so many projects that they didn’t take this too 
seriously, so they ran it as a second feature with Bandido (1956), with Robert Mitchum, 
and it was very disappointing. So I think one of your questions you ask about what my 
position was with United Artists and distribution. 
 
JF: Yes, yes. 
 
JBH: Well, yeah, we had no position. 
 
[Laughter]. 
 
JF: Ah ok. 
 
JBH: They did what they wanted to do. You know, you get so many licenses for France, 
you know, for in those days, I don’t know how it works today, but each company would 
get licenses for so many films that they could distribute, because I guess the French 
want to keep the French film industry from being overloaded with American and 
foreign films. So, they didn’t want to give a license, they wanted those licenses for their 
bigger pictures. So they said they had a deal to sell it to the Sibirsky brothers, they were 
film distributors in France, but for $10,000 and you know they felt that the contract with 
us was, they give you so many days to find a deal, then if you can’t you approve their 
deal. So we had no facility to try to better the deal. And so they sold the film to France 
for $10,000. Can you imagine? 
 
JF: Wow.  
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JBH: And it was a big hit in France. So the Sibirsky brothers did quite well. 
 
[Laughter] 
 
JBH: But UA had bigger fish to fry, they didn’t want to waste their rights on a little 
picture like The Killing. But what The Killing did was, like you said, it was a calling 
card. 
 
JF: Yeah. 
 
JBH: This film really caught on, not at the box office, but it caught on in Hollywood 
and everybody was really impressed with it. Particularly because we were so young. 
And we got written up in Time magazine and we were offered a deal at MGM, where 
Dore Schary was head of production at that point, and he loved The Killing. He brought 
us over to do a film and we wanted to do Paths of Glory, which we had in the meantime 
acquired the film rights to. But at MGM they had done The Red Badge of Courage, an 
anti-war film, and Dore Schary said absolutely not, you know, find something else to 
do. And Stanley was always a big fan of Stefan Zweig and, you know, Schnitzler. 
 
JF: Yes, yeah. 
 
JBH: And they owned a story by Stefan Zweig called The Burning Secret, which 
Stanley jumped on that, I mean he really wanted to do that. I’m getting a little adrift 
from your questions. 
 
JF: It’s great to listen to. 
 
JBH: But it’s the real stuff, you know, the real story. And Stanley had become a fan of a 
writer named Calder Willingham, who had written several books, and so he insisted on 
bringing Calder Willingham to work on the screenplay with Stanley. MGM said that 
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wasn’t the deal, we were supposed to produce and direct and write the film ourselves 
for $75,000. Can you imagine? This was 1956. 
 
JF: Yeah. 
 
JBH: For both of us to share $75,000 to produce, direct and write the film and we had to 
do it in forty weeks or something like that. But that was the deal. And so we agreed to 
do it, but they finally agreed to allow Calder Willingham, we had to get him back from 
Ceylon where he was working on The Bridge on the River Kwai for Sam Spiegel. 
 
JF: Yeah, yeah. 
 
JBH: And, you know, we took so long to get to work on the screenplay and we kept Jim 
Thompson and put him to work on writing a draft of Paths of Glory, you know, sort of 
like moonlighting, which MGM eventually used as a vehicle to fire us, because Dore 
Schary got fired and they wanted to clear out everybody that he brought in, so they fired 
us as well. So we never did The Burning Secret, but at least we were developing Paths 
of Glory in the meantime. 
  
JF: So, how did the deal progress from there and how did Kirk Douglas get involved? 
 
JBH: Well we eventually finished the screenplay on Paths of Glory. Jim Thompson had 
done his thing, we kept Calder, who we’d brought out for The Burning Secret, and we 
kept Calder and had him do a draft with Stanley on Paths of Glory. Now we had a 
finished screenplay and we also had an agent at this point, and the agent asked us who 
are we going to want. To put the picture together we would have to get somebody 
attached, like a major name. And in those days you could get the script to actors without 
having to make a firm offer, like you do today. They won’t even read the script unless it 
comes with a firm offer or a picture that’s fully funded, it’s so difficult now. But in 
those days, you could get the script to an actor and, you know, through the agent, and so 
we did. We sent it to Kirk Douglas and he loved the script and said yes I’ll do it, except, 
I can’t do it now as I’m committed to do a stage play in New York and once I finish 
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that, he said that could run a year, it could also flop, but anyway, he said he couldn’t 
make the commitment until he was free. So we then tried everywhere, and we couldn’t 
get any actors to agree to do it, everybody thought it was too downbeat, that there were 
no women in it, it was anti-war, which is not very glamorous. So we were very lucky 
when Kirk Douglas had some kind of falling out on the stage play and came back to us 
and said that he would agree to do it. So he had a house in Palm Springs, California, and 
his agent was Ray Stark at that time, who became a producer later on. Ray Stark was 
Douglas’s agent and so with our agent, who was Ronnie Lubin, Stanley and I drove out 
to Palm Springs and had a meeting at Kirk Douglas’s house, at which they made the 
most outrageous deal and we were so anxious to get him that we agreed to it. But we 
had to agree to do five films for his company. 
 
JF: Yeah. 
 
JBH: Of which, he would only be in two of them. The only good thing about it was that, 
we didn’t have to do, he had no interest in Paths of Glory, in terms of any financial 
interest or any credit as a producer or anything. The only thing he insisted on was that 
we put the name of his company, Bryna Films, on the titles. 
 
JF: Yeah. 
 
JBH: But he was strictly an employee. We paid him $200,000 and he went to work for 
us.  
 
JF: So would Paths of Glory count as one of these five films that this contract talked 
about or was it separate then? 
 
JBH: It was separate, separate. This was like a slave labour thing, five pictures, of 
which only two he would be in.  
 
JF: Yeah.  
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JBH: And we knew our goal was to get out of this deal somehow, someway. We were 
not going to tie ourselves up. I mean, it’s pretty much like a lifetime, I mean you did a 
picture every eighteen months, would take you about eight years to be free of it right.  
 
[Laughter] 
 
JBH: So anyway, we did Paths of Glory with Kirk and we our stock went way up. I 
mean, after The Killing, we were so accepted from an acceptance standpoint in 
Hollywood. When we came back with Paths of Glory, then we really, everybody was so 
excited, everybody wanted to work with us. Marlon Brando, who at that time was the, 
like the top actor in the world, came to us and said he was so impressed with our film 
that he wanted to go into business with us and make films with us, which we thought 
was, my god, this is really terrific.  
 
JF: Yeah. 
 
JBH: So we agreed to do that. You didn’t ask any questions about One-Eyed Jacks 
(1961) or the things we had going with Marlon. Are you familiar with any of that? 
 
JF: I am, yes, and how for instance, when Marlon eventually wanted to direct One-Eyed 
Jacks himself and so forth. 
 
JBH: Yes, I’m not sure he wasn’t devious in this, because we were to agree on what our 
picture would be and so everything Stanley and I presented to Marlon – we wanted to 
do a boxing picture, a fight picture – he didn’t like anything we submitted to him and 
we didn’t like anything he submitted to us, which I can’t even remember if he did 
anything seriously. But one night he invited Stanley to dinner and told Stanley that he 
had a commitment to do a Western at Paramount that he wanted Stanley to help him do 
that commitment. The deal would be that Stanley would direct this western and that I 
would be looking then for projects to do with Marlon after they had finished it and it’s 
not included in the deal to do the Western. I wasn’t asked to be the producer or anything 
like that, I was delegated to be looking for material and properties that we could do with 
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Marlon after they did that. I think that Marlon really just wanted to direct the picture 
himself, but he needed someone to do the technical, you know, the setting up of the 
shots and all that stuff, you know, which Stanley could do. The only problem was he 
started to read this script to Stanley after dinner. They went back to Marlon’s place and 
Stanley said I can’t deal with this, you know, give me the script I’ll read it, you know, 
don’t read it to me. And Stanley called me after and said, we got a problem, you know, 
the script is terrible, what do we do? And so we decided that we wanted to keep the 
relationship with Marlon, we didn’t know that he was so devious, so he said why don’t 
we put it to him that if we can rewrite the script then Stanley will direct the picture and 
he agreed to that. So once again, he called in Calder Willingham and Calder and Stanley 
rewrote the script and when that was finished Marlon showed his true colours, you 
know, he had a big entourage of people that he would have meetings with. Some 
meetings he called and never showed up. 
 
JF: Yeah. 
 
JBH: And he would conduct these meetings like a school teacher, give everybody, give 
them ten minutes to put forth their views of whatever they were talking about and then 
cut them off at ten minutes and go onto the next person. Well, Stanley felt that this was 
getting to be an impossible situation and that he was never going to be able to work 
under these conditions with Marlon and so the whole idea was we can’t quit because if 
you quit, you don’t get paid. But if you get fired, they have to pay you off. That’s a big 
difference. 
 
JF: Right, yeah. 
 
JBH: And Stanley was going to get $100,000 to direct the film. So Stanley just made it 
impossible to work with and so they got rid of him, but they had to pay him. So we 
were done with Marlon at this point. That was the end of that. But three days later, now 
in the meantime whilst this is going on, I had acquired the rights to Lolita, you know, I 
had come across the book and got the rights to Lolita. So now we wanted to do Lolita 
but we had this problem about Kirk Douglas. You know, we don’t want to let him get in 
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on Lolita, because that to us was really going to be once in a life time. You know, this 
was number one on the bestseller list, famous the world over, but three days later we get 
a call from Kirk Douglas that he’s been shooting a picture called Spartacus, and he’s 
been shooting for three days with Anthony Man and he doesn’t like what he’s getting 
and would we consider lending Stanley, lending him out to Kirk Douglas to direct 
Spartacus. And we figured, well, I figured this is a chance to renegotiate with Kirk on 
our deal, get him to leave Lolita and, you know, don’t participate in that at all. And 
charge a $100,000 to Stanley so we could get some money into the company, because 
Stanley kept a $100,000 that he got from Marlon. He didn’t put that in the company. 
But we did with the Spartacus money, that came into our company, and I renegotiated 
with Kirk and I get him to waive Lolita. And whilst Stanley was doing Spartacus, we 
got Nabokov to come back to California and write the screenplay. 
 
JF: So when Kubrick was directing Spartacus was your attention mainly on Lolita and 
developing Lolita? 
 
JBH: Yes, yeah, certainly was. We had an office, we had a bungalow actually, at 
Universal, we made that our office, and I worked out of there. We got a house for 
Nabokov in Mandeville Canyon, just on the way to the beach, and so he wrote the 
screenplay. But it was so unwieldy, you know, I mean you couldn’t lift it, it was so 
heavy. 
 
[Laughter] 
 
JBH: So many pages, I mean it would have been like a four-hour film or something. So, 
we had that, but, you know, I wasn’t able to raise the money to do Lolita yet. Anyway, 
I’m really drifting away from the specific questions, I hope I’ve answered some of 
them.  
 
JF: I mean, a lot of what you are saying is answering the questions actually, but with 
Lolita, I’m quite interested in this issue of how you got it financed and the reasons for 
the UK and why you choose to film in the UK? 
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JBH: Yeah, ok, so now we have a script, but it’s not really workable, it’s too long and it 
needs to be trimmed down and it needs to be rewritten, really. Actually, we had Calder 
Willingham write the first draft of the script while Stanley was doing Spartacus and 
went over to Spain to do the battle scenes for Spartacus. Calder had completed the 
screenplay and sent it to us and I spoke to Stanley in Spain and he said he didn’t like 
Calder’s screenplay. I kind of liked it. I thought it was pretty good. But Stanley said, 
you know, we have to redo it, so when he came back we found we were able to get 
Nabokov, because we tried him originally, but he turned us down. Then he suddenly 
became available. I guess he needed the money or something, but he came to California. 
So anyway, while Stanley was doing Spartacus, we went to James Mason and we had 
the same problem with Mason that we had with Kirk Douglas, that he was going to do a 
play in New York and he wasn’t available. So we had to abandon the idea of James 
Mason. Stanley was working with Laurence Olivier on Spartacus and so we had lunch 
with Larry, Sir Larry, and he agreed to do it, he agreed to do it, and he said he just had 
to tell his agent – it was MCA at the time – and they were also our agents. Stanley and I 
had MCA as our agents. And that afternoon he told Stanley, sorry, he’s not able to do it. 
Well, I’m sure MCA talked him out of it, that Sir Laurence Olivier can’t walk into a 
project like this with these two kids and, god knows what they’re going to do, you 
know, you are Sir Laurence, you can’t be running the risk of telling the story of a 
paedophile. So we didn’t have Mason and we didn’t have Olivier. And I thought, maybe 
we can get David Niven. He jumped at the chance to do it. Stanley was kind of hesitant 
about that, but I talked him into it. And then we lost David Niven because he was doing 
a television show for Four Star Television and they had sponsors and so William 
Morris, the agency, told us that they had to withdraw David because if he did Lolita 
then the sponsors would cancel his television show. So we didn’t have anybody. And 
then out of the blue James Mason calls us back, the same thing that happened with Kirk 
Douglas, his play fell through and he’s available and he wanted to know if we still 
wanted him. You know, at that point I said don’t go anywhere, you know, I’m coming 
right over.  
 
JF: Yeah. 
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JBH: And so we now had James Mason in Lolita, and I don’t think he’d even read the 
screenplay. You know, it’s just that everybody knew that the subject, they knew about 
Paths of Glory and The Killing and they knew that Stanley was doing Spartacus with 
Olivier and Laughton and Ustinov and Kirk. And, you know, we had this tremendous 
prestige going for us that we were able to get the actors to agree to do the screenplay. 
But I didn’t have the money to do the film, so I thought maybe I could get, you know 
what presales are? You know, you can presell territories? 
 
JF: Yeah. 
 
JBH: You can sell it to distributors across to France, to Italy, to Germany, so I thought I 
would make a trip to Europe while Stanley was finishing up Spartacus and raise some 
money by preselling the distribution rights to this picture. Because I could at least say 
that James Mason is committed to doing it. 
 
JF: Yeah. 
 
JBH: So my first stop was in New York and I was having lunch with a friend of mine, 
his name was Kenneth Hyman, and Ken Hyman and I were schoolmates, just like I was 
with David Wolper. In fact, in our class in high school Steve Ross, who eventually 
became head of Time Warner, and David Wolper, who became a huge television 
producer, you know, having done all these biographies and then he did Roots, and 
Thornbirds, he became a giant. And all of us were in the same class in high school. And 
Kenny Hyman’s father was also in the film business and he said that his dad had this 
company and they were looking to do some feature films. So he said why don’t we go 
back and talk to my dad. So I made the deal in ten minutes, you know, it was a miracle; 
we went from just having a lunch to going back to his father’s office. And his father 
said what are you doing and so I told him about Lolita and he said ok let’s be partners; 
we’ll put up the money, how much do you need? So Stanley and I thought we could 
find some cheap place in the world to do it for a million dollars. So I said I need a 
million dollars and Elliott said fine. We’ll be fifty-fifty partners, find the girl to do the 
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part and we’ll put her under contract and share the contract and I’ll see you later. And 
that was it. It took ten minutes to get the commitment. And so I went to Europe now, 
not looking for money but looking for a place to do the picture. It was a great trip 
because I had no pressure on me at this point. 
 
JF: Yeah. 
 
JBH: As time went by though, when Seven Arts realised that we had James Mason and 
they said why can’t we do this as an Eady Plan picture, do it in London. We can take 
advantage of the Eady Plan and you get two exemptions. You can exempt the director 
and you can exempt Shelly Winters. And we got Peter Sellers after we got James 
Mason, so we would easily qualify for an Eady Levy picture. But the budget went from 
a million to like a million and three quarters. You know, as time goes along you’re 
talked into spending more money, you know, you can’t do it for a million in England so 
forth and so on, because of the union. So that answers your question of how it came to 
be an Eady Plan picture.  
 
JF: When would the Eady Levy money have been paid? After the picture had been 
released? 
 
JBH: I think it comes back after, you know, based on the gross of the picture, or 
something like that.  
 
JF: Yes, so obviously with Lolita, Kubrick said later that if he’d known about the 
censorship issues, he perhaps wouldn’t have filmed the novel. I mean, what are your 
views about the censorship issues on that particular picture?  
 
JF: Well the company that put up the money, it eventually became Seven Arts. You 
know, it was Associated Artists originally, then it became Seven Arts, and of all things, 
being a small world, they took on Ray Stark, the very person that made the Kirk 
Douglas deal. 
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JF: Oh right, yes. 
 
JBH: He was now the top executive for Seven Arts, but anyway, Seven Arts decided 
that they wanted to get some protection on the censorship, so they hired a man named 
Martin Quigley, you know, who was the founder of the code, you know of the censor 
code, the MPAA. And Quigley had written the code, so we figured if we could get him 
on our film as a technical adviser, he could keep us out of trouble, he could guide us, 
you know. Because you had to get a code seal in those days, there was no classification. 
That’s alleviated since now you have a G and a PG13 and an R and all of that. But in 
those days, you had to get a code seal, or you’re out of business. So that was an absolute 
must, so that’s why they hired Quigley and he negotiated with Geoffrey Sherlock, who 
was the man in charge of the code for the MPAA after the picture was finished. And 
there were only minor cuts necessary. If you’re familiar with the picture, the only thing 
that they really had us shorten is when they are in the hotel room when they wake up in 
the morning. 
 
JF: Ah yes, is this when they’re on the cot. 
 
JBH: James Mason is on the cot and she says, did you ever play a game when you were 
young, he says what game was that, and she whispers in his ear. And so she moves 
down to the middle of the bed and starts to bend over, which looks like she’s about to 
perform oral sex. That’s how they interpreted it and so they asked us to shorten that and 
to not have her lean down toward his midsection. But that was a minor cut, you know, 
it’s all implied in the dialogue anyway, this is where we play the game.  
 
JF: Yeah, the dialogue’s fantastic. 
 
JBH: Yeah, we had no problem, if that got us a code seal. You know, I wasn’t even in 
on the negotiation. That was the whole beauty of it is that we had the original writer of 
the code negotiating with the MPAA. It was like a payoff. But our troubles were not 
over yet. There was a thing called the Legion of Decency in those days. You know, 
called the Catholic Legion of Decency. It was supervised by an archbishop, no, by 
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a…was he an archbishop? I don’t know, but his name was Senor [Inaudible] Liddle. 
And he condemned the movie, along with La Dolce Vita, the two pictures were 
condemned, and so all the Catholic churches told their congregations not to go attend 
this movie. We had to get it by the Legion of Decency, which we eventually did. It took 
six months, but we eventually negotiated some edits on the film. And I must say that 
they were not outrageously strict. They were understanding and, you know, but they 
stood firm on certain things. They screened it for the nuns and people and a lot of the 
reviews coming back were complementary of the film and so it softened them up a little 
bit on the censorship issue. We had to change certain things and we had to agree that 
when the picture was distributed that we would have a restriction on age and that 
nobody could attend the picture that was under the age of seventeen. So we made that 
deal and got by the censorship. We had to make some edits in the film but they weren’t 
really major. Do you remember the scene when Humbert is in bed with Charlotte?  
 
JF: Is this with the photograph? 
 
JBH: The picture that Humbert is looking at whilst in bed with Charlotte. Well we had 
to shorten, I don’t know how many looks he had at the picture, but we had to trim that 
down to maybe two looks. I mean, I tried to argue with them. 
 
[Laughter] 
 
JBH: I was embarrassed to try to sell the point to them that he wasn’t using it as an 
aphrodisiac, but you know we played it that way. But I was saying that he was using, 
you know, he just missed her. 
 
[Laughter] 
 
JBH: But they didn’t buy it and that people would interpret it as using her to be sexually 
stimulated, because he wouldn’t ordinarily be stimulated by his wife. 
 
[Laughter] 
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JBH: So we made that and there was a, there was a picture over, you know, the ashes, 
we had to cut that out. The ashes of her former husband.  
 
JF: Oh yeah. 
 
JBH: Because there was a religious picture or something on top of it. We had to put a 
negative, a blur, to blur out this religious picture, whatever it was. And then we had to 
put that in the ads when MGM distributed the movie. I mean, it was ridiculous to say 
that anybody under seventeen, which meant that Sue [Lyon] couldn’t go to the premiere 
of the picture. I mean it was absurd. She did the picture but she wasn’t allowed to see it.  
 
JF: Yeah. 
 
JBH: But anyway, we got it through and that’s the whole story of the censorship. 
 
JF: I’m conscious of time, because I don’t want to keep you too long and I’m just 
interested in how, obviously after Lolita Kubrick is wanting to make this nuclear 
holocaust film, Dr. Strangelove. So you were initially involved in the preproduction of 
that, is that right? 
 
JBH: Yeah, yeah, we acquired the film rights to a book called Red Alert by an English 
writer named Peter George and Stanley was absolutely convinced that there was going 
to be a thermo-nuclear confrontation. He even opened a bank account in Australia, 
figuring that he was going. You know, this is the nexus of how we came upon doing a 
picture about it. And I did a picture about it too, a serious version of a thermo-nuclear 
dilemma. But anyway, so we thought that this would make a terrific suspense movie 
and so we set about doing the script, you know, he did a script with Peter George and 
then Stanley and I got started on working on a script together in his New York 
apartment and there were times when it got late and it got a little silly. And we thought 
about what it would be like in the War Room if everybody got hungry, and you know 
send out to the deli. 
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[Laughter] 
 
JBH: And you know, the Jewish waiter comes in with the apron on and someone wants 
the corn beef on rye. And you know, Stanley and I, we never ever smoked grass or ever 
got in to drugs or anything, so the point was, we were almost behaving like we were on, 
smoking grass or something. We found it so funny, we became so hysterical about it. 
And, you know, we figured we can’t get off a winner. The book is a winner as a serious 
dramatic piece, we better stick with it, because to sustain a comedy for two hours, you 
know, is not our thing. We’d never done that. We did Lolita as a comedy really, but you 
know it was pretty much, you could take it either way, you know, we kept the humour 
in it and that’s why Peter Sellers did it. Not like the remake where they had [Frank] 
Langella. I mean, there wasn’t a laugh in that whole movie. I think that’s where they 
went wrong. You know, I mean they had some pretty good talent in that movie and yet 
they took it too seriously. You have to approach it as humour. 
 
JF: I completely agree. 
 
JBH: We of course got rid of any prior attitude to paedophilia with Humbert Humbert. 
We just made Lolita the first person that captured his fancy. But anyway, we decided 
we would play it straight. And we finished – and when I say we I was sort of more of a 
consultant, a helper on the script, I wouldn’t get any credit for writing it. But I kind of 
engineered it for them to stick with the seriousness of it. We had sold our rights of 
Lolita to Seven Arts and when the deal came along we owed them a second picture and 
I figured this would be perfect for the second picture to be ‘Edge of Fear’, ‘Edge of 
Doom’, whatever we called it. And we took a big double page trade ad saying, you 
know, Harris-Kubrick’s next movie is this. And I went to Eliot Hyman, who was head 
of Seven Arts, and he didn’t want to do the picture as he didn’t like the idea. I talked 
him into it, I begged him to do it, I said it’s going to be terrific, there’s never been 
anything like this. And I talked him in to doing it, and it’s at this point – I know one of 
your questions is – it was at this point that I had been developing this desire to direct 
film. I mean, you can’t blame me, hanging around Kubrick for seven years and three 
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movies, and you just get so inspired to want to direct. And when you see a master, when 
you see somebody who is that good, it looks easy, you know, I mean I don’t know if 
you’re in to sports or anything, but you know the best athletes always make it look easy, 
and the same play by the average person makes it look spectacular. But the real 
superstars, they make it look easy. And, you know, I didn’t realise how directing was 
until I tried it. But I had built up this terrific desire, based upon Stanley’s 
encouragement, first of all – not that he wanted to get rid of me, because he always 
loved the idea of sharing and I’d sit next to him in the editing room and he always 
wanted me around for consultation and for support and he had no feeling of resentment 
or, you know, he never, he invited criticism, he invited me to express my opinions about 
things. He never felt he had to preserve or play a game with being totally confident that 
he didn’t need any help.  
 
JF: Would you perhaps describe the relationship as being collaborative, as very 
collaborative? 
 
JBH: It was completely, particularly on Lolita, because on Lolita you know, my brother 
wrote the love theme. 
 
JF: Oh right. 
 
JBH: Stanley loved it. My brother wrote it, I brought in Nelson Riddle to do the music, I 
talked, I told Stanley that it would play much better if we did it in flashback form, 
because you don’t want to end the picture on a comedic scene, you want to end it, end 
the picture on a feeling of sorry for Humbert, feeling all his distress. And so, you know, 
we played the killing of Clare Quilty in flashback. So I made a lot of contributions and 
even wrote some of the scenes – with the hula-hoop, watching the horror movies, things 
like that. And Stanley loved this, I mean even on the post-production stuff he would let 
me do the ADR stuff with Shelley Winters and so forth. Probably because she was a 
pain in the neck.  
 
[Laugher] 
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JBH: But anyway, so I went to Eliot and talked him into it and at this point I felt I had 
now arranged the financing, the script was solid, the deal was made, and I could feel 
free, you know, and no way in letting Stanley down, because now all he had to do was 
make the movie and he’s got it financed. You ask a question here about producing. 
Stanley can do anything. I mean Stanley when he puts his mind to it can do anything. 
He watched me throughout the picture, consulting with me on anything to do with 
producing. He could just take over and, which he did. He had no trouble. He used his 
brother-in-law, Jan, to be the executive producer to take care of a lot of details on things 
that Stanley wouldn’t bother with. But Stanley had a complete understanding of the 
business aspects of it and probably many times he questioned me on certain things, 
which ruminated, certain things I wouldn’t have thought of had Stanley not brought it 
up. So we did the same thing, we started playing poker by just reading the books on 
how to play and the next thing you know we’re playing in $500 table stakes and then 
we got in to the stock market. We used to go to the stock market, to the broker’s office 
and watch the ticker, buy trade stocks. In California we are three hours behind New 
York, so you had to get there at 6.30. So the point I’m making is that anything Stanley 
put his mind to do, he’d become an expert at it. You know, when he decided to do Red 
Alert, he read, you know, he gave me the books to read, On Thermo-Nuclear War by 
Herman Kahn. Herman Kahn was a think tank specialist. You know the name Herman 
Kahn? 
 
JF: Yeah, yeah. 
 
JBH: He was in phone calls with Herman Kahn. I mean you’re talking to the guy who 
wrote the book and that’s how it was with Arthur Clarke. You know, it doesn’t matter if 
he’s playing poker with the best poker players. He truly, truly was, I hate to use the 
word genius, I mean I really hate it because I’d rather say extremely talented, one of a 
kind, you know that type of thing, but he truly, when he put his mind to something, he 
became an expert at it. I mean it’s amazing. And so, when you ask about producing, that 
was like a piece of cake, nothing to it. Ok, so now, I’m free to go back to California and 
open an office there, and I’m looking for material to do as a director. Then after a 
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couple of weeks I get a call from Stanley and he says do you know who Terry Southern 
is and I said no, and he said he wrote books like The Magic Christian, stuff like that. 
He’s a really funny guy, really terrific, and we’re starting to turn the script into a satire 
comedy and I said what! I said, Stanley you got a good thing going. Eliot Hyman, I had 
to use every bit of persuasion to get him to do the picture, you’re going to turn it into a 
comedy, you’re going to blow the deal with them for sure. He said no, I think you can 
make the point a lot better in a satire or comedy than in a straight dramatic piece. I said 
oh my god, and when I hung up the phone, you know, he started to read me names like 
Jack D. Ripper and Merkin Muffley, I said to myself, gee he’s going nuts, I mean, he’s 
flipped out. 
 
[Laughter] 
 
JBH: And when I hung up the phone I said, it just goes to show you, I leave him alone 
for ten minutes, and he’s going to blow his whole career. And it turned out that Dr. 
Strangelove is my favourite Kubrick film, you know, it just makes the point of how 
smart and how clever and talented he was.  
 
JF: And it’s a film that still resonates today, that film, doesn’t it?  
 
JBH: Absolutely. 
 
JF: The fact that it’s so funny, but at the same time that’s the scary thing about it.  
 
JBH: Yeah, I mean I’ve seen it seven, eight times, ten, I don’t know how many times 
I’ve seen it and to me it’s like always seeing it for the first time. You know, I still laugh 
at all the gags and all the funny stuff. And people like George C. Scott, was incredible, 
you know, the way he played that part. The only thing was that Peter was going to do 
the Slim Pickens part, but it became too much. He was going to play the president, he 
was going to play Strangelove and he’s going to play Mandrake. And then he was going 
to play Cowboy. But when it came to doing it, just like in Lolita, he was going to play 
the school psychiatrist in drag, he came down in makeup and in shoes, he looked like 
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Miss Marple and he just said the same thing he said about Strangelove, he said that’s 
too much. It’s a little too broad, you know, Lolita is such a good satire really. The only 
time we rallied against that was, I couldn’t resist it, was when bringing the cot up, when 
Lolita is sleeping in bed, and they bring up the cot and they can’t open the cot. He just 
left me to it, you know, Stanley just went along with it. Anyway, the point I’m making 
is that Stanley turned it into a masterpiece, an absolute masterpiece. 
 
JF: Yes, yes. Well thank you very much for taking the time out to do this interview. 
 
JBH: Thank you. If you’re ever in Los Angeles, drop by.  
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Appendix II: 
Transcript of Interview with Jan Harlan 
 
 
Date: 27 January 2016, St. Albans, UK. 
Participants: Jan Harlan (JH) James Fenwick (JF) 
 
JF: Thank you for agreeing to do this. 
 
JBH: You’re welcome. 
 
JF: I just wanted to start with a question, if you just explain or tell me about your first 
official role on a Kubrick production. 
 
JH: It originally was research for Napoleon. I did that in Zurich and in Germany 
gathering picture material from the period, and other people did the same. And then, 
since I knew him [Kubrick] already quite well, through other things like music and stuff 
like this, he asked me in 1969 whether I would be interested in joining him for a year to 
work on Napoleon in Romania; Romania because he had a principle deal to use the 
Romanian cavalry for the first Italian campaign and the Russian campaign. At that time 
only Eastern Bloc countries still had cavalry and you need a cavalry not horses and 
riders, they look ridiculous, they are just not, just not believable. You also didn’t have 
computer graphics, you had to film everything for real. I’m talking 1970. That was the 
plan. Anyway, so, the company I worked for in Zurich – which was organising and 
business planning, that’s what I did before, in New York and Zurich, Frankfurt and 
Vienna – they said oh absolutely, do this, it can only be beneficial, blah blah blah. Off 
you go for a year. And Romania also at that time, they spoke more likely German and 
French rather than English. So, and Romania was also good cause it had such a varied 
landscape, very mountainous in the north, and really it’s a big country with different 
climate zones. So it suited him very well for the Italian campaign and for the Russian 
campaign. So, alright, I came to England, I met all the people, people like Ray Lovejoy 
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and all the people who worked with him already. I got introduced to them, I rented a 
house, and I bought a Landrover, getting already basically six months later to go to 
Romania. And then MGM pulled the plug. They got scared. They didn’t believe the 
budget was going to be that believable. They probably didn’t like the script. I don’t 
blame them, because he didn’t like it either particularly. He would never have made that 
script that he delivered. But he wanted to do something that would fit in three hours. I 
don’t think it would have. I personally think he would have made a two-part film, 
lasting four to five hours. But anyway, whatever MGM thought, the official line was 
that Dino De Laurentiis had made a plan to do Waterloo, with Rod Steiger in the role of 
Napoleon, it was a Soviet, American, French co-production, and it was too risky for 
them to do a Kubrick related theme a bit later. And so they pulled the plug. So I had a 
rented house in Elstree. Kubrick was depressed for two weeks because he had invested 
two years of his life and I was ready to go back to wherever, New York, Zurich. I had a 
baby. I was already married. And then he said well, we get on well together, you like it 
here. Maria loved England, totally besotted with England, and I liked him and we got 
along extremely well and so we thought, ok, we’ll have a go. One of the first things I 
did was organise the rights for Traumnovelle by Arthur Schnitzler, 1970, he was totally 
besotted with Traumnovelle. I think it was a difficult, difficult task, but it became our 
very first deal with Warner Bros., signed and sealed and ready to go. Approved, 
budgeted, scheduled, everything. Not casted. And then Stanley got cold feet. Just too 
bloody difficult frankly. And he went to Warner Bros. and said, look, let’s postpone 
this, I don’t know how to do this yet. I’ll think about it. 
 
JF: Sorry, but do you think that was Kubrick with his producing head on? 
 
JH: No, it was the artist. The producer didn’t come into it. He was somehow always 
given, because he came to Warner Bros. with something and he had just made 2001 for 
MGM, Warner Bros. were delighted to have this guy on their books. So he was very 
cross with MGM because they had pulled out of Napoleon. No, no, that was from a 
Warner Bros. point of view a production issue. For Stanley, he wanted to do Schnitzler, 
he was absolutely crazy about this novel. And he was fascinated by the fact that 
Sigmund Freud called Schnitzler his alter ego and all these kind of things. And I studied 
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the Dream Diary, and the archive and so he thought about this for weeks and weeks, and 
weeks.  But he wasn’t happy with the script he was at that point writing by himself. So 
then he approached Warner Bros., at the same time Warner Bros. had an interest in this 
book A Clockwork Orange, which he also had read. And Warner Bros. jumped on this 
and said, fine, don’t do Traumnovelle, don’t do that, very happy for you to do A 
Clockwork Orange, and that was my first practical experience. A Clockwork Orange 
was easy, because it was a scissor job. It’s a book written in the first person, so basically 
today you’d call it cut and paste. So, ‘there is me Alex and my three droogs’, bang, 
you’ve got the line. So it was much, much easier to transfer into a film script. It was 
also a short book. And in substance, he was totally loyal to the book, in substance. Not 
in form here and there, but that doesn’t matter. Well it was my first experience and I 
liked it very much, I liked to work with him, I liked this degree of self-criticism. Also 
this mixture of being careful and reckless. I admire that very much. He was also a funny 
man, very great sense of humour and he was a political beast, which also suited me. He 
was interested in what was going on in the world, and then very, very soon, I mean he 
was very interested in making a film about the Holocaust, always, was not at all 
interested in a documentary, I mean not at all, that was not what he did. He wanted to 
have a drama, a Shakespearean drama like Electra or something like that. And he tried 
an idea to develop a film, an ordinary day at UFA Studios during the Nazi period under 
the umbrella of Joseph Goebbels, but I worked with good people, but we couldn’t get 
the story together. So he gave up and he then did Barry Lyndon. Parallel to that or 
immediately afterwards, there was always focus again on the Holocaust, so one of the 
things that came up, and Maria was instrumental in this, is Isaac Bashevis Singer. Do 
you know him? 
 
JF: Yes. 
 
JH: Incredible man. He died a long time ago, but he got the Nobel Prize for Literature. 
I’m talking about the 1970s. And then we said, this is a guy who must know, I mean he 
was surrounded by refugees and he went public saying everyone has a story to tell, 
every person has a story to tell. So Stanley thought it was a good idea, so I made an 
appointment through the publishers, very official, went to New York, saw Mr. Singer, 
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terrific guy, and stated my case and Singer, incredibly polite, said, ‘I loved Barry 
Lyndon, Dr. Strangelove’, it was just after Barry Lyndon. I think it was 1976. So I 
stated my case and he said he was very interested, very flattered that Mr. Kubrick would 
want to hire me and write a film script, blah, blah, blah but there’s a huge problem. And 
I said, what’s that? I don’t know the first thing about it. And Stanley understood that 
message and dropped the whole thing for twenty years, until he came to do Begley’s 
book called Wartime Lies. And there was an element of autobiography, and so Stanley 
felt encouraged again because this man did know what it was all about. He couldn’t say 
he didn’t know the first thing about it, because he wrote about himself. He was the little 
boy, do you know the book? 
 
JF: I do. I have done quite a bit of research about this. 
 
JH: So he was the little boy. And so I met Louis Begley, wonderful man, he still is 
alive, he became a lawyer. As a child he managed to get through the net of Nazi 
occupation, went to America, was educated there, became a lawyer, very successful, has 
a wonderful house on Fifth Avenue, and so anyway. I met him, I met him twice. Then 
Stanley was very glad that he could finally fulfil this, we are now talking much later. 
1992 and 1993, yeah. A real big jump forward. And I worked for almost a year on it. It 
was just after 1989, the Berlin Wall had fallen, the whole thing collapsed, the Eastern 
European countries could be accessed and I was there on the day when the Czech 
Republic and Slovakia split. I was already as far gone as having a deal with the city of 
Bruno to put Nazi flags down on a weekend, close the city centre for a weekend to copy 
Warsaw, because Warsaw had been destroyed completely. To have trams from the tram 
museum there. We were that far gone, we had spent a lot of money. Then it was Terry 
Semel, the head of Warner Bros. who called Stanley and said, ‘do you realise, Steven is 
making a film called Schindler’s List in Krakow?’ Sort of related topic not quite sure 
but definitely. 
 
JF: Was he making it roughly the time you were out there? 
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JH: Maybe a little bit later, but more or less that time frame. The time frame for Steven 
was so fast, and we are so slow. He would have been out before us, that was the key. 
Never mind details, the key thing is we would have followed Schindler’s List. Terry 
Semel didn’t know anything about Schindler’s List, whether it was good or not, it was a 
Steven Spielberg film. I mean it will get attention. You don’t want to follow that. Let’s 
postpone it. What Warner Bros. was much more interested in anyway was that Stanley 
should do A.I. Artificial Intelligence because we had optioned the book by Brian Aldiss 
called Super Toys Last All Summer Long. Stanley loved the book and when I say loved 
the book he always loved what he did. He wouldn’t touch a story unless he had sort of a 
crush on it. That was a prerequisite almost. He was in love with A Clockwork Orange, 
or Traumnovelle, or whatever else. It was never, ‘ah it’s not too bad, let’s do it’. Forget 
that, it wasn’t Kubrick. But anyway, he loved that Brian Aldiss also worked with him, it 
was a short story that had to be lengthened. Stanley came up with the idea to do 
Pinocchio. This whole Pinocchio came from Stanley. Anyway, and then finally he 
didn’t do it because he thought actually for this film Steven would be the better director. 
I was very disappointed because I was looking forward to it. I remember Steven came 
within forty-eight hours from Los Angeles to the kitchen here in St. Albans. They sit at 
this big table, these two guys – remember we already had 600 drawings made by Chris 
Baker on the concept of A.I. and Steven was very excited, but of course, you know, he 
also has plans. So it wasn’t that simple, he couldn’t say ‘oh, well I’ll do it’. But then, so 
it didn’t happen. Stanley had of course convinced himself that Steven would be the 
better man and because it needed a lot of special effects, a lot of crew, and a lot of 
technical stuff and he finally decided to do Eyes Wide Shut. Warners were disappointed, 
but lets put it on ice and do Eyes Wide Shut. And that’s when the producing part comes 
in, when he has the freedom basically to do what he wants, but the producer part is not 
really that important, it’s his artistry and the seriousness he brought to every project that 
makes his films last forever. Go back to The Killing and Paths of Glory, Lolita, they’re 
all there. Nothing disappears. That’s the work of an artist. That’s not the mark of a 
producer. So let’s go back: so the irony is that after his death, well it’s not irony, it’s 
very nice. Steven Spielberg, who loved Kubrick, they loved each other, because they 
were so different.  
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JF: Yes, in terms of filmmaking styles and themes. 
 
JH: Yes. I mean, Stanley loved E.T. and all these films, but he would never have been 
able to do that, it was just gorgeous. 
 
JF: I do like the idea of those two collaborating, it’s kind of the tension between the 
different kind of filmmaking styles. 
 
JH: Totally different. And Steven, I know that Steven invited, that when Steven had 
heard Stanley had died, next day he invited all his close friends to his house and 
screened Paths of Glory. I mean it was that kind of a relationship. Anyway, so then 
Steven made A.I. after Stanley’s death, very quickly after. He was very faithful to 
Stanley’s concept, but did exactly what Stanley wanted, but lightening it up a bit, 
without pulling the dark side of it completely because humanity has gone. And the only 
thing that remains of us, our own creators computers, robots that have developed to 
such an extent there’s a fairytale element here that they were able to sustain themselves. 
And the film doesn’t say for how many centuries after humanity lived after the little boy 
gets trapped under the Ferris wheel. We don’t know. 500 years? 1000 years? We don’t 
know because then it cuts 2000 years further. And that was what was in Stanley’s script. 
And the key part of A.I., which is something that Steven Spielberg completely stuck 
with and honoured Stanley by not explaining anything. And that is, at the end, all the 
robots discovering the little boy, all they do, is they all at the same time get the 
information telling us there is no hierarchy and that’s why they exist.  
 
JF: That’s a very Kubrick idea. 
 
JH: Yes, very much so. There’s no hierarchy. That was that. 
 
JF: If we just go back then to when you, the first time you got a credit as an executive 
producer that was Barry Lyndon. 
 
JH: I always did the same. 
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JF: So if you could describe that then for the first time on Barry Lyndon. 
 
JH: Getting permissions. Get permissions to shoot in Potsdam, second unit permissions, 
talk to, that’s what you do, you get permissions, you make deals, I suggested music, but 
that was not really my role that was fun. I just know a lot of music so I suggested it. He 
decided it. I had nothing to do with what you see on the screen. Only to do with what I 
was supposed to get, that he wanted. I was a member of the crew. Ok, I had signature 
power, but I was a member of the crew, and my job was to make deals, to negotiate, to 
get permissions, to hire people, to do what was wanted.  
 
JF: To make sure that the film got made? 
 
JH: I wouldn’t go that far. I wouldn’t take that much of a credit. He made sure the film 
got made. He negotiated with Warner Bros. initially. Once that was done, then it’s 
automatic, the money gets transferred weekly, you don’t have to worry about that. What 
the accounts department does is produce a progress report, together with first assistant, 
to report what we have done. That’s an automatic process, that’s true in every film. Do 
you know about progress reports? 
 
JF: I’ve seen many, yes.  
 
JH: It’s not that complicated. You say what you have done this week and therefore 
conclude what still has to be done in order to complete. The key part of the progress 
report is not just to say what you have done, where the progress is, but what have you 
not done, so that the studio knows that, say, last week it was still to complete eighty-one 
days, and this week it is still to complete eighty-one days. So, you know, you lost a day. 
So that’s the idea, and so that the studio has a little bit of an idea, not that they can do 
much about it because half a film is no good at all, so you get the producer. In case of 
Kubrick, there are severe penalties if it goes seriously over budget, but even that doesn’t 
help you. So if the film isn’t finished, you have to finish it, otherwise you have nothing. 
So that’s what I did.  
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JF: So Kubrick was in charge of the creative? 
 
JH: He was in charge of what he put on the screen. It was his idea and you have 
constantly, you are constantly in touch with him for each scene and he, he talks to the 
art director and says really we need this. Only if someone can express what you need, 
then I come in, ok? I will see how we can get it. But it is not an inartistic job that I had. 
Suggesting music is not really, I mean that was easy, but he decides. I had a wonderful 
job, no responsibility at all. It was really his film, totally. He also edited the film. Of 
course he had technical people who did it, but he decided on the cut. Just think of the 
huge change he made in 2001 and he decided to kick out Alex North’s scores and take 
Johann Strauss. I mean, I think everyone around him thought he had really lost it, 
seriously, but he was right. I suggested the Strauss to him, but I don’t take any credit for 
it. He just called me and said I really need something big, that comes to an end, and I 
said, oh ok, big. I had a stack of LPs, you know, Bruckstein, Mahler, Wagner, and aye 
aye aye. And the needle dropped, so, and he already liked the title, Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra. I didn’t realise how much that fitted, in context, I didn’t know the film at 
all. And then, yeah, he got the rights and wonderful. And then when I needed, I made 
this documentary on Kubrick, have you seen that?  
 
JF: Life in Pictures? Yes. 
 
JH: Well I use that music of course. I also needed the rights, it was not yet in public 
domain. So I stated my case, said I have no budget, I need this to be very cheap or I 
can’t use it. And I’m making a film about Kubrick and of course it should have this 
music. And they said to me, you made us so much money because Kubrick used that 
music afterwards for commercials and stuff, you can have it for £1. So going back to 
Barry Lyndon, that’s what I did. We went to Ireland, we shot in Wiltshire, we had an 
office in Salisbury, before that in Waterford, and then in Bray, Bray studios in Dublin, it 
was a big long film. It was very successful in the Latin countries, it was a complete flop 
here and the United States, and this is what happened to him often. Eyes Wide Shut 
exactly the same. Eyes Wide Shut was really killed in America and in Northern Europe, 
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including the UK, and it was hugely successful in Portugal, Spain, France, Italy, and 
Japan.  
 
JF: Do you think with Barry Lyndon, obviously things were changing in Hollywood: 
Spielberg had just done Jaws, then you get Star Wars, the kind of films that are being 
made are very different. Was Kubrick effected by that in terms of, did he think well, 
maybe I’ve got to change? 
 
JH: No, he didn’t, he couldn’t. He couldn’t change, he was himself. I mean, you know, 
Van Gogh never sold a painting, that didn’t mean he didn’t stop painting or painting 
more like people who were successful, he couldn’t. The main thing was that he had to 
like what he did. For Kubrick, he was no good at doing, at filming to order. He had to 
like it. He loved Barry Lyndon, and of course Jaws came. Jaws wiped us out in business 
terms, except in Lisbon. Lisbon is the only town where we are beating Jaws. Maybe that 
tells you something about the Portuguese. But anyway, be that as it may, it was a very 
small market at the time, and I don’t think the currency was even convertible, I mean it 
was just crazy, before the EU and everything – I think it was still a dictatorship in 
Lisbon at that time. But, so, that was Barry Lyndon. Eyes Wide Shut exactly the same, 
as I mentioned. EWS huge hit in Japan, we got an email from the Japan – I told this to 
students just last week – an email saying, not an email, what’s it called – a fax! Saying, 
incredible what the film does here, fantastic: couples are leaving the cinema holding 
hands.  
 
JF: Which is different to how people tried to criticise the film as being cold. 
 
JH: The justified criticism is that it’s bloody complicated if you don’t pay attention. 
And you have to see the film twice. And if you don’t like it the first time, why would 
you bother seeing it a second time? So, that’s the problem. But it’s not a problem in 
France, Italy and Spain. I mean, they aren’t more intelligent than Britain, or people in 
Sweden, or Norway, or wherever, but they have a different kind of thing. I spoke to a 
journalist in Rome and explained this to him, and he said, oh it’s quite clear, it has to do 
with Catholicism. I said why? What on earth does it have to do with Catholicism? We 
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deal with the topic of sex and lust early on, it’s always on the table. You pretend it 
doesn’t concern you and you make dirty jokes, that’s the difference. I mean, it’s 
oversimplified, no doubt, but it’s interesting that he said it. What do I know? I know 
that it was a flop here, and a big hit in Italy, so there’s no question about that. That’s 
what it is. That’s what I know. And it’s also more coming up, the people who thought 
the film was stupid realise suddenly that actually it isn’t. 
 
JF: It’s took a lot longer than, because that’s the thing with Kubrick’s films. For 
instance, Barry Lyndon, it takes several years for people to get them. But with Eyes 
Wide Shut, it seems to have taken a lot longer. 
 
JH: I think EWS will be around in a hundred years. It is like, certain films, you know, if 
you ever want to know about the, say, the past, it’s perfect to look at the old Bergman 
films, to get an insight into Swedish society like nothing else. Yeah, so Kubrick is great.  
 
JF: So, going back to Barry Lyndon, how, in kind of a business sense it was made. So, 
for instance, Bernard Williams was on that film. 
 
JH: Bernard Williams, yes, he died last year. 
 
JF: Brian Cook. 
 
JH: He’s still alive.  
 
JF: So how were they lined managed, and in terms of that business side? 
 
JH: Oh, it was different jobs.  
 
JF: But was there a hierarchy? 
 
JH: It’s not a case of a hierarchy. It’s different jobs, not hierarchical. Bernie did similar 
stuff to me, but there was so much to do. I concentrated a lot on second unit and Bernie 
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did a lot in England and Ireland. Brian Cook is the first AD, he has to deal with today, 
now, right what happens in the next two hours. He has to get ready for the next day. He 
does the call sheets. Bernie has nothing to do with that. I have nothing to do with that. 
He does the call sheet with Stanley, what do we do tomorrow. That depends on the 
weather forecast. It depends on very down to earth things. And then you prepare the call 
sheet for the next day and you make sure that the right actors are called. So, it’s a 
different job. It’s not a question of hierarchy. 
 
JF: But is there some sort of, like, a meeting that takes place to liaise with what’s going 
to happen so that people know? 
 
JH: Sure, you have to make sure that everybody who needs to know is there and is 
informed. That happens all the time, though not many formal meetings during the 
shooting. That happens parallel. As soon as there’s a break you get together and you 
decide. The so-called production meetings happen before, before you start shooting. 
Too expensive, don’t want to waste any time.  
 
JF: So when the shoot is taking place it’s a lot more frantic. 
 
JH: Yeah, though, frantic is really what Stanley was fighting. The more you really 
shoot, I mean it has to be prepared, everybody is rushing around, but the moment you 
film, no noise, quiet, have all the time in the world. Very important.  
 
JF: So time was very important. 
 
JH: Sure. But time was of essence, yeah. In Eyes Wide Shut, I talked to another film 
accountant and we spent as much in a week as they did in a day. But we had so few 
people. Everybody has to do everything. I bought all the masks in Venice. I personally 
went to Venice and bought the masks, that’s how we worked.  
 
JF: So it’s almost like a family? 
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JH: Well, yeah, you have to, if you shoot so long, you have to have a small crew, 
otherwise you go bust. Stanley rightly said that he trusted our tastes, trusted me to buy 
the masks, they look good. I also thought you could make telephone calls from 
wherever you are, and he was absolutely right. So, and today, it’s even better. I mean it 
doesn’t matter where I am, I can do my job. I am all the time in touch with the 
exhibition and Warner Bros. I have my laptop and my phone. They don’t even know 
that I’m not at home or my office or in Denmark last week. They couldn’t care less, it 
doesn’t matter.  
 
JH: So in terms of the budget, how was that compiled then? Would Kubrick himself sit 
and compile the budget for a film? 
 
JF: No, the budget is a question of above and below the line as you know. So above the 
line is nothing, it depends on the deal you make with the above the line people, that’s 
Stanley himself, and if you have Jack Nicholson – and that has no effect on the below 
the line budget. The below the line budget is made simply in cooperation with the 
studio, art department, how much does it cost, the rental of the stages, how long do you 
need the stages, to build, to shoot, to wrap. So you know how much a stage costs in 
rental, you know how many stages you need, you know how many extras, how many 
props, etc, and it’s the accountant and the art department, every department has to give a 
sub-budget to say what they need, that’s how the budget is made together with the 
schedule. The schedule, how many days, and then you have the cast, that’s a separate 
item, but the cast is usually still below the line. And then you have the above the line if 
you have Tom and Nicole, that’s an above the line cost.  
 
JF: It was John Trehy, the accountant. 
 
JH: Yes, John Trehy, brilliant guy. He’s an accountant, yeah. He could tell you all about 
it. He did also the Harry Potter films. A very competent accountant. He’s a pencil 
pusher, that’s what he does.  
 
JF: Thinking about Barry Lyndon, what were the main problems while filming that? 
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JH: Oh, big problems. We filmed in Ireland and we had the IRA who hated an English 
crew, potentially, and at one point we had to run. Whether it was justified or not, I don’t 
know, but we stopped from one day to the other and moved to Wiltshire. That was a 
problem. Luckily we had finished. The other problem is that if you shoot in Ireland, or 
in Wiltshire, and you do exterior filming you are weather dependent, not only good or 
bad weather but have the same weather for the same scene, because once you start in 
bad weather you don’t want the sun to shine. Or the other way around, because 
otherwise you can’t edit, you see, it doesn’t make any sense. Particularly if your 
exteriors were daylight, not daylight, clouds or not clouds, it makes a huge difference. 
So these are things, and you sometimes don’t have weather cover. If you have a studio 
film, where you have inside and outside you always have weather cover. You know 
exactly if the weather screws you up, you go inside and carry on with another scene. 
And you have the actors for that other scene on standby. But this is normal planning. 
The other thing is that Stanley liked to shoot in script order, to the extent possible – he 
wasn’t totally unreasonable. But if at all possible, he didn’t like to shoot early late 
scenes in case he changed his mind on the script and then suddenly it doesn’t fit. That 
also makes sense.  
 
JF: And with Barry Lyndon was there a lot of improvisation?  
 
JH: Sure. Always. 
 
JF: For instance, with the final scene between Lord Bullingdon. 
 
JH: Yes, we did that in Wiltshire.  
 
JF: In the script it was just one line, but Kubrick turns it into this tense ten minute 
sequence. 
 
JH: Yes, you have to make it believable. You have the nervousness of Lord Bullingdon, 
believable so that it becomes a drama. Not everyone likes the way the scene is shot. 
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Some people find it outright boring, it takes too long. But, you know, forget it, it 
catches the period. It catches the totally different character between Barry and Lord 
Bullingdon. Leon Vitalli was very good.  
 
JF: And obviously another important part to Barry Lyndon is the camera and the 
collaboration with Ed Di Giullio. 
 
JH: Ed Di Giullio was a head technician of a company called… 
 
JF: …Cinema Products. 
 
JH: Yes, Cinema Products. Based in Los Angeles. Manufacturer of the Steadicam. So I 
was in touch with Ed Di Giullio for a long time. He almost became a friend, you know, 
I knew him, and when we were in Los Angeles we had dinner or lunch, nice guy. The 
key for him was to adapt a Mitchell BNC to take this ultra fast Zeiss lens, which Stanley 
needed in order to shoot by candlelight. That was his obsession almost. Now at that 
time, film speed was 100 ASA. If you pushed it in the bath one stop, it got grainy, it 
was really not good. The fastest lens was F2. And today a standard set is 1.2, or 1.4, 
absolutely normal. That time it was F2. There were good lenses in F2, but they were not 
as fast. But today, it’s so much faster, or you use digital. I mean, it’s so much easier and 
cheaper to make a film. To make a good film is as difficult as it always was, but that has 
nothing to do with the equipment. The equipment only has to do with costs, whether 
you could do certain things. Stanley had to, wanted to get this atmosphere of the period 
onto the screen, with costumes, with lighting, if you look at the paintings you always 
see the tables on the other window, and Dutch paintings, Rembrandt, and also English 
painters. So we found this lens. And Ed Di Giulio adapted the BNC and it worked, it 
was an incredible pain in the neck to use it, totally useless now, nobody would use it 
because if you do this [moves], you’re out of focus.  
 
JF: So did that have an effect on the framing?  
 
JH: Sure. But on the other hand it looked good. 
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JF: Did it then become a close collaboration with Ed Di Giulio. Didn’t he do something 
on A Clockwork Orange? 
 
JH: No, that was Joe Dunton. Joe Dunton was our technical guy. And at that time you 
used blimped cameras, you didn’t, I mean you could have had the big studio cameras, 
but Stanley didn’t like that. And if you wanted real sound you had to blimp it. Ed Di 
Giulio only came in for Barry Lyndon. And then of course the Steadicam on The 
Shining. We had the inventor, Garrett Brown, we had him operate it. He was the 
operator on The Shining. Eyes Wide Shut we had Steadicam as well, but everyone had 
this by now. 
 
JF: So obviously, Kubrick was an artist that would push the boundaries of cinema, but 
with, but did he ever have kind of, like a practical sense of ‘this is not practical I need to 
restrain myself’, rein in his ideas? I’ve thought it, therefore I’ll film it. 
 
JH: Oh no, he was not unreasonable. He was pushy enough and he knew it, but he made 
compromises. Absolutely comprise when stuff got too expensive, he dropped it. Like 
the other way around, he used the Schubert trio as music, it was out of time. He knew 
that, it was thirty years too late, he should have used Haydn or Mozart, but he said that 
this is perfect music, emotionally perfect music, I just adore it. He adored the Schubert 
trio, so he used it and never mind, who cares. The composition was public domain, cost 
nothing. We recorded it ourselves in a church so that we didn’t waste money if we 
didn’t have too. What was expensive was the long, complicated stuff with these bloody 
candles.  
 
JF: With The Shining who is The Producers Circle? 
 
JH: They had rights to the book. We don’t know these people. They had rights to the 
book and they sold it to Warner Bros. with the condition they get credited. We don’t 
know who they are, I’ve no idea. We don’t know the company, where they are, don’t 
know the people. We had this also in A Clockwork Orange. There is, I think it’s 
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Litvinoff. They are people who are dealers, developers, they own the book, at the time, 
or an option in it. And so Warner Bros. got it and Warner Bros. bought it, and Anthony 
Burgess was very cross at first, because I think he got $25,000 for the book, while Raab 
and Litvinoff got $200,000 for the book. And he felt a bit sad about this. Well, he didn’t 
have to sell it, nothing to do with Kubrick. For Kubrick, the book was simply provided 
by Warner Bros. and as part of the budget of the film of course. And WB had the rights 
now and only bought the rights because Stanley said I’m going to do it, otherwise they 
wouldn’t have bothered.  
 
JF: So, with Warner Bros Kubrick has this relationship from 1970. 
 
JH: Yes, from Traumnovelle, that’s the first.  
 
JF: Through to Eyes Wide Shut. A long time. 
 
JH: Yes, didn’t go with anybody else. 
 
JF: That relationship, then, it was quite obvious that it was a perfect relationship. 
 
JH: Yes, perfect. 
 
JF: But what was it then, what did they view Kubrick as in a business sense? Was it 
initially thought? 
 
JH: Look, A Clockwork Orange made a fortune, it cost peanuts to make. It was, I think, 
$2 million, so they made a fortune, but in addition to that they had a man who had great 
prestige from films he made for other people. Dr. Strangelove, 2001, Lolita, I mean, 
Warner Bros. had great benefits, not financially, but from the prestige of having this 
man on their books. And they didn’t want to lose him, ever again. So, now he did Barry 
Lyndon, which was not a financial success. Well, so, let’s hope for the next one. Then 
came The Shining, financially dubious, but it’s ok, it was a big hit, and it’s now an 
absolute classic. 
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JF: It’s considered one of the greatest horror films ever made. 
 
JH: I think it gets more credit than it deserves. And then Full Metal Jacket again was a 
big financial hit. Cost very little money. Was shot in East London. But again, talking 
about compromise, they’re all too old, Stanley knew that. The marine recruits should be 
nineteen or twenty. We tried, we had 2000 casting in tapes, and it was just pathetic. We 
gave up, and went up to twenty-six and twenty-seven, but good actors. And somehow 
the audience, nobody complained even though it was totally incorrect casting. Because 
it doesn’t matter. Because it wasn’t about that. Full Metal Jacket is the abuse of young 
men. And then, of course, Eyes Wide Shut.  
 
JF: Would you describe Kubrick as a collaborator? Because with 2001, how he 
facilitated an environment to allow other people to experiment as well. 
 
JH: Sure. Particularly with the actors. Once the main take was in the can, lets see what 
else we can do. That’s why he did many takes. Film is cheap in comparison to the 
overall budget. In Eyes Wide Shut, there were just seven people there: Tom and Nicole, 
a minimum crew, let’s have fun. He hated it when there were so many people there. I 
remember a line of his: if you have more than forty people to wash up after lunch, you 
are making a mistake.  
 
[Laughter] 
 
JF: So obviously between films, Kubrick developed many projects. For instance, in the 
Archive there is Thomas Pynchon’s The Crying Lot of 49. 
 
JH: There are many projects. He prepared actively A.I. as you know, Napoleon, the 
Holocaust film as you know, Eric Brighteyes – that is Sir Rydl Hagaard. It was a very 
famous book by him. We gave up. I remember I shortened the novel by taking the 
whole Italian thing and inventing stuff. But it would have meant going on location to 
very cold areas if north Scotland wasn’t good enough. So probably would have been 
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Iceland or Northern Finland and he didn’t really fancy the idea. But it’s a saga, beautiful 
book in the year 1000. Tremendous opera, huge development, fantastic story, but he just 
didn’t like to travel. Travelling was a big, big problem for him. He hated it.  
 
JF: Empyrean Films, that was a company that Kubrick formed and supervised by Tony 
Frewin? 
 
JH: Yes, sure, book readers.  
 
JF: So he was just constantly searching for the next project? 
 
JH: All the topics I told you, he wanted to do. I mean, at one point I think he was 
dreaming of doing maybe a musical even. This is not all really realistic. Realistic was 
Napoleon, and the Holocaust film, A.I., which he gave to Steven, and Eric Brighteyes 
for a short time, absolutely. And what else? He hired the costume designer and the set 
dresser from Heimat for Aryan Papers. He loved Heimat, totally taken by that.  
 
JF: Did Kubrick have to pitch an idea to Warner Bros? 
 
JH: He’d say to them, look I’m going to film this, are you interested. And they’d say 
yes, always. Sure, you want to make this film, fine. Ok, I mean, let us see what it is, 
what’s the budget, who is going to be in it. Of course they’re not saying do whatever 
you want, no way, but once they made a deal with him, they would never interfere. 
There was no point. I mean, what are you going to do? You hire a great painter, you 
don’t tell them what colours to use.  
 
JF: Thank you very much for your time today, Jan. 
 
JH: Thank you.
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Appendix III: Statement of Profit and Loss, Minotaur 
Productions Inc. (Killer’s Kiss), 24 August 1953 – 30 July 1960  
 
 
Income from sale of Killer’s Kiss to United Artists $75,000 
Less cost of production $89,188.64 
Gross loss on sale $14,188.64 
    
Less other expenses for period:  
 Commission of Sale of Picture $3,000 
 Office rent $150 
 Interest and bank charges $567 
 Stationary and postage $16.09 
 Christmas expense $55 
 Misc $21.81 
 Telephone/graph $33.77 
 Professional fees $500 
 Officer’s salary (S Kubrick) $700 
 Other taxes N.Y.S Franchise $181.27 
   $5,224.94 
Gross Receipts:   
 Tax $187.50 
 Occupancy Tax at $6.70 $375.47 
 Corporation Organisation Expense $88.14 
   $651.11 
    
Net loss on corporation operation $20,064.69 
    
General Production Costs  
 Negative insurance $444.20 
 Liability insurance $401.76 
 Payroll taxes $615.24 
 Union fees $222.50 
 Film storage $272.70 
 MPAA Seal costs $700 
 Other (settlement with union) $5,000 
 Still processing $896.57 
   $8,552.97 
Other Costs:  
 Legal fees $3,875 
 Accounting fees $1,000 
 Office supplies $102.77 
 Telephone $187.96 
 Secretaries $121.70 
 Office rent $791.31 
 Misc. $386.04 
 Christmas expenses $85.50 
   $6,550.28 
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Talent:  
 Contract and bit players $3,551.45 
 
Extras $430 
 Dubbing $320 
   $4,301.45 
    
Lab Costs:    
 Raw stock  $5,667.35 
 Lab costs  $7,939.60 
 Titles  $414.11 
   $14,021.06 
Recording:    
 Sound effects  $1,846.60 
 Recording and mixing $11,195.25 
   $13,041.85 
Music:    
 Musicians  $3,894.52 
 Arranging and orchestra $600 
 Copyist  $500 
   $4,994.52 
Editing:    
 Editors/Cutters  $1,727.40 
 Projection  $587.98 
 Negative cutting  $2,570.96 
 Equipment rental $1,558.94 
 Cutting room supplies $32.65 
   $6,477.93 
Travel and Transport:   
 Rent of truck  $871.39 
 Taxi, oil, gas, repairs $1,169.83 
 Other fares and delivery $190.27 
   $2,231.49 
    
Subsistence:   $638.50 
   
Studio and Equipment:   
 Studio rental  $904.75 
 Cost/rental of sets $392.88 
 Cost/rental of props and costumes $3,316.75 
 Maintenance and rental of camera $13,527.12 
 Location rental  $2,440 
   $20,581.50 
Personnel:    
 Production manager $1,893.59 
 Cameraman  $2,425.36 
 Electrician/grips  $2,687.47 
 Sound men  $407.52 
 Script clerk  $385.07 
   $7,799.01 
    
Grand Total:   $89,190.56 
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